Improving Training Yield - In-Unit Collective Training to Win the Land Battle
Abstract
Field training time in the Australian Army is a precious commodity. It is also unlikely to increase in the near future. Fighting echelon units must examine ways of improving their training yield if they are to improve their combat effectiveness. This paper examines three ways that fighting echelon units can improve their training yield. First, by using regimental training to turn their junior leaders into better collective trainers. Second, by using early evaluation of whole-task training to improve training efficiency. Third, by increasing the objectivity of training evaluation. Cognisant of the resource constraints facing units today, the paper aims to offer pragmatic options that do not simply demand doing more with less. Where options requiring greater effort are detailed, the costs are made clear, but so are the benefits.
Introduction - Identifying the Need for Change
Regardless of the particular fighting echelon, branch or corps one works in, troop leading is a complex cognitive function.1 In the Australian Army the regimental system relies on each commander training the echelon immediately subordinate to him or her to shape, adapt and win the land battle.2 It is generally useful for that commander to do so in the most familiar setting; for example, tank troop leaders generally train tank crews within a troop setting. The requirement to train this subordinate echelon is also partly why the professional organisations in armies have evolved the commissioned and non-commissioned structural relationships that they have.
Most of the Army’s fighting echelon units train in similar ways. They establish a training continuum, including a mix of part-task and whole-task training3 that more or less follows a ‘crawl–walk–run’ methodology, and apply that methodology to both the echelon that the training focuses on and the difficulty of the training being conducted. Unfortunately, for a number of concrete reasons (mostly to do with resource consumption and available time) the balance between part- and whole-task training is unquestionably in favour of the completion of part-task training.4 This will most likely remain the case, so improving combat effectiveness by training more cannot be the answer. Fighting echelon units must examine ways of achieving higher quality training in order to ensure levels of professional mastery that will weight combat outcomes in blue favour rather than in red.
This paper examines three ways that units can improve their training yield. First, units should focus on making better trainers by providing their junior leaders with collective training skills that are not delivered by current individual training continuums. Second, units can use their training time more efficiently by using evaluation to identify where training effort is required and where it is not. Finally, units can improve the effectiveness of their training by increasing the objectiveness of proficiency reviews.
Terminology: ‘Whole-task training’ and ‘whole-of-task practice’ are training situations that are as close to operations as possible—orders are issued, a detailed background situation is developed and a live enemy opposes blue force actions. Whole-task training must occur in the field. In peacetime training, the fear and danger associated with executing operations against an enemy cannot be replicated; the decrease in effectiveness of force exposed to these elements over time is also not replicated. Whole-task training is useful in increasing the practical experience of those undertaking it. It improves the intuitive decision-making cycles of commanders through iterative learning, aids in developing an understanding of where friction is likely to hinder the successful execution of missions, and is a very effective means of identifying weak proficiency in constituent skills. Constituent or part-task training and practice incorporate the myriad subordinate skills that are used during tank troop operations. This includes weapons handling and preventative maintenance checks and services through to higher order practices like Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS) and Steel Beasts simulation.
There are significant benefits in increasing the ratio of whole-task training to part-task training. Unfortunately it is unlikely that there will be an increase in the available field training time for tank troops and so the ratio is unlikely to change in the near future.5 As a result, regiments must improve their conduct of training and examine the priorities allocated to training the myriad constituent tasks at the troop level to create an improved yield.
Making Better Trainers
There is no more important influence on the training of a unit than its commander.6 Training is the single most important factor affecting morale7, and in turn morale is the most important single factor in determining fighting effectiveness8. If the conduct of collective training is fundamental to fighting effectiveness, why are the skills not given to Army’s junior leaders?
If the conduct of collective training is fundamental to fighting effectiveness, why are the skills not given to Army’s junior leaders?
Units should focus initial internal regimental training (distinct from collective training continuums) on turning their junior leaders into collective trainers. They should do this by improving the experience of their junior leaders through the conduct of historical battle studies. They must provide their junior leaders with coaching and mentoring skills. Junior leaders must be trained in collective training design and execution. Finally, units should use a regimental training program to develop a habit of critical self-review amongst its junior leaders.
Improving the quality of training in units by making better trainers will have an initial cost. Early in the training cycle junior leaders should undertake a regimental training program focused on common development training. This training is as important as the ADF mandatory training that occurs at the start of any given calendar year, and will certainly have a far greater effect on improving warfighting capability.
