Paratus Papers - Amphibian Deployment and Sustainment: Further Investments Essential to Realise the Dream
Abstract
Successive Defence White Papers have emphasised the need for an effective amphibian deployment and sustainment system involving Army, Navy and Air Force assets to project force across Australia’s primary operating environment. Australia is purchasing two ships capable of carrying significant amounts of equipment, but further investments of both money and professional resources will be essential to develop an effective force package capable of the full suite of amphibious tasks. Lessons can be learned from the US Marine Corps and the UK Royal Marines. A layer of complexity is added by Australia’s geographically diverse primary operating environment. This article aims to encourage further professional discussion and makes a number of recommendations toward turning the ‘dream’ of a full range of amphibious capabilities into a reality.
Government has recognised that the ADF must have both situational awareness and the ability to operate with decisive effect across the POE. This has therefore led Government to determine that the ADF must be expeditionary in orientation at the operational level, and must have the requisite force projection capabilities to enable the achievement of this orientation.
- Australia’s Amphibious Concept1
Introduction
Joint and combined arms is how we do business—it has to be. The Defence capability plan, Joint Project 2048 (JP 2048), reflects this. The Defence White Paper 2009 articulates Government’s intent for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to build, maintain and sustain an Amphibious Task Force (ATF)2. The need for this has been recognised by consecutive governments since Defence White Paper 2000.
The ATF is to consist of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of Battlegroup strength and an Amphibious Ready Element (ARE) of Combat Team strength capable of force projection within our primary operating environment (POE)3 to either defend against an incursion on Australian territory or lead coalition operations against hostile actors within our immediate vicinity. Acknowledging there are significant issues that remain outstanding with respect to this capability, this paper will focus on the following three key points: it will provide context to the combined arms team as a critical capability of JP 2048, evaluate a number of requirements to make this concept a reality and recommend key future actions.
Combined Arms Team
The Australian Army’s capstone land warfare doctrine, LWD-1, Land Warfare Doctrine, defines combined arms as a ‘case-by-case mix of combat, combat support, combat service support and command support elements selected on the basis of a specific combination of task, terrain and threat’.4 This remains important to the Joint Team, the purpose is to present an adversary with a dilemma and enable the Joint Force Commander to fight more than one way. This philosophy must be central to the development of our own ATF and drives the C2, interoperability and doctrine based recommendations of this paper.
Context
In discussion of the amphibious deployment and sustainment system (ADAS), heavy weighting is given to the Landing Service Dock (LSD) and the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) as the key acquisitions under JP 2048. However it is now widely recognised that ADAS, in its current proposed form, would be incapable of operational manoeuvre from the sea (OMFTS) in the littoral environment. It would be unable to dominate the environment that lines the coast of both Australia and our neighbours (the POE).5 Even when in receipt of appropriate air support, the proposed landing craft would offer limited flexibility to a commander tasked with anything other than limited ship-to-shore manoeuvre.6
In its current proposed form, it is hoped that ADAS will deliver a combined arms team (up to battlegroup in strength) from ship-to-shore to an uncontested beachhead in a non-permissive environment attempting ship-to-objective manoeuvre (STOM) within the POE. Realising this there is opportunity for other defence projects to make significant purchases within the bounds of JP2048, an example of this is the acquisition of an armoured breaching capability and increased interoperability with the United States Marine Corps (USMC).
Over the past ten years Government direction for ADAS has become increasingly narrow, so narrow that we risk not building an effective force element that will achieve operational and strategic objectives, but find ourselves focused solely on constraints driven by the budget. It appears the ADF is deviating from its goal of developing a force package capable of achieving the requirements laid out in consecutive white papers that would be comparable to that employed by both the USMC and British Royal Marines (UK RM). It would appear that this is in order to meet Government’s reduced spending objectives.
Government direction (...) has become (...) so narrow that we risk not building an effective force element that will achieve operational and strategic objectives
If Government wants a true amphibious capability that reflects that of Australia’s peers, it will have to commit and invest appropriate funds.
