The COIN Environment: The Integration and Execution of Lethal and Non-Lethal Effects at the Tactical Level – Platoon Team Lessons from MRTF-2 in Afghanistan
Abstract
This article examines the key role that junior commanders and their soldiers must play in the execution of force concepts necessitated by the emergence of modern counterinsurgency warfare. Now more than ever, platoon teams and sections have the moral, legal and strategic imperative to analyse and apply force concepts at a rate and magnitude equal to, if not in excess of, their higher command. This article discusses approaches to this increased pressure by drawing on experiences from platoon teams operating as part of Combat Team A (CT-A), Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 2 (MRTF-2), in Afghanistan from June 2009 to February 2010.
Introduction
■ Lesson 1: Junior commanders now have an operational responsibility far in excess of that for which they traditionally train.
It is important to recognise initially that the operational scenario experienced during the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 2’s (MRTF-2) tour is likely to be markedly different to that experienced by more recent rotations. Force construct and mission profile have evolved in response to the challenges and successes that previous forces, including MRTF-2, have experienced while operating in Afghanistan. As such, the purpose of this article is not to discuss the merits of MRTF-2’s particular tactical actions and environment, but rather use it as a medium to aid in explaining the shift of operational responsibility and approaches experienced by junior commanders and their soldiers.
The first imperative of this article is to accurately describe the disconnect between accepted understandings of lethal and non-lethal effects, and the reality of applied force concepts in a tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Lethal and non-lethal force is often interpreted in terms of the kinetic effect that a soldier can impart onto an adversary. To the average soldier graduating from Initial Employment Training, the distinction between lethal and non-lethal is normally in the type of weapon system used to impart force, rather than the distinction between the kinetic and non-kinetic means of creating it.
So far as can be identified, nowhere in Army doctrine does it provide a clear definition of ‘Force’, despite it being used in various contexts. For the purposes of this article ‘Force’ is defined as:
The physical or non-physical means of exerting influence over a person, group or situation, which is contrary to the natural or intended state of that entity.
The integration of lethal and non-lethal concepts is often considered to be the domain of higher level tactical and operational planners. Indeed, Platoon Commanders are often not expected, trusted or trained to implement their own non-lethal targeting concepts while conducting tactical training within Australia. It is evident, however, based on recent operational experience, that it is the most junior of commanders that possess the actual agility and available assets to be able to accurately and sufficiently devise, integrate and execute these effects at the tactical level.
Setting the Scene
As part of Operation PELATEL MANA in the Mirabad Valley between 1–29 January 2010, 2 and 3 Platoon, CT-A were tasked with occupying platoon houses within the green zone for a period of approximately three weeks. One of these houses was preexisting, while the other had to be established from scratch. The platoons were given areas of operation of approximately five by three kilometres to dominate, each with a local population base of about 4000 people. The primary focus of this portion of the operation was to deny the enemy freedom of action within the area, disrupt enemy caches, conduct reconnaissance for engineer works, and to catalogue and earn goodwill with the local population.
... deny the enemy freedom of action within the area, disrupt enemy caches, conduct reconnaissance for engineer works, and to catalogue and earn goodwill with the local population.
For a number of reasons, patrol strength during this time was normally limited to section team size (nine to fifteen people). Of note is that these patrols were largely un-partnered; often conducted solely by Australian forces with limited interpreter support. The patrol program was aimed at saturating the area and saw patrols on the ground for a combined period of six to twelve hours every day, by day and night. Due to the COIN nature of the conflict, the patrol program was very much intelligence driven and would often be amended at extremely short notice due to the information obtained by innovative and talented junior commanders and soldiers.
During this period junior leaders were forced to develop a rapid understanding of non-lethal effects as a means of positively influencing the local population. This proved initially difficult as the locals were extremely weary of International Security Assistance Forces due to Taliban intimidation and their infrequent contact with foreigners. Both 2 and 3 Platoon had to balance this non-lethal approach with the need to maintain the poise and mentality to be able to effectively employ lethal effects as the situation arose.
Stages of COIN and Approaches
■ Lesson 2: Junior commanders must understand the four stages of the Australian COIN approach and their place in it.
■ Lesson 3: Each neighbouring cultural and geographical area can exist in separate stages of COIN independently of one another.
■ Lesson 4: Each stage of the COIN battle requires different levels of kinetic posture.
