Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan: Supporting Australia in the ‘Long War’
Abstract
An enduring element of Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan is the Special Operations Task Group (known as TF66). This force is specifically trained for counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations, both of which have been conducted as part of the effort in Afghanistan. The effectiveness of these operations has to date been significant. This has been due to the direct and indirect Tines of Operation, which have been developed into a series of operating methodologies throughout the rotations that have occurred since 2005. TF66 provides the capability to incapacitate the insurgent leadership group, keep them off balance, and ultimately to defeat their plans.
The Australian Special Forces component is comparatively large and extremely capable. It concentrates on anti-leadership (sic) operations in the area where most of the population lives and where most of the Taliban activity occurs. (In addition), the Special Forces conduct operations which assist the other components of the Task Force and the Afghan troops. Their disruptive effect is reportedly huge.
– Major General Jim Molan (Retd)1
Introduction2
An enduring element of Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan has been the Special Operations Task Group (known as TF66).3 The roles and tasks of TF66 derive from Australian Government intent, the campaign objectives of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the requirements of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA). TF66 is a force that is specifically trained for counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations, both of which have been conducted as part of the overall effort in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
The effectiveness of these operations has to date been significant.4 This has been due in large part to the direct and indirect Lines of Operation, which have been developed into a series of operating methodologies throughout the many rotations that have occurred since 2005. The aim of this article is to discuss TF66 operations and the Task Force’s effectiveness in the fight in Afghanistan.
ISAF Strategy
The combined efforts of both ISAF and its predecessor (during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) have largely eliminated many of the insurgent sanctuaries that existed in Afghanistan prior to 2001.5 In the past few years, however, ISAF has suffered from one of the most fundamental strategic errors when conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations: insufficient resources to accomplish its overly ambitious goals. After eight years of anti-insurgent operations, ISAF has experienced a strategic ‘drift’ and has failed to convince native Afghans that it is safe to commit themselves to believe in the authenticity of the GoIRA.6 This is in part due to a ‘too-heavy’ focus by the Coalition on anti al-Qaeda counter-terrorism operations, as opposed to a counterinsurgency strategy focusing on anti-insurgency operations. There has been too much effort on kinetic destruction of insurgent groups, rather than an effort to ‘out-govern’ the Taliban Shadow Government and offer a legitimate government that can provide essential security and services for all Afghans. No longer can a massing of ISAF military force be relied upon to secure solutions to what is an inherently political conflict between Afghans, as any foreign physical presence will be regarded as a military occupation. The latest surge of forces committed to ISAF from the United States echoes this point, and is deliberately limited to a ‘middle option’ of 30,000, rather than the original 80,000 initially requested.7
Afghanistan’s problems are further complicated by the nature of the insurgency, with several of the key insurgent groups (al-Qaeda, the Taliban, various narcotrafficking gangs, and criminal elements) colluding and morphing into a ‘Talibanesqe’ organisation, based in remote and inaccessible locations throughout the region. This threat now presents a real and growing emergent problem not only to Afghanistan, but also potentially to the central-Asian region itself.
After more than thirty years of war, as well as the almost complete destruction of human and physical infrastructure, the people of Afghanistan no longer have the capacity to produce anything other than the most modest incremental improvements to their democratic institutions and basic services to their communities. These circumstances have forced ISAF and supporting governments such as the Australian Government to realistically adjust their campaign objectives into the following tangible goals: preventing Afghanistan from again providing sanctuary to insurgent groups, prevent the collapse of the GoIRA, and legitimise the GoIRA through the provision of basic essential services.8 These are now key objectives rather than ISAF’s more lofty aims such as the defeat of the insurgency and the delivery of Western-style democracy and freedom. In a recent speech unveiling the new United States strategy in supporting ISAF, President Obama said the regional objective was (now) to ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in relation to the Taliban, it was merely to deny them government in Afghanistan.9 There was little talk of victory or democracy.
