Boldness Be My Friend: Why the High Risk Plan is Often the Safest (and the Most Successful)

Abstract

In the second half of 2009, two Australian officers served at the Headquarters of the United States Marine Corps 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) in Southern Helmand Province, Afghanistan. During this period the 2d MEB conducted significant offensive and counterinsurgency operations. This article focuses on one of these operations—EASTERN RESOLVE II—to act as a snapshot of 2d MEB activities and to draw lessons from the USMC experience for Australian Army audiences.

In August 2009 the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB), United States Marine Corps (USMC) conducted an operation to seize key terrain in the Now Zad District of Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The operation brought together a unique task-organised force structure from within 2d MEB and attached elements from other government agencies to achieve brigade objectives within one of the battle group areas of operation. The operation, named EASTERN RESOLVE II, was notable for its diverse objectives, aggressive insertion methods and the swift achievement of its mission.

Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II seized key terrain, disrupted a well established opium production and distribution node and facilitated the establishment of local officials immediately prior to the 2009 Presidential Elections. It demonstrated that, with sound intelligence preparation, appropriate air cover and indirect fire support, conventional forces can utilise insertion methods normally associated with Special Forces. The battalion (-) airmobile assault proved the effectiveness of surprise and the potency of offensive action.

Background

Helmand is one of the most volatile provinces in Afghanistan, and it remains one of the most hotly contested areas of operation between the resurgent Taliban and Coalition forces. Prior to July 2009 there had been no permanent presence in much of the district south of the provincial capital Lashkar Gar. In early July 2009 the USMC reinforced its presence in the north with the deployment of the 2d MEB, also known as the Marine Expeditionary Brigade – Afghanistan (MEB-A), with its headquarters established at Camp Leatherneck. ¹

The USMC doctrinally only deploys packaged combined arms teams, known as Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). The MEB-A consisted of a potent combination of an Infantry regiment (Australian brigade equivalent), a Combat Logistics Regiment and a Marine Air Group consisting of utility, lift and attack helicopters, fixed-wing lift and attack aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.² From 2 July 2009 the MEB-A deployed approximately 4000 Marines and 650 Afghan troops into the area of operations as a part of Operation KHANJAR or Operation STRIKE OF THE SWORD. The operation was the largest Marine offensive since the Battle of Fallujah in 2004 and was the biggest offensive airlift by the Marines since the Vietnam War.³

The Marines pushed into three significant areas along a 75-mile stretch of the Helmand River valley south of Lashkar Gah. Two Marine infantry battalions and one Marine Light Armored Reconnaissance battalion spearheaded the operation. In the north, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines (2/8) pushed into Garmsir district. In central Helmand, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) pushed into Nawa-I-Barakzayi to the south of Lashkar Gah and 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion deployed to the Khan Neshin district.

Marines and Coalition forces had occupied areas in the northern Helmand district of Now Zad for several years. The town of Now Zad, formerly the second largest in the Helmand Province, had been deserted since Coalition forces and the Taliban began a series of exchanges that saw the civilian population displaced to other cities and towns throughout Helmand. From 2006 the Coalition had deployed company-sized forces from the United Kingdom, Estonia and the United States which rotated through the forward operating base in the centre of Now Zad. At the same time, Taliban forces began systematically seeding the town with improvised explosive devices (IED) and reinforcing small villages and irrigation systems in the ‘Green Zone’—the vegetated area next to the seasonal waterway known as the Eastern Wadi.⁴ Over several years a standoff had developed, with neither group able to generate the combat power to clear the area, displace established bases or ensure freedom of movement.

Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II

Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II sought to break this stalemate by seizing key terrain, clearing a key drug bazaar and disrupting enemy command and control.

MEB-A planning staff, in conjunction with the Marines of Golf Company 2nd Battalion 3d Marine Regiment (G Co.2/3), identified the key terrain in this area as the Dehanna Pass: a critical junction of two knife-edged ridges that dominated the eastern side of the Now Zad area. The seasonal river bed of the Eastern Wadi ran through the Dehanna Pass and its dry banks provided a key movement route for Taliban supplies and reinforcements into the Green Zone.

