Big Books on ‘Small Wars’: Milestones or Millstones in Counterinsurgency Thinking?

Abstract

This article reviews the 2006 US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual along with two major historical works on counterinsurgency. The author does not seek to present a precis of each work. Instead selected threads from each work are drawn out to pose the question: Are these works milestones that further our understanding of counterinsurgency or millstones that place impossible burdens on us? While other books and operational experiences have contributed significantly to the corpus of counterinsurgency thinking, these selected works have been quoted widely as seminal influences.

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Introduction

This article examines selected ideas discussed in three influential ‘big books on small wars’. First published in 1896, C E Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice is our starting point. The second work is the United States Marine Corps’ Small War Manual published in 1940. The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, released in December 2006, is the third ‘big book’ in this study.¹

Although immediately influenced by recent operational lessons, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual also acknowledged the solid intellectual bedrock of past military thought—including our two books on ‘small wars’. So why select these two works when there are so many—by both practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency—to choose from?

Firstly, the three works studied in this article were published at roughly fifty year intervals and thus provide three equidistant signposts in counterinsurgency thinking. Secondly, one suspects that the two earlier books are more often referenced rather than actually read, so we shall see what they actually have to say. Thirdly, Small Wars and the Small Wars Manual were not part of the ‘classical’ canon of the post-1945 era inhabited by Thompson, Galula and of late, the ubiquitous John Nagl. This allows us to examine two different, ‘pre-classical’ perspectives on counterinsurgency.² Lastly, the new manual aims to challenge military practitioners to think differently about the challenges posed by insurgencies. This article will examine whether these works have assisted or hindered our understanding of this complex topic.

Most officers would understand the central tenets of classical counterinsurgency thinking: the emphasis on gaining the population’s acquiescence by improving its security and wellbeing; dislocating the insurgent functionally or geographically; the multiple lines of operations (of which combat is but one); and the need for a unified political/military effort (the ‘whole-of-government approach’ in modern parlance). For our purposes here, we can be content with David Kilcullen’s pithy definition that ‘counterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at’.³

Callwell's Small Wars

As a general rule, the quelling of the rebellion in distant colonies means protracted, thankless, invertebrate war.⁴

It is easy to view Callwell’s book as an anachronism. My copy, a handsome reprint of the 1906 edition, has a stirring painting of the 1884 Battle of Tamai for its cover. In the foreground, we see Sudanese troops armed with short spears and shields advancing towards the British square in the middle distance; some tribesmen have fallen while others crouch and continue running forward. Ahead, shrouded by dust and smoke, stands the thin red line of British infantry, weathering this onslaught.

At first glance, then, this would seem to be a book recounting imperialist campaigns against conquered ‘savages’. But on closer inspection, we perceive something different. This painting shows a Sudanese firing a rifle. Did he pick up a discarded rifle during the battle or was it supplied previously by a rival European power? We also see that the surging wave of Sudanese has passed an abandoned Gatling gun; obviously this battle has not been a one-sided affair and the British have ceded ground (and lost their key fire support weapon) under extreme pressure. A painting capturing an instance of ‘asymmetric warfare’ is an apt cover for a book on the type of wars that ‘regular forces always have most to dread’.⁵ In his book, Callwell treats his various enemies, if not with respect, then at least with caution and circumspection.

An artillery officer by training, Callwell served in a number of imperial campaigns and fought against the two of Her Majesty’s most resolute foes—the Afghan tribes and the Boers. He used the term ‘small wars’ to describe those campaigns in which regular, modern, professional forces fought irregulars or forces that were relatively irregular in comparison. Describing his subject as ‘an elastic expression covering a great diversity of conditions’, Callwell noted that such wars could be fought for conquest of new territory, suppressions of rebellions, punitive campaigns in response to a perceived insult or as a ‘campaign of expediency’.⁶ These small wars, while displaying different characteristics each time, shared a number of common aspects. They broke out unexpectedly and if not prosecuted quickly, ‘small wars’ often became protracted affairs against an adaptive and cunning enemy. Invariably, this enemy would operate or seek sanctuary in remote and inhospitable areas, where they enjoyed considerable advantages in local knowledge and support.