Training rather than instructing: There is an important difference between individual training instructors and collective training trainers. Army has a tradition where non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are trained to become extremely good individual training instructors. It also has a strong system for developing their instructional experience by posting them away from their fighting echelon units after their junior NCO (JNCO) command appointments to complete corps-specific or all-corps instructional appointments. As a result they have significant strength in some of the part-task training necessary to generate exceptional fighting sections and crews. This system does not necessarily make them good collective trainers.
The All Corps Officer Training Continuum (ACOTC) includes periods of instruction on collective training design in every course leading to sub-unit command. It does not include instruction on the execution of that training, but relies instead on commanders mimicking the commanders they have been trained by—this can create a destructive feedback loop. It is understandable that completing the ACOTC does not make great trainers as the focus in the process should remain on tactical proficiency and fundamental operations staff officer skills so that every soldier can be an expert in close combat. Moreover it is impossible to identify the elements of training in the various training management practices of the ACOTC that could be removed to increase the number of periods of instruction focused on development of these officers as trainers.
Accepting that training institutions do not have the resources—time, training aids, correctly experienced instructors—to develop the collective training skills needed by junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers, the training burden falls elsewhere. This is where fighting echelon units come in. Fighting echelon units have the greatest vested interest in making better collective training trainers. Fighting echelon units should focus regimental training on providing junior leaders with collective training skills.
Fighting echelon units have the greatest vested interest in making better collective training trainers.
Studying historical battles: The most important result of studying history is that students learn what they need to think about.9 One part of regimental training that should be employed to improve collective training trainer-skills is the use of historical studies that emphasize the successful use of defeat mechanisms (disruption and dislocation) and the control of friction. By improving the base knowledge of their junior leaders, units can ensure that when they design and execute training it is more likely to successfully develop the collective skills necessary to make use of defeat mechanisms as well as control the effects of friction. It is clear that units could employ the study of campaigns and battle of which they have been a significant part in order to improve their own esprit de corps but it is not necessary. The key is that the focus of the battle studies must be to improve training design skills of the junior leaders of the unit. Ideally those design skills should enable junior leaders to design training that will focus on using disruption and dislocation to defeat an enemy as well as identifying the points in any mission where friction is likely to be high and to employ control measures to mitigate that friction.
Understanding how the combat team is likely to fight: Most arms corps lieutenants graduate their respective Regimental Officers Basic Courses with a working knowledge of the tactical actions (formations, methods of movement and some of the battle drills) their first command may undertake to achieve any given mission. Unfortunately the corps schools are simply unable, given resource restrictions, to provide training in a combat-team setting fighting an enemy that is capable of forcing decision upon them. Given the schools are not equipped to do so, fighting echelon units must establish a common base of understanding of how combat teams are likely to fight. Ideally the formation should coordinate how units do this so as to better enable rapid regrouping within the formation during combat. There are a number of ways of doing this within a regimental training system—the most efficient is to demonstrate the tasks a combat team may be employed in by using simulation. A unit’s simulation officer could reasonably easily construct instructive simulation videos that detail how a combat team is likely to achieve key tactical actions. For example using Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2) a simulation video could be constructed that demonstrates how a combat team achieves break-in to a defended urban environment. The video could clearly demonstrate how each of the Battlespace Operating Systems are employed to achieve the requisite combat functions and how it sets the conditions for follow-on actions once break-in is achieved. A series of these videos could form the basis for a regimental or formation training program that establishes a common understanding amongst its junior leaders of how the formation’s combat teams are likely to fight. The 1st Brigade Concept of Operations10 and the Multi-role brigade—close combat narrative11 are two resources that may enlighten the discussion.
... fighting echelon units must establish a common base of understanding of how combat teams are likely to fight.
Coaching and mentoring skills: As previously discussed, the Army already produces good instructors. What is needed in developing the capacity to lead training for complex cognitive functions like combat command are coaches and mentors.12 The Army is not as accomplished in producing coaches and mentors as it is instructors. Fortunately there are other organisations that can help fighting units in developing these skills. Importantly our junior leaders must be given some techniques for identifying when training is ineffective and selecting a different approach to train the same skill. The Combat Training Centre (CTC) has been training observer/trainers (OTs) for more than ten years and has a very useful package for developing the necessary skills to improve collective training. Units could approach the CTC to gain use of its training package to deliver elements of it to aid in junior leaders’ development as trainers. Fighting echelon units could also qualify key trainers as high-order coaches within the National Coaching Accreditation Scheme. While the athletic sports-specific skills are not applicable to training for troop operations, the generic skills modules are definitely transferrable13.
