Paratus Papers - The Distributed Manoeuvre Battle: Preparing Combat Service Support Elements

Abstract

Distributed manoeuvre—multiple small combined arms groups operating independently of each other—will be further explored and developed by the Australian Army over the next two decades. Small groups in the first echelon need to be supported by a second echelon of combat, combat support and combat service support, with a main body ready to rapidly mass and strike as required. This creates a number of challenges for maintenance, supply and health elements tasked with supporting the battlegroup. Logisticians will also have to adapt to a changing Army structure. With the uncertainty of future funding, rollout of future technologies and platforms, the Army should immediately focus on those aspects that will remain constant in 2030. All logistic personnel need to be ‘soldiers first’ so that they may survive long enough to perform their job on the battlefields of tomorrow.

Generally, management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organisation.

- Sun Tzu

Introduction

In 2010, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie as Chief of Army endorsed the Army Objective Force 2030 as the aiming mark for Army’s modernisation and development. The Army Objective Force (AOF) 2030 Handbook describes, among other things, how the future Army needs to be able to fight and one of the four manoeuvre concepts that the AOF 2030 must perform—distributed manoeuvre.

By 2030 it is expected that many of the skills conventional forces currently lack to conduct distributed manoeuvre will be overcome by technological solutions. It is anticipated that technology will be able to enhance the situational awareness of all friendly elements, automate or simplify a number of functions and provide situational awareness across a joint force at the lowest levels.

This paper will firstly explain the concept of distributed manoeuvre and discuss the logistical challenges it imposes. It will also look at the ability of Army’s proposed new force structure to sustain distributed manoeuvre operations and what steps are needed in the near future to ensure the Australian Regular Army is postured to meet the AOF 2030 sustainment requirements. It will focus on the combat supply, maintenance and health aspects of combat service support (CSS).

Distributed Manoeuvre

The basic concept of distributed manoeuvre is to employ large numbers of small, combined arms teams in complex environments to destroy the enemy without presenting a targetable mass. This and similar concepts are currently being explored and developed by Western armies but all are essentially twenty-first century modernisations of the skirmishers used in the eighteenth century and the German ‘Storm Troop’ tactics of the First World War. For distributed manoeuvre to be effectively realised, the Australian Army must develop greater precision in both its use of technology and its human resources. The management of joint fires and very specific elements of manoeuvre, as well as the coordination of small well-trained and cohesive teams that this entails will create ongoing challenges.

Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan explain that distributed manoeuvre relies on multiple, small, combined arms groups operating independently of each other across the battlespace ahead of more traditional groupings of conventional forces. These independent groups continually and simultaneously probe the enemy defensive system with the intent of triggering an enemy response. This response is observed or measured and through the collection of multiple responses, friendly force commanders can determine the enemy’s overall defensive posture.¹

These independent groups continually and simultaneously probe the enemy defensive system with the intent of triggering an enemy response.

With multiple, continual probes the offensive force hopes to overwhelm the enemy and remove their ability to react. Through these actions the attacker can now know how the enemy operates and shape their responses, therefore allowing the attacker to employ the full spectrum of assets at their disposal to defeat the enemy.

For this to occur, the small groups in the first echelon need to be highly capable and have the ability to act decisively within their allocated tasks. They need to rapidly employ many supporting elements, in particular precision fires from naval assets, conventional artillery or aircraft. The strength of these groups in the first echelon lies in their ability to operate below the enemy’s detection threshold, work with and make the best of the micro-terrain and pass through gaps in the enemy’s defence. They are also vulnerable because they lack traditional mutual support mechanisms and because of their inability to sustain combat with enemy forces for any lengthy duration.

These small groups therefore need to be supported by a second echelon of combat, combat support (CS) and some CSS elements that facilitate the rapid reinforcement, replacement, resupply or relocation of the small groups. Behind the first and second echelons a main body of conventional forces is waiting in formations that prevent effective engagement by enemy indirect fires. The main body is postured to rapidly mass and strike as required.