In order to explain the junior command approaches used during MRTF-2’s tour, the Australian approach to COIN as detailed in LWD 3.0.1 Counterinsurgency must be understood. In conjunction with many of our coalition partners, Australia’s four-stage approach is: shape, clear, hold and build. The ‘shaping’ phase is primarily a strategic action which tactical forces need to understand in terms of presenting a united narrative and maximising effect.
The ‘clear’ stage is far more relevant to the scope of this article and involves clearing the area of operations of insurgents. It is primarily kinetic in nature. This stage is important because without security established, the population is not in a position to be decisively and positively influenced. What is not understood well by junior commanders is that the main effort for this stage of COIN, as it is with all other stages, is still the population. Far too often, and as a result of a focus on kinetic training, junior commanders are not attuned to the fact that an adversary can sometimes be cleared without kinetic force, and therefore with less risk to the population.
The next stage of COIN is ‘hold’. This is possibly the hardest to define as it can encompass elements of both the clear and build stages concurrently. It involves the maintenance of security by continuing to clear insurgent threat as it eventuates, and by winning the population through building efforts. The focus for this stage begins to shift from kinetic to non-kinetic action, and towards influencing and understanding the population.
The final stage is ‘build’ and includes the establishment of basic services, but more importantly, the establishment/re-establishment of local law and order. Primacy in this phase begins to shift to supporting indigenous forces that have normally been trained and mentored through the hold phase. The build phase is the indigenous forces’ chance to affirm their ability and build support from the local people prior to the withdrawal of occupying forces.
The final stage is ‘build’ and includes the establishment of basic services, but more importantly, the establishment/re-establishment of local law and order.
It is important to understand that the stages of COIN are fluid and an area can rapidly transition from one to the other. This transition can often occur independently from other neighbouring areas where one can be in the clear phase while the other is transiting through the hold phase. The implication of this is that tactics and approaches need to be tailored for each area and/or ethnic group based on a thorough appreciation of local factors by tactical commanders.
Each stage of the COIN battle requires different levels of kinetic posture, and commanders must be able to adjust this rapidly as their efforts start to take effect. Arguably, the more successful a commander is in progressing their region through the stages of COIN, the less kinetic their approach must become. This is not to say that they should not be prepared for the area to decline rapidly back along the COIN spectrum, but they should be aiming to work themselves out of a job as quickly as possible.
Defining a Tactical Area of Responsibility
■ Lesson 5: When defining boundaries in a COIN environment the first consideration should always be to the population, followed then by capability and terrain.
■ Lesson 6: Cultural and political information is best gathered through a non-lethal approach. This information is mission critical.
Nowhere is the considered and accurate allocation of tactical boundaries more important than in the COIN environment. Traditionally, tactical boundaries are assigned from an appreciation of functional capabilities of our own forces, or due to geographical convenience of an area. Indeed, during most military appreciation processes the battlespace is normally defined geographically as a precursor to the area than being dissected and analysed for stakeholder influence.
While own force capability and geography are important considerations, in a COIN environment boundaries formed from these considerations alone will often not correspond to the tactical and cultural reality of the forces on the ground. It is suggested that in the COIN environment, the first consideration should be to the main effort (the population). Once this is achieved, areas of operation and tactical areas of responsibility should then be allocated with further consideration to other influences such as capability and geography. This should occur at all levels of command.
It is suggested that in the COIN environment, the first consideration should be to the main effort (the population).
During Operation PELATEL MANA there were a number of platoon team, combat team and even coalition boundaries within a valley area of approximately 10 to 15 kilometres. It was soon established by the sections and platoons operating within this area that these boundaries did not correspond to the cultural and political boundaries as understood by the local population, despite best guesses during the planning process.
In one example, a key leader from a particular village resided approximately 80 metres over a combat team boundary from the platoon that was tasked with that village’s security. This created a deconfliction dilemma for junior commanders as they tried to build rapport and act on short notice information and intelligence, while at the same time contending for battlespace with an adjacent combat team. This issue would have been further compounded had the adjacent organisation been from a coalition country and without compatible communications systems.
This example highlights the importance of integrated and thorough intelligence planning pre H-hour in order to better define these cultural boundaries. Indeed this is not always possible, especially when the area of operations is relatively unknown to the force. In this situation, the need for flexibility, a bias for cultural understanding, and rapid and effective population mapping by ground forces post H-hour, is necessary to be able to rapidly realign control measures to support the mission.