The Taliban controlled this choke point by establishing check points to tax locals and had dug defensive positions to secure the Pass. A number of Soviet 12.7 DSchK heavy machine guns were known to dominate the Pass and its approaches, and the perennial threat of IEDs threatened any ground movement.

The second piece of key terrain was identified as the Salaam Bazaar, an area several kilometres south of Dehanna, known for its trade in opium, home made explosives and a suspected Taliban command and control node. This bazaar was one of many in the Helmand Province; however, this particular location influenced the Now Zad area because the sale of illicit drugs provided essential finance to local Taliban leaders, and the distribution of home made explosives directly threatened Coalition and civilian movement on all of the road and track systems in the area.⁵

Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II simultaneously targeted these two objectives, and sought to undermine the enemy’s centre of gravity by:

• Denying the ability to concentrate reinforcements;
• Dislocating enemy ground defensive structure based on dug in positions and routes seeded with mines and IEDs;
• Disrupt enemy command and control;
• Disrupt Taliban drug funding sources;
• Clear the Salaam Bazaar;
• Seize Dahanna Pass; and
• Control Dehanna Village.

The critical aspect of the operation was simultaneity. On H Hr, Marine HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) and Marine aviation assets targeted identified command and control nodes, while two reinforced company-sized groups conducted airmobile assaults to secure and clear their objectives. This approach targeted the enemy’s situational awareness and undermined their ability to concentrate reinforcements. The method of insertion dislocated the enemy’s defensive structure and achieved a high degree of tactical surprise.

The insertion of G Co(-) 2/3 was particularly notable. During the staff planning process the only secure landing zones identified were roughly two to three kilometres from the township of Dehanna. These sites would need continuous unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance and air cover from AH-1 Cobras. Each site provided a secure landing zone, but an insertion at either or both of these locations required an approach march that would have been easily identified and enabled an enemy withdrawal. This course of action is likely to have exposed the advancing Marines to enemy indirect fire, IEDs and direct attack. As a result, it was assessed that different courses of action needed to be considered. After much discussion, it was decided that G Co.2/3 should insert on the objective, thus maximising surprise, eliminating the enemy’s ability to withdraw or organise local defence, and swiftly securing the key terrain in the township.

Landing troop-laden helicopters immediately inside a known enemy village obviously entailed significant risk, but the planning staff mitigated this risk by the insertion of a reconnaissance platoon to provide overwatch, by the provision of on call fires from Marine HIMARS, 81mm and 120mm mortars, and by Marine fixed- and rotarywing assets. Furthermore, the insertion was to occur before first light, making the best use of coalition technology while targeting the enemy’s lack of night fighting capability.

Figure 1.

G Co. 2/3’s insertion was remarkably successful. The first wave landed no more than 50 metres from the local Taliban commander’s compound and had secured this initial objective within minutes. The landing received limited and uncoordinated small arms fire; however, the aggressiveness of the Marine response and the speed at which the Marines were able to close with the enemy and secure the key terrain denied the enemy the ability to organise resistance.

This action enabled subsequent heli-borne troops to land in safety and provided a secure base for the ground convoy to deploy into the Dehanna Pass and village. The ground insertion comprised additional forces attached to G Co. 2/3 as well as a company (-) of Afghan National Army (ANA). The ground convoy inserted with engineer bulldozer assets, which carved a new track to the Dehanna Pass to counter the threat of IEDs. Once in location, G Co. 2/3 (reinforced) secured the ground dominating the Pass, established defensive works and a vehicle control point, constructed a barrier across the stretch of the Eastern Wadi and occupied the Dehanna Village. The attached ANA Co.(-) was an essential aspect of this phase of the operation and, with their assistance liaising with locals and informing them of their new security, the immediate phase of the operation concluded.