Let me be clear: Callwell did not write about counterinsurgency as we now understand it. When he spoke of small wars, he meant largely military campaigns against non-professional, non-Western armies, guerrillas or bandits.⁷ His book focused almost solely on military solutions at the tactical and operational level to what he saw as military problems. In modern parlance, he adopted an enemy-centric approach in which many of his recommended practices would be considered too harsh for the sophisticated tastes of the modern counterinsurgent. In this way, Small Wars is not a prototype of later ‘classical’ counterinsurgency works. What then, are we to make of Callwell’s robust ‘principles and practice’?⁸

In general, Callwell advocated self-contained columns that pushed out into the remote areas and brought the fight to the enemy. In so doing, he understood that independent, small unit leadership was crucial and that logistics, as much as the desired end-state, would dictate the conduct of operations.9 Callwell warned that troops—infantry, generally, and lots of them—must be able to work, survive, protect lines of communication and fight in all iterations of small wars, over all types of terrain and against all manner of foes.

We can only guess what Callwell would make of the later ‘classical’ counterinsurgency theory, although we may assume that he would probably disagree with the rationale of the multiple lines of operations executed simultaneously. However, as a British officer with experience in numerous imperial campaigns, which were designed to either open up a country for trade or protect established commercial/imperial interests, Callwell saw defeating the enemy first as the essential precondition for subsequent lines of operation. In due course (and in theory), the British colonial civil service would follow once hostilities concluded and provide governance and public services, in turn creating an indigenous civil service and stability.10 Local military forces would be trained to take up key roles in imperial constabulary actions.11 Economic development would follow as goods were traded throughout the Empire, locals employed and so on. Questions about imperialism’s morality and actual operation aside, it was the context in which Callwell wrote his dictums: removing the enemy’s military power first was the sine qua non of further success.

Does Small Wars deserve any of the resurgent attention it has enjoyed? Maybe it should be simply seen as a historical examination of just one line of operation—combat—and not as a textbook on counterinsurgency as we understand it. Perhaps Callwell’s weakness was not considering other elements of national power and not viewing the wider, local population as a group to be won over and supported, rather than subdued. For example, he noted clearly that the stance of the wider population was always in doubt, and the commander would never know how many would decide to take part actively in operations against him. He took this ambivalence as a given, not a factor that could be mitigated. Should we chide Callwell for his failure to do more to reach out to the indigenous population or recognise his pragmatic assessment of the reality of human nature?

Callwell also wrote that gathering sound intelligence from the population was difficult. Screening one’s own operations was even more difficult, due ‘to the social system in such theatres of war ... news spreads in a most mysterious fashion ... the regular army is being watched in all its operations and cannot prevent it’.¹² Callwell’s methods meant that he missed the potential to shore up population support, thereby minimising information passed to the enemy and increasing the quality of intelligence received.

Conversely, does Callwell challenge our cherished ideas about population-centric counterinsurgency? What Callwell did make clear was that a small war was still a war and to consider it anything else was folly. He advocated that small wars must be prosecuted with all the commander’s will and combat power at his disposal. Failure to do so spawned desultory warfare, with the enemy emboldened, soldiers exposed to small war’s frustrations and dangers, and opinion makers at home increasingly uneasy. Callwell knew whatever technological and organisational advantages an army enjoyed would be undermined or negated in the longer term. He understood that ‘strategy favours the enemy.’¹³

Callwell adopted an enemy-centric approach, but we should not treat this term as a pejorative per se. If the strategic purpose of the war, such as the speedy recommencement of trade and normalcy, did not warrant the wholesale destruction of the enemy and alienation of the population, then Calwell wrote that other solutions should be found.¹⁴ He understood that some foes could be over-awed by a demonstration of military resolve, whereas a ‘savage race swayed by a despotic sovereign’ would have to be defeated in battle.¹⁵ Though he used the words of Lord Wolseley, Callwell stressed that the ‘root of the whole matter’ in determining how to defeat or influence one’s opponent was to ‘capture ... whatever they prize most and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to conclusion’.¹⁶ In other words, what would be the centre of gravity in each campaign?

