Size Matters: Turning to Small Teams to Succeed at Counterinsurgency

Journal Edition

Abstract

This article discusses the unconventional thoughts of H John Poole and his advocacy of small teams as the key to success in counterinsurgency conflict, and whether with modification they may find application in our own ongoing counterinsurgency effort in Uruzgan.

Introduction

The ADF is currently entering its ninth year of the ongoing campaign to eliminate terrorist safe havens and assist in the removal of a resurgent Taliban in order to create a democratic Islamic state in Afghanistan under the auspices of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As it is well known, the foundations for today’s campaigns are a direct consequence of the actions of the Taliban-backed al-Qaeda network and the series of attacks that culminated with their 11 September 2001 strike on the United States mainland.

Nine years on, are we any closer to achieving victory in this campaign to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and radical Islamic extremists? And is there a way to produce greater effects on the ground at the tactical level? The aim of this article is to discuss possible ways forward at the combat team, platoon and small team level to take away the insurgents base among the people, while continuing to build a credible Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Current Issue at the Tactical Level

This article came about as a direct result of my observations recorded throughout my deployment as part of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) with the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 1 (MRTF 1). Always at the forefront of my thinking after returning from a patrol were the questions ‘What is happening now after I’ve left?’ and ‘What are the insurgents doing out there now that there are no coalition forces about?’ I would often look out beyond the Hesco and study the valley, and wonder what could be achieved if we had a more permanent presence on the ground, denying the insurgents the ability to reoccupy an area after we had departed. The ANA at that point were some time away from having the ability to conduct independent tasks by night, and at times would only reluctantly join partnered missions of extended duration for a variety of reasons, both logistic and capability related. When this was coupled with the lack of combat team presence for large portions of time within a particular piece of the area of operations, it affects ones ability to create lasting influence over that piece of the battlespace. From my perspective this was an issue that needed to be resolved, but in real terms it would prove both complex and difficult to apply quick fixes. By chance I came across the work Tequila Junction by H John Poole, a former US marine corps NCO and officer who writes extensively on small unit tactics. He had produced a work that focused on the emerging crisis in Latin America and how it ties into what is occurring in the Middle East. Though it is in parts idealistic, impractical and certainly agenda driven, there were some points worth taking away. The one that provided the most interest was the technique he had devised for countering insurgents in their own traditional safe areas, the so called ‘Fire Team Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR)’¹ approach.

Our force in Afghanistan has replaced the previous MTRF organisation. This force is structured around an Infantry battle group and is charged with primarily building Afghan army capability through its operational mentoring and liaison teams, while on a separate line of operation providing limited protected reconstruction to the population. Though the new task force is now moving away from this reconstruction aspect and is focusing more on the mentoring role, there continues to be an ongoing inability to generate anything more than short-term effects on the ground at the tactical level, as the presence of coalition forces is at best transitory. This issue is somewhat alleviated by the ‘ink spot’ approach of construction and garrisoning of patrol bases by the coalition in conjunction with the ANA, but it does not change the fact that the insurgents can still move relatively freely among the population when the ISAF forces are not ‘outside the wire’. Could the methods discussed by Poole in his dissertation of modern counterinsurgency operations possibly have some practical application on the ground in Uruzgan?

Poole advocates in his latest work the need for change at the tactical level in the way we conduct counterinsurgency operations. He believes there are inherent problems with the way we think about and approach counterinsurgency, and asserts that militaries such as those in the ABCA (American, British, Canadian, Australian) alliance are hamstrung in their methods of countering insurgents as we employ ‘top down’ decision-making structures, whereas insurgency needs to be confronted from the bottom up.

He believes we are too slow to adapt to changing situations at the tactical level, and need to be more flexible in our approach while altering our training methods and doing away with traditional infantry force structures if we are to beat insurgents at their own game on their turf. One example of this is a comparison he makes between Mexican drug cartels and American law enforcement agencies. A study carried out in 2006 suggested organised crime syndicates can often move through their own version of Boyd’s decision-making cycle up to six times before a federal agency has completed one. Therefore the government is permanently playing catch-up as they are only reactionary to the tempo and momentum maintained by the adversary.²

Fire Team TAOR Concept

Poole advocates a more decentralised approach to how we conduct counterinsurgency operations. He believes that in order to win at a tactical level, we must continue to empower junior leaders and give them increased autonomy while conventional force structures are not the optimum solution for fighting a well organised irregular opposition. His alternative is what he has termed the ‘Fire Team TAOR concept’.