All of these intelligence needs are best gathered through effective use of non-lethal force rather than lethal. Without the junior commander having a thorough understanding of their importance as a sensor and without employing effective non-lethal force and tactics to the population, the information junior commanders require will likely not be forthcoming. The likelihood of extracting cultural information from a population under duress is relatively low. Even less likely is that the information obtained will be accurate or given in full. In this regard it is important to remember that it is not only the enemy that can scare and intimidate the population, but us as well.
Integration of Stakeholders
■ Lesson 7: Junior commanders must learn to coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic effects from all sources and agencies to be successful.
■ Lesson 8: A balance must be reached between the amount of non-kinetic force used, and maintaining an appropriate kinetic posture to ensure security.
Tactical level ground forces are only one of the many very important sensors. Junior commanders must understand the need to coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic effects from all sources and agencies to ensure maximum effect is achieved.
Junior commanders must understand the need to coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic effects from all sources and agencies to ensure maximum effect is achieved.
This concept is again one which would traditionally be expected to occur at higher headquarters. However, in a complex COIN environment where patrols have regular contact with and are often supported by other nation’s armed forces, government agencies, non-governmental organisations, contractors and indigenous forces, it is the patrol commander on the ground that will often discover he has the opportunity and requirement to incorporate these assets into his force concepts in order to best support the mission.
During Operation PELATEL MANA, platoon houses were often bolstered by a number of battlegroup and theatre assets including: Explosive Ordinance Disposal, Light Electronic Warfare teams, Human Intelligence teams, Psychological Operations detachments, interpreters and Engineering Reconnaissance teams. Support to operations included coalition air and vehicles, as well as Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams from various nations, with their associated Afghan Security Forces. In similar operations, additions might also include media and a number of governments and nongovernmental agencies.
These assets were normally allocated to the platoon house commander under a Tactical Control arrangement. This junior commander was then responsible for using and coordinating them on a daily basis to achieve higher commander’s intent, while tailoring their efforts to support the geographical and cultural nuances of his particular tactical area of responsibility. In addition to this, the commander was constantly receiving intelligence feeds from both up and down the chain of command, with most originating from the population itself.
In this scenario the junior commanders entrusted with these assets were expected to devise and then execute their own kinetic and non-kinetic force concepts based on their appreciation of the battlespace and understanding of the COIN approach.
Without a sound understanding of COIN warfare, the battlespace and the capabilities of the assets themselves, the concepts would be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. The commander needs to reach a balance between the amount of non-kinetic focus needed to best support the mission, while still maintaining an appropriate kinetic posture in order to ensure security. This is a difficult task for relatively untrained and inexperienced junior commanders without the luxury of a specialised planning staff.
Understanding Non-Kinetic Force
■ Lesson 9: In a COIN environment where the population is the main effort, do not always expect a tangible result for your successes.
■ Lesson 10: Non-kinetic action is tiresome and requires weeks, months and normally years of persistent effort. This does not fit in well with our training and operational cycle.
It is fair to say that soldiers train hard at and have a good understanding of the lethal force concept; to do otherwise could have disastrous results in combat. Lethal force is but one aspect of kinetic force and relates to that which has the potential to kill. Forced entry for search purposes and detention of suspects are other examples of kinetic force that are not traditionally lethal in nature but may produce unexpected consequences.
Non-kinetic force is a relatively new concept that has little attention in doctrine; particularly that doctrine relating to the employment of ground forces such as Infantry, Armour and Engineers. It is understood that it was December 2008 before LWD 3.3.7 Employment of Infantry doctrine was amended to include mention of non-lethal and non-kinetic force:
LWD 3.3.7, Paragraph 1.10: Influence. The battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and international audiences is a decisive element of warfare. Infantry, working among the people, is uniquely placed to influence perceptions through respect for the people, adherence to the laws of armed conflict and the sparing use of force (lethal and nonlethal, kinetic and non-kinetic) with the greatest possible discrimination. Australian infantry soldiers have an enviable reputation for winning the hearts of indigenous populations.
Currently, Army has in draft form LWP-G 3-8-3 Non-lethal Capabilities, which should shed more light on the subject once it becomes available. Given the current lack of writing on the topic it is not surprising that many inexperienced junior commanders have almost no understanding of methods available to impart non-kinetic force in support of a COIN campaign.