Amphibious Ready Group
For the purpose of this paper I will broadly discuss the landing force currently proposed by Defence White Paper 2009 and the JP 2048 concept document within the bounds established under the Adaptive Campaigning — Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC).7
Australia’s Amphibious Concept has determined that the ARG is to be capable of the full suite of amphibious tasks. The ARG is based on both of the LHDs and the LSD currently in the acquisition phase. The manoeuvre component is a medium-weight battlegroup of approximately 2200 personnel with associated stores and equipment. The battlegroup is likely to be comprised of infantry, armour (including tanks), artillery, engineers, armed reconnaissance helicopters, lift and mobility helicopters, and other combat support enablers.8 The ARG naval platforms will, at the time of writing, need to be augmented by civilian contractors for combat services support—another example of under investment. The force package built on these naval assets, battlegroup and air force assets would form our own Amphibious Task Force.9
The ATF will be expected to operate throughout the POE, facing threats of varying intensities and sophistication in circumstances ranging from permissive to hostile. Threats to ADF expeditionary forces include anti-ship missiles, long-range artillery, fighter-ground attack aircraft, man-portable air defence, fast attack craft, submarines and mines. As a result, investment in and access to over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, becomes even more important and is a vital component to ensure the success of the ATF.10
Furthermore, the archipelagic nature of our region adds a layer of complexity to sea-based manoeuvre. While an amphibious capability that is configured to operate from afloat offers increased flexibility in its ability to concurrently influence affairs ashore across multiple islands without necessarily a commitment to land operations, the use of coastal, riverine and reef enclosed waters for resupply and tactical manoeuvre by an adversary must be countered by an equally agile maritime force. The ADF’s POE is geographically diverse and complex. It is dominated by ocean with numerous landmasses separated by narrow maritime passages. Its littoral nature is characterised by the archipelagic, riverine and estuarine terrain, subject to large tidal variations and severe weather.11
This means that the naval component of our ATF must be more diverse than just a floating staging base if we are to set up the ARG for success—it should have the capacity to take advantage of the terrain within the POE and landing craft must have the flexibility to manoeuvre and deliver the ARG over an increased range and in a wider variety of sea-based environments as described above.12 To achieve this we must invest in this capability. Currently there is a significant gap between expectation and reality. If we were to invest, the potential to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict within the POE certainly exists, but to achieve this we must learn from our peers, as such this paper will recommend increased interoperability and exchanges with the USMC.
... the naval component of our ATF must be more diverse than just a floating staging base ...
Comparison
If we are to follow the tried and tested USMC model, our battlegroup afloat would look something like a Marine battalion landing team. The battlegroup would be comprised of infantry (mechanised with the ability to deploy with or without their vehicles), armour (based on a tank troop group), artillery, engineers (with mechanical breaching), armed reconnaissance helicopters, lift and mobility helicopters, and other vehicles.
This battlegroup will have many constraints placed upon it. It will still be expected to conduct STOM, possibly on multiple and concurrent lines of operation. Growing and training such an organisation will be best based on the experience of our peers and will be best achieved by investment in a ‘plug and play’ component of the USMC model.
Sustaining the mechanised force that must constitute the ARG if it is to be capable of operating in a hostile environment is a massive burden that must not be under-appreciated. From a manoeuvre battle operating system perspective alone the ATF would require us to learn from lessons of the past fifteen years in the maintenance of Army’s armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) fleet. It would require investment in operational pools of repair parts scale, investment in the recruitment, training and retaining of maintainers for our AFV fleet that would allow our equipment to be sustained appropriately in respect to our goals.
At a glance, logistics to the ARG is relatively straightforward, with ‘sea basing’ being the default response. This method would be unlikely survive first contact in anything other than a permissive environment. Future planning for ADAS will need to address the massive investment required in second and third line logistics in both combat support and combat service support elements to allow the ARG to have a chance at operating past its operational viability period.