Poole’s Fire Team TAOR concept revolves around evolving the traditional battalion or combat team structure into ‘combined action platoons’, consisting of an infantry platoon augmented by host nation police and military. They then flood an area of operations with scores of fire team sized groups who live for extended periods in mutually supporting mini TAORs. These forces would focus less on kinetic effects and perform a role more akin to that of ‘beat cops’ within their respective locations. They would receive extra medical, engineering and unconventional warfare training. By virtue of living among the population for protracted periods, they would be better placed to disrupt and detect insurgent patterns of movement and methods of operating. Poole believes that a battalion employed in this manner may well produce effects on the ground out of proportion to their numbers, and that those conventional force elements, such as company and platoon size groups that we traditionally employ, are often not the optimum sizes or structures for fighting an asymmetric fight in complex terrain. His alternative, the flooding of an area with many small teams operating in a decentralised manner, is described as:

The pre-requisite then to 4th Generation Counterinsurgency is better training to all US infantrymen, then deploying them in small, semi-autonomous teams throughout a besieged population. Of course for the more risky situations the GI’s would need UW training. At least then throughout the contested peasantry there would be someone to counter the Islamic aggressor.³

At first glance it may seem his theories are impractical or possibly even dangerous given his emphasis on small force sizes and the level of autonomy under which they would operate. However, if we were to take Poole’s example and modify it to suit our own ends, it may prove to be a workable tactical level innovation that can help keep the initiative against the insurgents. Poole describes the employment of such groups as:

that means spreading lone rifle squads across some of the most volatile regions of several foreign countries. Besides advanced light infantry training these squads will need instruction on criminal investigative procedure. Then instead of filling the unpopular role of occupier, they can help local police and soldiers, (through combined action platoons) to maintain order...

He went on further to say:

finally each squad will need and engineer and medic attached to assist with the rebuilding of infrastructure. To succeed over the long term, a counterinsurgency effort must do more than just provide security. It must score commensurate gains across all 4th generation warfare (4GW) arenas: (1) martial/combat; (2) political/media; (3) economic/infrastructure; and (4) psychological/religion.⁴

Could the employment of dozens of small team size force elements among the rural areas of the Mirabad or Baluchi Valley for protracted periods prove to be a viable alternative to the current methods we are employing? By Poole’s logic it is not only a workable option but a necessity if we are to permanently dislocate the insurgents from the population. As previously discussed, the single biggest shortcoming of the current methods we employ at the tactical level is the limited duration our force elements remain on the ground and in touch with the local population. While an operation is being conducted we are able to project force at will wherever we choose; however, it is after the combat team returns to base that the gains on the ground are lost. It is a particularly frustrating part of counterinsurgency operations to know that within a short time of a coalition force lifting from an area, the insurgents will be back debriefing the population and attempting to undermine our efforts through a combination of propaganda, intimidation and coercion. The mere fact that they are able to return is proof to the undecided local population that ISAF cannot guarantee permanent security, providing the Taliban a free Information Operations victory without cost to themselves. As long as this impasse exists, the local population will remain hesitant to back the government, because while they can see all the good we are attempting to do, it is quickly undone after we depart their village. The result is an ongoing waiting game where the insurgents, by virtue of being born and bred in the area, will win if they have the willpower to outlast the coalition. As both we and the opposition are well aware, time is on their side.

An Australian Alternative

How can this be countered by the application of Poole’s techniques? If they were to be employed in an Australian context, we could see the employment of a platoon broken down into section sized groups within their own mutually supporting mini TAORs in the Mirabad or Chora valleys or elsewhere. They would be within range of the fire support assets located on the nearest patrol bases, while using these locations as their theatre rendezvous in the event of coming under sustained insurgent attack, while also offering a go-to location if a casualty is sustained or illness occurs. Their placement within the community in the immediate vicinity of the existing patrol bases would also allow for greater freedom of movement of the ANA and OMLT teams already in these locations. This second order effect is achieved by virtue of them being a semi-permanent fixture within the community, therefore providing a safer operating environment for the OMLT/ANA teams moving to and from their patrol bases. These teams would, through observation and deterrent patrolling, secure the ground behind or in advance of both large scale deliberate operations and day to day framework patrols carried out within their immediate TAOR by other friendly force elements. They would also inhibit local insurgents’ freedom of action by keeping them off balance, therefore denying sanctuary, while concurrently identifying newcomers into the local communities. Furthermore they would also restrict insurgent groups’ mobility and their ability of to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or engage coalition forces with direct or indirect fires. This is made possible by the fact that the insurgents are never going to be sure of the coalition forces’ position, or when they will be targeted by the coalition forces living and operating around the clock in what were traditionally their safe areas.