In the military, our training is normally geared toward achieving a tangible objective, or by gaining a tangible result such as ‘taking that hill’ or ‘refuelling that many aircraft’. Naturally, it is reasonable for a junior commander on operations to expect a tangible outcome from their missions as this is the way we have trained. Unfortunately, in a COIN environment where the people are the objective, and our effort is broken down into multiple lines of operation, this is rarely the case. Many of these lines of operation are intangible in nature, and those that do have a tangible aspect often take far longer than the six to eight months of an operational rotation to achieve.
Commanders must understand that COIN warfare occurs in regions that have experienced, almost exclusively, long term periods of instability and violence. Kinetic action is swift and violent and aimed at a gaining a tangible resolution to an adverse situation over a finite period of time. Non-kinetic action is tiresome and requires weeks, months and normally years of persistent effort in order to be effective. Patience is not something that most naturally possess, at least not in the quantities required to achieve success in COIN. The rotation of forces in and out of country, while a necessary burden, does not lend itself well to continuity in the COIN environment.
As we know COIN is broadly about shaping perceptions and winning over population. Perception is never positively influenced by violence; however, violence must be used as a means to protect that which you seek to influence. Therefore, how do you balance the approach and what actions can a junior commander take?
Non-Kinetic Effects on Patrol
■ Lesson 11: Junior commanders need to understand how to exploit ‘surfaces and gaps’ both for kinetic and non-kinetic action.
■ Lesson 12: Quick Impact Projects are a highly effective non-kinetic approach.
Quick Impact Projects: It is important to stress the need for junior leaders and soldiers to develop their understanding of ‘surfaces and gaps’ as it applies to the non-kinetic piece. Certainly in Afghanistan it was found that the average local farmer did not care about the big ticket items as much as the decision-makers in Tarin Kot did. To them the fixing of a foot bridge between their home and their corn field held far more importance than who was going to be elected in the upcoming election.
Certainly in Afghanistan it was found that the average local farmer did not care about the big ticket items as much as the decision-makers in Tarin Kot did.
This is because these communities are survivalist in nature with a very strong sense of family and community. Unless an issue has direct benefits to their community, a local population may not see the point in worrying about it. What these people do value is tangible deliverables that have an immediate effect on their everyday life. Such projects are termed Quick Impact Projects.
These Quick Impact Projects are ‘gaps’ to the junior commander as they gain good faith and trust, require little work, need almost no resources and can be achieved in a short period of time. The larger projects such as a medical clinic are ‘surfaces’; these traditionally require many resources, numerous hours discussing plans with local government and stakeholders, and huge amounts of time and effort to complete. Many never eventuate, because by the time the plans are finalised the tactical situation has changed and priorities have moved on. The end result is often distrust for coalition forces.
Junior commanders need to embrace these gaps by exploiting them as they become evident. An example of an effective Quick Impact Project from Operation PELATEL MANA was the assistance given by a patrol to a local family in forging a path in the side of a mountain. This path would lead from their home to their grazing pasture and would allow the family to take feed to their flock by wheelbarrow, thereby making everyday life easier.
While this was certainly not an arduous task, the junior commander was able to recognise and exploit this opportunity by returning 30 minutes later with some picks and shovels and simply assisting the family to dig. The entire path was finished inside three hours, but the goodwill that was earned lasted indefinitely. This family was later able to provide some valuable information that assisted in the arrest of two suspected insurgent bomb makers/weapon couriers. The lesson is that if the patrols focus had only been on the ‘big ticket’ items, which at the time was the construction of a large foot bridge over the Tiri River, then opportunities such as this path would have been overlooked.
To illustrate further the effect that exploiting these gaps can have, it was discovered through analysis that over the period of the three-week operation, the rate of small arms and improvised explosive device attack in the area decreased dramatically. It is the author’s opinion that this was as a direct result of the non-kinetic efforts taken by junior commanders who understood the importance of the non-kinetic approach.
... it was discovered through analysis that over the period of the three-week operation, the rate of small arms and improvised explosive device attack in the area decreased dramatically.
■ Lesson 13: People need to be engaged and local leaders need to be allowed to be leaders.
■ Lesson 14: Local leaders can set the foundation for lucrative, effortless and permissive search.
■ Lesson 15: Within the rules of Operation Secrecy always be honest and put energy behind your promises.
