Abandoning the Temple: John Boyd and Contemporary Strategy
Abstract
John Boyd is a military theorist who achieved significant influence on military thought with his renowned OODA Loop. His thoughts evolved during the Cold War, but he did consider guerrilla and irregular warfare. The majority of his work dealt with this security environment as his frame of reference. The author believes that Boyd’s work remains relevant to the contemporary security environment. Boyd’s approach to strategy is articulated and then discussed using the 9/11 Commission Report as a tool for comparison. We will see that the apparent simplicity of Boyd’s theories conceal some profound analyses that enables them to be broadly applicable to contemporary security problems. The article concludes with a call to revisit Boyd’s work in totality in the way the ADF approaches military planning.
The OODA Loop may appear too humble to merit categorization as good theory, but that is what it is. It has an elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of applicability, and contains a high quality of insight about strategic essentials, such that its author well merits honourable mention as an outstanding general theorist of strategy.
- Colin S Gray1
Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide.
- Napoleon2
Great strategists and theorists emerge from many areas and backgrounds. The truly great rarely appear to be fostered or formally developed by the nation that they will ultimately serve. Most continue their work despite this and fate calls them to the stage when the act is written specifically for them. John Boyd, however, departed that stage during his soliloquy, not because his ideas were incomplete, but because the audience did not quite comprehend the potential of his verse. As the historian and strategic analyst Colin Gray argues, Boyd deserves greater recognition and study, particularly since his simple OODA (observe, orient, decide and act) Loop and resulting work have significantly influenced contemporary US military concepts, equipment design and have even reached into the realm of business strategy.3
A former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) referred to Boyd as the architect of victory in the First Gulf War.4 Boyd revolutionised the rules of design for fighter aircraft and combat,5 made a major contribution to the development of ground attack aircraft and, more importantly, encouraged innovation in US military combat concepts.6 In the 1980s and 1990s, Boyd’s theories were instrumental in ensuring that US military might massively over-matched any adversary encountered on the field of battle.7
But the application of military power is only one facet of strategy. Just as strategy is a broader topic, so too the scope of Boyd’s work is extensive—far more extensive, in fact, than most strategists assume. The purpose of this article is to analyse Boyd’s work in the realm of strategy, his area of focus later in life. The resulting discussion will place Boyd’s work in the context of a major strategic event: the 11 September 2001 attack and its immediate aftermath—specifically, the 9/11 Commission Report key recommendations. The specific and overall relevance of Boyd’s theories will then be examined, as will the fact that these theories provide an overarching framework for dealing with contemporary issues that is surprisingly robust. As with any theory, the relevance of Boyd’s thought to present-day conflict depends to some extent on what latter-day theorists choose to make of it.
Boyd was a theorist of conflict. He began in the narrow realm of air-to-air combat tactics where, as a fighter pilot instructor, he was revered. As he analysed fighter tactics during the Korean War, Boyd noticed a discrepancy in the loss exchange ratio between the US F-86 Sabre and the Soviet-built Mig-15. Theoretically, the Mig-15, with a superior rate of climb and higher speed, was the better aircraft. Yet F-86 pilots had a superior kill ratio. Boyd assessed that a number of factors gave the US pilots the advantage. First, the F-86 had a high-set cockpit which allowed better observation. F-86 pilots were also better trained in air-to-air combat tactics; they were more skilful in orienting to the situation and deciding on the best tactics to employ. In addition, the F-86 had fully hydraulic powered flight controls while the Mig-15 had only hydraulically assisted controls. Thus the F-86 pilots could transition from one manoeuvre to another more rapidly. This became the core of Boyd’s fundamental (but not sole) legacy for strategists—the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop or ‘Boyd Cycle’. A combatant able to move through this loop more quickly than an opponent will ultimately disorient that adversary and be able to strike before the adversary can effectively respond.8 Boyd went on to expand this cycle, constructing a more comprehensive form which will be considered later in this article.
Boyd’s theory permeated US military doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s;9 it still forms the core of USMC instruction in tactics and is extensively analysed within the US Army.10 US military power is a key component of contemporary strategy (both nuclear and conventional), and the efficiency of military force is one of the foundations of military power—and thus strategy. The use of military power is but one component of strategy (albeit a rather potent and costly one) and the OODA Loop has exerted a significant influence in the realm of military operations. This much is generally known and accepted by military strategists. What is less appreciated is the potential for Boyd’s theories to extend beyond the realm of contemporary military strategy.
The majority of Boyd’s work takes the form of extended slide presentations which Boyd refused to abbreviate. One of his first published essays, ‘Destruction and Creation’, is exceedingly difficult to read and, while containing many innovative ideas, is not well structured.11 It was not until the doctoral work of Dr Frans Osinga that a novice to the discipline could view Boyd’s work holistically. Osinga defined Boyd’s series of slide shows as a ‘discourse’, starting with ‘Patterns of Conflict’ (probably his foundation presentation),12 moving to ‘Organic Design for Command and Control’ (citing the need for directive control on operations), ‘The Conceptual Spiral’ and ‘The Essence of Winning and Losing’13
Boyd’s most important strategic presentation was ‘The Strategic Game of ? and ?’ (in which the question marks represent ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ respectively).14 Boyd developed a framework for three realms of strategy: the physical, the mental and the moral. In conflict, a strategy must be focused on isolating an adversary in all of these domains. Boyd also turned this construct 180 degrees, citing the need for open communication within, information about, and understanding of the ‘world’ with which the strategist must engage.15 This facilitates engagement with the strategies of allies, avoiding the creation of unnecessary adversaries and allowing the identification of true enemies.
In summary, Boyd advocates that strategists:
Shape or influence the moral-mental-physical atmosphere that we are a part of, live in, and feed upon so that we not only magnify our inner spirit and strength, but also influence political adversaries and current adversaries as well as the uncommitted so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and empathetic toward our success;
yet be able to
Morally-mentally-physically isolate our adversaries from their allies and outside support as well as isolate them from one another, in order to: magnify their internal friction, produce paralysis, bring about their collapse; and/or bring about a change in their political/ economic/social philosophy so that they can no longer inhibit our vitality and growth.16
While this is, of course, easier said than done, it possesses an ‘elegant simplicity’—a description that Colin Gray also applies to the OODA Loop. The emphasis on the moral basis for strategy permeates Boyd’s work and is incorporated in his final version of the OODA Loop. He also highlighted the importance of the ‘orient’ phase, reminding strategists that they must be aware not only of the cultural mores of others, but also of their own.
One of the pivotal events of the past decade and probably the next—the 11 September 2001 attack—is thoroughly permeated with the theories of John Boyd. Indeed, further application of Boyd’s work to this event would be illuminating. At this stage, there is little point analysing the 11 September 2001 attack in detail; suffice to say, the inability to detect (observe) and discover the intent of (orient) the terrorists quite clearly prevented the containing (decide) and capture/killing (act) of the terrorists. The initiation of the US government’s decision cycle came far too late and structural faults in command and control prevented a coherent response:17
At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al-Qaeda, though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy.18
It is in the recommendations of Chapter 13 of the 9/11 Commission Report that the threads of Boyd are most apparent. The key overarching theme of the follow-up actions recommended in this chapter is the need for unity of effort. Four of the five major government recommendations call for unity: unification of strategic intelligence and operational planning (better observation); a unified Director of National Intelligence (better orientation and decision-making); unified information-sharing systems (better orientation); and superior Congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability (ensuring better decision-making [apparently]).19 Even the fifth recommendation, the strengthening of the FBI and homeland defence, underpins the ability of the United States to ‘act’ against the terrorist threat. Boyd’s ‘elegant simplicity’ runs right through the recommendations for government reform.
It is, however, in the preceding chapter that Boyd’s simple approach to grand strategy finds relevance.20 A key theme of Chapter 12 is the call to see beyond terrorism itself, to use all elements of national power and to include (in this case) Moslem nations as partners in development and implementation. This chapter resonates with Boyd’s three strategic environments: the physical, the mental and the moral.
Boyd’s ‘physical’ environment is represented in the report’s recommendation to target terrorist sanctuaries and organisations and to decisively support counterterrorism or confront terrorist support in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. This recommendation places the emphasis squarely on the physical domain, as does the call to protect and prepare the United States for terrorist attacks. Many of the recommendations also extend into Boyd’s ‘mental’ domain.21 The emphasis on broadening the national strategy to a coalition strategy again reinforces the importance of both the mental and Boyd’s ‘moral’ domain. But it is probably in the moral domain, in seeking to engage the Islamic community, that the strongest alignment with Boyd’s preference for positive engagement is apparent. How effectively the Bush administration implemented these recommendations is a task for others to assess.
The challenges of contemporary strategy are not simply confined to the application of national power against religious fanatics. As the current US Secretary of State commented acidly, the 5000 nuclear warheads possessed by the United States make the destructive power of a few hijacked airplanes trivial. Strategy also includes many skills and assets that are not seeded in conflict: diplomacy, trade, education and culture among others.
While Boyd reinforced the need for harmony among allies and the importance of a moral basis for strategy, he will always remain, above all, a strategist of conflict. Boyd’s method of research in itself provides some insight into the use of his concepts beyond his key domain. In dealing with strategy and its definition, he outlined his typical approach (author’s italics):
- make a general survey (observe)
- consider the essential elements (orient)
- place in strategic perspective (decide)
- implement (act)
As a broad approach to strategic planning, indeed any complex problem-solving, this provides a strong overarching framework.
Perhaps Boyd’s most contentious assertion is embodied in his work ‘Creation and Destruction’ which is essentially a thesis on the need for continuous change and evolution. Boyd theorises that, the moment an organisation is established, running effectively and achieving its aim, it is in danger of being rendered obsolete by a competitor and thus must change. But Boyd went further than this, advocating the destruction of the original organisation to allow a new system to evolve. The need to evolve and adapt is Boyd’s only constant. While this is an extreme metaphor, Boyd emphasised that the status quo should never be accepted and roundly condemned mediocrity. He highlighted the risks of strategic stasis leading to irrelevance and eventual defeat:
The wrong research path would be to again coin conceptual categories grounded in current events rather than good theory.22
Boyd’s Zeitgeist was the Cold War and counter-revolutionary war, but his theories transcend these and hold much for latter-day strategists who choose to explore and exploit his work. As Kalyvas emphasises, concepts cannot be based on current events and trends, although it is difficult to envisage strategic design that does not risk becoming trapped in its time or domain.23 Maritime strategy, counterinsurgency strategy, the continental school of strategy and nuclear strategy are all theories that have swung in and out of vogue as have a host of others. It is also the case that a particular nation or actor may have to remain wedded to one or a limited hybrid of ‘schools’ by dint of geography or resources. However, the more broadly based the theory, the greater its chance of retaining relevance and applicability.
In his criticisms of Clausewitz, Jomini and others, Boyd demonstrates a grasp equal to analysts such as Gray and Echevarria.24 Indeed, Boyd’s intellectual power is beyond question. As Colin Gray argues, Boyd’s relevance lies in the ultimate simplicity of his theoretical framework. While he possessed a complex mind that led him down convoluted paths, he was careful to leave simple codas to all his work. Boyd was an educator as well as a thinker. He did not leave specific approaches or solutions, but general principles and concepts that are broadly applicable to contemporary strategy.
As discussed, Boyd’s theoretical framework for strategy consists of three basic platforms. The first advocates approaching any strategic problem in the three domains (physical, mental and moral) and recognising the need to isolate the adversary and develop harmony within the friendly organisation and that of allies and potential allies. Boyd’s second platform comprises the expansion of his simplified OODA Loop, highlighting the importance of continuous orientation and, in particular, the need to understand culture (friendly, adversary, and that of the operating environment). The third platform encompasses his overall approach to strategic problem-solving which provides the strategist a solid framework for analysis and concludes with the important and difficult stage of implementation. These three platforms combine to embody a simple theory that is applicable to the complexity of the contemporary strategic environment.
All strategic theories will shift in and out of fashion. Boyd’s work, however, boasts continued and universal applicability. He attempts to understand the core of human behaviour in conflict and provides deductions towards the development of battlefield command and control. Boyd provides a dynamic dialectic model for strategy in conflict that can be expanded into a strategy for peace. Analysis of the 9/11 Commission Report demonstrates that Boyd’s simple elegance translates to one of the most extreme and complex issues of the last decade. Boyd’s three theoretical platforms retain their relevance for the modern strategist dealing with the challenges of contemporary strategy.
Like any theorist, Boyd is subject to both criticism and acclaim that will wax and wane. His refusal to publish extensively has placed his theories in an unusually vulnerable position; the dangers they face include over-simplification by others or even being lost to contemporary strategists. The parallels and indeed strengths that Boyd offers the Army and ADF in conceptual terms are of such value that considerable effort should be devoted to ensuring that neither fate befalls his theories. Indeed, his thought provides the elusive luxury of a solid foundation in this post-modern environment of conceptual spin-doctoring.
Like any universal theorist, Boyd remains relevant to the modern era of warfighting; the challenge now lies in finding a means to fully utilise this relevance. Broad-based theories do not provide easy paths to answers; it takes education and then practice to apply these fully. Boyd’s thoughts and deductions provide a powerful lever which needs only a suitable fulcrum point and the application of effort:
So, how does one pay homage to a man like John Boyd? Perhaps best by remembering that Colonel Boyd never sought the acclaim won him by this thinking. He only wanted to make a difference in the next war, and he did. That ancient book of wisdom—Proverbs—sums up John’s contribution to his nation: ‘A wise man is strong and a man of knowledge adds to his strength; for by wise guidance will you wage war, and there is victory in a multitude of counsellors.’ I, and his Corps of Marines, will miss our counsellor terribly.25
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas is a Royal Australian Armoured Corps Officer who has recently returned from service as the Commander of the Australian Contingent on Operation PALADIN, the Australian contribution to UNTSO. Prior to this he served in a variety of training and command appointments.
Endnotes
1 CS Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 91.
2 ‘Napoleon on Politics & Power’, <http://www.napoleonguide.com/aquote_power.htm>
3 TM Box, K Byus, C Fogliasso and WD Miller, ‘Hardball and OODA Loop’, Proceedings of the Academy of Strategic Management, Vol. 6, No. 1, Allied Academies International Conference, Jacksonville, 11–14 April 2007.
4 JL Cown, ‘Warfighting brought to you by...’, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, Vol. 127, No. 11, November 2001, p. 61. Cown quotes General CC Krulak, USMC Commandant at the time of Boyd’s death.
5 GT Hammond, The Mind of War, John Boyd and American Security, Smithsonian Books, Washington, 2001, pp. 35–100.
6 FPB Osinga, Science, Strategy and War – The strategic theory of John Boyd, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 4.
7 C Stockings, ‘The End of Strategy? Not so Fast’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1, Autumn 2007, p. 14.
8 Boyd would also later advise US F-4 Phantom pilots on tactics to counter the more manoeuvrable Mig-17 during the Vietnam War.
9 Osinga, Science, Strategy and War, p. 47.
10 AA Bazin, ‘Boyd’s OODA Loop and the Infantry Company Commander’, Infantry, January–February 2005, pp. 17–19.
11 JR Boyd, ‘Destruction and Creation’, 1976, <http://www.gaolsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf>
12 Osinga, Science, Strategy and War, p. 129.
13 All these papers are available from <http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Boyd-Papers.html>
14 JR Boyd, ‘The Strategic Game of ? and ?’, slides 45–51, <http://www.dnipogo.org/boyd/pdf/strategy.pdf> accessed June 2006.
15 This approach is paralleled by Gray in Modern Strategy, p. 49. Gray cites a definition by Fred Charles Ikle, highlighting the strategist’s need for a broad intellect and worldly vision.
16 JR Boyd, ‘The Strategic Game of ? and ?’, slide 51, <http://www.dnipogo.org/boyd/pdf/strategy.pdf>.
17 The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, WW Norton and Coy, 2004, p. 42.
18 Ibid., p. 351.
19 Ibid., p. 399.
20 Ibid., p. 361. The basis for the next three paragraphs of analysis is the 9/11 Commission report, pp. 361–98.
21 Ibid. See p. 385, for example.
22 S Kalyvas, ‘New and Old Civil Wars: a Valid Distinction’, World Politics 54, October 2001, p. 117.
23 Or a domain-based concept claiming to be a strategy. See C Stockings and C Fernandes, ‘Airpower and the Myth of Strategic Bombing as Strategy’, ISAA Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, p. 6.
24 See Osinga, Science, Strategy and War, p. 94; and AJ Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 103. Osinga and Echevarria in turn demonstrate an equivalent comprehension of Clausewitz’s understanding of friction.
25 Cown, ‘Warfighting brought to you by...,’ citing General CC Krulak at the time of Boyd’s death.