Creating any permanent state apparatus, such as the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), will require a long-term commitment measured in perhaps decades rather than years. In the meantime, the Australian Government (who has limited its primary focus to Oruzgan Province), in partnership with the GoIRA and ISAF are forced somewhat to respond to the more immediate challenges: maintaining pressure on insurgent and terrorist networks throughout the region (in order to provide security to mentoring and reconstruction efforts), as well as preventing the overall insurgency from overwhelming the GoIRA. TF66’s deployment into Afghanistan occurred to overcome some of these immediate challenges.
TF66 Lines of Operation
TF66 is deliberately located within Oruzgan Province to work in support of and in collaboration with Regional Command-South (RC-S) and Task Force Uruzgan (TF-U), which includes elements of the Australian manned Mentoring Task Force. One of the unique qualities of Special Forces is an ability to have a ‘reach’ that spans from the local tribal level to the national GoIRA, while remaining integrated to the overall ISAF campaign and its continuing efforts to transition ANSF from a fledgling force to a capable military outfit.10 This ‘reach’ is critical to the overall civil-military COIN integration effort that will ultimately harness and synergise the security governance, development and strategic communications concept.
ISAF, in the immediate sense, seeks to defeat the insurgency via the provision of essential services and training to GoIRA and elements within the government (such as the ANSF) to win the support and loyalty of the people of Afghanistan. In many ways, this is the focus of the TF-U and, by implication, the Mentoring Task Force. TF66 supports these operations through missions designed along four Lines of Operation: conduct counterinsurgency operations, enhance the force protection of ISAF forces, conduct counter-leadership operations, and assist with the training and mentoring of the ANSF.11 These mission sets are generally conducted via an indirect approach, and a direct approach.
COIN Operations and the Training and Mentoring of ANSF - An Indirect Approach
Success in COIN results from operating systems and practices that integrate and synchronise political, security, economic and informational components that will reinforce government legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing the effects and influence of the enemy insurgent.12 The classic ‘clear, hold, and build’ strategy used in Iraq is a formula for success in Afghanistan, yet there are currently insufficient ANSF and police available to effectively implement this approach. In an attempt to remedy this, TF66 seeks to support RC-S and TF-U efforts to generate ANSF such as the 4th KANDAK Brigade, currently in partnership with the Mentoring Task Force.13
COIN operations are not a new mission for Special Forces. Unconventional warfare, civil affairs, psychological operations, and foreign internal defence are all traditional activities of Australian Special Forces. A critical aspect in Afghanistan, however, is the emergent need for a broader integration and synchronisation of counter-terrorism and COIN efforts to ensure unity of purpose and effect. Special operations and conventional operations—whether counter-terrorist or COIN in nature—must be coordinated rather than simply de-conflicted. TF66, in its conception and planning of all operations, seeks to achieve this integration as an absolute priority.
TF66 currently conducts COIN through the integration and cooperation of partners such as ANSF, GoIRA, local tribal and religious leaders, other coalition Special Forces, and other ISAF force elements. Partnering ‘by, with, and through’ ANSF in particular has enabled enduring partnerships between TF66 and ANSF elements that have resulted in several successful joint operations.
Successful COIN throughout Oruzgan Province requires a variety of means, both military and military-enabled, many of which are held in the TF66 mission set.14 The key capability in this environment is the ability to conduct intelligence-led precision operations at the tactical level that can generate operational effect (campaign and theatre) and, in certain instances, strategic effect If, for example, a high level insurgent commander from Helmand Province was targe-table in Oruzgan Province, TF66 could remove him from the operating environment. These precision operations can range from a carefully timed and targeted information operation (such as a village medical or veterinary clinic), to a key leader engagement in a remote non-permissive area, to a high threat operation against a key insurgent leader. At the less demanding end of the scale, TF66 continues to provide a flexible and responsive presence, influence and situational awareness capability in locations (‘ungoverned spaces’) out of reach of GoIRA or conventional ISAF forces. Further to this, Special Forces’ aptitude for working with indigenous forces and local populations is key to wresting popular support away from the insurgency and the building capacity within ANSF. In time, TF66 seeks to set the conditions for conventional force partnerships with the ANSF and the local population. The persistent presence that these forces can provide can generate lasting positive effects and further allow Special Forces to gain influence deeper into the province.
Enhancing Force Protection of ISAF - A Direct Approach
As part of its mission set, TF66 is specifically focused on enhancing the force protection of ISAF forces. These tasks include, but are not limited to: elimination and denial of insurgent sanctuaries within Oruzgan Province; the disruption and defeat of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) network; the prevention of the Taliban Shadow Government from returning to Oruzgan in significant volume; the gaining of situational awareness through deep presence patrolling and intelligence development; the conduct of enemy anti-propaganda operations (by, with and through GoIRA and tribal networks); and escorting, partnering and hand-off of areas such as Chora township and parts of the Mirabad river valley to other ISAF conventional forces, who then in turn conduct and coordinate reconstruction and presence patrols alongside their ANSF partners, the 4th KANDAK Brigade.
TF66 operations in this regard contribute directly to the mentoring and security efforts within the Mentoring Task Force and, more broadly, TF-U. TF66 attempt to ensure that their operations are synchronised with the main and supporting efforts of both RC-S and TF-U, and are ‘nested’ within the ISAF campaign plan; this should ensure that these efforts are contributing directly to theatre level campaign objectives.15
Counter-Leadership Operations - A Direct Approach
Probably the most direct approach to the removal of the insurgent capability from RC-S is through the conduct of TF66 counter-leadership operations. While this is the lesser priority operation for the Task Force, it is nevertheless the most effective mechanism in removing a particular type of threat from the operating environment.
Amongst the leadership element of the insurgency, there exist a minority number of hard-core irreconcilable ideologues that seek nothing other than total subjugation of the Afghan people and the destruction of ISAF and all Western influences from Afghanistan.16 They often form elements of the Taliban Shadow Government, operating against GoIRA as well as recruiting vulnerable Afghans to their cause through the promise of money, drugs, weapons or prestige. This group is the most potent and dangerous element of the insurgency, incapable of compromise, and sees nothing other than total victory as acceptable. This is the group that ISAF and GoIRA must target in the event of their refusal to be reconciled. TF66 performs this function, conducting ‘counter-leadership operations’ specifically in support of COIN objectives and to remove the influence of irreconcilable insurgents from the operating environment, which in turn directly generates operating space to enable ISAF to conduct indirect COIN operations. To date, the effectiveness of these operations has had a devastating and dramatic impact on insurgent leadership throughout Oruzgan Province. This has limited the insurgent’s ability to coordinate operations locally, as well as had an impact on their ability to recruit local fighters to their cause. Ultimately these operations have separated the insurgent from the local population, a key element of COIN in defeating the insurgent’s ability to shape and control political power—the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.17
An operating methodology used in counter-leadership and other direct action operations is the targeting cycle known as ‘F3EA’, or Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, (and) Analyse.18 F3EA uses elements of both kinetic and non-kinetic capability within TF66, such as persistent intelligence collection, that can allow Special Forces teams to adapt to the situation and the environment as required. This generates tempo and decision speed that exceeds that of the insurgent. This intelligence has on many occasions enabled the insurgent to be ‘found and fixed’ in his location, regardless of appearance, clothing, operating methods, or rate of effort. Any change to the insurgent is observed and the Special Forces team has the ability to seamlessly adapt to it.
On an anticipated intelligence cue, the Special Forces team can then ‘finish’ the target, either surgically via precision effects (if in an area of high civilian population), through mass effect (if located in a base area with other insurgents), or by forcing the insurgent to surrender if he so wishes. The Special Forces team remains capable for a range of kinetic and non-kinetic targeting options, making them able to scale their response in a way that is adaptive to the insurgent and environment. This becomes especially important as me nature of the operation changes; for example, insurgent targets become fewer and the focus of the operation shifts towards the support of the population.