Key Leadership Engagement: Quick Impact Projects on their own are not enough to change the battlespace and influence the population. Another important aspect which is common in training is Key Leadership Engagement. The trouble with Key Leadership Engagement in a COIN environment, particularly Afghanistan, is that key leaders often have their own unique agendas that may not reflect the ‘good of the people’. This is not to say that these leaders should not be engaged, but what is gained from them should be considered with some degree of scepticism.
The second consideration with Key Leadership Engagement in the COIN environment is that key leaders are only a small percentage of the population. Ground forces need to engage with all people in order to best gauge atmospherics and give the best chance for diverse information collection. The difficulty remains in balancing this with the need to allow the local leaders to be leaders. Undermining the hierarchal system will automatically destroy any good faith gained and potentially cause new issues of its own.
The third consideration is that leaders exist in a variety of circles. In Afghanistan the village leader and religious leader are normally one and the same. When this is not the case the junior commander needs to invest energy into discovering the local political and power system. For example, a leader within the Mirabad area was a local doctor. He was openly subservient to the village chief but behind closed doors he held substantial influence.
The doctor’s power was that far reaching that he had written permission from Taliban upper echelons in Pakistan to administer polio immunisation injections to infants, despite this being largely against accepted Taliban beliefs. Such was his importance with the people of the area that even the Taliban had to concede to some of his requests, rather than risk alienating themselves from the main effort.
Local leaders can also help with setting the conditions for permissive search and clearance of the area. We found throughout the tour that many people who were not insurgents either knew of buried insurgent caches, or had buried some themselves during the Soviet occupation. What was universally true was that these people did not want to be found with these goods as they risked being arrested and handed over to local law enforcement whom at the time, they did not trust.
What junior leaders were able to achieve in the Mirabad Valley was the explanation to local leaders that there would be an amnesty period; locals would be encouraged to bring any contraband items to the platoon houses, or alternatively when forces turned up to search their property the locals should instantly direct them to the location of any contraband items.
The effect of this approach was that local leaders were able to influence their own people, many items were recovered without any effort on our part, and many people who were likely not insurgents were not detained unnecessarily. The local population saw us as a fair and considered force rather than occupiers who would imprison innocent family members. The good will gained from this approach again helped to endear us to the people, and as a result the provision of information of tactical value increased. The approach was also beneficial in increasing our legitimacy to detain anyone who was found with prohibited and undeclared items. It provided less chance of local backlash as all had been warned.
The final consideration is the truthful, timely and frank explanation of purpose and mission. Communities operate much like a schoolyard; once a rumour starts it is hard to stop. This can be debilitating if it is not the truth. It is important to rapidly convey the purpose and intent of your mission, within the guides of Operation Secrecy, to the local leadership. This will ensure that the right rumours are spread by the people with the influence necessary to ensure they are understood. Key Leadership Engagement is pivotal in achieving this effect.
Communities operate much like a schoolyard; once a rumour starts it is hard to stop. This can be debilitating if it is not the truth.
■ Lesson 16: Dominate the terrain. Be seen or be known.
Presence: Another method to exert non-kinetic influence is simply by providing a presence. Insurgents operate at all times of day and night; therefore so must we. Despite it being often dangerous and uncomfortable, it is necessary for patrols to operate regardless of weather, season and terrain. During Operation PELATEL MANA normally three patrols of two to four-hour durations were planned each day. At least one of these was at night to demonstrate that we dominated the terrain. This concept is not foreign to any junior commander, but what was difficult to grasp was why we were doing so when there was no evidence of recent insurgent activity at night.
The answer to the above question was that, ‘just because it’s not happening doesn’t mean it won’t’, and ‘perhaps that’s because we are preventing their activity by continuing to dominate the night’. Regardless, the importance of ‘saturation’ is obvious, despite how uncomfortable it can be in the middle of an Afghani winter.
In addition to maximising time on the ground, patrols should be as small as tactically possible. This affords those not on patrol more rest, gives the commander more flexibility in event of an incident, can increase net effort over time, and most importantly demonstrates to the people confidence in the patrol’s ability and in the security it has created to operate in those smaller numbers. This confidence, whether it is real or just a portrayal, is infectious and the population will follow suit.
The final consideration is that in order for presence to be effective, the population needs to know about it. During those periods where there is no activity, such as night-time in winter, there are non-kinetic methods available to display presence. The method of choice during Operation PELATEL MANA was leaflet drops. By night patrols would stop by all mosques on their patrol route and leave behind information pamphlets explaining aspects of coalition of Afghan force involvement in their area. This let the population know when they got up in the morning that Australians were out making them safe.
