Close Combat: Army’s Fundamental Skill

Abstract

Army’s doctrine is absolutely certain of the importance of close combat. Land Warfare Doctrine 1 (LWD–1) in fact describes close combat as Army’s fundamental skill—is this true? Is the doctrinal focus of close combat reflected in the training areas and schools of the Army? The anecdotal evidence is that it is not. An examination of recent works on distributed manoeuvre identifies the essential characteristics of any close combat training ‘system’. Training close combat is at the forefront of United States Marine Corps thinking, and they have institutionalised this as part of Exercise Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). The EMV construct is broadly applicable to the Australian Army, and its adoption represents an opportunity to align actions with doctrine.

Battles are fought by platoons and squads. Place emphasis on small unit combat instruction so that it is conducted with the same precision as close-order drill.¹

If anyone requires convincing that the Australian Army is serious about succeeding in close combat then Land Warfare Doctrine 1 (LWD-1) should be their first stop. In the opening chapter it states:

The Army’s mission is to win the land battle. The Army achieves its mission by providing a potent, versatile, adaptable and agile land force that can be applied with discrimination and precision to protect and promote Australia’s national interests. Close combat is the Army’s fundamental skill. Mastery of close combat underlies the application of land power.²

The italics are mine, added to highlight the absolute centrality of close combat to Army’s capability and mission. If there are still any doubters, LWD-1 continues:

An army adept at close combat possesses the essential foundation for undertaking the full range of military operations. The ability to be successful in close combat is imperative to the application of manoeuvre theory. Close combat skills are the result of an ethos and training regime that emphasises the importance of the fighting soldier, a willingness to endure hardship, to apply force appropriately and an ability to function as part of a team in lethal circumstances.³

Following these convincing opening salvos it is probably superfluous to remind readers that the Chief of Army’s first core competency is that every Australian soldier is an ‘expert in close combat’.⁴ Given the absolute importance given to close combat in our doctrine we must be thinking and training this stuff furiously, right? Right? Alas, the anecdotal evidence is that we are not. There are many combat arms officers who have never planned or conducted combined arms live fire breaches at any level, and soldiers who have never felt, seen or heard what intimate suppression looks like. Other symptoms are Tactical Exercise Without Troops and Command Post Exercises conducted without ‘consideration’ for gun target lines and minimum safe distances of supporting arms. I acknowledge this is anecdotal evidence and it would be foolish to assume that excellent close combat training hasn’t or isn’t occurring in units. The point I make is that there doesn’t appear to be an organisational or institutional approach to close combat training in the Australian Army.

Why the Australian Army isn’t training close combat as well as it potentially could is a difficult question to answer. I will only briefly touch on this en route to the main objective of this article, which is to understand what improved close combat training could look like in the Australian Army. This will be examined in two parts: first through an examination of the characteristics of close combat from a training perspective, and then briefly constructing a straw man for institutionalised close combat training in the Australian Army. Many of the ideas for the straw man come from the United States Marine Corps (USMC) exercise Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). EMV is a twenty-eight day Operation ENDURING FREEDOM pre-deployment training package conducted at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in California.

A necessary preliminary to this discussion is to define the term ‘close combat’ which has been obscured by a melee of related terms such as close battle, ‘close quarter battle’ and ‘close quarter combat’. The definition of close combat provided by Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, and that which is used in this discussion is:

Close combat is that carried out with direct fire weapons, against identifiable individuals, supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires and nonlethal engagement means. Note: Close combat defeats or destroys the enemy forces or seizes and retains ground.⁵

This definition implies close combat occurs in offensive and defensive manoeuvres, but for the sake of simplicity I will discuss close combat in an offensive context only. The exclusion of the defensive phase of war would no doubt please the author of the opening quote, General Patton. Patton’s quote is quite explicit as to level of command at which close combat training should be conducted and the method used to conduct it. However, the absence of any clear instruction on ‘what to train’, delivered with similar conviction, is conspicuous and reflective of our own conceptual difficulties.

