Australia’s Amphibious Ambition
Abstract
This article discusses the effect of the acquisition of the Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment (ADAS) System, acquired under JP 2048. It is argued that the project is largely ignoring the need to control river systems and shallow water areas that dominate our region’s geography. The article also discusses the training implications associated with the raising and sustaining of a world class amphibious force.
A small but highly trained [amphibious] force striking ‘out of the blue’ at a vital spot can produce a strategic effect out of all proportion to its slight numbers.
- Basil Liddell Hart
As an island nation in a region characterised by enormously complex riverine systems and archipelagos, Australia has long faced the challenges of littoral manoeuvre within an amphibious area of operations. The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) amphibious ambition is currently achieving a degree of realisation through the Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment (ADAS) system. Acquired under Joint Project (JP) 2048, ADAS will potentially provide the capability to deploy an Amphibious Ready Group of approximately 2200 personnel—a significant enhancement in ADF capability.1 Yet, for all the complexity of this system, it appears that a number of fundamental truths have been ignored—not least the fact that the acquisition of large amphibious ships alone will not provide Australia an amphibious capability comparable with that of its coalition allies, Britain and the United States. If these ships are to be considered more than simply transport vessels, Australia must also invest in enabling platforms and training for ship-to-objective manoeuvre and distributed manoeuvre. The ADAS system may also create a capability gap by failing to consider the replacement of Army-operated watercraft or the development of a capable riverine force. As a result, ADAS may deliver its promised Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) before the ADF is ready to employ this capability to its full potential within any credible threat environment. JP 2048 as a whole appears to be increasingly focused on blue water capability, ignoring the need to control the river systems and shallow water areas that dominate the region’s geography. If the ADF is to engage in littoral manoeuvre, it must be equipped and trained to conduct tactical surface manoeuvre and apply force within shallow coastal areas and river systems. While the ADAS system focuses on the transit to theatre, it is only part of the amphibious puzzle; the real challenges lie in the successful prosecution of littoral manoeuvre within the amphibious operations area.
Australia’s ability to project and sustain amphibious forces within its region will be substantially enhanced with the introduction of new amphibious ships, supporting sealift ships and landing craft. The Defence White Paper 2009 argues that this capability will provide a significant capacity for maritime manoeuvre of land forces in the littoral environment.2 However, JP 2048 largely ignores the requirement for ADF forces to conduct surface manoeuvre once in theatre. The LHDs and strategic sealift ships that will transit forces to theatre cannot enable all facets of littoral manoeuvre without supplementation from a variety of surface manoeuvre assets. This is a point of particular concern given that Australia’s primary operating environment is characterised by archipelagic, riverine and estuarine systems subject to large tidal variations and severe weather.3 Indeed Australia’s Amphibious Concept defines littoral manoeuvre as ‘the use of the littoral as an operational manoeuvre space from which a sea-based joint amphibious force can threaten, or apply and sustain, force ashore’.4 Current NATO doctrine also reinforces the need to control this environment:
The salient requirement of an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift, uninterrupted build-up of sufficient combat power ashore from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power as the attack progresses toward ATF [Amphibious Task Force] objectives. To achieve success, an ATF should have sea control in and over its area of operations (specifically the amphibious objective area), as well as a favourable air situation, and—in the case of an amphibious assault—a substantial superiority over opposing forces ashore.5
For the ADF to control amphibious areas of operation for extended periods, it must acquire a surface means of projecting and sustaining force across the spectrum of the amphibious area. Operating effectively within this environment requires amphibious vehicles, supplementary watercraft and a riverine capability, not just ship-to-shore connectors.
Australia’s ability to project and sustain amphibious forces within its region will be substantially enhanced with the introduction of new amphibious ships, supporting sealift ships and landing craft.
The watercraft procured within JP 2048 and specifically designed for the ADF’s primary operating environment are not suitable for prolonged tactical manoeuvre, force protection or riverine operations. While the Landing Craft Medium (LCM) 1E is a very capable ship-to-shore connector and will provide enhanced capability during ship-to-shore operations (including the ability to transport an Abrams battle tank), it is not capable of prolonged riverine or distributed operations. Currently, this capability is partially filled (somewhat poorly) by use of both the LCM8 watercraft and LARC V amphibious vehicle. To date the ADF has not identified a replacement for the ageing amphibian or the Army’s independent watercraft fleets, despite the fact that these are due to be decommissioned in 2017. This capability cannot be provided by the new LCM1E as it does not possess the crew habitability or the survivability required for distributed manoeuvre. It is also unsuited to prolonged independent riverine operations and its size precludes it from a number of tactical applications.
Given that current operational watercraft fleets are less than ideal for use within the region’s restricted waterways, the ADAS system’s failure to procure a watercraft capable of riverine and tactical inshore operations will further degrade this essential capability. Additionally, the LCM1E is integral to the LHD and is likely to be withdrawn once the initial amphibious operation is complete and the LHDs return to Australia or are required elsewhere to conduct other operations. Clearly the acquisition of the ADAS system must be complemented by a force that is capable of operating within the riverine environment and manoeuvring in coastal areas. Failure to adequately address these key pieces of the amphibious puzzle may see the ADF unable to conduct anything other than an unopposed linear beach landing and helicopter insertion and deny it the ability to conduct surface manoeuvre within the littoral and river systems. This is a critical weakness in the ADAS system.
Clearly the acquisition of the ADAS system must be complemented by a force that is capable of operating within the riverine environment and manoeuvring in coastal areas.
In the Australasian region, waterways often serve as primary lines of communication and will potentially constitute key terrain. Riverine operations seek to project power ashore by exploiting the riverine manoeuvre space and are complementary to the principles of manoeuvre. These operations should be conducted by a riverine force task-organised to operate within river systems and capable of adapting to the unique characteristics of this environment.6 If the ADF fails to acquire a riverine capability, its ability to conduct extended manoeuvre within a significant portion of its primary operating environment will be severely curtailed. The recent experiences of coalition partners in Iraq highlight the importance of dominating river systems. The Royal Marines patrolled Iraq’s vast river systems during Operation TELIC, denying the enemy mobility and resupply. The fifty craft and 185 personnel of 539 Assault Squadron, Royal Marines, conducted extensive patrols and were involved in the initial assault on the Al Faw Peninsula and clearing operations on the Khawr Abd Allah, Khawr az Zubayr, Shatt al Basra and the Shatt al Arab waterways. The squadron saw continuous operations for thirty-one days across distances of over ninety nautical miles during which it conducted three opposed landings and fired in excess of 10,000 rounds.7 The British experience highlights the need for a capable riverine force to conduct operations across large river systems and coastal areas. This is particularly pertinent to Australia’s immediate region which is dominated by archipelagos, large river systems and limited port and road infrastructure. To place this in perspective, Australia’s closest neighbour, Papua New Guinea, has 10,940 kilometres of navigable rivers and only 686 kilometres of sealed roads.8 While special forces operate small, fast, armed craft such as the eleven-metre rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIB), it is unlikely that these units will be tasked to conduct extended riverine patrols. However, a conventional riverine force would be capable of enduring manoeuvre in the coastal regions and river systems that dominate Australia’s primary operating environment. Failure to acquire such a force will severely limit the Commander Amphibious Task Group’s options and ability to project force within the area of operations.
The failure of the ADAS system to procure a craft capable of tactical manoeuvre within river systems and shallow waters will significantly reduce the ADF’s ability to conduct surface manoeuvre within the region. To a large extent, the flexibility and effectiveness offered by a riverine force is dependent on the surface craft employed. The Royal Marines use a mixture of Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP) and Offshore Raiding Craft (ORC) to control river systems, deliver combat power and conduct tactical resupply deep into the area of operations from a seabase positioned offshore. For these craft, survivability is an essential attribute. Survivable, deployable surface craft that minimise their signature and reduce their ability to be detected and engaged by advanced weapons are vital for riverine operations. Survivability can be achieved through a mix of stealth, speed, manoeuvrability, deployability and armour. The LCM1E and large ocean-going landing craft acquired within the ADAS system will be designed as transport vessels rather than manoeuvre assets capable of providing tactical support to the land force through the use of fire and manoeuvre.
Survivable, deployable surface craft that minimise their signature and reduce their ability to be detected and engaged by advanced weapons are vital for riverine operations.
It is also likely that the LCM1E will be commanded and crewed by Royal Australian Navy (RAN) rather than Army personnel, which will significantly affect the support available to the Land Force Commander. It is unlikely that RAN assets will be allocated to the Land Force Commander to support his scheme of manoeuvre or to conduct the prolonged independent operations required for distributed manoeuvre. Unlike the LCM8, the LCM1E has no crew accommodation, limiting its ability to project from the LHD for extended periods. The LCM1E is likely to return to its parent ship once the land force has conducted its lodgement. Despite this, the small number of LCM1E landing craft procured within the ADAS system will be capable of achieving the initial requirement of the insertion, which is ‘... to project two company groups by surface assault in multiple waves, up to two discrete SPODs [sea point of disembarkation] or beach landing sites’.9 It is unlikely, however, that this assault could be prosecuted within any credible threat environment without supplementation from smaller, faster craft.