The Special Forces team then ‘exploits and analyses’ the target to gain an insight into the insurgent’s operating systems, allowing for further weaknesses to be located. This in turn cues additional TF66 and other ISAF intelligence assets to shape their operations against this discovered weakness, and so the process begins again.
F3EA employs all the true qualitative elements of a Special Operations Task Group—design, planning, adaptation and action—and allows for near autonomous, rapid decision cycles to develop future operations that are not contingent on higher headquarter decision cycles or strategic intelligence feeds. F3EA is enhanced and integrated through the establishment of a Fusion and Targeting Cell, and has proven itself operationally in Afghanistan since 2005—examples demonstrating its effectiveness have been the targeting of high and medium level irreconcilable insurgents operating in southern Afghanistan.19
Operating Relationships
In order to operate, TF66 actively cultivates and values its interactions amongst the key stakeholders in Oruzgan Province. What is truly ‘special’ about Special Forces is the ability to work through and alongside other stakeholders in the pursuit of mutually beneficial solutions to complex problems. The complexity of the current operating environment demands that TF66 personnel are masters at not only warfighting, but also cultural knowledge. These ‘3D operators’ take a multi-dimensional world view of all actions and seek to understand the human perspective when planning and executing operations. Appropriate mechanisms that mesh TF66 operations within the ISAF campaign are therefore developed, as well as the diplomatic and governance efforts of our partners, including the GoIRA. Much effort is devoted to ensuring that TF66 plans are ‘nested’ and that operational priorities are understood by all force elements.
The most important relationship for TF66 in Afghanistan is with the Afghan people themselves. First and foremost, TF66 operations concentrate on and emphasise that the use of force should be a last resort and any application must not be counterproductive to the wants and needs of the Afghan people, or compromise the ISAF campaign overall. Population support is key to accessing the insurgent; any action that upsets the ANSF, GoIRA, local villagers, or tribal or religious elders is not conducive to mission success. It is this overwhelming priority that drives the planning and conduct of all TF66 missions.
Additionally, while much of the focus on operations can tend to weight itself towards direct COIN activities, more emphasis must be placed on developing the ANSF. Responsibility of all activities and events must eventually be transferred fully to the Afghans. This is the exit strategy for ISAF—an enabled ANSF that can provide the GoIRA with the stability it needs to deliver essential services to the Afghan people.
The second relationship priority for TF66 is with other ISAF elements, most particularly, RC-S and TF-U. All operations must be ‘nested’ whether direct or indirect. The use of liaison officers as well as collaboration during planning and operations ensure a unity of effort for all ISAF forces and reinforce attempts by TF66 to either ‘support’ or be ‘supported’ by their ISAF, GoIRA or ANSF colleagues. Moreover, Australia’s enduring commitment to ISAF gives it influence in the range and type of operations conducted throughout southern Afghanistan.20 TF66’s access to intelligence and coalition collection assets, as well as its reputation throughout ISAF, has established a level of support that has the capacity to amplify its tactical effects across the entire theatre through the export of lessons and the migration of skills and knowledge to all stakeholders. This is a regular feature of the operational ‘lessons learnt’ process.21
Measures of Effectiveness/Measures of Success
Since 2005, TF66 operations have achieved significant outcomes throughout Oruzgan Province. Some Measures of Effectiveness include the conduct of hundreds of long-range patrols in the deep northern spaces of the Province, the facilitation of hundreds of Afghan community engagements (that have forged long lasting relationships both with TF66 and other RC-S forces), the successful removal of insurgent group commanders from the area of operations, and the introduction of ANSF to hostile and contested areas within the Province (which in turn re-establishes the GoIRA in these areas and enhances their legitimacy).
