Assessing Afghanistan against Aden and Oman: A Euphemism for Capitulation or the Seeds of Success?

 

Abstract

Is Australia prepared to support the possibility of a negotiated solution to the current Afghan situation? A negotiated solution must be from a position of strength, and not as a last resort or from a position of fear. With the Soviet–Afghan war as a backdrop, the insurgencies in Oman and Aden provide the basis for debate on the merits of negotiation as a means to resolve insurgencies. Many of the Afghan population support dialogue with the Taliban. This underscores President Karzais desire to bring moderate Taliban into the political arena in order to progress the reconciliation process.

---

Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

- John F Kennedy¹

Introduction

Insurgencies are more than solely military actions. This has been demonstrated by numerous belligerents in past centuries, and more recently by the Taliban in Afghanistan where they are utilising many influence strategies to achieve their end-state. The Taliban believe that they are winning, or that they only need to not lose in order to win. In recent propaganda released by the Taliban, they stated that ‘the West has the clocks...but the Taliban have the time’.² Counterinsurgency is primarily about winning and keeping the ‘hearts and minds’ of the in-theatre population and, equally importantly in the modern era, the domestic population of the coalition forces supporting counterinsurgency operations in distant war zones.

This article aims to create debate on the possibility of a negotiated solution to the current Afghan situation. It strives to point out that any negotiated solution must be achieved from a position of strength, and not as a last resort or from a position of fear in order to save political face with Western electorates. George Schultz articulated the essence of the requirement when he stated, ‘Negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation if the shadow of power is not cast across the bargaining table.’³

Often the root cause of an insurgency can be identified early and isolated from the insurgent’s narrative, or ideology, leaving the insurgency dislocated from popular support. The sooner this can be achieved the faster the insurgency can be neutralised through negotiation and, if necessary physical destruction. NATO and Australian Army doctrine defines counterinsurgency as ‘Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency’⁴

It must be noted though, that despite the idea of physical and psychological isolation of an insurgency from the population, an exclusively military response has historically been unsuccessful. In several cases this has only exacerbated the problem and brought more of the population to view the insurgent’s narrative as the only road.⁵ Likewise, various examples from history, including Northern Ireland, Kenya and Malaya, demonstrate that, despite the use of military power, having a dialogue with the insurgents is similarly important. One of the most comprehensive polls recently conducted in Afghanistan showed that a considerable portion of the population supported negotiations with the Taliban, indeed, a sizeable segment of those polled also supported a Karzai and Taliban coalition government.⁶

In Australian Army counterinsurgency doctrine there is no mention of reconciliation or negotiations being required for success. To examine these concepts and

Table 1. Negotiate with the Taliban⁷

Should the Afghan Government deal with the Taliban?
	Negotiations	Coalition Government
Strongly support	36	25
Somewhat support	38	29
Somewhat oppose	9	14
Strongly oppose	9	19
Depends/Don’t know	8	13

pose the question of where negotiations may be used to assist in the present Afghan counterinsurgency, two counterinsurgency wars of the last century will be examined. First though, an examination of the Soviet–Afghan conflict is necessary, as it provides perspective for the present campaign.

The Soviet-Afghan Era

Afghanistan has been embroiled in war for centuries. The Great Game was played out between the British Empire and the Russian Empire in the mid to late 1800s, and since then both domestic and external participants have been the catalyst for further conflict and instability.⁸ Much has been written on the Soviet–Afghan conflict and drawing out several significant points highlights that some of the Soviet philosophies in dealing with the Mujahedin have become established in the current methodology of dealing with the Taliban.

The Mujahedin, like the present belligerents, consisted of many disparate groups and, according to O’Neil’s lexicon, could be labelled as traditionalist insurgents, with some overlap to egalitarians and preservationists.⁹ In reality, the insurgency was more an instinctive campaign against international involvement than any notion of nationalism. The insurgents, or the Mujahedin, received support from many Western and Middle Eastern countries and were provided sanctuary in Pakistan; however, there were as many Tajiks, Uzbeks, Baluch and Hazarans involved as Pashtuns, which contrasts with the present conflict. The current insurgency is almost exclusively centred on Pashtunistan and its tribes. The support provided by the United States and others afforded the Mujahedin a level of sophistication in weaponry and communications equipment beyond the Soviets, but they lacked a critical mass to overwhelm the Soviets throughout the country.¹⁰