Understanding which close combat skills to train requires detailed understanding of the tactics, techniques and procedures required in close combat. Doctrine is an obvious start point for this understanding. Unfortunately the close combat explanations are somewhat simplistic and close combat, ‘closing with the enemy’ and ‘fire and manoeuvre’ are treated as largely synonymous. Fire and movement is explained in ‘The Rifle Platoon’ as ‘the technique of using fire to cover exposed movement. Within the platoon, one or more sections may cover the movement of another.’⁶ This explanation hardly does justice to the complexities of close combat. Mounted Minor Tactics introduces swarming, autonomous teams, the close combat cycle of observe–suppress–move–clear–observe and sensor shooting coupling in the opening chapter, but then reverts to simplistic examples and descriptions of linear tactics in subsequent chapters describing tactics, training and procedures.⁷ The effect of these simplistic explanations is simplistic understanding and subsequently simplistic training. We are all familiar with this type of simplistic training: assaults in extended line, movement occurring regardless of the effectiveness of suppression, or suppression being deemed effective without confirmation of where the rounds are impacting or the effects they are having. Other manifestations are: the Tactical Exercise Without Troops solution, for which the mortar firing position is not identified; allowing the gun target line geometries to be assumed away; or attack aviation fires being employed ‘freestyle’, regardless of direct fire locations and artillery gun target lines. These observations lead to a deduction that Army is potentially losing clarity in its collective understanding of realities, difficulties and complexities of close combat. Not knowing what close combat ‘looks’ like makes it difficult to train.

If our doctrine provides only simplistic explanations of close combat, from where might we get a better understanding? David Kilcullens analysis of assault tactics in his article ‘Combined Arms and the Close Battle in Complex Terrain’ is a useful start point for understanding the relationship between fire and manoeuvre in close combat and formulating ideas of how to train it. Kilcullen illustrates the passing of the simplistic linear assault tactics as follows:

Soldiers in close combat engagements tend to move using covered approaches that are often non-linear in character while fighting in a cycle of ‘observe–suppress–move–clear–observe’. In the close fight, soldiers tend to operate in small, semi-autonomous teams that ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’, rather than move forward in large linear-based groups. Because of the reality of close combat, it probably makes more sense to consider terrain in terms of representing a network of points and nodes, rather than as a sequence of lines. Under a point or nodal model of attack, manoeuvre supports fire. In other words, troops manoeuvre in order to generate effective fire, and then apply this fire in order to neutralise the enemy and achieve victory.⁸

Brigadier Justin Kelly and Dr Michael Brennan present similar ideas in their working paper on Distributed Manoeuvre as follows: ‘the inter-relationship between “lines” and “columns” is the basic mechanism of tactics. It is universal, has been continuous since pre-history, and remains evident even on the relatively formless battlefields of today’ Kilcullens view is that the movement from node to node is performed as a column because it presents the smallest face for the enemy to engage and allows manoeuvre and control through difficult terrain. The column becomes a line when the situation requires the maximum number of weapons to engage the enemy, and the terrain or friendly suppression permits this with acceptable risk. In this way, movement in columns (node to node) ‘enables the attacker, at least initially, to maintain a “limited liability” posture in which the forces gambited are sufficient to prompt the defender into a response, but not so large as to allow the attacker to become decisively engaged’.⁹ This idea is important as in all probability our threat will exist below our Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) threshold¹⁰ and it needs to be identified through what Adaptive Campaigning calls discovery actions.

The logical follow-on from the identification of the crust of the enemy’s defence is me attrition of the strong points. ‘This attrition is fundamental in forcing the defence to adapt and thereby creating signatures that the attacking force has postured itself to collect.’¹¹ The purpose of this collecting of signatures is obviously to then allow the destruction or suppression of the newly discovered enemy forces and for the close combat cycle to repeat. In summary ‘close combat’ in the offense generally consists of groups of soldiers manoeuvring from point to point. The purpose of this manoeuvre is to identify and attrite enemy strong points, as the act of doing so forces a response from the defender which creates a signature. To respond to the actions of the offensive force the assaulting force is then able to manoeuvre to apply fire (either directly or through a sensor shooter relationship) to the elements of the enemy’s system that revealed itself. This completes an evolution of the close combat cycle. To design training that reflects these characteristics, it should be asked what it is in combat that forces soldiers to adopt this means of attack as opposed to linear assault tactics. The answer, as it is with most innovations in warfare, is the basic human desire to avoid effective enemy fire. The obvious deduction is that genuine close combat training requires an enemy that can return effective fire (a glimpse of the blindingly obvious, I know). This return of fire and other responses is important to replicate the ‘prod/sense’ dynamic inherent in close combat. Similarly, the terrain cannot allow the attacker an information or position advantage such that the enemy can avoid Distributed Manoeuvre. Not stated but implied is that the enemy will generally attempt to disrupt movement between nodes through the use of obstacles.

