‘Fixed, Determined, Inviolable’ Military Organisational Culture and Adaptation
Abstract
While organisational culture can act as an impediment to change, its relative conservatism plays an important role in guarding against change that may be ill-conceived and radical. The great strength of military culture, however, is that it is well suited to driving adaptation, particularly in time of war. Change within the military should therefore be seen as a process of adaptation and renewal, maintaining what has proven successful without being tied to tradition. This concept of adaptation is far more appropriate to the particular role and requirements of the military than that of radical change which may portend an uncertain future.
The ability of armed forces to adapt to new circumstances or requirements has been a key determinant of success and failure in battle throughout history. New circumstances may range from the introduction of technology such as the aircraft or the tank to the appearance of new strategies or tactics. The application of innovative solutions to the exigencies of warfare and the capacity to marry new technology with new operational concepts can clearly deliver a significant advantage to the armed forces of a nation. It is logical to assume, therefore, that armed forces actively seek such a capability edge. However, the relationship between the military and change is highly problematic, as history demonstrates. In 1941, Rommel’s Afrika Korps defeated a numerically superior British and Commonwealth 8th Army at the Battle of Sidi Rezegh. In his book The Desert Generals, Correlli Barnett suggests that, while Rommel was the beneficiary of a dynamic German military culture that embraced inter-war innovation, the defeated British General Cunningham was the inheritor of twenty years of British ‘military decadence’.1 This article explores the degree to which military organisational culture can explain German success and British failure, and to what extent this relationship between change and military culture remains relevant today.
Stereotypical views of the military have tended to focus on intrinsic military conservatism and the unwillingness of military elites to change. This has led critics such as Basil Liddell Hart to suggest that ‘the only thing harder than getting a new idea into a military mind is to get an old one out.’2 J F C Fuller shared this opinion, remarking that ‘the average General cannot tolerate any change in preconceived ideas; prejudice sticks to his brain like tar to a blanket’.3 Yet the suggestion that militaries are inherently culturally opposed to change and require external system shocks such as defeat in battle to drive fundamental change verges on the simplistic. Moreover, evidence suggests that military organisational culture is not a dominant driver of change relative to a number of other factors. While organisational culture can act as an impediment to revolutionary change, its relative conservatism plays an important role in guarding against ill-conceived radical change. The great strength of military culture is that it is well suited to driving adaptation, particularly in time of war. The reality that this article portrays, therefore, is less the Liddell Hart or Fuller line than the sentiment expressed by Douhet who commented that ‘Victory always smiled on one who is able to renew traditional forms of warfare, and not the one who hopelessly tied himself to those forms.’4 Change in the military should therefore be viewed as a process of adaptational renewal—retaining what is successful without being tied to the baggage of the past. This concept of adaptation is far more appropriate to the particular role and requirements of the military than that of radical change which portends an uncertain future.
To appreciate the tensions surrounding change and the military, it is important to understand the enduring characteristics of the environment in which military change occurs. In his introduction to The Challenge of Change, Winton suggests that it is the tension between continuity and change, between the need to maintain military traditions and authority during the grim realities of war and in the face of an uncertain future, on which the reluctance of the military to engage in radical change is based.5 The dominating factor is the strategic environment.6 Throughout history, civilian and military thinkers alike have sought to predict the nature of future conflict and thereby determine the requirements for armed forces to be victorious. The vagaries of such predictions are manifold; indeed the nature of future conflict is no less difficult to predict in the contemporary environment than it has been throughout history. Theories on the future of war continue to emerge, from Colin S Gray’s continuation of historical patterns of conflict7 to Rupert Smith’s prediction of ‘war amongst the people’.8 Enormous uncertainties pervade military thinking on the nature of future warfare and, consequently, on preparations for future warfare.
Strategic uncertainty is also reflected in the relationship between the armed forces and the political and social environment.9 The military does not exist in a vacuum.10 The armed forces sit within a political and social environment that shapes attitudes and available resources in relation to competing priorities in the climate of the hour. Nor is the potential impact of new technologies ever entirely clear.11 Revolutions in Military Affairs or Military Technical Revolutions have proven far easier to identify retrospectively than in the present or indeed the future.