If every small war and insurgency is sui generis, logic would lead us to the conclusion that the centre of gravity would be different in each instance. Classical counterinsurgency theory states that the population is always the centre of gravity. But is it not conceivable, that the centre of gravity in a given iteration of an insurgency could be the destruction / defeat / intimidation of the enemy?

Callwell argued that the army must thrust out into the enemy’s country and seek battle, admonishing that it ‘must play to win and not for safety’.¹⁷ The modern reader will comment that to fight the enemy, one must first find him and this requires sound intelligence. We may also comment on the effects of urbanisation and other sociological developments which militate against Callwell’s clear cut strategies. However, for Callwell, any misgivings about war’s violent reality were to be ignored and dismissed as misplaced compassion. The greater tragedy was allowing the war to drag out; he knew that aspects of small wars would ‘shock the humanitarian’ so operations should be conducted quickly and with purpose, to bring fighting to an end quickly and decisively; failure to so would result in protracted conflict.¹⁸ Contrary to classical counterinsurgency, which stated that excessive military operations can turn the population’s sympathies towards the enemy, Callwell suggested the opposite. He argued ‘a vigorous offensive has the effect of keeping home those who hesitate to take up arms ... a bold plan of campaign tends to reduce the hostile forces to the lowest limits and to disincline those who are uncompromised from joining in.’¹⁹

On this point, let us not also forget that these military operations were not conducted without some external scrutiny from correspondents (both British and European) and domestic parliamentary inquiries. As such, Callwell did not suppose that an absolute free hand of excessive brutality was an allowable means to an end. To be sure, media ubiquity and influence was nowhere near as pronounced as it is today, and as such, this represents a major influence in the conduct of such wars; one that Callwell would surely have been surprised, and concerned, about.

But we, as modern soldiers in the constant scrutiny of the media, do not have the option to wage a Callwellian campaign, even if we wanted to. Callwell used a brutal but ultimately realistic logic to justify his small war principles, but on these points, modern armies have parted ways with him. In trying to find and isolate the enemy, we must, to a large degree, switch our focus to the local population to gain its support.²⁰ To assuage public opinion home and abroad, we must limit the use of our military power. These are noble and correct objectives. But ultimately, does our compassion condemn us to courses of action that result in ‘protracted, thankless and invertebrate war’?

USMC Small Wars Manual

In small wars, tolerance, sympathy and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population (but) there is nothing in this principle which should make any officer or man hesitate to act with necessary firmness... whenever there is contact with armed opposition.²¹

The Small Wars Manual introduces us to the concept of the soldier in another milieu, where he is welfare worker, election official, astute cultural observer and occasionally, combatant. The impact this second work has upon modern counterinsurgency thinking cannot be overstated.

The Small Wars Manual distilled the experiences of a number of USMC-led interventions in the Caribbean.²² We may say that Callwell wrote his work for a general to plan his campaign or an independent column commander his operation; Small Wars provided the guiding principles with the tactical context given through after-action reports and proven techniques from the field. In contrast, the Small Wars Manual was designed for a company commander with his own area of operations. In that area, he was responsible for all combat missions, intelligence gathering and stabilisation activities.

In so doing, the manual provided practical instruction and ‘how to’ advice for company-level operations ensconced within the strategic, political and legal context of small wars. The Small Wars Manual stressed the importance of the US State Department and the USMC’s working relationship with it. This was paramount in small wars because ‘very junior subordinates of the State Department and the Marine Corps may have to solve problems that might involve the United States in serious difficulties’.²³

Noting again that the term ‘small war’ could describe any number of iterations, the Small War Manual wrote that it covered limited interventions in a friendly country through to full-blown military expeditions to restore order and governance. As such, US Marines may be required to cooperate with the local government or replicate its functions if in abeyance; support and/or train local security forces; conduct combat operations; and maintain good relations with the locals. Pace Callwell, the Small Wars Manual stressed that ‘the application of military measures may not, by itself, restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political or social.’²⁴