Throughout the insertion and during the following three days, significant contact occurred between the Marines and local insurgents. Although not well coordinated, Taliban forces continued to engage Coalition forces in the Dehanna area and from dominating terrain. Marine air/ground teams engaged heavy machine gun and recoilless rifle positions in mountainside cave systems with precision artillery, helicopter, attack aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicle munitions. On 13 August 2010, a Taliban rocket propelled grenade ambush resulted in the death of a Marine. By the end of the third day, USMC and ANA forces had captured or killed a significant number of insurgents, cleared the area, established checkpoints and secured the town. Fundamental to this success was the surprise achieved by the initial insertion, which had enabled the capture of key leaders and disrupted the enemy’s ability to concentrate resistance.

At the Southern Oasis, a Task Force Raider—comprised of Alpha Company, 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion and personnel from other government agencies including US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials—landed by helicopter at the same time as G Co.’s initial launch. This group swiftly secured their objectives and cleared the Salaam Bazaar, seizing hundreds of gallons of sulphuric acid and acetic anhydride and thousands of pounds of drug lab components.⁶ They seized and destroyed tens of thousands of pounds of poppy seed and significant amounts of wet opium. Taliban in this area offered limited resistance, engaging Marines with small arms and accurate mortar fire from frequently changing locations. The Taliban also aimed to respond asymmetrically, and the Marine commander narrowly avoided significant friendly and civilian casualties when a vehicle-borne suicide bomber was detected by ground troops and destroyed by AH-1 Cobras close to the bazaar.

Within a period of 34-72 hours Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II had achieved all of its immediate objectives: The Dehanna Pass had been secured, the Dehanna village occupied and controlled by USMC and ANA forces, the Salaam Bazaar had been cleared, and significant amounts of contraband material had been seized or destroyed. The operation also achieved its effect on the enemy leadership, directly targeting key leaders thus undermining their ability to deploy a coordinated response to either area and significantly disrupting their command and control structure. The timings of these effects were particularly notable as Taliban throughout the region had a clearly identified intention to disrupt the August 2009 Presidential and Provincial elections.

Australian Lessons

Two Australian officers, Major Richard Barrett and Captain Michael Mudie served as embedded staff at the headquarters of 2d MEB, joining 2d MEB as individual reinforcements from exchange postings with the USMC. The experience provided a unique exposure to the conduct of warfighting and counterinsurgency operations in a combined arms and services brigade sized formation. Both officers identified a number of lessons relevant to an Australian Army context. In particular, Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II provided a succinct example of battle group offensive and security operations in a brigade setting.

In the Australian Officer Training Continuum several courses use tactical scenarios based on battle group activities in a brigade setting. Usually, these tactical scenarios are used as a part of the learning process to develop effective staff procedures and assess individual participation in the Military Appreciation Process (MAP). This training structure provided embedded Australian officers with a solid understanding of the MAP and a sound foundation for adaptation to the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The Australian version of the MAP and the United States MCPP essentially share the same structure, significantly assisting combined and joint planning capabilities. A key point of difference, however, was the absence of decisive event planning in the MCPP. For a number of operations, including EASTERN RESOLVE II, the inclusion of decisive event planning proved critical to the development of a feasible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection plan and as a means to prioritise and allocate competing national, brigade and battle group information requirements.

Figure 2.

Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II provided an interesting example of the relationship between a battle group and the brigade. The operation crossed a number of planning and physical boundaries between battle group and brigade activities, tasking battle group sub-units, deploying the Brigade Reserve and using other government agencies to achieve brigade objectives. 2/3 Battalion’s areas of operations included the Now Zad District, and its battalion headquarters maintained a set of operational priorities that did not include an activity to seize the Dehanna Pass or raid the Salaam Bazaar. This situation highlighted the fact that different levels of headquarters identify different priorities within the same battlespace. Consequently, brigade staff needed to carefully manage the tasking of G Co. 2/3, the deployment of Task Force Raider and the management of brigade battlespace issues within a subordinate headquarters’ area of operations.