The nature of the armed forces themselves is another significant enduring characteristic of the environment in which military change may occur. Different forces and services within those forces have their own characteristics, values and attitudes that interact constantly with the uncertainties outlined above.12 This is by no means a one-way interaction, as the armed forces are subject to changes in the social and political environment while also capable themselves of influencing political and social discourse. Bacevich suggests that the contemporary US armed forces’ demonstration of military ‘mastery’ has shaped the perceptions of American politicians who feel that they can and should make use of this capability.13 Having examined the context for military change, it is now important to analyse the term ‘change’ as it applies to armed forces in this context.
In ‘The Sources of Military Change’, Farrell and Terriff outline three ‘pathways’ to military change: innovation, adaptation and emulation.14 Perhaps the most common definition of change in military terms refers to innovative change, particularly in peacetime. Such change is variously described as a fundamental change in doctrine, adoption of new technology, the creation of a new combat arm or new roles and objectives. These changes are typified in historical examples such as the creation of an independent air force, the development of carrier-based aviation and the mechanisation of armies in the inter-war period. Innovative change can thus be defined as major change based on new ideas.
The second form of change nominated by Farrell and Terriff is adaptation, which they describe as refining and adjusting to new requirements without necessarily implementing radical reform. It is this form of change, particularly in wartime, for which the military is best suited, and this will be examined in more detail later. Farrell and Terriff’s third form of change is emulative change. This ‘pathway’ to change is most often identified with developing armies or smaller states which, rather than innovating themselves, mimic or adopt developments perceived as positive in other forces.16 Indeed the British Army’s influence in nations such as Ghana and Nigeria has seen it adopted as a role model for both military and civilian aspects of society.17 Emulative change is a significant aspect of change in the armed forces of many nations and, as such, the emulative qualities of military culture are worthy of consideration. However, for the purposes of addressing the degree to which military culture is a driver or impediment to change, innovative and adaptational change provide a more useful framework.
Another form of change worthy of mention is the newly described ‘transformational’ change. At first glance this form of change shares many of the properties associated with innovative change such as the need to engage in fundamental reforms during a period of relative peace. Transformational change does, however, differ in one significant aspect, as former US Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, noted:
We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fight.18
Transformation, according to this description, aims to change the way armed forces adapt, and seeks to transform military organisational culture to one of innovation. However, this aspiration becomes problematic when confronted with the reality of external influences and the drivers of change.
In order to establish the extent to which military organisational culture is either a driver or impediment to change, it is important to examine the other drivers for change that may also prove influential. While there are numerous drivers for change discussed in a variety of texts, most acknowledge the significance of the strategic environment and potential threats as key drivers for change.19 Whether potential threats can be described in traditional terms such as conventional interstate threats, or are less historically recognisable as is globalised terrorism, there will always be a spectrum of threat that shapes the military environment of any armed force. Conversely, the absence of a direct or specific threat can be even more problematic. 20
A second major driver for change is the political environment and the imperatives of the day. Political and social appetite for investment in the armed forces is influenced by available resources and perceptions and prejudices regarding the role of the military within society.21 This is itself a function of factors such as geography, which can result in debates over continental and maritime approaches to strategy, and historical experience. The degree to which the experience of the First World War influenced inter-war perceptions of the role of war and the armed forces in many nations should not be underestimated in understanding military innovation during that period. 22 It is at this stage that military culture should be introduced as a factor in driving or impeding change, for what the inter-war period clearly demonstrates is that it is the combination of external drivers such as strategic and political imperatives, and their interaction with the military culture of a nation’s armed forces that shapes the way armed forces innovate—or choose not to innovate.