By highlighting this economic, political and social element, the Small Wars Manual introduced us to the conundrum that we still struggle with today: balancing the training, skills and mindsets required for combat with those for stabilisation missions. As such, the manual provided explicit information on how to conduct, supervise and police elections and how to proclaim, create and administer functionally a military government.²⁵ In particular, by establishing the civilian population as the focal point for efforts, the Small Wars Manual codified the requirement for Marines to possess cultural awareness, circumspection and self-discipline lest they inadvertently injure or alienate civilians. Therefore Marines on such operations must exercise ‘judgement, persistency, patience, tact and rigid military justice.’²⁶

This said, the Small Wars Manual still emphasised the principle of the offensive as a key component of the mission. In fact, its advice would have resonated with Callwell: in the early stages of the intervention, a crushing victory that would end the insurgency in one fell swoop was to be desired. However, as the manual tells us resignedly, ‘this is seldom achieved.’²⁷ Instead the remnants will disperse into small groups of resistance. Offensive operations, through aggressive patrolling, then became paramount to the wider mission’s success. Not only did such methods gather intelligence, they served to deny sanctuary to insurgents in remote areas and protect the civilian population as well. In fact, the manual stressed that as long as armed opposition remained, the intervening force had to maintain the offensive. This was as much to maintain the psychological ascendency as to kill or capture the enemy.²⁸

Like Callwell, the Small Wars Manual argued that the myriad of local nuances and inter-related factors made centralised control unworkable, and as such, local commanders must be given as much autonomy as possible. This meant that any unit in small wars must be ‘tactically and administratively self-sustaining’.²⁹ As local commanders were responsible for all actions—combat, intelligence and civil/ political—in their area of operations, specialist staff functions, which would normally reside at formation-level, must be devolved to a much lower level. Intelligence gathering was a case in point, with the manual stressing that ‘every detached post or station must organise and develop its own intelligence system’.³⁰ Sub-units must tailor an aggressive patrolling program to gather local demographic (perhaps via a census-style record) and terrain information to send back to the higher command. These local units would be the ‘subject matter experts’ for their area, feeding intelligence up, rather than being the recipients of centrally processed intelligence from a battalion/formation S2. Anyone who has reaped the benefits of a company-level S2 cell while on independent operations would surely agree with this advice.

As the key overarching concern for such USMC interventions was the speedy restoration of normalcy through the normal functioning of the state, the Small Wars Manual stressed that the creation of a constabulary or armed forces was a priority ‘as soon as tranquillity has been secured’.³¹ It is clear when reading the manual, that the creation of host nation forces was not a line of operation to be executed concurrently with others; instead such forces would be created only after combat operations had concluded and the United States was preparing to withdraw from country in question.

Thus like Callwell, the Small Wars Manual identified a number of lines of operation, but argued that they should be executed sequentially rather than concurrently. Lest there be any doubt, let us examine the point made in the chapter on ‘Strategy’:

The initial problem is to restore peace. There may be many economic and social factors involved, pertaining to the administrative, executive and judicial functions of the government...peace and industry cannot be restored permanently without appropriate provisions for the economic welfare of the people. Moreover, productive industry cannot be fully restored until there is peace’, (emphasis added)³²

Despite its age, the Small Wars Manual may still be one of the best single volume resources for a company commander on such operations. For sure, one may have limited need for the techniques for correctly fitting a mule with the Phillips pack saddle (although never say never!). However, the manual’s workman-like chapters on the unique requirements of small wars, balanced with a pragmatic view on the use of aggression and force, have remained especially relevant.

The Small Wars Manual marked the middle ground chronologically and perhaps more importantly, doctrinally, in this study of counterinsurgency thinking. It was not solely enemy-focused but emphasised the equal importance of restoring legitimacy to the host nation government rendered unstable due to domestic unrest. The final work to be examined here—the US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Manual—takes this concept further. Counterinsurgency is studied in the context of nation-building (or failed state rebuilding) and dealing with transnational threats. Creating a state, in some cases ab initio, demands more unusual, non-traditional skill sets, while transnational threats pose particular challenges to contemporary counterinsurgents.