Adverse Effects of Lethal and Kinetic Force
■ Lesson 17: Soldiers must ask the ‘right’ question, ‘Do I need to shoot?’ not ‘Can I shoot?’
■ Lesson 18: Applying the ‘right’ question is not a ‘softening’ of approach but rather a refining of it.
The ‘Right’ Question: At this point it is pertinent to restate the importance of lethal and kinetic force throughout all stages of the COIN battle. While this article is aimed more at the non-kinetic piece, without appropriate kinetic poise, posture and potential, a force cannot maintain the security necessary to influence the main effort within the COIN environment. All soldiers should be trained and ready to impart up to and including lethal force on an adversary, but they should be able to do so after giving strong consideration to alternatives and the consequences. After all, Key Leadership Engagement that comes under fire will suffer more from a lack of coalition response than it will from an excessive one.
With that in mind it is important to understand ‘the question’. When confronted with a violent, uncertain or threatening situation, a soldier must make a choice as to what response they should deliver. Often at a tactical level a soldier will ask the question, ‘Can I shoot?’ Invariably the answer will be ‘yes’, given current rules of engagement in our present COIN environments. The generally accepted line being that if you feel your life is in danger you may defend it.
When confronted with a violent, uncertain or threatening situation, a soldier must make a choice as to what response they should deliver.
In the COIN environment this is the wrong question to ask. Rather, soldiers should be asking the question, ‘Do I need to shoot?’ It is imperative that junior commanders enforce this mentality on their soldiers, as the one who asks the wrong question can undermine an entire operation in an instant.
While conducting operations in the Miribad Valley it was identified that a common enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) was developing: bolt action rifles were being used to snipe at Australian platoon houses and other static positions from concealed and complex terrain. The fire from these rifles was reliably inaccurate and would range from distances as close as 100 to 200 metres, but more often than not it was from well beyond 600 metres. This action became a subset of the classic insurgent ‘shoot and scoot’ TTP and the primary insurgent culprit was quickly nicknamed ‘the Jackal’. This tactic was preferred by the insurgents because they were more than aware of their inability to compete with us kinetically, and it allowed them to avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Due to the nature of the enemy’s TTP and the complex terrain of the Mirabad valley, it was often extremely difficult to apply accurate fire. Whereby in the conventional battlefield it would be tactically sound to suppress the likely firing points and attempt to manoeuvre. In Afghanistan, it paid to consider the residual effects of engaging the enemy back.
Due to the nature of the enemy’s TTP and the complex terrain of the Mirabad valley, it was often extremely difficult to apply accurate fire.
In this situation junior commanders need to make an appropriate risk analysis. A comparative analysis is needed to identify a balance of risk for what their action (or inaction) may cause to coalition forces, the enemy, the physical and human environment, and the likely effect on both the immediate and COIN mission. As an example:
An insurgent engages a platoon house over a distance of 800 metres. The fire is ineffective, the piquet positions are unable to locate the exact firing point of the enemy and all platoon members are safely behind cover. The commander asks himself ‘do we need to shoot?’ Because the enemy fire is not effective, and due to the inability of the platoon to respond rapidly through complex terrain in order to clear a suspected area, it is decided that returning fire is not likely to achieve anything except potential collateral damage. Instead the commander chooses to use an unmanned aerial vehicle to fly over the suspect area to try and get eyes on the enemy as he concurrently launches a patrol to clear the area and reinforce local security, without the use of fire support.
Had the commander asked the wrong question in this scenario, he may have given the order for the piquets to suppress the area while he conducted a quick attack. As was experienced in Mirabad, it is very unlikely that a shooter would be found amongst the complex terrain without local assistance. This aggressive and highly kinetic manoeuvre while addressing the short term risk to the platoon house could potentially undermine the larger COIN mission.
By asking the wrong question, and by not measuring a kinetic response to the situation, a friendly force might assist the insurgents in achieving their mission of undermining coalition security without the enemy even having to inflict a casualty. By not conducting an appropriate risk analysis, by committing to substantial kinetic action and by doing so without killing or capturing any insurgents, the reacting force has reinforced to the population that security does not exist and that they are not in full control. The net loss is a heightened sense of local fear.
