Contemporary Warfare, the Utility of Infantry, and Implications for the Project Land 400 Combined Arms Fighting System
Abstract
This article examines the role of infantry in contemporary warfare, and finds that a highly trained infantry capability is essential for contemporary warfare. Infantry must operate in concert with other arms and services, but at times will be required to operate independently from vehicles. Therefore, the article proposes a balanced force model for the Army based on a single type of infantry battalion and a single type of cavalry regiment, or divided between more specialised reconnaissance cavalry and armoured personnel carrier regiments, with all forces designed to operate in combination with each other as well as independently.
Introduction
Project Land 400 Combined Arms Fighting System (Land 400 CAFS) is potentially the most significant change to the equipment and tactics of the combined arms team for the next twenty years. Consequently, this article asks two important questions: what are the characteristics that only the infantry capability can bring to a combined arms team in contemporary warfare; and what are the implications of these characteristics for Land 400 CAFS? This article offers a unique perspective on the Land 400 CAFS problem and seeks to enhance the intellectual discourse on one of the Army’s greatest capability investments.
This article contends that the implications of the role of infantry in contemporary warfare, based upon Army’s operational experiences since 1990, are that a highly trained infantry capability is essential for contemporary warfare. Infantry, however, must operate in concert with other arms and services but at times will be required to operate independently from vehicles. Therefore, the time and resources invested in the infantry capability that are not directly related to the infantry’s primary role diminish the characteristic that makes the infantry a key component of combined arms teams.
The article analyses each of the key terms contained within the extant role of the infantry and tests their meaning and relevance in the context of the contemporary operating environment defined by the Army’s Future Land Operating Concept – Adaptive Campaigning. This analysis of the role of the infantry in contemporary warfare is intended to distil the unique qualities, characteristics and functions the infantry provides to combined arms teams. The current armoured and infantry force types will then be examined to determine if the current structures are optimal in light of the review of infantry’s role in contemporary warfare. This article will then suggest a possible force structure solution drawing on Army’s recent operational experiences.
The Role of the Infantry in Contemporary Warfare
To Seek Out The Enemy
Infantry is capable of seeking out an enemy operating in complex physical terrain1 and discriminating between the enemy and non-combatants in circumstances and in ways that other capability cannot. It is possible to discover an enemy by a wide and diverse range of technical and specialist reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence means in a range of environmental conditions. However, the preference of many potential enemies to retreat into complex terrain limits the utility of many of these means. The number of possible targets is likely to be too many, and the targets too dispersed, for scarce technical and specialist detection means to address. Moreover, the retreat into complex terrain is a deliberate choice by potential enemies to operate where many advanced reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence means cannot penetrate or where these means lack the fidelity to discriminate between an enemy and a non-combatant. Therefore, detection and identification of enemies is often only possible at close quarters by human beings. The ability to get close enough to an enemy often requires movement through spaces that vehicles (both ground and aerial) cannot move through or into, and technical means cannot penetrate (buildings, bunker systems, caves and jungle canopies for example). Therefore, infantry should be able to persist within and move through complex physical terrain on foot, and discover enemies and defeat them at close quarters in meeting engagements as part of a combined arms team.
The outcome of ... battles [in the early stages of the Afghanistan war] depended on factors beyond the influence of sensors and precision munitions. Geography was a critical factor in that the complexity of the terrain as well as the intermingling of Al Qaeda forces with civilians foiled attempts to kill or capture the enemy. Surveillance of the difficult terrain at Tora Bora, for example, could not compensate for the lack of ground forces to cover exfiltration routes. After a sixteen-day battle, many Al Qaeda forces, probably including Osama bin Laden, escaped across the Pakistan border.
As the fight developed over the next ten days, it became apparent that over half of the enemy positions and at least three hundred fifty Al Qaeda fighters had gone undetected. The enemy’s reaction to the attack was also unexpected. American commanders had expected al Qaeda forces to withdraw upon contact with the superior allied force rather than defend as they did from fortified positions.2
An enemy’s rationale for operating within complex terrain often relates to the ease with which they can disguise their identity by operating amongst a civilian population. Therefore, it is often difficult to discern an enemy from a non-combatant unless they reveal themselves in the prosecution of an attack, someone gives away their identity, or physical control measures (biometric scans or identity checks) compromise their anonymity. In these circumstances, discriminating enemies from non-combatants will tend to necessitate a continuous physical presence among a population. Continuous and sufficiently pervasive physical presence among a population allows a force to recognise an adversary against the background of normal patterns of life. It also provides protection and other inducements to vulnerable populations such that members of those populations are willing to collaborate and inform on enemies. The degrees of persistence, pervasiveness and proximity necessary to reveal the identities of enemies operating amongst the population and to protect the population from enemy coercion are only achievable by a relatively large number of appropriately trained soldiers operating on foot. These soldiers should be capable of interacting with, and operate continuously amongst the population. While non-infantry troops are capable of this function, they generally require additional training to be proficient. Moreover, the conduct of continuous security operations among the population comes at the expense of their ability to fulfil their core function. Each tactical component of infantry should be capable of protecting, controlling, interacting with, and operating continuously among vulnerable populations.