Operational flexibility and tactical impact could be maximised by the conduct of simultaneous surface and air assaults from the LHDs utilising small, fast craft coupled with amphibians and LCM1Es. These smaller vessels provide the means to rapidly project force to multiple locations, enabling distributed manoeuvre and simultaneous action. The operational pause and channelling effect of a single beach landing site would be reduced by the use of amphibians and alternative surface options. Amphibians are able to cross unprepared beaches and move directly to the objective during inclement weather and large swells. Currently, the only means of projecting surface forces from the LHDs is via LCM1Es and special forces craft. The LCM1E is constrained by tidal variations, surf zones and, when laden, is capable of only twelve knots.10 The ADAS system is yet to be complemented with tactical manoeuvre capabilities that provide force protection, riverine, estuarine and archipelagic surface manoeuvre support to the Land Force Commander’s scheme of manoeuvre.11 While the LHDs will provide the capability to project force throughout Australia’s primary operating environment and possibly beyond, once in theatre, littoral manoeuvre will be prosecuted by various types of watercraft, amphibians and helicopters, not ship-to-shore connectors. Operations within the region may necessitate the use of watercraft capable of riverine operations and independent coastal tasks over a prolonged period. The LCH replacements will possess the ability to transit blue water and conduct independent coastal operations; however, the size and draught of these large vessels will preclude them from many tactical applications and all but the deepest rivers.
Operations within the region may necessitate the use of watercraft capable of riverine operations and independent coastal tasks over a prolonged period.
ADAS will herald another loss in capability with the decommissioning of the LARC V amphibious vehicle without an identified replacement. An amphibious vehicle provides significant flexibility to an amphibious operation as it is not constrained by the lack of local infrastructure, tidal variations or available beach exits. It also provides the commander with the option to insert or withdraw forces deep into the area of operations when environmental or tactical conditions preclude the use of helicopters. Amphibians are capable of delivering large quantities of aid and supplies without the need for landing craft, additional wheeled transport, ports or prepared beaches. Helicopters can provide all that an amphibian can; however, helicopters are often constrained by weather conditions and the availability of landing sites and air hours, making them unreliable for disaster relief operations and tactical resupply. The demise of the LARC V will also affect the JP 2059 (bulk liquid distribution) project, which relies heavily on the LARC V for the deployment and recovery of a large floating fuel dracone (the Towed Flexible Barge Discharge System). Without the LARC V, this component of JP 2059 will require significant revision. The use of amphibious vehicles in a non-combatant evacuation or disaster relief operation provides the flexibility to move straight to the objective without a change in transport mode or the need for prepared landing sites. Amphibians are particularly useful in flood-damaged areas where roads and landing points may be inundated with water, mud or debris. The unique attributes of amphibious vehicles provide a niche capability that allows surface manoeuvre in a variety of operations and conditions.
The littoral manoeuvre concepts of ship-to-objective manoeuvre, distributed manoeuvre and sea-basing as defined in current Australian doctrine require the conduct of extensive training before they can become feasible options for the projection and sustainment of land forces from an amphibious task group. Indeed, acquiring equipment and training operators to negotiate the inherent difficulties of the littoral environment is key to the development of amphibious skills and capabilities commensurate with those of Australia’s coalition partners. A recent comment by the Chief of Army highlighted this need: ‘... amphibious-related individual and collective training requirements exceed baseline infantry skills, as the landing force requires exposure to the maritime environment of surface and air assault’.12 If the ADF is to possess a capable amphibious force with the ability to conduct successful littoral manoeuvre, Australian forces must be equipped and trained to fight within coastal and riverine areas. The ADF’s planners are constantly challenged to adapt land-centric organisations, procedures and equipment to their maritime equivalents so as to create or maintain critical balances between land compatibility and maritime constraints.13 Interestingly, the Chief of Army suggested that Australia provide one online battlegroup at the same certification as the ADF’s coalition partners, confirming that the Royal Marines and US Marine Corps have been identified as models for Australia to emulate. This aspiration is indeed ambitious given the ADF’s lack of a dedicated amphibious force or training establishment to teach the required amphibious skillsets. If Australia is to emulate these capable, well-trained and well-resourced amphibious forces, it must be prepared to enhance amphibious training across the Army. The Royal Marines and the US Marine Corps are specifically trained and equipped to fight in the amphibious environment. To train a battalion to perform these tasks on a rotational basis would be problematic at best as operating effectively within the littoral environment requires specific skill-sets that would be difficult to gain within a twelve-month rotation. The landing force must be trained and equipped to dominate the amphibious objective and exploit the riverine system in order to dislocate objectives or bypass opposition.