The Soviets, in a similar position to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, could not enter Pakistan. They relied heavily on the Afghan Government security apparatus to conduct offensive action, as particularly towards the end of the conflict, Soviet public support waned. Additionally, Soviet bombing of villages alienated Afghans and ground tactical successes were accompanied by withdrawals to safe areas. These tactics dealt operational and strategic blows to the Soviet campaign to dominate the land. Disunity within the Afghan Government also played into the hands of the Mujahedin. Furthermore, the Soviets attempted to close the Pakistan border and, like today, were unsuccessful. An incomplete understanding of the insurgents and their narrative caused some of the Soviets to question their own legitimacy.¹¹

Towards the end of the war, when the outcome was looking uncertain, the Soviets implemented a strategy of reconciliation with the various belligerents, but it was too little, too late.¹² Another dominant issue was that the Afghan population saw the Karmal and Najibullal regimes as being too closely aligned with the Soviets: does the Afghan population view Kabul’s relationship with the United States as analogous with the Soviet era?

Capturing Soviet mistakes and comparing them against today’s campaign highlights several points: a lack of understanding of the Pashtun society, or limited social network analysis; too many Soviet troops confined to garrison duties and a heavy reliance on Afghan troops for combat duties; and the ever present sanctuary afforded by the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Several of these issues have a common theme in counterinsurgency conflicts of the past century, especially the post colonial conflicts of the Second World War.

Following the Allied victory over the Axis powers in the European and Pacific theatres, several small secessionist wars broke out. To provide a suitable backdrop for analysis, two campaigns have been selected where tribal Islamic elements pitted themselves against Western forces. The insurgency in Aden in the mid 1960s highlights several areas where Afghanistan’s current situation has parallels; but first, the successful counterinsurgency in Oman, also during the late 1960s, presents opportunities for debate on the merits of negotiation as a strategy with the Taliban.

Dhofar War (Oman)

The campaign in Dhofar has had little coverage, but its example as a successful counterinsurgency requires its mention here. Primarily, the counterinsurgency was fought by Omani, Iranian and British troops from 1962 to 1975. Up to and during the initial stages of the insurgency, which was predominately conducted with the insurgents receiving tacit support from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the Sultan of Oman had maintained a diffident approach to the nation’s development.¹³ This was particularly the case in Dhofar, a protectorate of Oman, where oppression of the population for the benefit of the Omani hierarchy was the norm. As a result the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) was formed. In 1970, a successful coup by the Sultan’s son allowed for an immediate change in government policy. This brought about substantial changes in the type of campaign that was conducted against the insurgents, known as the Adoo. A combined civil and military chain of command was created and many of the Adoo’s grievances were rectified immediately.

Reconciliation through amnesty and protection of villages was negotiated with the Adoo, who surrendered, and irregular company sized units of Firquats (former Adoo members) were formed to operate with British Special Air Service (SAS) liaison officers.¹⁴ Furthermore, British Army Training Teams (BATT) were created, and embedded into the expanded and re-equipped Sultan’s regular Armed Forces, at twenty-two advisors per battalion. British soldiers in the BATT required cultural adjustment as the local tribe, the Dhofari, had a very direct communication style.¹⁵ Distribution of small handheld transistor radios in the DLF sanctuaries allowed for the government’s messages to be disseminated easily. Interestingly, Tony Jeapes, the SAS commander in Dhofar, claimed that the Ministry of Defence’s plan called for five fundamental parts:

•  An intelligence cell

•  An information team

•  A medical officer supported by SAS medics

•  A veterinary officer

•  When possible, the raising of Dhofari soldiers to fight for the Sultan.¹⁶

These five fundamentals were the focus of a spirited but well-coordinated military campaign that avoided indiscriminate actions or reprisals. The medical part was to provide aid to the 50,000 people living in the Dhofar Mountains and the veterinary part to improve farm stock, including the provision of fresh water. Finally, the information team or the psychological operations element persuaded the rebels through reconciliation and negotiation to change sides, which garnered significant intelligence and targeting value, most of which was non-kinetic.

The modification to the military and civil procedures allowed for improved targeting of the Adoo’s lines of communication and support base in Dhofar. Aggressive patrolling supported by air power in the Adoo’s sanctuaries coupled with a ‘hearts and minds’ approach of establishing medical and veterinary clinics, schools, roads and fresh wells all eroded the DLF claims that the Sultan was merely using Dhofar for resources. Finally, as a result of these successes, the DLF was unable to maintain a coherent narrative with the public, which saw support reduce in a vicious spiral.