The instruments of Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign, small mobile groups of paramilitary and police, were intermingled with the innocent civilian objects of their terror and were, therefore, unidentifiable and immune to NATO air power. Intelligence analysts often had clear pictures of Albanian refugees cowering in the hills, but could not locate the Serbs who were terrorizing them. Aircraft looked for targets in vain, sometimes refuelling four times without dropping a bomb. Because aircraft could not land with bombs, millions of dollars of ordinance landed in the Adriatic Ocean or on the vacant countryside. Serbian Army tanks and other vehicles dispersed and hid. Even when Serbian tanks and artillery pieces were located, bombing might have provided an emotional catharsis, but the activity was irrelevant to stopping the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign.3
To Close With The Enemy
Closing implies movement to within close range of an enemy and the possible application of force or the threat of force at close range. Combined arms teams will exploit the protection afforded by mobility platforms, automation, and precision offensive support where appropriate to close with an enemy. However, the vulnerability of vehicles increases in close physical terrain where manoeuvre is difficult. Enemies may also operate in environments that vehicles cannot navigate, potentially denying the opportunity to use land vehicles. Enemies operating in close proximity to non-combatants tend to limit the utility of indirect and aerial delivered offensive support, which are often not sufficiently precise to prevent the death of non-combatants or prevent the unnecessary destruction of property. Air power is of itself generally a transitory battlefield effect and many contemporary warfighting capabilities are unreliable in certain climatic conditions. Furthermore, movement on foot is often much easier to conceal than movement by vehicles. Therefore, while it is often possible to close with an enemy from the relative protection of a vehicle (manned, unmanned, aerial or ground based), there are likely to be many occasions that it is advantageous or necessary to close with an enemy on foot. Infantry should be able to move to a point of decision4 through the most difficult terrain on foot (particularly enclosed spaces) independent of platform based support (air and/or ground), and may be reliant only upon direct fire weapon systems that are man-portable (including less than lethal weapons).
The fight for possession of the long boot of Italy was ... a struggle in which a force composed largely of North African and French mountain troops ... using only a few vehicles and pack animals, actually moved faster in difficult terrain than vehicle-clogged British divisions closer to the coast. Contrary to common expectation, modern equipment had not necessarily made an army more mobile. Road and weather conditions underscored the difference between physical and tactical mobility. In Italy, the unceasing winter rains turned the countryside ... into a quagmire that restricted even tracked vehicles to the roads. Most offensive action, therefore, had to be effected by infantry, sappers, and artillery, not always in sufficient numerical superiority.5
In some circumstances, it is necessary to modify terrain in order to gain a positional advantage over an enemy or to protect troops from the effects of enemy fire. These modifications might include the use of explosive demolitions and hand tools to create alternate avenues of approach (punching holes in walls and bunkers for example), hand tools to improve protection from fire (constructing field defences for example), and climbing tools to move vertically (ladders and ropes for scaling walls and cliffs, and entering tunnels). While all these skills reside with the engineers and other specialist capabilities, it is unlikely that there will be an appropriately skilled engineer within every infantry small team manoeuvring through complex terrain. Therefore, it is unlikely that the expertise will be available when and where it is needed, particularly during meeting engagements in built up areas. Every infantry grouping should be skilled in the use of some tools and explosives in order to modify terrain in close combat.