Ultimately this is not a debate about whether force protection measures should be reduced to protect Afghanis at the expense of our own soldiers, but rather a call for increased awareness by junior commanders to find a way to add flexibility into their plan, to consider the use of all available assets, and to consider the protection of locals as well as their own soldiers. When asking the right question a soldier is still left with a lethal option should he require it, but the approach is more attuned to the consequences. Being able to apply ‘the right question’ to each step of our operations, and at all levels, is not a ‘softening’ of approach but rather a refining of it.
■ Lesson 19: Place yourself in the shoes of those you mean to influence.
Search and detention: Non-permissive searches and detention are also examples of kinetic force. While it may produce tangible short term results, unnecessary and fruitless searches in particular can leave a lasting negative effect that may need to be considered. Commanders would often do well to envisage themselves in the shoes of those they mean to influence. Few of us would warm to the thought of a foreign military breaking down our door, tearing our home apart and physically intimidating our children.
However, at times, particularly during the ‘clear’ stage of COIN, non-permissive search and detention are necessary. If there is a need for this to occur, the general rules of search applicable to that theatre should apply, but in addition tactical commanders should take every effort to explain to the affected families and communities the reasons why it was conducted. They should also limit the amount of damage they do to buildings and limit the degree of physical force they project and impart. The principle of proportionality does not just apply to lethal force.
The principle of proportionality does not just apply to lethal force.
■ Lesson 20: Soldiers are emotional beings. People may be injured and killed. Commanders must empathise with soldiers while being attuned to the danger emotions can have to the mission.
Taking Casualties: Despite preparation and training, soldiers are still emotional beings. Fear is a natural and powerful emotion in war and one which can rapidly lead to a thirst for revenge should one of the team be wounded or killed. The desire for revenge cannot be underestimated, nor can the damage this emotion can create to any good work done during the COIN battle.
Junior Commanders must be attuned to the emotional effect taking casualties can have on soldiers, and be able to remind them that despite gut feeling, adjusting their approach is not the answer. While TTPs may need to be amended to ensure a similar incident does not occur, the force concepts behind those TTP should remain constant.
Following a suicide bombing incident in August 2009, it was found that there was a period where soldiers ceased to interact with the population due to fear of a repeat incident. In the week or so following the incident soldiers started to view all locals as the enemy and as such succeeded in alienating themselves from the population. Additionally, the need for revenge led them to become far more aggressive toward the people. It was not for some time that the attitude adjusted, the correct COIN approach was readopted, and the people re-engaged.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article has discussed the modern realisation that tactical forces and junior commanders have a moral, legal and strategic responsibility within the COIN environment, far in excess of that for which they traditionally train. The article has discussed the Australian approach to COIN and how force concepts and tactical approaches must vary to conform to all aspects of the battlespace.
The COIN battle is a complicated and time intensive pursuit. It requires persistent application of force in order to understand, and subsequently win the support of the local population. The article does not advocate a ‘soft’ stance by coalition forces, nor does it describe the need to treat all people without suspicion. It does, however, preach the need to consider the methods and durations that a commander applies force in order to best support the mission.
Operation PELATEL MANA was used to give substance and background to the concepts discussed and to the lessons learned. Importantly, the approaches taken during different stages of the COIN spectrum were discussed in the context of their independent cultural and geographical boundaries. The importance of accurately allocating these tactical boundaries was stressed in terms of thorough pre and post H-hour assessment and information gathering.
The article discussed the importance of integrating lethal and non-lethal effects from all sources and agencies to ensure maximum effect is achieved. This responsibility is increasingly falling to the junior commander who is necessarily entrusted with the tactical command of a variety of complimentary kinetic and non-kinetic assets.
While the examples cited are drawn from operations that were largely un-partnered in nature, the concepts illustrated are just as important for those commanders currently executing mentoring operations. By understanding COIN, non-kinetic surfaces and gaps, and by exploiting them through the use of both kinetic and non-kinetic methods and approaches, it is hoped that future junior commanders can learn from and build on the lessons learned by MRTF-2 in the Mirabad Valley.
About the Author
Captain Matt Proud enlisted into the Army in January 2003. In 2004 he attended the Australian Defence Force Academy and was awarded a Bachelor of Arts (Management and Geography) in 2006. Upon graduation from the Royal Military College – Duntroon in 2007 he was posted to the 1st Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment and was deployed to Afghanistan with Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force – 2. He is currently the Second in Command of the South Queensland Wing of the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy and is studying a Masters of Business.