Developing design skills: Before the junior officers and NCOs are sent to train their troops they must have an understanding of training design. Unfortunately there is a dearth of useful Army doctrine on designing, developing and executing training for developing capability at the troop level. The current collective training doctrine is useful in helping unit and sub-unit commanders use their experience to develop and execute training programs; it is less useful in aiding the development of training programs for troop training. The US Army provides a more useful aid to training for junior leaders with its Battle Focused Training Field Manual 7-1 and the frequently-used guide to that manual—The Leader’s Smart Book.14 This guide is the most useful reference for training design, development, execution and review available for unit, sub-unit and troop-level training available. It should be a compulsory document for all junior leaders within fighting echelon units. The strength of the guide over Australian or US doctrine is its succinct aide-memoire style. Most importantly it is the best tool for understanding training theory and the transition of that theory to praxis.
The Leaders Smart Book ... should be a compulsory document for all junior leaders within fighting echelon units.
Developing the training program for troops or platoons must be nested through sub-unit to unit level. The best method of doing this is by conducting a workshop (reminiscent of previously conducted quarterly training briefs) with unit key leaders down to troop level. During the workshop the commanding officer (CO) should articulate the training goals of the unit based on his own analysis. The operations officer (S3) should articulate the training time available and which echelon the training time is allocated to. Once this is done the CO should also articulate when each echelon is required to achieve each directed Army Training Level (ATL) and to what standard and under what conditions these levels will be achieved. The command group should then develop a (or ideally refine an already-developed) list of the assessments or tasks, conditions and standards associated with each Army Training Level/Standard (ATL/S). Once this is done, sub-unit commanders should then detail the tasks and skills they will train and those that will be trained by subordinate commanders. Armed with this list the unit’s junior leaders should then develop the training programs for their echelon. Their programs should be checked by their OC, but back briefed by the troop/platoon leader to the CO. This action should be undertaken quarterly in order to review previous performance (more on this later) and to account for any changes in the higher echelon. By doing this task in person the CO and OCs can be certain that their subordinate commanders understand their role in the training regime. There is also a degree of certainty of unity of effort, making this a more powerful method than relying on the commander’s written training guidance. It is absolutely understood that the time demands on the CO are already extreme. This essay contends that because the CO is the most important individual in the training culture of a unit, time spent personally ensuring that junior leaders understand his training intent is vitally important in improving combat effectiveness. For the cost of four days in any given calendar year unit training is likely to be far better nested and far more effective.
Critical self-review: Army’s second principle of leadership behaviour is to ‘know yourself and seek self-improvement’.15 One of the most challenging parts of training an organisation is conducting objective reviews. It is very difficult for those closely responsible for designing and executing the training to see fault in the work they have been involved in. By using objective measurement tools that use techniques where predetermined conditions and standards are set for constituent skills or for the execution of whole tasks it is less likely that faults will be overlooked during review. After action reviews (AARs) remain the most effective means of identifying flaws in an organisation’s performance and thereby identifying means to rectify them. Therefore, early in the training cycle leaders should be trained in how to complete AARs. To ensure that subordinates have established a habit of completing AARs their commanders can require them to raise post-activity reports or the commander can attend the subordinate echelon review in person. A mix of these two tools is appropriate. Finally, if units establish a habit of critical organisational review it is reasonable to assume that the same habit will result in leaders habitually reviewing their own performance without the need for a formal setting.
By making better trainers fighting echelon units will be prepared to commence training to adapt, shape and win the land battle with more effective trainers who have an intimate understanding of their commander’s training intent, knowledge of how their echelon will fight as part of the larger organisation, an increased understanding of the likely points of friction within their future missions and how they may target an enemy’s weakness. However, more effective trainers are not the only means of improving training yield—units must also improve training efficiency by being selective about how much time they allocate to training specific constituent skills.