Returning to the British defeat at Sidi Rezegh, the extent to which British military culture should bear the blame remains highly debatable. British strategic outlook between the wars was less clear than retrospect might have us believe. Tensions between continental and maritime approaches to strategy re-emerged and political and social imperatives, along with issues of resourcing, created an environment that was not conducive to radical innovation. In his assessment of British failures, Barnett points to the tendency to view the British army as an ‘imperial gendarmerie’ as a factor in impeding the development of mechanisation. 23 The mantra of ‘no major war for 10 years’ that underpinned the strategic outlook was more a social and political driver than a military assessment.24 Yet the British Army did establish experimental organisations to investigate mechanisation and sought to improve its performance across the spectrum of military requirements—including its constabulary tasks. While the fact that more radical change did not occur was certainly a result of internal organisational factors, military culture was not a significant driver of that change that did occur. External drivers set the conditions in which innovation might occur—to argue that change was impeded by a culture that blindly sought to retain the old—such as the horse—while refusing to embrace the new—the tank—is far too simplistic.
Technology itself is a further driver for change. The impact of technology of any form on the battlefields of the future has proven almost impossible to predict at any stage throughout history, whether that technology has taken the form of the longbow, air power or information systems. The tendency of armed forces to be slow to adopt new technology in innovative ways will be further analysed as military organisational culture is examined.
There are many definitions of culture, all of which centre on the notion that culture is the sum of the values, attitudes and norms of behaviour of a group. Thus culture, as the very foundation of a group or organisation, is an aspect of behaviour that is extremely difficult to change. Military culture is in part drawn from the society from which it originates, but is perhaps most fundamentally influenced by the role of the armed forces in war.25 It is this role that shapes its unique structures, qualities, attitudes and outlook and therefore gives the military its organisational ideology. This is critical in appreciating the reluctance of the military to change in the face of uncertainty, as the cost of failure to change appropriately is death and defeat.
Military culture is also a product of its promotion system, with promotion potentially driven by anything from birthright to merit. Unlike many businesses, the armed forces cannot recruit laterally from similar organisations in order to effect internal change or to introduce fresh thinking.26 Inter-service relationships and identities are important in shaping the culture of the armed forces, as these represent enduring tensions in the way the services define themselves.27 Strachan suggests that the real danger in inter-service rivalry is that, while competition may focus on scarce resources, the arguments essentially concern strategic rationales.28 Strachan cites the early twentieth century British Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher who argued for the employment of the army as an amphibious force in support of a maritime strategy, but whose driving philosophy was actually based on his mantra of ‘every penny unnecessarily spent on the army means 2 pennies taken from the navy’.29
It is therefore not a single or homogenous culture, but a culture of sub-cultures that defines the military. This ‘density’ of culture has a profound effect on the ability of armed forces to accommodate radical change, as this in turn relates to the bureaucratic aspect of military culture.
The characteristics of military culture as they relate to innovative change in peacetime are also worth examining. The first of these characteristics is conservatism. The armed forces share a number of characteristics with other bureaucracies, including a desire to maintain the status quo. Bureaucracies tend to feel less threatened when conditions of resources, politics and internal organisation are stable.30 Within the military, however, this conservatism is often the result of factors other than simple bureaucratic protectionism. These additional factors relate to the origins of military elites within society and their dependence on support from society, whether it is political support or the provision of the resources required to maintain a privileged position within that society.31 Janowitz suggests that conservatism is the ‘only appropriate ideology’ for the officer class.32 Conservatism and traditionalism can also be seen through another prism—as responses to the uncertainties faced by the armed forces over the future of warfare. Janowitz argues that the experiences of the past become a ‘powerful precedent’ for future warfare in the face of this uncertainty.33 Celebrating past achievements and utilising the past as the basis for considering the future, rather than embracing radical change in the face of uncertainty, should be viewed in this broader context.
Military conservatism and traditionalism tend to take the form of ‘dogmatic doctrine’.34 Doctrine encompasses those considerations that have proven valid in the past, and can become dogmatic when unquestioned or applied blindly. Arguably it is this factor more than any other that impedes innovative change. Rather than sustaining an atmosphere of continuous professional debate, the existence of and reliance on doctrine may stifle innovative thought. Military doctrine by its very nature aims to capture the hard-earned lessons of the past. Thus, doctrine should not be discarded lightly on the appearance of a new military fad or theory—often a new technology—that is proffered as the ‘way ahead’ in times of strategic or political uncertainty.