US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Field Manual

COIN is fought among the populace. Counterinsurgents take upon themselves responsibility for the people’s well-being in all its manifestations.³³

Unlike many military doctrinal publications, the US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Field Manual (henceforth referred to as the Field Manual) is well written, is an engaging read and provides an overarching narrative. Stressing that it is a guide, rather than a prescription for success, the manual is a synthesis of ‘soft’ operations research and decision-making techniques, the emerging field of social network analysis, recent operational experiences, historical anecdotes and perhaps most importantly, ‘classical’ counterinsurgency theory.

Compiled over two years, the manual was the product of multiple academic, military, government and non-government organisations’ contributions and many recent operational experiences.³⁴ In particular, the manual has been inordinately influenced by David Galula’s seminal 1964 work, the experience of the British in Malaya, and modern proponents of classical counterinsurgency doctrine such as John Nagl and David Kilcullen.

But the most interesting contributions to the military debate made by the Field Manual are not strictly related to the subject of counterinsurgency. For example, the manual is to be praised for restoring the central role of the human, not technology, in warfare. In so doing, it recognises the essential truth of what warfare was, is and always will be—a clash of wills between adaptive, free-thinking opponents in which human emotions interact with friction, chance and chaos. Counterinsurgency operations involved ‘complex, changing relations among all the direct and peripheral participants ... both sides continuously adapt to neutralise existing adversary advantages and develop new (usually short lived) advantages on their own.’³⁵ One US battalion commander assessed that the enemy adapted within one week to any tactical changes enacted.³⁶

As such, the Field Manual is not just a ‘how to’ guide to fighting insurgency; it is a call to action to become a better learning organisation generally. ‘In COIN,’ the manual argues, ‘the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better learning organisation-usually wins. Counterinsurgencies have been called learning competitions.’³⁷ One would argue that this sound advice is applicable across the conflict spectrum; but determining what constituted a lesson in counterinsurgency is the vexed question. Success may be difficult to determine if second or third-order effects are yet to be seen. Similarly, ‘lessons learned’ may not have universal applicability; for example, just because Anbar ‘awakened’ does not mean Helmand will respond to the same counterinsurgency measures.³⁸

The chapter, ‘Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations’ introduces strategic decision-making techniques and concepts pertaining to intuitive, naturalistic decision-making and pattern recognition into the common military vocabulary.³⁹ One can predict that such multi-disciplinary skills, concepts and qualities will gain more attention in military journals and usage generally. This is a general recognition of so-called ‘right brain’ attributes such as big picture synthesis, perception and empathy. Therefore methods tailored to delve into the nature of the problem are introduced as a guide to penetrate the multifaceted ‘wicked problems’ in counterinsurgency. Moreover, such methods are designed not to be analytical, breaking down a problem into its component parts, but rather to assess the problem in its gestalt or entirety. Such is the goal of systems thinking, which ‘seeks to understand the interconnectedness, complexity and wholeness of the elements of systems in relation to one another.’⁴⁰

Therefore ‘Learn and Adapt’ is decreed as the counterinsurgency ‘imperative for US forces’⁴¹ Due to the decentralised nature of counterinsurgency operations, the role of junior leader decision-making is paramount. As such, the value of pattern recognition, which assists intuitive decision-making in complex and time-pressure situations, is highlighted. Recognising the context and what is out of place requires a deep and broad frame of reference; this can only be gained by experience, education and immersion in prior examples, case studies and anecdotes. Moreover, soldiers must submit their plans and concepts to continual assessment so as to incorporate the evolving complexity of counterinsurgency operations.

By the order of chapters, one can see the emphases in this manual. After a discussion on the nature and characteristics of insurgencies, the manual deals in turn with ‘Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities’ then ‘Intelligence in Counterinsurgency’ and ‘Developing Host-Nation Security Forces’ This reflects the long-standing importance and common recognition of these subjects in counterinsurgency; Callwell hinted at them, whereas the Small Wars Manual referred to them explicitly. The Field Manual notes that the counterinsurgency environment is crowded place with non-government organisations, multinational forces, a multitude of US government and other government agencies, each bringing specialist skills and advice to the operation. Orchestrating these disparate groups’ efforts across multiple lines of operation was the key to success.