INSIGHTS FROM THE OMAN COUNTERINSURGENCY

The Dhofar War offers several insights to the conduct of a successful counter-insurgency, particularly from a military and political perspective. The DLF had some justifiable complaints, and the replacement of the Sultan in 1970 addressed many of these grievances. The Taliban’s grievances need to be fully understood and, if legitimate, measures are required to address them. Interestingly, according to a Canadian research group, a sizable portion of the South-Eastern Afghan population (14 per cent) still strongly supports the Taliban ideology, so some of the Taliban grievances may have merit, which might well be grounds for an initial approach to commence negotiations.¹⁷

Civil infrastructure improvements in Dhofar contributed significantly to the defeat of the insurgency, which addressed the populations grievances and dislocated the Adoo from the population. In Afghanistan, electricity, roads, wells and schools are but a few requests that the Afghan people present. Reconstruction is underway but potentially not at the level required to keep the people supporting the national government. Also, the Taliban regularly attempt to destroy any infrastructure that is erected to maintain the current status quo, such as mobile phone towers.¹⁸

The civil and military diarchy was essential for the counterinsurgency to be successful. The Afghan national government’s intent, executed through the provincial governors, and the Afghan Security Forces, aided by ISAF, must be seen to have political primacy. For this to occur, a legitimate government at the national level that is seen to hold sway at the provincial levels, is crucial.

Reconciliation through amnesty for the Adoo fighters and protection for their villages on surrender was a key factor in the establishment of the Firquats, which allowed for the sanctuary and support bases to be eroded. Furthermore, it allowed intelligence development to accelerate and long-term post-insurgency planning to be established. This suggests that Taliban amnesty measures need to be more aggressive. Resettlement programs and security for villages is still an issue, as insufficient Afghan Security Forces exist to achieve this. Until security is possible for villages, malleable Taliban are not going to change sides as staunch Taliban control the countryside at night through the dissemination of night letters and other forms of psychological warfare. Furthermore, the capacity for the Afghan national army and police to absorb former Taliban will be difficult, and it may be better to establish irregular fighting units managed by Special Forces, similar to the Firquats, who would then allow for more discriminate targeting of the staunch Taliban in their sanctuaries.

Aggressive foot and vehicle patrolling, supported by air power and, to a lesser extent, sea power, eroded the Adoo’s sanctuaries and lines of communication. In Afghanistan, the same philosophy applies in the border regions along the Durand Line and the mountainous regions in Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces. Unremitting pressure against the Taliban hardliners in their sanctuaries is necessary so as to disrupt their freedom of movement. This disruption will be needed prior to any real progress being made in negotiations with the more moderate and malleable Taliban. In Oman, the successes of the counterinsurgency, through military action, reconciliation and negotiation, eventually led the DLF to lose sight of its objectives and, when mixed messages started to emanate from the insurgency leadership, public and regional support bases evaporated. This philosophy could also be applied to the Taliban, where a schism could be developed between the hardliners and the moderates. Bringing the moderates to the negotiating table as a cohesive group will be difficult unless they see real benefits for themselves and their community.

In tandem with the Oman insurgency, another disturbance was developing on the South Arabian Peninsula, known as the Aden Emergency. This conflict has many pointers for the South-Eastern Afghan insurgency and they apply primarily at the political level.

Aden Emergency

The Aden Emergency, although an unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaign, offers several insights for the current contest. Aden had been a British Protectorate since 1845 and was used as a staging post for naval vessels travelling between India and Britain. However, by the mid twentieth century, particularly with India gaining independence in 1947, Aden as a seaport was no longer as important to the British. Furthermore, Arab nationalism was growing in the region. By 1963 anti-British insurgents with varying political objectives began to coalesce into three larger, rival organisations. Firstly, and the eventual dominant group, was the Egyptian backed and resourced National Liberation Front (NLF); and secondly, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) were the main belligerents. These two groups fought each other as well as the British.¹⁹ Thirdly, a smaller organisation, the South Arabian League, was made up of mainly the middleclass and intelligentsia, but it succumbed to more radical elements and ceased to exist past 1966.²⁰

The insurgency in Aden was initially fought in the mountains of the Radfan and eventually in the alleys and streets of the Crater. At the time it was a particularly brutal campaign where insurgents conducted beheadings and other forms of psychological warfare. However, claims made by Amnesty International, against the British Forces, of widespread torture and inappropriate interrogations also surfaced, allowing the legitimacy of the counterinsurgency campaign to be questioned.²¹