Focusing the Efforts of New Trainers
Being Selective: As suggested earlier, most fighting echelon units train in similar ways. Furthermore most fighting echelon units train in ways reminiscent of how they themselves have been previously trained. Although this creates a strong organisational culture it is important that fighting echelon units look critically at the training they conduct to achieve war-fighting capability. Most fighting echelon units adopt a time-honoured tradition of troop/platoon internally-directed training followed by company/squadron-directed training before entering into actions like Paratus Cup16 and Predator’s Gallop17. Although this collective training cycle has proven effective at developing very good troops and combat teams, it may not necessarily be the most efficient means of doing so. A more efficient means would be to establish a way of identifying where most training effort is needed at the start of a training cycle rather than trying to allocate time to train all combat skills. Fighting echelon units must become more selective in determining how they use their precious whole-task training time. In order to do so formations must also be prepared to provide them a little leeway in allocating training resources early in the collective training continuum. Units should be selective about the tasks, standards and conditions that they train at each ATL. The basis of making these selections will be a mix of intuition and evaluation. This evaluation is the key part of being selective; at the moment evaluation of whole task proficiency occurs too late in the training cycle to drive efficient collective training.
Evaluate proficiency early and often: Fighting echelon units should change their collective training methodology from ‘crawl–walk–run’ to ‘run (with close evaluation)–crawl–walk–run’. The first whole-task training event (either in barracks or the field) that a troop/platoon conducts during a collective training cycle should be used to evaluate its proficiency in specified skills and tasks. Their proficiency should be evaluated by dedicated, unit-provided, experienced leaders (officer commanding, regimental sergeant major, squadron sergeant major, 21C and/or adjutant) acting as an Observer Trainers (OT). This evaluation should occur before the troop is given time to conduct its own internal field training. The training should be intense, it should test the troop to failure and it should be of a duration that will test their operational viability period (OVP)—approximately 72 to 96 hours for a troop. The troop leader must conduct a combination of internal reviews and AAR while still undertaking the mission against an unconstrained enemy (that is without any exercise pauses for the conduct of such reviews). The troop must enact fixes to rectify faults while still completing its actions with an active and unrestrained enemy. Throughout the conduct of the mission the OT must collect data and record observations to enable review at the end of the mission. At the end of the mission the OC, the troop leader and subordinate commanders must complete a thorough review of their performance. The review must be based on the requirements established during the Regimental training mission analysis that has been previously discussed. It must identify the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and its subordinate elements. The weaknesses then become the focus for troop/platoon-directed internal training. The OC must articulate how and when the troop’s proficiency will be evaluated in those weak areas. While this will be a very demanding training action for a unit it will improve the training yield by ensuring troops are not overtraining actions that they are already proficient in.
Best reward for effort: This type of early whole-task evaluation will not only identify which tactical actions the troop must train to improve, it will also identify the constituent tasks that are weak. For example if the duration of the training exercise is sufficiently long it will certainly identify if the operator maintenance skills of an organisation are adequate. It will determine if the organisation has reasonable crew rest procedures in place. If properly instrumented it will confirm whether or not the crew’s equipment maintenance was adequate. In the event that whole task evaluation is not feasible due to lack of training space or other resources, the OC must rely on simulation to determine proficiency and identify weakness in constituent skills. As with the whole-task training the evaluation of proficiency of constituent skills must occur first in the training cycle. This initial evaluation then allows targeted training to improve weaknesses and avoids wasting training time on making strengths stronger. Once the tasks requiring training are known, the effectiveness of the training can be improved. By evaluating the performance of the unit’s subordinate fighting elements during whole-task and constituent training, the areas of weakness can be understood. Once the responsibilities for training to improve those faults have been allocated, subsequent training design can begin. To ensure that the training undertaken is effective the Regiment must manipulate the training environment and increase the objectivity of training goals and assessments.
Manipulating the Environment
Varying intensity and duration of whole-task training: Frequency, duration and intensity are three of the fundamental elements of training that can be altered to affect the organisational outcomes of training. While these three elements have been used to promote stress adaptation in physical training for many years18 an understanding of their effect on training complex cognitive function is less mature.
It is reasonable to suggest that they can be used to promote similar adaptation in collective training. As previously stated, frequency of training is unlikely to be increased, so the paper will only examine how duration and intensity of training may be used to prompt adaptation within a unit’s subordinate elements. Importantly though, these mechanisms will result in failure of different constituent parts of the system during the conduct of whole-task training. Increased intensity will stress cognitive capacity, while increased duration will stress cognitive endurance. How each can be employed in unit collective training will be examined.