In terms of Measures of Success, TF66 operations since 2005 have been decisive in opening up the Mirabad valley to TF-U operations, which in turn have gone on to establish permanent bases there. This greatly increases TF-U access to the local villagers and enables organisations such as the Mentoring Task Force to build upon this work and consolidate ISAF control. Additionally, TF66 decisive combat operations through the Baluchi Pass in 2006, as well as the denial of Chora Pass and Chora valley to the local Taliban throughout the period 2005–08, have enabled the permanent presence of TF-U forces, who have seized this opportunity to make contact with the local people and introduced GoIRA and the ANSF to a populace who for several years were under the direct control and influence of the Taliban Shadow Government. Additional successes have been achieved in the disruption and interdiction of the insurgent IED network, as well as the facilitation of significant reconstruction operations, including the placement of an electrical turbine in Helmand Province in 2008.22
Conclusion
Success in Afghanistan requires that ISAF seize the initiative from the insurgent and re-establish the political legitimacy of the GoIRA. This requires the use of ‘smarter’ campaign objectives, facilitated via a COIN strategy that employs direct and indirect Lines of Operation that gives ownership of the insurgency problem to the Afghan people. The objectives of ISAF, the Australian Government and GoIRA seem clear, although they are not well articulated: create an Afghanistan from which global terrorist groups are displaced; assist GoIRA in becoming an apparatus that can provide enough security to its people and borders and can facilitate the conduct of reconstruction operations; and give the GoIRA a degree of legitimacy amongst its people that can generate faith in the government from all Afghan people. In order for this to occur, ISAF must be sufficiently resourced or risk remaining caught in the ‘strategic drift’ that has got it to this point, eight years after the fall of the Taliban.
The Special Forces from TF66 is an important component to Australian Government efforts in Afghanistan (along with the Mentoring Task Force). The balance between counter-terrorism and COIN is an essential consideration in the formulation of all operational concepts that support the broader ISAF objectives. TF66 has over time, successfully integrated this balance between direct and indirect Lines of Operation by seeking to integrate ANSF and GoIRA in line with the overall aim of one day handing off all responsibilities to the Afghans.
Australian Special Forces provide the capability to incapacitate the insurgent leadership group, keep them off balance, and ultimately to defeat their plan. Insurgents in Afghanistan have witnessed firsthand what TF66 Special Forces can do. To them, the prospect of a high-performance counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency force in partnership with ANSF, able to operate anywhere with speed, agility and lethality, displaying resolve and unity, is highly unwelcome. The insurgent lacks the capacity to counter its strikes. Australian Special Forces hit the insurgents hard and often. This is precisely how TF66 can build and support the road map towards victory in the Long War.
About the Author
Major Ian Langford is former Commando Company Group commander from 2 Cdo Regt who has deployed as an operational commander with the Special Operations Task Group to Afghanistan. He has additionally served in that theatre with the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre on the 2008 review of ISAF special operations. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Marine Command and Staff College (2009), and is currently a student at the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting.
Endnotes
1 Major General Jim Molan, (Retd), ‘How much is enough in Afghanistan?’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 21.
2 This article is based upon a collection of conversations, observations and commentary from stakeholders within the Australian Government, ISAF, and within the ADF over the past five years concerning Australian operations and commitment to Afghanistan.
3 The Australian Special Operations Task Group has been committed to Afghanistan over three periods: 2001–03, 2005–06, and 2007 to the present.
4 Information regarding the details of these operations has been withheld from general release to the public in order to safeguard tactics used by SOTG forces, as well as deny the insurgent access to information that improves his awareness of these operations. Much of what has occurred throughout the SOTG deployments goes unreported due to the nature of the operations conducted and the ‘protected identity status’ of all members of Special Operations Command.
5 ISAF assumed command in 2003, taking over from the US-led coalition, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
6 ‘Afghanistan: NATO showing stronger resolve’, TwoCirdes.net, 6 April 2008, <http://www.twocircles.net/2008apr06/afghanistan_nato_showing_stronger_resolve.html> accessed 25 December 2009. The term ‘drift’ is attributed in this article to the Australian Foreign Minister.
7 Brad Norington, ‘McChrystal backs Obama plan’, The Australian, 10 December 2009, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/mcchrystal-backs-obama-plan/story-e6frg6so-1225808789223> accessed 28 December 2009. Note that the overall adjustment in US strategy now seeks to ‘reduce’ the insurgency, rather than ‘defeat’ it.