The Field Manual explains that insurgency is attacked by a number of conceptual categories or logical lines of operation (LLO), namely combat operations, support to host nation security forces, and providing essential services, governance and economic development. These LLOs are characterised as strands of rope that are individually of little consequence, but when woven together, form a more powerful multifaceted rope. Information operations (IOs) are overlayed on all these LLOs or as the manual states, ‘may often be the decisive LLO. By shaping the information environment, IOs make significant contributions to setting conditions for success of all other LLOs’⁴² These LLOs are well understood and its concepts are mirrored to a large extent by the lines of operation in the Australian Army’s Adaptive Campaigning.⁴³

What is less understood is the order in which these LLOs are to be applied. In Small Wars and Small Wars Manual, it was clear that the active enemy was to be defeated (or at least severely weakened) before other lines of operation were to be enacted. The Field Manual recommends a three phase process, likened to emergency triage on a patient. The first stage, ‘Stop the Bleeding’, aims ‘to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and set the conditions of further engagement’. The implied order within this stage is protect the population, then attack the insurgents. Stage two is characterised as ‘Inpatient Care – Recovery’ wherein the bulk of what is commonly understood as classical counterinsurgency actions take place. Stability is the goal, with all LLOs developed, especially the host nation military and governance capacity. This achieved, the efforts merge into the final stage, ‘Outpatient Care – Movement to Self-sufficiency’, the main goal of which is to transition the running and conduct of the counterinsurgency to the host nation, with foreign assistance gradually reduced.⁴⁴

This would seem a clear-cut echoing of Callwell and the Small Wars Manual; security first, then nation-building in all its forms. But the manual is less clear than one would expect. Therefore, while it stresses that ‘accomplishing the objectives of combat operations/civil security operations sets the conditions needed to achieve essential services and economic objectives’, the manual also informs that ‘progress along each LLO contributes to attaining a stable and secure environment for the host nation’. In other words, all LLOs are equal and security is not necessarily a prerequisite for other LLOs to operate. Indeed the manual argues other LLOs that assist the ‘progressive, substantial reduction of the root causes of insurgency’ reinforce stability.⁴⁵ This tension between a ‘security first, nationbuilding later’ mindset and one more in line with classical counterinsurgency precepts is never fully resolved in the manual.

This also assumes that the root causes of insurgency are material (rather than religious or ideological) and can be challenged by nation-building measures. Moreover, the manual would seem to believe that democracy, rather than something more Hobbesian, is the natural state of affairs in the world. A major tenet of this nation-building is grafting democracy onto an extant belief system, which may or may not be receptive to this graft.

In her introduction to the University of Chicago edition of the manual, Sarah Sewell, a human rights academic, noted ‘if these other instruments of national power don’t show up, can’t stay or aren’t effective, the buck then passes back to the military’.⁴⁶ This captures the greatest concern one may have with classical counterinsurgency theory and the Field Manual. While a ‘whole-of-government’ approach understands that civilian agencies and other government organisations are better suited to provide civilian services, the fact remains that the military will assume these roles when the insurgency is still violent and relative stability cannot be guaranteed. Again, this highlights the tension between the ‘simultaneous’ and ‘subsequent’ LLO constructs. If the active insurgent elements are not weakened enough so that nation-building efforts can take place in relative safety, these government and non-government agencies will be withdrawn. The military will then be forced to undertake tasks in which it has little expertise. It would seem in the best interests of the ‘whole-of-government approach’ with its division of labour, that the military achieve security and a level of dominance over the enemy first. If this is not achieved, the military must undertake combat and nation-building roles simultaneously, leading to a dilution of effort and confusion about its raison d’etre.