To increase training intensity fighting echelon units should increase the strength of the adversary in training exercises. An enemy capable of using the combined arms effect to force dilemma on the blue force commander, while at the same time operating in depth to have a disruptive effect on the combat team’s supporting elements, is likely to stretch the junior leader’s cognitive capacity to failing point. Once cognitive capacity has failed, and the exercise has reached a point where review is feasible, the OT should coach commanders through a review of their decision-making processes and identify unnecessary elements of the problems that commanders considered or appreciated. Training for this intensity will result in two improvements. First, the stress adaptation of doing this type of training may result in increased cognitive capacity, and second it will identify any external factors a troop/ platoon leader can ignore during future decision making thereby lessening the demand on the commander’s cognitive capacities in future similar situations.
By increasing the endurance of the adversary in exercises, training duration is lengthened but with a valuable outcome. A persistent and pervasive enemy that is capable of making and maintaining contact with a force, but is not capable of decisively engaging a troop or platoon will stretch the troop/platoon commander’s cognitive endurance. For example, where an enemy has adopted an operational plan reliant on exhausting the moral authority of an opponent, the tactical enemy is likely to use techniques not dissimilar to the Vietcong in South Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan to wear down the blue force. The enemy must still be capable of lethal combat, but is only likely to employ it in its own defence when its support elements are threatened. An exercise design that sees the unit employed in stabilisation operations and in constant contact with an enemy that uses sniping, ambushing and mine attacks to disrupt the blue force while avoiding decisive engagement is likely to result in decision fatigue in the blue force commander. When the exercise design allows, the OT should guide commanders through a review that identifies where errors in judgement were made as a result of fatigue. The OT can adjudicate discussion, identifying points when the commander made unnecessary decisions that resulted in stressing cognitive endurance. Establishing standard operating procedures will enable commanders to focus on the task at hand without having to make decisions about routine operations and increase the troop/platoon’s endurance.19
Varying intensity and duration of part-task training: The same techniques can be used to good effect during part-task training. The aim of a part-task training event should be to train to failure, identify the cause of the failure and then re-train to rectify the fault. Weapon handling drills are a classic example of this. Junior NCOs (JNCO) should direct weapon drill training so that the crew carries out drills until they fail. The JNCO can induce increased intensity by asking the individual members of the crew questions about preventative maintenance checks and service tasks related to their station or tabulated data relevant to their trade while they are undergoing the task. When the individual fails, the JNCO stops the practice, identifies the fault, and ensures that the drill can be correctly carried out under decreased intensity and then resumes. Carrying out the training at night will also aid in increased intensity. JNCOs directing the training can increase duration by repeating the task for a long time at low intensity until the crew fails and by then carrying out the corrective action detailed above. By training to failure induced by intensity or duration, identifying the fault and then training to rectify it stress adaptation will occur, improving the proficiency of the individual members of the crew.
Increasing Objectivity
Audio and video recording: Whenever training design allows, the execution of tasks should be recorded. The use of video in the review of performance has long been a successful element of training in the elite sports and is directly applicable to some of the skills employed within the tank troop. For example, when a tank troop is conducting whole-task training in an intense scenario it is likely, particularly if the training is early in the cycle, that the troop leader’s communication will be ambiguous at times. It is also likely that this ambiguity will lead to a subordinate crew carrying out a task that the troop leader did not order, or at the very least in a way that the troop leader had not visualised. If the OT has recorded the radio transmissions and can play them back during review the troop leader and subordinate commanders will accept the transmission objectively and seek a means of rectifying the fault rather than arguing the toss on what was said during the transmissions. While outside the scope of troop training, the same tool would be useful during a unit’s battle staff training. During both the planning and execution phase, an OT could use the recordings to objectively establish the events, identify fault and then lead the staff in a discussion to rectify fault. Training effectiveness is likely to improve through the recording of certain elements of training to increase objectivity. Noting that units resource allocations are always stretched (particularly cash) they may have to rely on personal recording devices to achieve these aims. While this may create extra work for the Unit Security Officer it is likely to yield better training outcomes.