Intelligence collection played a crucial part in the campaign for both sides: the NLF conducted such a successful counterintelligence operation on the British that nearly all Aden Police Special Branch agents were assassinated.²² Furthermore, the Aden Police was compromised with infiltrators from the NLF, which caused British Army and Police units to regularly search Aden Police vehicles. This eventually spiralled into a mutiny as the ‘face’ of the locally employed Aden Police commanders became tarnished.²³ In essence, once the Aden Police lost control of the Crater area, the security forces never fully recovered the initiative. From this point the insurgency shifted into an armed urban battle where sections of the general public were involved in overt insurrection.

British Army special units were tasked with developing intelligence and this was often not melded with the overall campaign plan. Regular units were not informed of intelligence collection or special units’ tasking which resulted in a lack of cohesion or poor unity of purpose.²⁴ National level collection techniques, such as that provided by the Information Research Department, continued to provide intelligence, but this was more at the political and strategic level, rather than the type needed to solve the urban insurgency in the Crater.²⁵ The general public, not wanting to be involved with British rule of law, did not respond to ‘hearts and minds’ tactics and were involved, in passive and active means, in the fight against the British.²⁶

Potentially, the most crucial issue that caused havoc in Aden was the 1962 declaration by the British Government of a withdrawal date. This led the locals to believe that the British were not fully committed to Aden’s government.²⁷ No long-term planning was instituted by the British and this resulted in the local administration’s officials ignoring the British, but maintaining one eye on the future. Significant political manoeuvring occurred where future alliances were formed and the population felt they were being monitored by the insurgents. This was confirmed when the NLF and the FLOSY conducted assassinations of the majority of their future political rivals.²⁸

Insights from the Aden Emergency

The Aden Emergency offers several insights, particularly from military and political perspectives, which have application in the Afghan theatre. The loss of the less radical South Arabian League removed the government’s ability to have a rational dialogue or negotiation with the disaffected among the South Arabian population. Additionally, long-term political commitment and post-insurgency planning was not possible. In Afghanistan, moderate or less radical disaffected elements of the population require nurturing so as to increase the segment of the population capable of rational dialogue and negotiations. These activities may include interaction with the religious Mullahs and the less committed Taliban elements.

British heavy handedness in dealing with captured insurgents eroded international support and legitimacy. Any further torture of insurgents in Afghanistan will erode the ISAF legitimacy in the eyes of the Red Cross and Amnesty International. Popular support locally and abroad will also suffer, as it did during the Abu Ghraib incident.²⁹

The elimination of most of the Police Special Branch informants created an intelligence vacuum. Human intelligence takes careful preparation and, in particular, takes time to establish. In several months the NLF and the FLOSY achieved complete domination of the urban areas by the dismemberment of the police intelligence agent network. Intelligence development, through the use of turned Taliban, would greatly assist in targeting.

The declaration by the British Government of a withdrawal date was instrumental in dissipating any unity of purpose, post-insurgency planning and intelligence. It sent a very negative message to the Aden public that caused support for the British Administration and the South Arabian Government to become futile, as the population perceived that the NLF and the FLOSY would eventually take control. This perception became reality only a matter of days after the British departed; many officials were murdered and others had to flee the country. The Afghanistan population hold very similar views. They feel that the Coalition does not have a long-term view and that they will eventually have to deal with the Taliban. Much of the population are maintaining a ‘wait and see approach, as an Environics poll of South-Eastern Afghans suggests (where the nationally held view and the Kandahar locals’ views are recorded).³⁰

Table 2. Likely Outcome of the Conflict³¹

Who will prevail in the current conflict?
	National	Kandahar
Afghan Government, with foreign assistance	40	45
Taliban, once foreign troops leave	19	16
Too early to say/Don’t know	40	38

Any announcement by a Western government of a proposed pullout date, as some NATO contributing nations have done, only reinforces the notion the population holds: that the Western Coalition is not committed to defeating the Taliban. A military solution is only part of the answer. Negotiations are also required in Afghanistan, but they must be approached from a position of military and political strength and not as an alternative to defeat.