8 ‘Mission, International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan website, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/our-mission/> accessed 25 December 2009.
9 Paul Kelly, ‘Rudd an astute manager of the US alliance’, The Australian, 9 December 2009.
10 This effort could take up to ten years and possibly longer, depending on the rate of effort of the GoIRA and its partner nations.
11 NATO, ‘Australia increases ISAF commitment’, Media Release, 10 April 2007, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A6E0C04F-8FB0F4BA/natolive/news_8539.htm?selectedTocale=en> accessed 1 December 2009. Specifically, the release states the role of the SOTG is to ‘enhance provincial security by disrupting Taliban extremists’ command and control and supply routes’. These roles and tasks have continued throughout 2008–09 to evolve in order to adapt to the environment and the nature of the threat.
12 United States Government Bureau of Military Affairs, Counter Insurgency Guide – 2009, US Government Printing Service, Washington DC, January 2009, p. 17.
13 The challenge for ISAF in the training and generation of ANSF forces is significant. The ANSF relies heavily on its partnership with ISAF forces. The ANSF has no institutional memory when it comes to conventional force capability and organisation. While infantry and other combat forces are what is most effective in the kinetic phase of defeating an insurgency, a modern military force needs a greater number of technical specialists, such as logisticians, medics, artillery personnel, combat and construction engineers, and a professional leadership group if it is to take over successfully from ISAF. The timeline for such force generation is uncertain and very difficult to predict.
14 The author acknowledges that Special Forces is limited in certain elements of COIN, for example, the ability to generate a ‘dwell’ capability in a certain area for a protracted period is more suited to ISAF conventional forces. This underscores the importance of close cooperation between all ISAF elements to ensure that both conventional and Special Forces elements are appropriately tasked in order to achieve the best mission effects on the ground.
15 The synchronisation of all efforts across the theatre is a significant challenge. Each Task Force and their respective national governments have their own national caveats and considerations to integrate into their planning. This can make collaboration and integration across theatre extremely difficult. This issue is ongoing.
16 This comment is based on the authors experiences. The leadership component of the insurgent group is also part of the ideological base; this makes them unable to be successfully persuaded to reconcile or compromise with competing groups such as ISAF or moderate Afghans. This leadership group is critical to the insurgents ability to operate and, if defeated and removed from the operating environment, can achieve profound positive effects that should negate the need to conduct high intensity kinetic fighting against the entire insurgent group.
17 Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf> accessed 26 December 2009, p. 1-1. TF66 is currently focused on Oruzgan Province, which is a priority for the Australian Government. As a result, the Task Force has to overcome this operating restriction through effective integration and liaison with other ISAF Special Forces, ensuring that neighbouring provinces do not become sanctuaries from TF66 interdiction.
18 Michael Flynn, Rich Juergens and Thomas Cantrell, ‘Employing ISR- SOF Best Practice’, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter 2008, p. 56.
19 Ibid.
20 Anecdotally, Australian Infantry and Special Forces have a reputation amongst their foreign colleagues for having a specific and unique focus on ground patrolling and physical presence as a mechanism for establishing security, rather than through alternative methods such as ‘free fire zones’ and through the application of firepower as a means to control and dominate key terrain. This approach is highly valued within the current COIN campaign in Afghanistan.
21 Colonel Mark Smethurst, ‘Afghanistan the Future: Australian Policy for the Afghan Commitment’, Unpublished paper, Australian Defence College Canberra, 2009, p. 22.
22 Major General Tim McOwan ‘Update on Special Operations’, Media Release, 11 December 2008, <http://www.defence.gov.au/media/SpeechTpl.cfm?CurrentId=8602> accessed 26 December 2009. The operation referred to was Operation ARMU TANDER II. The commando group contributed to this multi-national operation to install a new turbine at the Kajaki dam in northern Helmand province.