It is also an essential requirement for our ADAS system to have a ‘plug and play’ function or to be able to achieve complete interoperability with our USMC and UK RM brethren. While both these organisations are recognised as leaders in amphibious warfare, it is important we base our expectations, and those of our senior leadership and government, on the realities of what we are prepared to invest.
Recommendations
Command and Control
The development, training and sustainment of the ATF requires a large investment, both professionally and financially. As a result, the ARG responsibility should reside with a specialist battlegroup headquarters and not be rotated between units—the specialist nature of these operations would be seriously degraded by the generalist approach of rotating control. The specialist battlegroup headquarters will require a habitual relationship with the key elements of the combined arms team discussed within this paper.
Interoperability
Should Government invest in a true near peer capability for ADAS, this would need to be reflected in the equipment purchased. Further appreciation must be conducted of the sea-based terrain within the POE, and the type of landing craft purchased must reflect this. Cross training between a broad range of ADF specialists and generalists should continue with increased emphasis.
Doctrine
Australia’s Amphibious Concept correctly identifies that we should not reinvent the wheel as we have done in the past. In order to instil experience and learn from past experience the development phase of ADAS should be exchange-heavy, with a focus on brick-size exchanges, not just individual exchanges; for example a tank troop.
... the development phase of the amphibious deployment and sustainment system should be exchange-heavy, with a focus on brick-size exchanges, not just individual exchanges ...
Opportunity
The emphasis on an increasing working relationship with the USMC should provide leverage for other acquisitions within Army; for example the acquisition of an armoured breaching capability and the purchase of additional M1A1 and M88 in support of Plan BEERSHEBA.
Exchanges
Continue the Expeditionary Warfare School Development Program with increased panel size (all ARA brigades should contribute in order to develop understanding); exchange with 31 Marine Expeditionary Unit for staff training and familiarisation of combat team and troop size force element; the Combat Training Centre should develop an amphibious training cell in preparation to shape our training in parallel to that of the USMC elements we would operate with; and augment marine expeditionary unit with ready battlegroup and LHD assets in years to come.
Conclusion
While the two LHDs procured through JP 2048 will represent a significant increase to the ADF’s current amphibious warfare capability, they do not have the capacity to deploy a medium-weight combined arms battlegroup and, more specifically, they do not have the capacity to hold the required numbers of vehicles and quantities of explosive ordnance. They will only be capable of limited manoeuvre.
The ADF and Government need to understand that while a professional force will learn how to conduct the full range of amphibious operations, STOM and OMFTS is beyond us, given the current personnel and equipment constraints. To man the amphibious task group and make this dream a reality, significant further financial investment from Government and professional investment from the ADF will be needed.
There are some good immediate observations that reinforce why the combined arms team needs to be fundamental to JP 2048 rather than an optional extra or afterthought. Not surprisingly, embarking tanks (or Land 400) requires a significant investment (logistics, vehicle preparation, equipment and simulation), and sustaining them and the people takes experience. The resulting capability is, however, very much worth it.
About the Author
Captain Anthony Bamford, Royal Australian Armoured Corps, commissioned from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in December 2006. He has served with the 1st Armoured Regiment as a Troop Leader, Squadron Second in Command and most recently as Adjutant. Captain Bamford has represented the Australian Defence Force on exchange with the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment (UK, 2008) and has deployed on Operation SLIPPER as a PMV Troop Leader (2009). He is currently a Staff Officer in the Operations Cell within Headquarters 6th Brigade.
Endnotes
1 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, Version 5.2, Department of Defence, Canberra, March 2010, p. 4.
2 Defence White Paper 2009 — Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 73.
3 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, p. 14.
4 Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2008, p. 92.
5 Dean Clark, ‘Australia’s Amphibious Ambition’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, Autumn 2011, p. 7.
6 Ibid., p. 5.
7 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning — Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009.
8 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, p. 14.
9 Ibid., p. 13.
10 Ibid., p. 5.
11 Ibid., p. 12.
12 Clark, ‘Australia’s Amphibious Ambition’, p. 7.