The landing force must be trained and equipped to dominate the amphibious objective and exploit the riverine system in order to dislocate objectives or bypass opposition.
In the quest for an organisation to benchmark the ADF’s future capability, British amphibious forces offer an example of a flexible, well-equipped force with a similar culture and method of operation to that of the ADF. The 3rd Commando Brigade is a core component of Britain’s Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Working in unison with the Royal Navy’s amphibious ships, the brigade represents a highly mobile, selfsustained and versatile organisation with a strategic power projection capability that is unique within the British armed forces.14 A recent Army Headquarters discussion paper concluded that the British model reflects a scale and structure that Australia could realise and offers an appropriate design that Australia would be wise to mirror.15 Royal Marine soldiers and officers understand the intricacies of operating in the maritime environment and the command structures that are unique to amphibious operations. The Royal Marines possess dedicated reconnaissance elements that are trained in shallow water diving and the operation of small, fast reconnaissance and riverine patrol boats which are fitted with armour and multiple weapon systems. Once in theatre, the Royal Marine Amphibious Task Group’s main effort is the execution of land force manoeuvre within the amphibious operations area, rather than the manoeuvring of major Naval fleet units. Conversely, current ADF amphibious operations seem to focus on Naval skill-sets, largely ignoring the requirement to integrate land force and maritime component manoeuvre. If the ADF is to develop an amphibious capability comparable to that of its closest coalition partners, a paradigm shift in training and culture is required.
Three options are currently being considered for the construct of the amphibious land force—and each of these options carries its own risks. Option one involves the tasking of a battlegroup as the amphibious specialist battalion, similar to an airborne battlegroup. This option would promote a high level of capability; however, it would also introduce force rotation issues.16 The viability of this option has been questioned given the ADF’s current focus on operations in Afghanistan—a view that appears somewhat short-sighted. To argue that none of the ADF’s ten battlegroups should become amphibious entry professionals because of current operational commitments involves flawed logic and may result in a failure to utilise new capability to its full potential. Like motorised and mechanised infantry, there is no reason amphibious infantrymen cannot be employed in Afghanistan. Currently, both the Royal Marines and US Marines are heavily involved in operations in Afghanistan.
Like motorised and mechanised infantry, there is no reason amphibious infantrymen cannot be employed in Afghanistan. Currently, both the Royal Marines and US Marines are heavily involved in operations in Afghanistan.
Option two involves tasking a brigade as the amphibious brigade similar to the US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit and Britain’s Royal Marines. This option has the potential to dilute amphibious skills across three battalions which would presumably rotate through amphibious battlegroup responsibilities. Option three goes one step further and envisages all of Australia’s ten battlegroups rotating through the amphibious role. This model allows the cultivation of very broad amphibious skills, but does not permit the development of expertise such as that of the ADF’s coalition partners. For a small army such as Australia’s to seek to develop skills comparable to the Royal Marines and US Marine Corps without focusing its limited resources on one battlegroup is ambitious indeed. Thus this option will most likely dilute expertise to such an extent that the ADF will not only fail to develop skill-sets comparable to those of its coalition partners, but may fall short of developing sufficient expertise to successfully prosecute amphibious operations at all.
Littoral manoeuvre must remain focused on projection and sustainment of land forces from major fleet units into the land area of operations. This is a capability that must be built through training and the acquisition of capable platforms. Currently, amphibious operations are not focused sufficiently on the land force, with the Amphibious Task Group preoccupied instead with the manoeuvre of RAN major fleet units rather than holistic land, sea and air manoeuvre in support of land force operations. This focus would be assured with the appointment of a Commander Australian Amphibious Task Group from the Army rather than the RAN. A paradigm shift in training and operations is also required if the ADF is to develop an amphibious capability commensurate with that of its coalition partners. The projection and sustainment of an effective land force requires personnel and equipment capable of negotiating the challenges of the littoral for a longer period than the initial lodgement. These are the enablers that will determine the way an operation is executed and whether distributed manoeuvre, ship-to-objective manoeuvre and sea-basing are viable. These enablers require resource allocation and robust conceptual development to ensure littoral manoeuvre is not constrained by a lack of suitable platforms or knowledge. Smaller, faster landing craft coupled with amphibians provide the means to rapidly project force, extract foreign nationals, distribute aid or deploy medical teams. This capability is vital for both warfighting and disaster relief.