Air power had a decisive effect in the rural and mountainous areas of South Arabia. Close air support was provided by a combination of Army Forward Air Controllers and Royal Air Force pilots. During the campaign these two groups worked extremely well and many insurgents were destroyed through this means.³² Afghanistan has demonstrated that air power in counterinsurgency operations is just as important as in major combat operations. However, it must be used discerningly, as media polling suggests that a third of insurgents joined out of revenge for a loved one killed as a result of coalition air strikes.³³

Finally, the British Government attempted negotiations with NLF and FLOSY on numerous occasions. However, the insurgent organisations believed that they had the upper hand and refused to cooperate. Indeed, these negotiations were not attempted until the twilight of the campaign, suggesting a level of desperation on behalf of the British, which compounded the insurgents’ awareness of imminent success.³⁴ This notion has some resonance in Afghanistan. Negotiations need to be conducted from a position of strength, rather than when the insurgents sense that their cause has the upper hand and the end is in sight.

Oman and Aden as Learning Opportunities for Afghanistan

The Oman and Aden conflicts represent insurgency cases where negotiation played an instrumental role in the outcome of the campaigns. In the Aden scenario, negotiations were attempted too late into the campaign and failed to get traction due to the insurgents sensing an approaching victory. Whereas in Oman, negotiations commenced early and many of the Adoo were turned as they sensed that their chances of success were limited. It is possible to draw several enduring concepts from the cases so as to shape the Afghan campaign plan.

Host Nation Lead. The establishment of a political civilian head to promote the civil power and not the military was achieved in Oman. Indeed, the Omani insurgents were politically and morally isolated through the conduct of reconciliation and negotiations and the settling of grievances. This is not occurring in Afghanistan. The lead nations do not support the Afghani desire for a negotiated strategy; indeed, the United States, Britain and Canada have stated they will not negotiate with the Taliban.³⁵

Intelligence Development. In Oman, through reconciliation and negotiation with moderate insurgents, intelligence became available. This allowed the authorities to get inside the psyche of the insurgent, and afforded the Sultans Forces not only intelligence but additional security forces, albeit not fully employable across the spectrum of operations. Furthermore, it demonstrated good faith that surrendering was not a death warrant. In Afghanistan, turned Taliban units could be established and, similar to Oman, placed under a Special Forces mentoring type arrangement.

Insurgent Isolation. By isolating insurgents from their physical and moral sanctuary, including righting real and perceived grievances, the Sultan’s forces dominated the narrative. Negotiation with less entrenched insurgents, deep operations and addressing grievances, achieved insurgent isolation in Oman. This required large numbers of troops in Oman; in fact, the troop numbers far outstretched the insurgents’ numbers by factors of up to twenty.³⁶

Offensive Action. Neutralising the insurgent through negotiation or destruction are the two options available. When negotiations fail to disengage radicals from the insurgency, then persistent individuals will need to be destroyed. This should be done as a last resort, as offensive action will trigger the Pashtunwali revenge tenet, and as many Taliban as possible should be reconciled.

Maintaining an eye on the Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, plus drawing on the Oman and Aden campaigns, allows insights into the potential for a negotiated strategy in Afghanistan. A campaign plan that incorporates political and civil policy, such as negotiation and reconciliation, equally with military tenets will have a good chance of success. Indeed, the weighting will tend towards the political and civil lines of operations as the campaign plan progresses and the need for a military response diminishes.

Conclusion

The overall strategy for the successful defeat of the insurgency in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan will require a coordinated approach. Indeed, a sole military solution does not exist and it will call for an international and whole-of-government methodology. On an international level, the Coalition powers must be steadfast in their support of the National Government of Afghanistan. There must be a single purpose and all Coalition members must be aligned and display a commitment towards that purpose. However, intractable support, especially of illegitimate decisions and actions, will be counterproductive and display to the international community that a sense of arrogance, or desperation, is developing in the campaign. The present regime in Kabul, under President Karzai, only controls the urban centres. To boost legitimacy, particularly with rural and regional Afghans, it is necessary for the successful conduct of negotiations. In a survey of South-Eastern Afghanistan, 74 per cent of the population supported Afghan national government negotiations with the Taliban.³⁷

It is likely that negotiations coupled with a surgical military response will be the only way to solve the present impasse. This will cause offense to some, especially those who have suffered as a result of the conflict; however, not every member of the Taliban can be incarcerated or killed, especially those lower level Taliban fighters who are involved through economic necessity.³⁸ In fact, President Karzai has already hinted at a possible dialogue with the Taliban when he stated,