Establishing tactical checklists: The US Army uses the Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to evaluate a unit’s tactical proficiency. This method has also been used in certain sections of the Australian Army. The ARTEP produces a checklist of the subordinate tasks that are required for the successful completion of a tactical task. It can be argued though that this system reduces the opportunity for initiative, and ties proficiency to procedure rather than to mission success. Instead of using the checklists for determining proficiency, they should be used for increasing the objectivity of review of performance. This type of checklist should be used during proficiency evaluation exercises as a means of identifying those constituent skills that are performed well and those that need more attention paid to them. Importantly, the checklists should only be used by OTs, not by troop leaders, as a map to successful execution. Their use as a troop planning tool could very easily lead to formulaic mission preparation and execution resulting in less room for initiative and imagination.
Costs
Varying the environment: When the intensity or duration of a training event is increased to promote stress adaptation, troops must be allocated sufficient rest following a training action to recover. Without this rest the troops will not make the desired adaptation. In a system that has finite field training time available, this means that more of that time may be required for rest. While this may seem counterintuitive, if the intensity or duration of single training actions is increased the reward is definitely worth the effort.
Increased objectivity: Increased effectiveness does not come without a cost. In the case of establishing tactical check lists for OTs, upfront work required by experienced commanders like OCs and SSMs will undoubtedly increase. It will also result in another burden on the time of the CO to ensure that the checklists nest with the visualisation of how tank troops will fight. OTs will simply not be available for every training action, nor should they be used in this way. Troops and platoons must develop the capacity to execute tasks in isolation and rely on their own ability for critical review and fault rectification. OTs should be used early in the training cycle to identify proficiency and weakness to aid in improving training efficiency through selectivity. They should also be used late in the training cycle to evaluate proficiency prior to reorganisation for operations or progression to higher order training. Establishing OTs is not easy for a unit. The best people to fulfil OT duties for troop training are OCs, 2ICs, adjutants, some staff captains depending on their experience, and SSMs. Removing them from their other tasks to provide the OT function will result in reduced capacity elsewhere in the system—a reduced capacity that may result in increased risk to mission or force elsewhere. The decision must be made whether the risk is worth the reward. The decision on when to use OTs should be considered during the quarterly training design workshops discussed earlier. The decision must include the assessment of the associated risks and the subsequent exercise design must reduce or mitigate the risk through some additional control measures. By identifying the OT requirement early, the sub-units executing the training will be better able to prepare for their provision as well as anticipating how to overcome the risks associated with drawing them from elsewhere in the organisation.
Conclusion
Available field training time in the Australian Army is generally outside of the control of the unit commander and, to a large degree, of the formation commander. As a result, if units want to improve proficiency they cannot do so by increasing the amount of field training conducted. Units must find ways to improve their training yield. There are three ways they can do this. The first is through creating better trainers by giving them a number of skills that will improve their ability to plan and execute training. The second is to improve the efficiency of training by being selective about the skills that they dedicate their finite training time to. The third involves increasing the effectiveness of training by varying the training environment to promote stress adaptation and increasing the objectivity of training reviews.
Making better trainers requires fighting echelon units to find additional training time early in the training cycle; this is the only technique discussed in this paper that requires units to increase their in-barracks training time. Fighting echelon units should complete a development package for the officers, warrant officers and SNCOs who will undertake training design and execution. The package should include battle studies that inform the trainer’s understanding of defeat mechanisms, how friction affects the execution of tasks and how to insert control measures that will overcome that friction. It should inform the trainer’s understanding of how combat teams are likely to fight as part of battle groups. It should also develop the trainer’s capacity for critical self-review. Finally it should provide them with training design skills informed by the conduct of a quarterly training mission analysis and design workshop. The presence of the CO will result in a far greater understanding of his intent for training than if it is left to the dissemination of written guidance. If only one element of the development package can be achieved then it must be the COs directed training analysis and design workshop.
Increasing training efficiency relies on increasing the rate of evaluation of troops/ platoons undertaking training. This evaluation should occur as early in a collective training cycle as possible and during the conduct of both whole- and part-task training. The outcomes of the evaluation should then inform the constituent task training that must be completed to improve warfighting proficiency at the lowest level. Instead of occurring as a culmination of ATL/S 3B training it should occur at the start of ATL 3 training and be used to inform the subsequent training of troops/platoons.