Conducting partnered missions with the OMLT/ANA and denying known resupply and infil/exfil routes as often as possible will significantly hinder the insurgent ability to sustain their IED cells, maintain cache holdings and resupply fighters in location. It will also make it harder to rotate fighters into or out of an area of operations and conduct casualty evacuation activities. These are regular insurgent actions traditionally carried out under the cover of darkness when they are able to transit the battlespace relatively free from interference from ANA or coalition forces. A protracted presence within an area will also prove valuable with the seasonal nature of the conflict. The cold season exodus and spring-time reinfiltrating of fighters would prove significantly harder for the insurgents to manage when denied concealment amongst the population. As the insurgents do, we need to approach this campaign seasonally. Tarin Kowt should be relatively empty during harvest season as we attempt to flood the area of operations in order to keep the insurgents contained, while in winter we can scale back our footprint on the ground accordingly.

The Australian section on the ground with a Combat First Aider per call sign, Joint Terminal Air Controller and engineer located with platoon headquarters, supported by interpreters at section level with embedded Afghan National Police (ANP) liaison, could overmatch most insurgent groups with the weapon systems and individual soldier skills at their disposal. The field craft and marksmanship of the Australian soldier is superior to the insurgent, which has been proven time and again over the past few years. Our ability to break deadlocks with air or indirect fires is also a massive force multiplier in contact. Furthermore, if fixed and under pressure, a section could call upon the support of their neighbouring call signs to bolster their numbers or relieve them if the situation required, while the OMLT and ANA from the nearest patrol base can also be utilised as a quick reaction force if needed. There is also the indirect fire assets located on the patrol bases. The supporting effects provided from 81mm mortars are also an excellent force multiplier. The issue of using supporting fires requires careful consideration, given the tightening of restrictions by ISAF on the use of close air support and indirect fires, particularly in close proximity to populated areas; however, if the situation warrants, support can be provided—which is reassuring to those out on the ground.

A further method of dislocating the insurgents is the employment of satellite patrolling, which has also shown to be a very effective means of keeping the insurgents off balance. They have been reluctant to engage our patrols when unsure of the exact location of our call signs on the ground. This overloading of their spotter network via multiple call signs moving in the same area erodes their command and control and gives their commanders reduced situational awareness. The end result is they are reluctant to commit to direct fire engagements. The use of multiple section sized patrols in adjoining TAOR’s for extended periods is an extension or enhancement of this principle.

Provided we do not fall into the trap of complacency and pattern setting, it is possible that an Australian section-sized group could dominate a small TAOR for a protracted period, given adequate support from neighbouring force elements and the resident patrol base in their immediate vicinity. The real advantage of this system is evident at night, where our sensors and night vision afford us a considerable advantage over the insurgent. The ability to interdict their freedom of movement and other actions traditionally performed during hours of darkness would cause significant disruption the way the insurgents operate, forcing them to take more risk when carrying out actions such as resupplying caches, laying IEDs and rotating fighters into and out of the area of operations. The forced change to their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) or heightened chance of compromise in turn increases the ISAF’s chances of successfully capturing or killing these individuals.

As mentioned above, the need to avoid setting patterns and routines cannot be underestimated. The enemy is astute in their observation of our actions and activities and constantly evolve their own TTPs to counter ours. Our movements are reported via a well developed spotter network from the moment we leave the forward operating base. This is where a force element deployed for a longer duration on the ground within these contested areas would be a valuable asset in denying the enemy situational awareness of our movements, and inhibiting their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. This aspect goes hand in hand with the tactical employment of our sections on the ground, and the trust that would need to be placed in the tactical judgment of the junior NCOs in charge of these call signs. Some would say it is too much responsibility, but I believe our section commanders are more than up to the task. A further benefit of a longer term presence in the rural area is the ISR aspect and the shortening of the sensor-to-shooter link that currently exists. Most operations are intelligence driven; however, there sometimes exists a significant time lapse from when the information is sourced and corroborated, to then finally being acted upon. On numerous occasions we have launched operations based on the strength of word of mouth from a local source, then turned up empty handed. A section deployed for extended duration in an area would be well placed to observe, record and report any movement of persons of interest, shuras or attempts at infiltration into a given area and provide a more reliable source of ground truth for higher headquarters while enabling short notice or time sensitive information to be acted upon quickly. This could prove a useful addition to the F3EA (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit and Analyse) targeting model currently successfully employed in theatre by TF66 and assist in increased interoperability and information sharing between the two organisations in order to achieve greater synchronisation of effects on the ground.⁵

These sections would be a constant presence out on the ground in the villages and would work closely with community leaders to continue to improve local living conditions through medical and minor works projects. Their presence would also allow greater access by both provincial reconstruction teams and enhance the ability of government and non-government aid agencies to reach out into these communities and interact with the population at a grassroots level. This aspect is crucial to help break down the traditional distrust of outsiders that the locals have and help overcome their negative perception of the central government’s ability to have an effect within rural areas. This traditional allegiance to tribe and clan rather than to an ideal of state or nation will continue to be an ongoing issue that will take time to overcome in areas outside of major regional centres.

While current force ratios in Uruzgan would make this concept difficult to successfully implement at present, a possible method of employing this approach could be as follows: a combat team held in Tarin Kowt for quick reaction force and other deliberate operations; a company broken down and deployed into half platoon groups to bolster the various patrol bases; support company providing the bulk of the OMLT; and the third rifle company providing the force element tasked with the ‘Fire Team TAOR’ or ‘area of operations saturation’ role. Each combat team, (except the OMLT) would rotate through the three tasks in one, perhaps two-month blocks. Given the demanding nature of this task, it would be necessary to experiment with the duration of this particular role in order to find the optimum timeframe for a call sign to be deployed without suffering excessive fatigue and performance degradation that could compromise safety and effects generated on the ground.

The concept outlined by Poole could be discounted or written off as impractical or possibly overly dangerous; however, the noted Australian counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen also writes of the benefits of this decentralised approach in his essay ‘28 Articles’. From article 16 he states:

Practice deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for this, including flooding an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be considered a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all the patrols are, making an attack on any one patrol extremely risky.⁶

While our current TTPs ensure we are not falling into the pitfalls detailed by Kilcullen and others, I believe there is still more that could be done at the tactical level to deny insurgent freedom of action within Uruzgan. Poole’s methods, adjusted to suit our requirements, may just be the answer. However, a change in tactics at the combat team level is only one aspect. We need to remain mindful of the fact that while the construction and garrisoning of patrol bases across the province has proved a positive move to date, it will not provide the ultimate tool at the tactical level to defeat the insurgency.

Kilcullen further reminds us of the dangers of becoming mired in a forward operating base or fortress mentality where coalition troops only sortie but in overwhelming numbers, are overly reliant on mobility platforms, and are only on the ground for short periods and therefore fail to engage with the local populace. His point 10 from ‘28 Articles’ reads in part:

...your first order of business is to establish presence. If you can’t do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach: living in your sector, in close proximity to the population rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling—all of these things seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with.⁷

The reoccurring theme among counterinsurgency experts is that the link with the population is key to successful prosecution of a counterinsurgency campaign. Decentralising our force structures down to the small team level could prove the most effective means to achieve this within our area of operations given the environment in which we are operating.

Conclusion

The opinions and possibilities presented by Poole and Kilcullen are but one line of operation in what is an exceedingly complex problem. History shows us numerous examples where innovation and winning at the tactical level does not equal defeating an insurgency. The ‘bush war’ fought by the Rhodesians is a great example of that. However, there is far more to resolving Afghanistan’s current problems than a tactical level shift in how we operate. There continues to be a great deal that needs to be done in areas such as border control, governance, and eliminating nepotism and the endemic corruption that pervades the government from the lowest levels before Afghanistan is able to be held up as an example of a stable and progressive society that is moving forward, as opposed to the state of play that currently exists in the country.

Continuing to build a credible Afghan army and police force, provision of basic community services in the rural areas and extending rule of law outside of Kabul and the major regional population centres are examples of several of the massive challenges currently confronting ISAF in country. We need to remain adaptive in our campaign, and techniques such as those discussed here provide another option in the ongoing effort to maintain the initiative and set the tempo while ensuring what is a clever, resourceful and determined opponent is kept on the back foot. It goes without saying that in counterinsurgency one cannot win by being reactive or losing support of the population.

The platoon house method adopted by MTRF 1 in the Mirabad Valley in early 2010 is a good example of how decentralising operations can bring success if given the proper resources, planning and interagency support. Another key is knowing the battlespace. What has proven to be a workable option in Uruzgan does not work so well for the British and Canadians in Helmand and Kandahar. The value of knowing the operating environment and adjusting the methods used accordingly is not to be underestimated. The danger of providing cookie cutter solutions to counterinsurgency is a real risk we must be aware of the longer this conflict continues.

Poole’s methods are an example of a decentralised approach to counterinsurgency that may provide a tactical level solution that ensures we continue to set the tempo and keep the insurgents off balance in Uruzgan. The question is, are we as an army ready to accept the challenges of decentralising command to the lowest levels in order to defeat the insurgency in which we are currently engaged?

About the Author

Sergeant Paul Dehnert enlisted into the Australian Army in 1992, serving initially in Ordnance Corps. He transferred in 1996 to Infantry and has served with the 5/7th and 7th Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment, and also as an instructor in Rifleman Wing at the School of Infantry. He has served operationally on numerous deployments, the most recent of which was to Afghanistan as a Platoon Mentor within the OMLT as part of the First Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force. He is currently posted to Adelaide Universities Regiment where he is an instructor for Army Reserve Initial Employment Training Courses.