There are three further points in relation to this. The first is that the manual would seem to have an unrealistic belief in the efficacy of a central military/civilian controlling authority. One may legitimately question the chances of success of a ‘whole-of-government approach’ in a war-torn country, coordinating the efforts of many disparate groups within the friction of the counterinsurgency context. Governments have a hard enough time coordinating and providing these services in their own country in peacetime.

Secondly, the manual is advocating this approach—it does not yet exist beyond the nominal services provided by USAID. This point cannot be stressed enough. Normally doctrine is guided by strategy and overarching government aims. Instead, the manual reverses this trend and asks ‘civilian agencies to detail their missions and develop capabilities’; in so doing the ‘risks and cost of counterinsurgency would be spread across the US government’.⁴⁷ In order to have a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, with all its benefits, governments must be prepared to send more than just soldiers. Until governments understand and commit to this, the manual’s ideal division of labour will continue to be wishful thinking.

Thirdly, one suspects that by placing an equal emphasis on all lines of operation, rather than prioritising some over others, a phenomenon—which we may call military relativism—has arisen. By treating the building of bridges, doling out of medical supplies and the aggressive targeting of the insurgents’ sanctuaries as tasks of equal importance, warfighting becomes ‘just another’ task. This presents a skewed operational context and allows contributing countries with justifications to commit only medical teams or engineers. After all, if providing essential services is just as important as combat operations, why would a country contribute combat troops and risk the public backlash when the casualties start occurring? Has this military relativism created an unintended rod for the United States’ back, and as a result, it must conduct the vast majority of combat operations itself?

Previously, we posited for whom Small Wars and Small Wars Manual was written. The Field Manual was written for ‘leaders and planners at battalion level and above.’⁴⁸ This provoked some commentators to accuse the manual of being too esoteric. To be sure, its high-level, academic, synthesis approach means that it is not an explanatory manual in the classic sense. This author found the manual’s tone and approach (if not all its content), attractive. However, to augment this manual, the US Army has just released a companion volume: Field Manual Interim 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. This links tactical actions to the larger context, provides new acronyms for mission analysis, and orders writing and section/platoon/company tactics, techniques and procedures.⁴⁹ When treated as a whole volume, it mirrors the British counterinsurgency pamphlet, which combined a higher level study of the topic with a ‘nuts and bolts’ methodology for troops at the tactical level.⁵⁰

The Field Manual is a great read, introduces new disciplines such as decision analysis, social network analysis and stresses the importance of rapid organisational learning to outlearn the enemy. However, it is anchored squarely in classical counterinsurgency doctrine and some of its conclusions would seem unduly influenced by a ‘best case’ view of counterinsurgency operations.⁵¹ The manual warns that each insurgency is different and does so admirably in its contextual chapters. Intuitively therefore, one would suggest that there would be no one ‘way’ of waging a counterinsurgency campaign; the manual instructs otherwise. It also bequeaths complex, non-traditional roles to the military with little suggestion of how the military is to attain the skills to fulfil these roles. Being flexible and operating across the full spectrum of operations is one thing. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual would seem to impose orthodoxy of a different kind; a mindset that nation-building is the key role of militaries in the future.

Conclusion - Milestones or Millstones?

I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency, until I started doing it.

- Major John Nagl, Khaldiya, Iraq, 2004.⁵²

If we accept that strategy is about defining priorities and thus making trade-offs, we also accept that we can only achieve strategic ends with the means we possess. Strategy in turn drives operational theory and doctrine. Our Adaptive Campaigning doctrine mirrors many of the precepts in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, and the Australian Army will have some deep soul searching to do. The same questions about what strategy we wish to pursue and thence the core purpose of our army and the skills it should possess will occupy us as well.⁵³ Is nation-building the best way to counter an insurgency? If so, are we prepared to spend the time, money and lives pursuing this strategy? If this is the end we seek, is the military—in particular, the Army—the best means to meet this end?