For the security and prosperity of the Afghan people, in order to be freed from al-Qaeda and terrorists and their inhuman actions, we are ready for any type of discussion and negotiations.³⁹

The current actors in Afghanistan, such as the United States and its allies, the Afghan Government, non-government organisations, the Afghan people, and the insurgents and their sponsors will require more dialogue. This discourse may require enemies to come together, discuss points of deadlock and, most importantly, for Pashtuns to subjugate their penchant for revenge under their tribal code, Pashtunwali. This is not suggesting that past transgressions be ignored or that due legal process be neglected in order to display to a media-sophisticated Western public that headway is being made in the Afghan conflict. More so it is to bring the delegates together, to hold discussions and map out a common framework from which a future Afghanistan can be steered on the right course. Nonetheless, it is also important to remain mindful that ‘Negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation’ if not conducted from a position of strength.

Endnotes

---

1     John F Kennedy, Inaugural address as President, 20 January 1961.

2     Attributed to senior Taliban figures and used as a general message to the local population in Afghanistan.

3     G Schultz, as Secretary of State during a presentation at the University of Kansas, 1986.

4     Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine, LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, Department of Defence, 2008, para 3-1.

5     Ibid., chap 3.

6     Environics Research Group, ‘2007 Survey of Afghans’, 18 October 2007, <http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653> accessed 19 January 2010.

7     Ibid.

8     Sir M Ewans, The Great Game: Britain and Russia in Central Asia, Routledge, New York, 2003.

9     B O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, Potomac, Dulles, 2005, pp. 35–37.

10    Dr R Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1993, pp. 131–38.

11    S McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan, Brassey’s, London, 1991.

12    Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars, pp. 169–74.

13    T Jeapes, SAS Secret War – Operation Storm in the Middle East, Greenhill Books, London, 1996, p. 29.

14    Ibid., pp. 99–113; The wali or civilian governor (Braik bin Hamoud) was given equal status to the military commander of the Dhofar Brigade (Brigadier Jack Fletcher).

15    Ibid., p. 53.

16    Ibid., p. 32.

17    Environics Research Group, ‘2007 Survey of Afghans’.

18    Associated Press, ‘Taliban Targets Afghan Cellular Service’, CBS News, 26 March 2008, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/26/world/main3971409.shtml> accessed 19 January 2010.

19    J Walker, Aden Insurgency—The Savage War in South Arabia 1962–67, Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2005, p. 220.

20    J Paget, Last Post: Aden 1964–1967, Faber & Faber, London, 1969, pp. 37, 116, 262.

21    Walker, Aden Insurgency, pp. 186–87.

22    D Benest, ‘Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966–76’ in Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century, Hew Strachan (ed), Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 115–44.

23    Walker, Aden Insurgency, pp. 234–35.

24    Ibid., pp. 171, 190.

25    Ibid., p. 277.

26    Benest, ‘Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966–76’, p. 121.

27    Walker, Aden Insurgency, p. 287.

28    Paget, Last Post: Aden 1964–1967, p. 177.

29    D Gardham, ‘Abu Ghraib abuse photos “show rape”‘, The Telegraph, 27 May 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/5395830/Abu-Ghraib-abuse-photos-show-rape.html> accessed 21 January 2010. Abu Ghraib prisoners were subjected to physical and psychological abuse and the incident eroded United States legitimacy in the Iraqi War.

30    Environics Research Group, ‘2007 Survey of Afghans’

31    Ibid.

32    Walker, Aden Insurgency, p. 174.

33    G Smith, ‘Portrait of the enemy’, Globe and Mail, 22 March 2008.

34    Walker, Aden Insurgency, pp. 224–27.

35    J Straziuso, Afghan opposition says it’s been talking to Taliban, ABC News, 16 April 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/WireStory?id=4662174&page=1> accessed 24 April 2008.

36    United States, Department of the Army, Army Counterinsurgency Handbook, Skyhorse, New York, 2007, pp. 6–21.

37    Environics Research Group, ‘2007 Survey of Afghans’

38    Hilary Clinton, the United States Secretary of State, at the Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 December 2009 stated, ‘We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of ideology, theology or conviction, but frankly due to coercion and money. The average Taliban fighter, it is our information, receives two to three times the monthly salary than the average Afghan soldier or police officer.’

39    G Smith, ‘What the increasingly confident Taliban want in exchange for peace’, Globe and Mail, 12 September 2007. President Karzai stated this at a joint news conference with visiting Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende.