Adaptive Campaigning: Letter from Colonel Chris Field in Response to Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas
Congratulations to the Army Journal and Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas for publishing the article ‘Adaptive Campaigning – Is it Adaptive Enough?’.1 I found the article both thought provoking and informative.
I must declare some interests in writing this letter. First, as Director Future Land Warfare and Strategy (FLWS) in 2008–09 my Directorate authored Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, which is the subject of criticism in Jason Thomas’ article. Any flaws in Adaptive Campaigning are therefore my responsibility. Second, I am proud to note that Jason Thomas is a fellow classmate from the RMC Class of ‘ 87. Third, in my opinion, Jason Thomas’ article is exactly the type of debate that Army and the Land Force should encourage and develop as we continue to fight, and think about, future wars.2
In this letter, I am not going to defend Adaptive Campaigning’s ‘Adaptation Cycle’ against the ‘real’ observe, orient, decide, and act Loop (OODA Loop) developed by Colonel John Boyd, USAF.3 Instead I have recommended to FLWS and Jason Thomas that they collaborate and write an article for the Army Journal explaining how the Adaptation Cycle compliments Boyd’s OODA Loop. My regret is that we were unaware of the value Jason Thomas could have added to Adaptive Campaigning during our development of the document. This debate is important for Army, and I think a FLWS/Jason Thomas article in the Australian Army Journal would be of great utility and perhaps generate more debate on this and other important topics.
For clarification, I will add some points regarding Jason Thomas’ comments on the Five Lines of Operation and the structure of Adaptive Campaigning.
In Adaptive Campaigning, a line of operation is ‘one of the five mutually reinforcing and interdependent lines of operation that comprise a philosophical conceptual framework for the conduct of Adaptive Campaigning in order to achieve accepted enduring conditions’, otherwise known as the Five Lines of Operation (5 LOO).4 Jason Thomas incorrectly cites Adaptive Campaigning’s 5 LOO as ‘five fixed lines of operation’.5 The differences between Adaptive Campaigning’s and Jason Thomas’ 5 LOO definitions are important, and demonstrate one area of value that Adaptive Campaigning can add, and has added, to Army’s thinking.
As noted in Adaptive Campaigning, the 5 LOO—Joint Land Combat, Population Protection, Information Actions, Population Support, and Indigenous Capacity Building—are present in all conflicts, and ‘the weighting between them is determined by the conditions, and changing conditions, of each conflict ... [and] they are not prescriptive and are not intended to be a template for direct application in campaign design’.6 Using this language, Adaptive Campaigning aims to build as much flexibility as possible into the thinking and contextualisation of the 5 LOO, which is very different from prescriptive ‘fixed lines of operation’.
Jason Thomas also states that Adaptive Campaigning has ‘only ... fifty-four pages [in a seventy-nine page document] directly dealing with the concept [of Adaptive Campaigning]’.7 This statement is important, and is best clarified via an understanding of the development of Adaptive Campaigning in 2008–09.
In order to gain wide support and maximise the usefulness of the document, Adaptive Campaigning needed endorsement by Army and agreement by Defence prior to publishing.8 To achieve this outcome, FLWS developed, as noted by Jason Thomas, ‘twenty-two versions [of Adaptive Campaigning]’ over a two-year period.9 Interestingly, during that two-year period, and despite extensive consultation by FLWS at the tactical, operational and strategic levels with Army, Defence, coalition partners, non-Defence Australian government agencies, eminent thinkers, scientists and private enterprise, the ‘fifty-four pages directly dealing with the concept [of Adaptive Campaigning]’ remained largely unchanged.
In contrast, the other twenty-five pages within Adaptive Campaigning—which established the need to adapt, a vision of the future, the complex operating environment, achieving the Adaptive Army, and force modernisation—were highly contested. This contest was partly generated by the May 2009 release of the Defence White Paper 2009, which heavily affected Adaptive Campaigning, especially in the areas of a vision of the future and force modernisation.10 These twenty-five pages within Adaptive Campaigning were also contested, in my opinion, because the need to adapt, a vision of the future, the complex operating environment, achieving the Adaptive Army, and force modernisation are all priority issues that affect the people, at all levels and in all organisations, who were consulted by FLWS.
In contrast, the ‘fifty-four pages directly dealing with the concept [of Adaptive Campaigning]’ provide guidance to Army in two parts. First, Adaptive Campaigning describes ‘actions taken by the Land Force as part of the military contribution to a Joint and Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts and advancing Australia’s national interests’.11 As Jason Thomas correctly observes there are elements of Adaptive Campaigning, such as mission command, that Army has been ‘formally teaching ... since the late 1980s’.12 This explains the less contested nature of most of the ‘fifty-four pages’.
However, the second part of the Adaptive Campaigning ‘fifty-four pages’ provides a ‘conceptual and philosophical framework’ for Army ‘in order to ensure that it remains postured to meet the demands of the future’.13 This was an area of some contest, and stakeholders made changes to Adaptive Campaigning during the two-year consultation period. Despite these changes, Jason Thomas’ article indicates that the consultation was less than complete. Again I take responsibility for this failure.
Like John Boyd who was ‘concerned that publication would freeze his views’, our Army does not want to ‘freeze’ our thinking in relation to Adaptive Campaigning.14 Debate on Adaptive Campaigning is important for an Army seeking to learn and adapt while in contact with the enemy. As noted earlier, Jason Thomas’ article is exactly the type of debate that Army and the Land Force should encourage and develop as we continue to fight, and think about, future wars.
Colonel Chris Field
Student CDSS
20 July 2010
Endnotes
1 Jason Thomas, ‘Adaptive Campaigning – Is it Adaptive Enough?’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. VII, No. 1, Autumn 2010, pp. 93–108.
2 Land Force: The Land Force will consist of task organised elements drawn from all Australian Defence Force services and the other Australian Government agencies, including the Australian Civilian Corps. The Land Force will be optimised for joint operations, operating in a joint environment, and relying on, and contributing to, joint enabling capabilities for full effect. The Land Force is also required to be educated, trained, equipped, and resourced for effective interaction, where applicable, with affected states, coalition partners, commercial contractors, private businesses, United Nations, International Red Cross / Red Crescent, donors, and non-government organisations (proposed definition). Note: This definition is a slight modification from the Land Force definition in Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, September 2009, p. xii.
3 Thomas, ‘Adaptive Campaigning – Is it Adaptive Enough?’, p. 99.
4 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, p. xi.
5 Thomas, ‘Adaptive Campaigning – Is it Adaptive Enough?’, p. 94.
6 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, p. 28.
7 Ibid., pp. 94, 99.
8 Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, was endorsed by the Chief of Army’s Senior Advisory Committee (17 April 2009), and agreed by the Chiefs of Service Committee (28 July 2009).
9 Thomas, ‘Adaptive Campaigning – Is it Adaptive Enough?’, p. 94.
10 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009, Canberra, 2009.
11 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, p. viii.
12 Thomas, ‘Adaptive Campaigning – Is it Adaptive Enough?’, p. 97.
13 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, pp. i, iii.
14 Thomas, ‘Adaptive Campaigning – Is it Adaptive Enough?’, p. 95.