Logistic Challenges in Distributed Manoeuvre

Distributed manoeuvre creates a number of challenges for typical first and second line maintenance, supply and health elements that are tasked with supporting the battlegroup or task force. Key challenges include:

• The distribution of forces. The obvious challenge in distributed manoeuvre for CSS is the dispersal of friendly forces. The distance and therefore travel time between the forward elements and likely CSS locations are increased, which creates potential issues for time-dependent tasks such as casualty evacuations. Therefore a force conducting distributed manoeuvre is likely to require more CSS assets at first line or greater support from aviation assets than a similar force grouped as conventional combat teams.
• Insecure lines of communication. As the small groups advance it is possible that they either do not detect or completely eliminate enemy forces. Enemy elements may even attempt to remain hidden or counterattack through gaps so that they can strike at valuable CS and CSS assets. As a result all CSS assets in this environment need to be protected and capable of at least fighting defensively. Logistic planners need to ensure there is a redundancy of CSS assets and that they are also dispersed. Aviation assets can again be of benefit in sustaining distributed manoeuvre as they are less susceptible to insecure routes or enemy interdiction behind friendly lines.
• Maintaining a continuous battle. Distributed manoeuvre also requires the attacker to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy so as to overwhelm the defender’s ability to respond. This tempo also has the potential to overwhelm the attacker’s own logistic system. Traditional rest and refit or operational pauses will probably not be available to make good supply shortages or conduct maintenance in a distributed manoeuvre battle. Maintaining an appropriate and flexible logistic reserve will help mitigate against this risk.

An Uncertain Future

In addition to preparing for distributed manoeuvre operations, logisticians will shortly have to adapt to a changing Army. The AOF 2030 handbook states that by 2030 the Army will have moved to three alike brigades.

Each brigade or task force will be made up of three battlegroups, two are dismounted and consist of three infantry companies and the third is an armoured cavalry regiment consisting of one tank squadron and three intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance squadrons that are each capable of lifting a dismounted combat team. Additionally, all battlegroups will have integral support elements and an attached engineer squadron. The task force will also include a combat service support battalion, artillery regiment and aviation battlegroup.

... all combat service support assets in this environment need to be protected and capable of at least fighting defensively.

For the dismounted battlegroups the integral CSS elements will potentially become smaller as most infantry battalions will lose the majority of their tracked or wheeled mobility assets to the new armoured cavalry regiments. However, to sustain four armoured vehicle squadrons this regiment will require significant maintenance, supply and transport assets.

Also unknown is how the introduction of new equipment fleets under projects Land 121 and Land 400 will affect the ability of logisticians to conduct their core business. Land 121 was commenced well before the AOF 2030 concept so there is a possibility that the products of Land 121 will not align with requirements of AOF 2030.

As previously mentioned, the provision of logistic support in distributed manoeuvre can be greatly assisted through the use of aviation assets. Unfortunately Australia’s future aviation capability is entrusted to the armed reconnaissance helicopter and multi-role helicopter. Both are behind schedule and have had numerous difficulties during their introduction into service. Furthermore, both assets do not share commonality with our likely future coalition partners, an underlying requirement of AOF 2030.²

Further doubt is created by the current global financial situation that has seen numerous defence programs cut or scaled back. It is highly likely that the numbers of protected logistic delivered through either Land 121 or Land 400 could be reduced in order to generate a saving.

On a positive note we can expect the future to bring technological aids that will greatly assist the logistician. A networked Army will have the ability not only to share battlefield intelligence but also logistic data. This allows the demand for stores to be more accurately predicted therefore reducing waste. New types of sensors will give maintainers and health services remote diagnostic tools. New equipment should also be more modular, allowing it to be tailored to specific roles or threats, and built-in test equipment will allow it to be repaired or replaced more efficiently.

Considerations and Preparing for the Future

What is known is that the manner in which logistics is provided at first and second line on operations has changed significantly in the last ten years and will continue to change in the next twenty years. Our doctrine and training needs to acknowledge these changes and teach techniques and procedures that will enable logistic elements to survive on the future battlefield.

The contemporary battlefield has already proven that logistic elements will be expected to provide their own protection and must be able to employ the full range of support effects that combat forces do. They also need to operate with the same situational awareness that combat arms have in order to improve their own safety and reduce the risk of fratricide. This capability and situational awareness is not present in Army with our current equipment and skill levels.