The final lesson of Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II was the bold use of conventional forces to seize key terrain. Both G Co. 2/3 and Task Force Raider utilised conventional forces to achieve MEB-A objectives, and both used heli-borne insertion techniques most often associated with Special Forces. In an organisational environment that is increasingly preoccupied with the quantification of risk, landing conventional forces on the objective was a bold and dangerous undertaking. A staff process using Australian military risk management structures would have had to classify it in the extreme category, requiring National Command or Commander Joint Operations approval. In the case of Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II, the plan was recommended by the 2/3 Battalion Operations Officer and approved by the Brigade Commander. This level of command authority facilitated the development of an aggressive plan that was quickly executed. The force of the insertion achieved complete surprise, dislocating any insurgent capacity to repel attack, deploy IEDs or organise coherent resistance. The bold plan—aggressively executed insertion—achieved the mission, limited Marines’ exposure and actually reduced risk.

Conclusion

G Co. 2/3 and the ANA Co.(-) established a company outpost in the Dehanna area. Its presence denied the Taliban the ability to use the Eastern Wadi as a key movement and resupply route through the Now Zad District. The operation set the conditions for further Coalition action in the district, and facilitated the return of Afghan locals and district officials to repopulate the Now Zad township.⁷ Task Force Raider’s activity disrupted the supply of opium and IED materials and proved to be the first of several operations aimed at eventually closing down the Salaam Bazaar.⁸

Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II was a tactical success due to the willingness of USMC commanders to develop bold plans and to accept risk. The level of surprise and shock action achieved by a heli-borne insertion on the objective, as well as the conduct of simultaneous action on two dispersed locations, dislocated the enemy’s ability to prepare a coordinated response and targeted their command and control capacity. The bold and high risk course of action not only achieved a high degree of tactical success but also proved to be the safest.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Barrett is currently serving as the Chief Instructor of the Royal Military College (RMC) of Australia. He is also an infantry officer with regimental experience in 1 RAR, 2 RAR and 6 RAR and instructional experience at RMC. He served in the G35 (Operations/Plans) cell of HQ 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) in Helmand province, Afghanistan and was the lead planner for Operation EASTERN RESOLVE II.⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Barrett holds a Masters of International Affairs (ANU) and a Masters of Strategy and Planning (UNSW).

Endnotes

1     C Brummitt, ‘2nd MEB Marines Begin Afghanistan Ops’, Marine Corps Times, posted 9 June 2009, <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/06/ap_marines_afghanistan_sur…;

2     MEB-A aircraft: Helicopter Utility – UH1N Huey; Helicopter Lift – CH 53D Sea Stallion and CH 53E Super Stallion; Helicopter attack – AH-1 Cobra; Fixed-wing lift – KC-130; and Fixed-wing attack – AV-8B Harrier.

3     S Gaskell, ‘U.S. Marines launch Operation Khanjar – largest military offensive since 2004 battle of Fallujah’, NY Daily News, 2 July 2009, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/07/02/2009-07-02_us_milit…;

4     M Marquez, ‘Now Zad: A Comeback Complicated by Success’, ABC News (USA), 10 February 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/now-zad-afghanistan-town-helmand-se…;

5     B Ardolino, ‘A counterinsurgency conundrum in Salaam Bazaar’, The Long War Journal, 2 August 2010, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/a_counterinsurgency.php&…;

6     A Rooks, ‘Recon Marines Revisit Insurgents in Helmand’, Military News Network, 19 October 2009, <http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/military-news/news1057.htm&gt;

7     K Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance’, Congressional Research Service, 6 April 2010, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21922_20100406.pdf&gt;

8     Rooks, ‘Recon Marines Revisit Insurgents in Helmand’.

9     All information in this article has been cross referenced with open source material. Maps accessed on 9 November 2009, <http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl&gt;