Conceptually, amphibious operations require a flexible, specifically trained and balanced force with the ability to project swiftly from LHDs and continue to operate within the littoral and river systems once the ships have departed. While the acquisition of the ADAS system will provide a means of projecting and supporting forces within and beyond Australia’s primary operating environment, it is littoral manoeuvre within the amphibious operating environment that requires a paradigm shift, as the Chief of Army noted recently, ‘Our Army amphibious capability does not necessarily need to be called Marines but it needs to train, look and fight like Marines.’17 To train, look and fight like Marines, the Army needs to significantly enhance its amphibious training and—just as importantly—acquire platforms with similar capabilities to those of its coalition partners.
To train, look and fight like Marines.’ To train, look and fight like Marines, the Army needs to significantly enhance its amphibious training and—just as importantly—acquire platforms with similar capabilities to those of its coalition partners.
The ADAS system provides the means to transit to theatre; however, it does not provide the means to conduct all aspects of littoral manoeuvre. Once the Amphibious Task Group has arrived in theatre, the focus must shift from the maritime component to land force manoeuvre. In order to conduct extended tactical land force manoeuvre within the littoral a range of surface vessels must be available to the Commander Land Forces, not just the Maritime Commander. If the ADF is to build an amphibious capability comparable to that of Britain and the United States, it must be prepared to resource additional training and acquire equipment that can operate tactically within the littoral. Without a capable amphibian and small, fast and armed watercraft, the ADF may lack the ability to conduct anything other than a linear beach landing in a single location. Training and equipping a capable amphibious force is much more than purchasing a few large ships and landing craft. To become a truly capable amphibious force and realise its amphibious ambitions, Australia must be able to dominate the coastal area and river systems through the use of capable platforms and well-trained personnel. The ADAS system must become a platform capable of supporting littoral manoeuvre within Australia’s primary operating environment and beyond.
About the Author
In 2010, Captain Clark was employed as the Officer Commanding the Amphibious Beach Team. During this time he conducted exercises with the New Zealand, United States, French and United Kingdom amphibious forces. He was also attached to 3rd Royal Marine Commando Brigade for Exercise AURIGA, which was conducted in the United States. Captain Clark is now employed as the Officer Commanding 30 Terminal Squadron.
Endnotes
1 Australia’s Amphibious Concept (version 5.2), Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 2010.
2 Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 73
3 Australia’s Amphibious Concept (version 5.2).
4 Ibid.
5 NATO ATP-8 (B), Vol. I, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, July 2004, p. 1–2. <http://intranet.defence.gov.au/home/documents/data/NAVYPUBS/NAVYMISC/AT…;.
6 Ibid.
7 For a description of this operation, see ‘539 Assault Squadron Royal Marines’, <http://www.onceamarinealwaysamarine.co.uk/539telic.htm> accessed 5 August 2010.
8 Dale Crisp, ‘Troubled times in paradise’, Lloyd’s List Daily Commercial News (Infoarmy Australia), 7 September 2009, pp. 11–14.
9 Australia’s Amphibious Concept (version 5.2).
10 See ‘LHD Characteristics’, <http://intranet.defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/jacit/comweb.asp?page=1222…; accessed 4 August 2010.
11 Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, September 2009, <http://intranet.defence.gov.au/armyweb/sites/DFLWS/docs/Adaptive_Campai…; accessed 11 August 2010.
12 Chief of Army’s address to Seapower 2010 Conference, Darling Harbour, 27 January 2010.
13 NATO ATP-8 (B), Vol. I, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.
14 See the Royal Marines website, <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/royalmarines/> accessed 8 August 2010.
15 ‘The Amphibious Amphitheatre, Amphibious Warfare’, discussion paper: <http://intranet.defence.gov.au/.../AHQ_Amphibious_Warfare_Discussion_Pa…; accessed 6 August 2010.
16 Chief of Army’s address to Seapower 2010 Conference.
17 ‘The Amphibious Amphitheatre’.