Kilcullen’s second major point is that ‘fire’, not manoeuvre, is the thing that leads to winning in close combat and manoeuvre is simply a method of getting fire where it can kill the enemy. As Patton said,

I think, if we should say ‘Fire is the Queen of Battle’, we should avoid arm arguments and come nearer telling the truth. Battles are won by fire and movement. The purpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is from the rear or flank.¹²

The follow-on is that close combat is a battle to gain support by fire, and attack by fire locations (nodes in Kilcullen speak) which enable the suppression or destruction of the enemy. In Patton’s view, and intuitively in our own, we know that destruction is more likely to result from fire at the enemy’s least protected areas. Supporting the idea of fire as the dominant factor in close combat, a 2001 study into attrition and suppression in close combat concluded that:

Modelling and historic analysis agree that success in offensive close combat is significantly improved by capabilities that: provide intimate support to the assault, and destroy threats to the assault group after all remote (from close combat) supporting fire has ceased; provide direct fire to support the assault as it finally closes with the defence; and provide indirect fire support to suppress the enemy’s defences as the assault closes.¹³

It is significant that all three ‘success factors’ relate to fire, not manoeuvre. The deduction is that close combat training should focus on the delivery and assessment of fires.

Determining where to focus our efforts in training the delivery and assessment of fires requires analysis of how fire is arrayed or employed in close combat. I will sidestep any examination of the evolutionary trail from single system engagements at Agincourt to the multiple system engagements of Fallujah and simply state as an assumption that, because the enemy presents himself in different guises (mounted, dismounted, dug in, etc) the location from which our fire is delivered will change by range, system and nature. These differences necessitate the use of an array of weapons to achieve suppression and destruction across the geographic and material depth and breadth of the enemy. It is rare that a single Support By Fire or Attack By Fire weapon system will achieve the suppression or destruction effectively, though I have trained this folly many times at troop/platoon level. Small teams using or directing multiple Support By Fire and weapons systems require effective sensor shoot ‘links’ or ‘coupling’ in Adaptive Campaigning terms. Thus for the close combat training ‘problem’ to be realistic, the enemy and the terrain should generally not allow destruction or suppression by a single weapons system or single firing location. The enemy will contribute to this problem through the emplacement of obstacles, which the attacking force will be required to reduce if they are to move to positions of advantage. The follow-on is the desirability of training that allows employment of the maximum number of weapons systems from the widest number of locations with the most permissive arcs. These weapons effects should be able to be directed or controlled by the soldier best able to observe the target and effects of fire.

The other obvious implication of multiple firing points is the need for an instinctive understanding of the geometries of fire. Only by making ‘safety’ the domain of the exercised force do we compel an understanding of minimum safe danger distances, gun target line restrictions and minimum engagement ranges at the lowest level. Thus the onus for effective and safe employment of weapons systems should lie with the exercised force and be executed in the ‘manner expected in combat’.¹⁴

In short, if we don’t know what the rules are to begin with it is difficult to assess the risk in breaking them. It would be naive to assume that safety restrictions aren’t valid considerations in combat, and as such an understanding of geometries of fire is paramount to prevent fratricide. Furthermore there is a requirement of deploying forces that intimately understand and feel confident in the balance between the risk of fratricide and the risk of exposing friendly forces to an unsuppressed enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stevenson’s paper Not So Friendly Fire summarises this in the chronologically dated but nonetheless relevant comment:

...developing targeted doctrine, hard, realistic training, and appropriate safety procedures can also play a role in minimising friendly fire incidents. However, unless the technology is underpinned by high-quality education and training, the Army will be left with a mismatch between its human and equipment capabilities. This will be the real challenge of HNA [Hardened Networked Army], to harness the synergistic effects of combined arms and joint operations without exponentially increasing the danger of large-scale fratricide incidents. This, unfortunately, can only be achieved by accepting some risk in peacetime training. Otherwise, the whole risk will simply be transferred to operations, where the threat is higher, the loss of life potentially greater, and the implications more severe.¹⁵

Finally, multiple attack points or nodes implies there is need to plan, control and resupply ammunition during the assault. I will not discuss this facet in depth, but wonder out loud if we still own or practice this skill?

Thus far this analysis has revealed the following requirements for a ‘close combat training system’, complex terrain, and a responsive enemy which forces an adoption and practice of Distributed Manoeuvre. Distributed Manoeuvre in turn requires that the small teams or nodes are capable of destroying or suppressing enemy strong points. For a small team to do this successfully they are reliant on a dynamic sensor shooter coupling, understanding of geometries of fire, in-contact resupply, and an ability to assess the effects of fires. Exercising geometries of fire understanding and sensor shooter links requires the widest latitude possible in the number of weapons employed and the locations and circumstances in which they can be employed. Close combat training should demonstrate a bias to training fire over manoeuvre. Excepting a ‘responsive enemy’, these factors point overwhelmingly to live fire as the close combat training system of choice.

So what might such a ‘close combat training system’ look like? Are there systems operating in other militaries that might serve as a model for the Australian Army? Any training activity that addresses the identified close combat characteristics is likely to be complicated and require non-standard safety procedures. Acknowledging this, the USMC has outsourced the most realistic of its close combat training to the Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG). The mission of TTECG is to

Conduct block IV (TF LFMX) pre-deployment training and assessment of tactical elements of the MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force] in the execution of the core competencies of combined arms techniques and procedures during full spectrum operations [in order to] prepare units for OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom].¹⁶

You can imagine TTECG as a Combat Training Centre (CTC) equivalent. TTECG performs three functions which allow the conduct of close combat training. I will examine each of these with an eye to CTC performing similar training.

Firstly, TTECG provides a safety backstop; this eliminates the need for exercising units to devise and develop the range safety architecture. If you want people to do something, make it easy. This is not to say that units don’t have the imagination and wherewithal to coordinate this training, but a dedicated control group allows economies such as standing waivers for reduced safety distances, standing risk assessments and a standing series of instructions. Further enhancing the economy of effort is TTECG’s use of gazetted purpose-built ranges. These ranges allow the use of all-organic infantry and light armour weapons at platoon and company level and have been designed to provide complex terrain likely to induce Distributed Manoeuvre, and mitigate potential risks through intelligent development of terrain which supports sound geometries of fire.

Using a gazetted purpose-built range reduces manoeuvre options for the exercised force. This is entirely in keeping with the characteristics of close combat training and is reflected in the TTECG mission, which focuses on ‘techniques and procedures’ only. It may appear that the presence of safety staff is contradictory to the idea that the exercised force should be responsible for the conduct of safety in the manner they are expected to in combat. In practicality there is no such contradiction and the phrase ‘safety backstop’ is an excellent description of a covert safety architecture that is there to ‘catch the exercise force if they fall’ and nothing else. Our range doctrine permits such an approach, but I am less convinced of the supportiveness of our philosophy and outlook. It is conceivable that this expertise and these ranges could be developed by CTC to allow the conduct of close combat training as part of a warfighter series. A standard company training iteration could consist of a live fire attack per platoon and company attack. The weapons support, such as mortars and machine guns, should be provided to local high readiness units or the parent battalion.

Secondly, TTECG staff brings the range to life by providing feedback to the range participants as to the enemy’s actions. This is enabled and controlled through the ‘corridor’, which ensures the consistency and accuracy of the enemy picture. Throughout their training Marines are instilled with three basic ‘paints’: ‘heavy fire’, effective fire’ and ‘sporadic fire’. The Marines understand the implications of these ‘paints’ for their movement, and respond by adjusting movement techniques or suppression as appropriate. ‘Fighting the enemy’ enables the corridor to manipulate the range for achievement of training objectives and forces the use of Distributed Manoeuvre and fires.

Finally, TTECG staff provides assessment. I take it as universally agreed that assessment is a good thing and is already within the CTC remit, so I won’t laud it here; if, however, Army wishes to claim close combat as its fundamental skill it should be assessed in detail.