Choosing to defend only the north part of the town but leaving the southern half a nightmare of trapped and mined houses, the Germans made its defence into a miniature Stalingrad of interconnected and heavily mined strongpoints. Here the Panzerfaust, an expendable infantry antitank weapon, made its appearance. Here, also, the Canadians adopted the German technique of “mouseholing,” using demolition charges to blow holes in walls so that troops could clear rows of houses without having to appear in the fire- swept streets. However, as the Germans often attempted to recapture houses by infiltrating through “mouseholes” of their own, captured buildings consequently had to be occupied in strength. Such practices naturally resulted in extremely close quarter combat ...6
To Kill and Capture The Enemy
Killing and destroying an enemy is possible by any number of different means. However, an enemy’s use of physical terrain and civil populations (as described in Adaptive Campaigning) often functionally and physically dislocates the means to kill the enemy remotely or at long ranges. While aerial and ground vehicles allow for the application of the greatest firepower at the longest ranges, the infantry soldier is capable of engagements at close range in terrain that vehicles and platforms cannot penetrate or in which they lack the fidelity to discriminate between an enemy and non-combatant. This does not preclude infantry from applying remotely delivered munitions. Indeed, infantry must be able to communicate to orchestrate the application of other vehicle based direct fires and offensive support. However, infantry is distinguishable from other means of killing the enemy by its ability to close with and kill at close quarters with precision, proportionality and discrimination. Therefore, every infantry tactical grouping should be capable of accurate, proportional, and discriminating application of integral and remotely applied lethal (and non-lethal) force at close quarters.
In the tactical arena, Hezbollah proved a worthy adversary for the IDF ground forces. Its use of swarming ATGMs and RPGs against Israeli tanks was both shrewd and inventive. Of the 114 IDF personnel killed during the war, 30 were tank crewmen. Out of the 400 tanks involved in the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged, and 20 penetrated ... Clearly, Hezbollah ... mastered the art of light infantry/ATGM tactics against heavy mechanised forces.7
Infantry can capture enemies in places and in ways that other capabilities cannot. To capture is to take by force or threat of force, which implies closing to within intimate range of an individual or group of enemy, taking them into custody, and holding them against their will. Only a dismounted soldier can detain another by force against his will (as opposed to surrendering enemy, who have given up the will to fight). While any soldier can capture another, it requires a particularly high level of perishable field craft to deliberately close with an adversary and take them as a prisoner from within a defended or secured location. Therefore, the almost ubiquitous requirement for combined arms teams to be able to capture enemies means that every tactical infantry grouping should be capable of infiltrating into defended and secured locations, and taking individuals or groups of enemy into custody against their will.
Close combat costs lives. Close combat is inherently violent and by its very nature always involves significant danger. When appropriate, commanders will typically make every effort to employ a suitable combination of means to effect close combat that minimises the risk to lives. However, a decision to enter into complex terrain to close with and kill an enemy accepts the potential for a violent decision involving significant danger at close quarters. Success in close combat in all seasons, weather and terrain, demands high levels of perishable proficiency in close quarter battle, including ‘hand to hand’ combat, marksmanship, field craft, self-discipline, small group cohesion, courage, mental toughness, physical power and endurance. These characteristics are the basis for an effective infantry.
To Seize and Hold Ground
Infantry can seize and hold certain terrain types and some infrastructure that other capabilities cannot. To seize is to clear a designated area and gain control of it. To hold is to maintain possession of a position or area by force. Combined arms team missions might require the seizing and holding of ground for a number of reasons. A combined arms team might need to seize a village controlled by an insurgent and hold it in order to protect the community from insurgent coercion and implement a range of initiatives to generate community collaboration. A combined arms team might need to seize and hold ground that has a decisive influence over other terrain and events, or provides an adversary a marked advantage. A combined arms team might need to seize and hold a critical piece of infrastructure that provides life-sustaining support to several communities. It is possible to fulfil these functions from platforms or with other means in some instances. However, some terrain will not be navigable by vehicles; the enemy will attempt to fortify their physical positions to reduce the effectiveness of ground based and aerial platforms (including the effects they are designed to generate); and the efficacy of seizing and holding terrain from aerial platforms is doubtful. Therefore, many circumstances will necessitate a persistent physical presence by a sufficient quantity of appropriately trained and equipped infantry soldiers.