Increasing training effectiveness is achieved in two ways. Firstly, by manipulating the training environment using intensity and duration to promote stress adaptation, and secondly by increasing training objectivity. Objectivity can be increased through instrumentation, recording and reviewing performance and through the use of tactical checklists. The abovementioned methods of increasing training effectiveness rely heavily on the use of OTs. Generating OTs creates a significant burden on organisations executing training as they will generally need to be sourced internally. The removal of OTs from their regular offices also results in increased risk to the force that must be accepted or mitigated. Importantly OTs should not be used for every training action. They are suited to identifying the training need and for evaluating ATL/S proficiency. The most useful tool for improving training effectiveness is recording training actions to objectify review.
During the current Strategic Reform Program the allocation of resources throughout the ADF will remain modest into the foreseeable future. If fighting echelon units must select only some of the techniques set out above to improve their training yield then they must focus on making better trainers and using OTs to identify the constituent tasks that need training and to increase the objectivity of training feedback. If units can carry out these tasks effectively then it is likely that the quality of training will improve. This will increase the morale of fighting echelon units and in turn their fighting power.
About the Author
Since 2001 Major Grant Chambers has been a tank troop leader, troop leader special equipment, squadron second in command and squadron commander at 1st Armoured Regiment. He served as the tank tactics instructor at the School of Armour. He has served as an operations, plans and resource officer at 1st Brigade Headquarters. He has also served as a mentor and sub-unit commander with MTF-2 in Afghanistan. Major Chambers is currently completing Australian Command and Staff College at Weston Creek.
Endnotes
1 Jeroen van Merrienboer, Training Complex Cognitive Skills, Educational Technology Publications Incorporated, 1997, New Jersey, p. 169–72.
2 Land Warfare Development Centre 2010, The Army Objective Force 2030, Puckapunyal, p.25.
3 van Merrienboer, op cit, p. 169–172.
4 For example, during the training conducted during 2011 at 1st Armoured Regiment, the cancellation of training at Cultana, the conduct of gunnery training at Mount Bundy Training Area, the deployment to Shoalwater Bay Training Area and the completion of Paratus Cup 2011 resulted in less than four months useful field training time. Considering the directed elements of Exercise HAMEL and time for rest, maintenance and sustainment it is reasonable to suggest that no more than ten weeks were available for whole-task training in the field. The other eight months of the year were spent in barracks. Removing the weekends and mandated tasks that could not incorporate constituent task training still leaves at least fifteen weeks available for the conduct of part-task training. 2011 was not unusual in its available training time.
5 This assumption is based upon the current requirement for field training for a medical evacuation plan that enables any casualty to be removed from the point of injury to a resuscitation facility within one hour and to a surgical facility within the subsequent two hours. The cost of establishing this system, given that Army does not use its own aviation assets to do so, means that a functional-level command is responsible for funding and a formation-level command is responsible for coordinating the support. The current method for resource allocation is that no increase in a resource of greater than 10 per cent is likely to be granted. When this policy is coupled with a very close watch on the time soldiers with critical skills (most of whom reside in the combat service support arms) spend in the field, it is clear that field training time will not increase.
6 Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2004 paragraph 2.23.
7 Hew Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’, Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 41 No. 2, 2011, p. 215–27.
8 Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2004 paragraph 4.50.
9 Colin S Gray, Another Bloody Century, Phoenix, London, 2006, p. 370–1.
10 Orme, 1st Brigade Concept of Operations, Robertson Barracks, 2007.
11 Winter, Plan Beersheba: Multi-role brigade – close combat narrative, Robertson Barracks 2011.
12 The Lightning Press, The Leaders Smart Book third edition, 2009, p4-1 to 4-4.
13 National Coaching Accreditation Program, Mentor Training Manual, Australian Sports Commission, 2010.
14 Field Manual 7–1 (FM 25–101), Battle Focused Training, Headquarters Department of the Army, 2003.
15 Land Warfare Doctrine 2, Leadership, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2004 Annex B to Chapter one.
16 Paratus Cup is the 1st Armoured Regiment’s annual competition to determine its champion troop.
17 Predator’s Gallop has long been a 1st Brigade exercise controlled by the formation with the aim of testing combat teams in a battle group setting.
18 Roy J Shephard, ‘Intensity, Duration and Frequency of Exercise as Determinants of the Response to a Training Regime’, European Journal of Applied Physiology, Vol. 26 No. 3, June 1968.
19 John Tierny, ‘Do you suffer from decision fatigue?’, New York Times Magazine, 17 August 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-…;.