The EMV close combat training model is ‘a way’ of training close combat. On the surface it seems feasible to adopt in the Australian Army. The key enablers of this training are the gazetted purpose-built ranges, modified safety restrictions and dedicated safety staff. Many of these things require effort to develop but once in place require little effort to maintain. Conducting this training in a single organisation removes the burden of reinventing the wheel by units. Only by making this training directed and assessed will Army achieve the focus that close combat’s importance merits. Without an institutional approach, individual units will be too easily consumed by the effort to make EMV-style close combat training work.

In conclusion, the Australian Army’s doctrine leaves no doubt that close combat is at the heart of its capability. However, the anecdotal evidence is that this is not reflected in training areas and schools across the country. While doctrine is very good at identifying the importance of close combat, it is less successful at outlining the nuts and bolts of its conduct that might form the baseline of a training methodology. Two relatively recent examinations of Distributed Manoeuvre have identified the principal characteristics of modern close combat. In broad summary, close combat generally consists of the movement of small teams from location to location to attrite enemy strong points and elicit a response from the enemy defensive system. Mounted Minor Tactics identifies this as the close combat cycle of observe–suppress–move–clear-observe.¹⁷ From this a training system to support the practice of close combat was generically identified as one that had a responsive enemy, used complex terrain, allowed the use of the widest array of weapons in the widest range circumstances, placed the onus on safety on the exercised force, practiced sensor shooter coupling and had a bias for training in the use of fire as opposed to manoeuvre. A training system with these characteristics is used as part of USMC pre-deployment training. The system is enabled by gazetted purpose-built ranges, a dedicated safety staff and rigorous assessment. Such a training system could be considered by CTC to conduct close combat training in the Australian Army. Much of this may seem obvious, but it seems to have escaped Army’s collective attention for some time. Institutionalising close combat training ensures that it gets done and cannot be postponed, diluted or fragmented. Our doctrine makes it clear that compromising close combat training undermines achievement of the Army mission.

About the Author

Major James Davis has served as a Troop Leader and Squadron Commander in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment as well as the Cavalry Officer Instructor at the School of Armour. He has also been employed as the 2IC of Tank Squadron. Major Davis has served in staff appointments at HQ 1 Bde and Land Headquarters. He has deployed to Timor-Leste and Iraq in staff and command appointments. Major Davis is currently posted as Second in Command of 1st Armoured Regiment. In 2009–10 he was the contingent commander of Australian Instructor Support Team Twenty Three which supported the conduct of Exercise Enhanced Mojave Viper.

Endnotes

1     General George S Patton, letter of instruction, dated 3 April 1944, as quoted in Patton, War As I Knew It, Houghton Miffen, New York, 1985, p.417.

2     Land Warfare Doctrine 1 (LWD-1) – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2008, p. 17.

3     Ibid., p. 17.

4     Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 81.

5     Ibid., p. 11.

6     Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare, Part Two, Volume 1, Pamphlet No 2, ‘Infantry Training: The Rifle Platoon’, Department of Defence, 1986, p. 134.

7     Land Warfare Procedures – Combat Arms (Mounted Combat), LWP–CA MTD CBT 3-3-1 Mounted Minor Tactics – Amendment List 1, Department of Defence, 2006, p. 11

8     Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, ‘Combined arms and the close battle in complex terrain’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2003, p. 79.

9     J Kelly and M Brennan, Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics, Working Paper No. 134, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, June 2009, p. 10.

10    Lieutenant Colonel Wayne D Eyre, ‘The Role of the Infantry in the War of the Snakes’, Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 9.1, Spring 2006, p. 86.

11    Ibid.

12    Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 394.

13    D K Bowley, T D Castles and A Ryan, Attrition and Suppression: Defining the Nature of Close Combat, proceedings of the Australian Army Land Warfare Conference, Adelaide, 2001, p. 73.

14    Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG), Safety Handbook, MAGTF Training Command, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 2.

15    Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stevenson, Not-so Friendly Fire: An Australian Taxonomy for Fratricide, Working Paper No. 128, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, March 2006, p. 52.

16    Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG), ‘Safety Handbook’, MAGTF Training Command, 2009. p. 1

17    LWP–CA MTD CBT 3-3-1, p.73.