Even when enemy concentrations were identified, complex terrain and the cover of fortified positions frustrated attempts to predict the effects of bombing and made ground attack the only option to defeat the enemy. At Keshendeh-ye Pa’in, for example, two days of bombing was not enough to prevent the enemy from halting a ground advance. At the Qala-i-Gangi fortress, despite air attacks involving multiple AC-130 ammunition loads and seventy-two thousand-pound GPS-guided bombs, the defenders survived and resisted. From an American perspective, continued resistance was surprising. It took fighting the enemy in the close fight to determine his skill as well as determination to continue resisting.8
The term ‘hold’ is also suitable when used in relation to population protection.9 It is an accepted part of the contemporary lexicon10 and describes the function of maintaining physical control of a population to deny enemy influence over that population and to allow for the subsequent application of other means to generate community collaboration. To this end, the term ‘ground’ in the function ‘seize and hold ground’ is inclusive of ground, infrastructure and population groups. The efficacy of applying a range of measures that protect the population from enemy influence, influence the population according to our narrative, and provide a range of life-sustaining and other support from behind armour, from the air, or through automated and robotic technologies is doubtful and unproven. Consequently, a continuous and pervasive combined arms presence taking advantage of all the elements of the arms is necessary to protect populations from enemy coercion.
Whatever government is in power and whatever your political leanings, unless you are confident in the ability of your government to enforce its peace then the man with a gun at your door at midnight is your master.11
Infantry can control and protect populations to an extent that other capabilities cannot. ‘Holding’ communities for only a finite time and leaving them vulnerable to the coercive influences of enemies by returning forces to operating bases or other safe harbours (for any length of time) undermines any attempt to protect and support populations. Controlling the movement of peoples, enforcing curfews, diffusing and controlling crowds, and influencing and protecting populations from enemy influences are largely functions of maintaining a continuous presence with a sufficient quantity of soldiers in close proximity to the population. While other means are available to achieve these functions, only infantry is likely to be appropriately trained to maintain the necessary level of continuous presence with a sufficient troop density relative to the population. Therefore, infantry should be capable of continuous and pervasive operations among vulnerable populations.
To Repel Attack
Repelling attacks is implicit in the function ‘hold’. It implies arraying a force to defend or secure something. An enemy must use force to wrest control of an area, piece of infrastructure, or community from a holding force, which implies attacking. Therefore, the imperative to repel attack nests within the function ‘hold’. Repelling attacks also encompasses other acts to protect, defend, and secure. Counter ambush, for example, is nothing more than a mobile force’s attempt to repel a surprise attack by an enemy laying in wait. Defeating attacks with a single arm is possible—but exposes the weakness of that single arm. Combining arms into the combined arms team maximises the strengths and protects the weaknesses of the individual arms. Therefore, infantry should be capable of repelling attacks in concert with other arms.
Achieving and Maintaining a High Level of Infantry Capability
An infantry corps capable of fulfilling its role in contemporary warfare demands sophisticated and diverse training. Maintaining a high level of individual skills and characteristics—such as marksmanship, physical power and endurance, communications, reconnaissance techniques, patrolling techniques, movement through complex terrain, close quarter battle skills, combat first aid, field craft, population control techniques, cultural competence, and explosive entry among others—require time and resources. The achievement and maintenance of an adequate level of collective capability requires an even greater investment in resources and time.
The notion that competence in the techniques of the infantry is a baseline for all soldiers is a fallacy. The notion is perpetuated by those that mistake the combat skills and techniques of the soldier (effective use of one’s personnel weapon, the techniques of patrolling, defence and attack) with the skills and techniques of the infantry. This flawed assumption tends to undervalue the infantry and leads to a harmful underestimation of the time and resources required to train individual infantrymen and infantry teams. Consequently, time spent by infantry doing things not directly related to achieving or maintaining collective infantry capability in the role described diminishes the quality of the infantry and therefore diminishes the capability of combined arms teams. Likewise, time spent by other corps trying to achieve proficiency in infantry skills and techniques is wasteful.
Versatility and Infantry's Ability to Function Beyond its Role
The above notwithstanding, the infantry is capable of fulfilling functions outside its defined role because of its ability to provide relatively large numbers of trained personnel with a functioning command structure. Its potential to provide continuous proximity to communities enables infantry to glean important information, such as the identities of influential community members and poorly functioning infrastructure, which might generate opportunities for actions by other elements of the force, both military and non-military. Individual infantrymen are a useful means of transmitting messages to groups and influential people because of their continuous proximity to communities. Infantry is also a source of personnel support to communities before, during and after major crises, such as natural disasters. Infantrymen are an obvious pool of appropriately trained soldiers for securing and enabling the evacuation of foreign nationals from strife-ridden countries. In certain circumstances infantrymen have trained to do some specific tasks normally undertaken by police; for example, riot control. Nonetheless, while the infantry is capable of fulfilling these functions with specific training, they are a by-product of the versatility infantry derives from fulfilling its primary role and do not constitute necessary additions to the role in themselves. Moreover, and critically, time spent preparing infantry to fulfil functions beyond its primary role comes at the expense of the quality of the infantry fulfilling its traditional roles in combined arms teams.
Summary So Far
Infantry’s unique characteristics are a function of its ability to operate at the point of decision on foot.12 Infantry’s characteristics enable it to mitigate many of the weaknesses and capitalise on the strengths of other arms in the combined arms team. Therefore, when combined with other capabilities in combined arms teams, infantry generates important tactical dilemmas for its enemies and synergies for the combined arms team. Other capabilities can achieve the same ends and produce the same effects that infantry can (and, of course, many that infantry cannot). However, infantry’s value is not necessarily the ends it achieves or the effects it produces by itself but in its ability to achieve these in ways, circumstances and environments that others cannot. Therefore, the primary conclusions of the analysis so far are threefold. First, the defining characteristics of infantry are its ability to function in all seasons, weather and terrain, its ability to hold, its ability to kill at close quarters and its ability to capture. Second, infantry is highly versatile, which is a function of its ability to generate soldiers trained to fight on foot. Third, individual infantry proficiency and collective infantry capability require a significant investment in time and resources.
The implications of these conclusions are that a highly trained infantry capability is imperative for contemporary warfare; infantry must be capable of functioning with other arms and services; and time and resources invested in the infantry that are not directly related to the infantry’s primary role diminish the unique characteristics that make the infantry the core component of many combined arms teams. The next section of the article looks at the Land 400 Combined Arms Fighting System in light of these implications.
Implications for Land 400 CAFS
Infantry Interoperability Within Combined Arms Teams
The imperative for infantry to contribute to combined arms teams implies that every level of infantry manoeuvre grouping (section – battalion) must be capable of communicating with and achieving similar levels of tactical mobility and protection to the other arms and services within the combined arms team. This imperative is currently met by the diversity and multi-skilling of infantry across four basic configurations: mechanised infantry, motorised infantry, light infantry, and Special Forces. 13
Types of Infantry Under The Current Force Model
The mechanised infantry. Mechanised infantry closes with the point of decision mounted in integral armoured fighting vehicles (AFV). Mechanised infantry allows for the combination of the unique infantry functions with tanks without compromising armoured functionality and tactical mobility. Mechanised infantry has greater relative tactical mobility, firepower, protection and endurance than light infantry in many circumstances. It is generally less vulnerable, better protected, and possesses greater firepower than motorised infantry. However, the coupling of infantry with a vehicle limits its ability to operate in certain environments because there are places that armoured vehicles cannot move into or through, and a relatively large sustainment cost must be considered. Mechanised infantry additionally require greater amounts of strategic lift to deploy. It also requires different training regimes because of the requirement for the infantryman in mechanised battalions to be capable of operating and maintaining the AFVs.
The motorised infantry. Motorised infantry is a term used to describe infantry mounted in integral protected mobility vehicles (PMV). This configuration affords infantry levels of mobility and protection between light infantry and mechanised infantry. It allows infantry to move to a location short of the point of decision protected as far as is safe to do so, then dismount and conduct operations on foot. However, unlike the mechanised infantry, motorised infantry is not configured to deliberately fight from its PMV at the point of decision. Because motorised infantry is coupled to an integral vehicle it also suffers from the same disadvantages as mechanised infantry to a greater or lesser extent.
The light infantry. Light infantry allows for an almost limitless range of operating environments. Light infantry possesses greater relative strategic mobility to mechanised and motorised infantry because of the relative simplicity of deployment, and the ability to move by a range of strategic means in relatively few lifts. Light infantry can conduct vertical manoeuvre, direct ship to objective manoeuvre, and dismounted infiltration. Light infantry closes with the point of decision and fights on foot, while retaining the capacity to operate with armour and cavalry as mounted infantry (currently mounted in Bushmasters from an armoured personnel carrier (APC) Squadron). However, once separated from its means of mobility, light infantry is relatively vulnerable, less mobile, and lacking in firepower and first line support.
Special Forces. Special Forces possess the key characteristics of motorised and light infantry but with the ability to function covertly, clandestinely, and unconventionally. Special Forces skills are highly refined allowing for greater precision, austerity, independence, innovation and discretion. Current levels of language competence, which are over and above that of the other infantry types, enhance Special Forces’ ability to operate among the people. Therefore, Special Forces are the most versatile of all military forces. However, the selection and training requirements for Special Forces are such that they are relatively scarce. This fact, coupled with the lack of enablers to function for extended periods above sub-unit level, means that Special Forces are incapable of generating the critical mass that conventional infantry can.
Types of Armour Under the Curent Force Model
In addition to the four infantry types, the Australian Army’s manoeuvre forces include three distinct types of armour. According to Land Warfare Doctrine 3-3-4, Employment of Armour,
armour is the generic term for the weapons systems that combine firepower, mobility and protection, and the military organisations that employ such systems.14
It also states that:
throughout history, all armour has been based on this combination, and the trading of one to increase another. In the 21st century, this combination has become a quartet of capability through the addition of networked communications.15
The role of armour is to locate, identify and destroy or capture the enemy, by day or night, in combination with other arms, using fire and manoeuvre.16 The three doctrinal types of armour include tanks, cavalry and armoured personnel carrier. Like the four types of infantry, the three types of armour provide different capabilities that contribute uniquely to combined arms teams. The Australian Army is not currently fielding any separate armoured personnel carrier capability at the moment—it currently provides protected mobility lift from a former APC unit equipped with PMV instead of APC.
Tanks. The role of tanks is, in coordination with other arms, to close with and destroy the enemy using firepower, manoeuvre and shock action.17 Tanks, like infantry, are capable of seeking out, closing with and killing the enemy. Tanks can repel attacks and are capable of operating by day and by night in a variety of terrains. However, there are certain terrain types that tanks cannot operate in without significant manoeuvre enhancement capabilities and there are some terrain types that tanks cannot operate in at all. Tanks are the best protected land platform available to the Army. Tanks also possess the greatest firepower of any manoeuvre element in the Army. The most significant and unique contribution of tanks to the combined arms team is the ability to produce the phenomenon of shock action.18 Tanks, like mechanised infantry, come with a significant logistic and strategic movement cost. Tanks never plan to fight as a single arm and always plan and configure to fight as a combined arms team, especially with other armoured elements.
Cavalry. The role of cavalry is to locate, dislocate, and disrupt the enemy through the conduct of offensive, defensive and security actions.19 Cavalry closes with an enemy in integral AFVs. Cavalry is an economy of force organisation; this means it is an austere organisation designed to perform its task over great distances in the face of a numerically superior foe. The trade off is that cavalry is less dense than infantry and therefore cannot accept decisive engagement and still perform its mission. Therefore, its role of locating, dislocating and disrupting implies actions that support other forces’ attempts to seek decision. It is less vulnerable, better protected, and possesses greater firepower than light or motorised infantry.
Nevertheless, the cavalry shares, to a greater or lesser degree, some of the qualities and characteristics of mechanised infantry; particularly with respect to terrain limitations, sustainment costs and strategic lift. However, under the current force model, the cavalry vehicle provides a different capability to the mechanised infantry in two important respects. First, its sensor systems make cavalry far more effective at reconnaissance and surveillance than mechanised infantry. Second, its primary weapon system enables it to generate more suppressive and destructive firepower than mechanised infantry.
Three types of armour and four types of infantry seem to be excessive for a Regular Army that can generate just ten battlegroups. This excessive mix of types causes unnecessary force generation complexity, increases the breadth of skills that infantrymen and armoured troopers must be proficient in, consequently diminishing the quality of the armoured and infantry capabilities in some cases. Rationalising the seven types of manoeuvre forces is likely to enable Land 400 CAFS to achieve more than would be possible under the current paradigm.
Project Land 400 Combined Arms Fighting System and the Types of Infantry and Armour
In light of the analysis of the current infantry and armour model, and in light of the analysis of the role of infantry in contemporary warfare, critics are likely to judge the success of Land 400 CAFS based on the extent that it achieves the following outcomes:
- it must provide for enhanced armoured reconnaissance and surveillance capability
- it must provide infantry and cavalry with improved levels of mobility and armoured protection, and increased firepower
- it must accommodate an infantry capable of its role on foot independent of vehicles when appropriate
- it should enable greater flexibility and a greater range of possible infantry/armour combinations in combined arms teams
- it should make it simpler and easier to generate and maintain task organised forces for operations and afloat amphibious platforms
- it should not diminish nor duplicate the unique contributions of tanks and Special Forces.
A short analysis of the employment of Australian infantry and armour on operations in the last half century reveals that the current structure of the Army’s manoeuvre forces is misaligned with its function. The result has been an increase over time of ad-hoc combined arms teams. In fact, the Army may well have inadvertently moved away from a more appropriate model, which it used throughout its operations in South Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s. The basis of this model was a single type of infantry battalion and a single type of APC squadron, each designed to operate in combination with each other and independent of each other. Under that model, the infantry was capable of dismounted infiltration independent of the APC squadron to seek out and close with the enemy undetected in complex terrain. This enabled the infantry to initiate over 80 per cent of engagements on its terms. It also enabled the APC squadron to conduct reconnaissance, flank protection, route security, convoy protection and escort, and other cavalry tasks independent of the infantry as appropriate. In combined arms teams the APC squadron provided accurate and sustained supporting machine gun fire, mobile mortar bases, ready reaction forces, armoured ambulances and resupply. The APC squadron inserted, redeployed and extracted infantry under fire. It also conducted insertions and extractions of Special Forces. And, of course, combined infantry and APC teams conducted attacks, defence, cordon and search, ambushes and advances to contact.
The Australian infantry encountered a strong force of Viet Cong during the afternoon and received supporting fire from artillery located at Nui Dat. ‘D’ Company, however, became pinned down and ran short of ammunition as the hostile force, now estimated at more than three companies, began to surround it. Because of the nearness to Nui Dat, the Australian infantry were on foot without armoured personnel carriers; there were no United States tanks in the area.
Back in Nui Dat, most of the personnel of No 3 Troop, 1st APC Squadron ... was ‘scrambled’ on an urgent call to pick up ‘A’ company of the 6th Battalion and go to the relief of ‘D’ in the rubber plantation about 1000 yards north-west of Long Tan.
As the line of armoured personnel carriers swept through the young rubber plantation in pouring rain, figures were seen at fairly close range. Corporal J A Carter, in charge of APC No 13 on the right of the line, said later: ‘They looked like green uniforms. I thought they might be Delta Company.’ Immediately the Australian carriers came under fire. Directed by Lieutenant Roberts they drove straight ahead with guns firing. The enemy, numbering about one hundred, broke and ran.
... Roberts continued the sweep northwards, firing on the move and over-running several other hostile groups. He then swung his carriers east to drive the enemy away from ‘D’ Company’s position. Under heavy automatic fire from his front and left flank, Roberts caught a glimpse of ‘D’ Company as his carriers literally charged the enemy. This finally routed the opposition and they were seen no more.20
The employment of infantry and armour has followed a similar pattern on operations in the last two decades (although under very different circumstances). It has followed this pattern despite restructures of infantry and armour in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s leading to a range of very specific types. The 1 RAR Battalion Group in Somalia in 1993 operated according to the same model used in Vietnam to great effect. Recent operations in Timor Leste, Iraq and Afghanistan have also followed a similar pattern where APC, cavalry (sometimes operating in the APC role) and infantry have operated together and independent of each other in highly flexible combinations.
However, unlike 1965–72, recent combinations of infantry and armour have been ad-hoc. For example, infantrymen that have been trained to operate with an integral AFV have deployed as light infantry to operate from cavalry vehicles. In addition, crews of integral PMVs from a motorised infantry battalion have acted as PMV crews for infantrymen from a light infantry battalion in an APC role. Tank crews have also acted as PMV crews on occasions. The cavalry/infantry combinations as used in Iraq and Afghanistan are not a normal part of ‘steady state’ training and only occur during the lead up to and conduct of operations. The reality is that the current structure of infantry and armour does not support the method of employment (the form does not follow the function). These ad-hoc arrangements diminish the quality of both the armour and the infantry, who, under the Vietnam model, would have been able to achieve much higher levels of core capability. In addition, force generation and task organisation for deployment would have been much simpler under the Vietnam model. Therefore, a Land 400 CAFS force structure consisting of a single type of infantry battalion and a single type of cavalry regiment, or divided between more specialised reconnaissance cavalry and APC regiments, with all forces designed to operate in combination with each other and independent of each other, is clearly worth exploring.
Conclusion
The analysis in this article supports an infantry configuration that can maximise the potential to operate with the highest levels of tactical skill independent of vehicles if required, while retaining the ability to operate with the full range of likely combined arms teams that Army might deploy (airmobile through to armoured). This demands the ability for each collective organisational level of the infantry—from fire team to battalion—to be able to execute successful tactical actions in accordance with its role. Implicit in this capability is the ability to move to the point of decision in whatever mobility means that circumstances demand. This might be on foot, airmobile, mounted in protected mobility vehicles, or in armoured fighting vehicles. To maximise versatility in a small army, it also demands common infantry procedures and equipment across the whole capability, which are also common across other arms and services where possible. This is not currently the case.
The Land 400 challenge is further complicated by the fact that both the current mechanised infantry and motorised infantry vehicles are inherently simple. There is a very real probability that the Land 400 CAFS will be as complex and technically demanding (if not more so) as a main battle tank. The current mechanised and motorised infantry model of APC and PMV crews rotating through crew positions as a part of career development and progression may not be achievable or cost efficient.21
A simplified model that combines expert infantrymen with expert vehicle crews within or between armoured and infantry units, is ideal. Such a model would conform to the function of armour and infantry in recent operations and is likely to enhance the quality and flexibility of combined arms teams. Moreover, a simplified model will alleviate many current force generation issues and will simplify the generation of future forces for the Amphibious Ready Group.
Acceptance of a new model will require a significant shift in mindset of both the infantry and the cavalry.
About the Authors
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Smith is an infantry officer with six years’ regimental service with 2 RAR. His other service includes Adjutant 42 RQR, Field Training Instructor and Adjutant RMC, and a member of the HQ 3 Bde staff. Lieutenant Colonel Smith has seen operational service as a platoon commander in Rwanda, 1995, as an UNMO in Israel and Lebanon, 2002–03, and as the operations officer of Overwatch Battlegroup (West) in Iraq in 2006. He is a recent graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and holds a Masters of Military Art and Science. Lieutenant Colonel Smith is currently posted to the Directorate of Future Land Warfare and Strategy in Army Headquarters.
Lieutenant Colonel Tony Duus graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1993. He served a series of regimental postings at lieutenant and captain level at 1st Armd Regt, 2nd/14th Light Horse Regt and 2nd Cav Regt. In 2002 he was posted as the Operations Officer at 1st Armd Regt for three years. Upon completion of ACSC in 2006, he was posted as the Brigade Major of HQ 1st Bde for two years. Following a year as CofS HQ 1st Bde in 2009, he is currently posted as Deputy Director Future Land Warfare.
Lieutenant Colonel Simeon Ward graduated from the RMC Duntroon in 1994 into the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. He has deployed to Timor-Leste in 2003 and 2006 and to the Solomon Islands in 2006. Lieutenant Colonel Ward is a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Command and Staff College and is a graduate of the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting. He is currently serving in the Force Structure Development Directorate of Strategic Policy Division.
Endnotes
1 Adaptive Campaigning defines ‘complex terrain’ as the environment shaped by physical, human and informational factors that interact in a mutually-reinforcing fashion. It is terrain that limits the utility of technological intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and reduces opportunities for long range engagement with a consequent increased emphasis on close combat.
2 Colonel H R McMaster, Crack in the Foundation: Defence Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in War, Center for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle, 2003, p. 62.
3 Ibid., p. 46.
4 For the purpose of this article, a point of decision is defined as that portion of time and space at which the success or failure of a mission is in the balance—the outcome will be decided.
5 John A English and Bruce I Gudmundson, On Infantry, Revised Edition, Praeger, Westport, 1994, p. 110.
6 Ibid., p. 111.
7 Matt Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, Combat Institute Studies Press, Fort Leavenworth, 2007, p. 64.
8 McMaster, Crack in the Foundation, p. 64.
9 Adaptive Campaigning uses the term ‘population protection’ to describe the act of maintaining physical control of a population to deny enemy influence over that population and to allow for the application of other means to gain community collaboration.
10 US Army FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006.
11 Justin Kelly, ‘How to win in Afghanistan’, Quadrant Online, Vol. LIII, No. 4, April 2009, <http://www.quadrant.org.au/magazine/issue/2009/4/how-to-win-in-afghanis…;
12 For the purpose of this article, a point of decision is defined as that portion of time and space at which the success or failure of a mission is in the balance—the outcome will be decided.
13 This model deliberately excludes Regional Force Surveillance Units for the sake of clarity.
14 Land Warfare Doctrine 3-3-4, Employment of Armour, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 1–2.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 1–4.
17 Ibid.
18 Shock is the paralysing effect created by rapid and simultaneous actions that render an enemy incapable of making an effective response.
19 Ibid.
20 Major General R N L Hopkins, Australian Armour: A History of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps 1927–1972, Australian War Memorial Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978, pp. 242–43.
21 It currently takes five weeks to train a main battle tank driver, who then serves in a unit before undergoing five weeks training to become a gunner, followed by further service in a unit and a further eleven weeks training for a crew commander. If infantry were to continue the ‘streaming’ approach to the mech trade, the time spent in the mech crewman role may have to be extended.