The concept of combat logistic patrols has developed from Coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These shortfalls in CSS have already been acknowledged and partially addressed through the development of combat logistic patrols (CLP) on operations. The concept of CLP has developed from Coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has not yet been fully integrated into Australian logistic training. CLP rely on the logistic personnel having the skills and equipment to provide sufficient protection and situational awareness to logistic forces.

Furthermore, the current B Vehicle fleet has only limited access to communications equipment, even in armoured corps units. Most vehicles operate without a radio and the operators themselves have only limited knowledge or understanding of communication equipment. Communication equipment and battlefield management systems need to be installed in greater numbers in logistic vehicles. Training in these systems should also be included in all basic logistic training.

In distributed manoeuvre operations, multiple, small CLP will be the norm and not the exception. These patrols, like the small combined arms teams will rely heavily on the skills and professionalism of their junior leaders. This is why training in tactics, the employment of offensive support and battlefield communications are so important for logistic personnel, especially those employed in first and second line CSS elements.

Another concern is the current adaptability and structure of A1 echelon assets. These assets will be primarily responsible for the provision of integral CSS to the dispersed, forward elements in a distributed manoeuvre operation. Supporting dispersed elements could potentially be achieved by designing A1 echelon elements for troop- and platoon-sized organisations rather than traditional company- or squadron-sized organisations. Alternatively the company or squadron A1s must be made modular so that they can be detached in ‘capability bricks’ that provide a platoon or troop with the essential integral support they need when dispersed from their company or squadron headquarters. At present there are insufficient personnel or assets within armoured or mechanised units to form these modular A1s. Therefore any current distribution of forces below company or squadron strength relies heavily on A2 echelon and second line assets pushing forward.

... company or squadron A1s must be made modular so that they can be detached in ‘capability bricks’ ...

In the future, the traditional practice of a task force or battlegroup’s CSS elements massing for mutual support and efficiency will also need to be considered against the enemy’s detection and offensive support capabilities. Any CSS organisation that establishes itself forward to support small groups needs to similarly remain small, highly mobile and employ stealth to avoid detection.

The dispersion of CSS assets will become a critical component of future operational planning. In distributed manoeuvre, logistics is unlikely to ‘just happen’. Detailed consideration must be given to what health assets can deploy forward in order to meet the ‘golden hour’ for casualties and what resupply procedures will be allowed so that constant pressure on the enemy is maintained. With multiple small groups engaging the enemy and potentially insecure lines of communication the evacuation, resupply and recovery teams will need to be closely monitored and controllable at a battlegroup level if required.

Conclusions

The Army’s logistic corps are already in the process of adjusting to meet the AOF 2030 guidance. With the uncertainty of future funding, rollout of future technologies and platforms the Army should immediately focus on those aspects that will remain constant in 2030. Specifically the Army should focus on:

• the ability of logistic elements to communicate, understand and interact with the deployed forces; and
• the training and knowledge provided to the individual logistic soldiers and junior leaders.

Developing knowledge and skills across a wide range of areas will enable individuals to make the most of whatever equipment is provided between now and 2030. Better education for our soldiers also means they will require less emphasis on technological enhancements to complete their assigned duties and remain competitive against future opponents. We need to ensure that all logistic personnel are in fact ‘soldiers first’ so that they may survive long enough to perform their job on the battlefields of tomorrow.

What size force can be sustained during future distributed manoeuvre operations will depend on our future CSS structures and organisations under AOF 2030, and how successful our future acquisitions and logistic training reforms are.

About the Author

Captain Geoff Orton is a Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers officer currently posted to the 1st Armoured Regiment as the OC Technical Support Troop. His previous postings include 7th Combat Service Support Battalion, 8/12th Medium Regiment and Headquarters 16th Aviation Brigade. Prior to his posting to the 1st Armoured Regiment he deployed as a member of Joint Task Force 633-A where he served in Kabul and Tarin Kowt. He holds a Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical) and Bachelor of Business (Logistics and Operations Management).

Endnotes

1    Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2009, p. 32.

2    N Pittaway, ‘Beyond Black Hawk – Air Mobility Operations with MRH90’, Defence Today, September 2011.