John Nagl, a key proponent of the US counterinsurgency strategy, served in Iraq as his battalion’s operations officer. He had previously won acclaim with his exquisitely-timed book on counterinsurgency and thus proceeded on his tour with the reputation of an expert. He found that counterinsurgency was easier to write about as a concept than it was to practise in the field. We may also say the same about the varied skills soldiers are told to acquire for the new operational environment. It is easy to write about in theory, but significant and drastic tradeoffs would need to made about the organisation, training and very core values the Army holds.

We progressed from an enemy-centric focus in Callwell to a hybrid enemy / population-centric stance in the Small Wars Manual. The Field Manual morphed further into a population-centric doctrine that does not seek simply to restore the legitimacy of the government, but rather create the concept and apparatus of government ab initio in the context of nation-building. Remember our definition of counterinsurgency as ‘armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at’? This is social work writ large, with Western governments asked to foot a massive bill over a long period of time, hoping that by dragging some societies into the twenty-first century, its members will not succumb to radicalisation.

A debate rages in the various military journals and blogs. Proponents of various emphases in counterinsurgency have coalesced into camps of ‘COINdinistas’, ‘crusaders’ and conservatives’. Some take issue with the dilution of traditional military skills in the interests of nation-building. Others question whether the threat of transnational Islamic groups, with utopian ideals, can be defeated using traditional or classical counterinsurgency doctrine. We have Rupert Smith declaring ‘war no longer exists’ but Colin Gray assuring us that we will face ‘another bloody century’.⁵⁴ Western militaries continue to grapple with the ramifications of this debate.

Is it time to develop a fourth iteration of counterinsurgency doctrine, that of a ‘home-centric’ focus? In the introduction to the Field Manual, it noted that enemies will try to exhaust Western nations’ will by undermining and outlasting public support, that counterinsurgency campaigns will be long and difficult with success hard to measure.⁵⁵ Recent polls suggest that the Australian public is overwhelmingly against a further increase of our very modest commitment due to the death of twenty-one Australian soldiers in Afghanistan. Our media is imbued with an almost institutional degree of anti-Western schadenfreude. Do we need to do more to protect our critical vulnerability of public opinion? In this fourth iteration, the population would still be the centre of gravity, but the population we would be protecting is ours, from the reality of war.

So we come back to our original question and basis for our study: do these three ‘big books on small wars’ help or hinder our understanding of counterinsurgencies? Are they true milestones that guide our way, or millstones that limit our ability to adapt to new iterations of insurgencies?

We have discussed at length the key issues and differences in enemy-centric and population centric strategies. This said, a number of threads are common to all three works. All iterations of insurgency will be different and care must be taken not to seek generic solutions. The role of intelligence is crucial and will drive all operations. The situation will be fluid and is best served by command devolved down to lower levels; as such small-unit leadership is paramount. All agree that infantry will be the key arm of any counterinsurgency operation and that local commanders will be responsible for all lines of operation in the areas of operation. The acceptance of risk and commitment to operate away from secure bases was consistent in all three. And all of these works warned that ‘small wars’ often drag out into long wars.

If we understand that all insurgencies are sui generis and use these ‘big books on small wars’ to provide illumination through historical context, we may consider them useful milestones. However, if against such inchoate threats, we rely on any one way or doctrine as an article of faith, such works may well be millstones that drag us into long, costly and bloody ventures for which we are ill-suited.

About the Author

Captain Dayton McCarthy served at 3 RAR as a platoon commander, assistant adjutant and company second-in-command. He saw operational service in the Solomon Islands, Iraq and East Timor. After two years as the Senior Careers Counsellor at Defence Force Recruiting, Parramatta, he was posted to RMC Duntroon where he is currently the Leadership and Ethics Package Master. He has a Ph.D in Military History from the University of New South Wales.

Endnotes

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1     C E Callwell, Small Wars: Their Theory and Practice, reprint of the 1906 3rd edition, University of Nebraska Press, 1996; United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, reprint of the 1940 edition, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2005; and United States Department of the Army, US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (US Army Field Manual No 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No 3-33.5), reprint of the 2006 edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007.

2     For further exploration of this theme, see David Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency Redux’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2006-07.

3     David Kilcullen, ‘Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’, Military Review, May–June 2006, p. 107.