A ‘cultural lag’ in technology terms is another military cultural characteristic that influences innovative change.35 Significantly perhaps, this is not a uniquely military characteristic, but rather one that military culture shares with industry. This characteristic is based on the principle that, until technology proves its worth, the organisation cannot afford to take the risk associated with its adoption. The cost in failing to utilise emerging technologies effectively is, however, far greater in war than in industry.36 As such, this constitutes an enduring challenge for the military, and is an element of change contemporary armed forces have struggled with at an institutional level.
The armed forces possess an institutionalised routine, internal structures and processes unique to the military. External influences such as the impact of technology through equipment procurement systems or future trends analysis through doctrine development branches are internalised by incorporation into the routine activity of the armed forces. This is particularly noteworthy when radical change or transformation is itself ‘bureaucratised’ and therefore diluted.37 This in turn suggests that innovative change is more likely to come from ‘outsiders’, be they external drivers or dissenting voices from within.38 Perhaps the greatest tension for the armed forces, and one that most differentiates the military from other organisations, is the requirement to balance change with the need to maintain the ‘fighter spirit’.39 Traditions, mannerisms and values that can appear irrelevant or archaic in peacetime are perpetuated by the armed forces, due to a perceived need to retain the moral component of fighting power in the face of changing societal, political or strategic drivers. The retention of the ‘regimental system’ in the British Army is often rationalised on this basis.40
Significantly, it is the way the military enacts change in peacetime that most clearly demonstrates the relative lack of influence of military culture as a driver of change compared to external drivers. Winton provides a useful framework for examining the way the military effects change in peacetime, using a three-step process to illustrate the difficulties faced by the armed forces in innovating. In the first step, the military, in coordination with social, political and technological influences, attempts to establish a clear picture of future conflict.41 This is a complex and problematic process and one that is unlikely to be resolved either to the satisfaction of those involved or indeed when tested against reality. Failing at this step, however, presents the very real danger of preparing the armed forces for the wrong war.42 Assuming that the organisation can develop an agreed picture of future threats, the next step is to develop the concepts, procedures and tactics that will ensure victory.43 At this stage there should be widespread debate and discussion within the organisation—here military culture has a role to play in its ability to tolerate ‘dissenting voices’ that propose radical or innovative concepts.44 Such dissenting voices are only useful when they remain constructive. Murray argues that both Fuller and Liddell Hart became counter-productive as time passed due to their antagonistic criticism of military leadership.45 Such debate will inevitably also be influenced by internal factors such as service rivalries, traditional versus reformist views, and by political imperatives such as the national budget. The third step, the establishment of experimental organisations to test and trial new concepts, can ultimately only be reached when a degree of clarity has been achieved in the first two steps. Winton acknowledges that this process is, of course, iterative; however, his process does highlight two key factors.46 Firstly, it is external conditions, especially strategic uncertainty, political imperatives and economics, that set the conditions for innovative change rather than military organisational culture acting as the principal driver. Secondly, internal culture through conservatism and traditionalism does shape the nature of change, and is more likely to impede innovation in the face of uncertainty than to drive towards a vaguely defined future. Military organisational culture therefore can be seen as an impediment to change, but only due to its relationship with uncertainty.
Given an uncertain strategic and political environment, the military bureaucracy naturally exhibits an inherent opposition to change. In this regard leadership plays a key role, whether enunciating a ‘way ahead’, encouraging open debate or actively supporting experimentation in relation to the process of change. However, leaders who rise from within the ranks of the organisation will tend to be promoted based on their success within the established norms of that organisation.47 The differences in influence between inter-war British Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, with Wilson as innovator and Montgomery-Massingberd as traditionalist, bear testament to the role of leadership in influencing innovation and change.48 However, military conservatism is not the horse-bound cavalry stereotype often trotted out; rather it is a response to the gross uncertainty of the future. Faced with the ambiguities of the future nature of warfare, the military cannot afford to change in radical ways lest such changes be based on a flawed vision. Even where clear opportunities for innovation are apparent, and the necessary leadership exists, innovation depends on the existence of appropriate strategic, political and economic conditions in order to take advantage of new concepts or technologies. The recent conversion of the Australian Army from a predominantly light infantry force to a mechanised, ‘hardened and networked’ force was the result of a combination of the contemporary strategic environment, the culmination of a sustained period of political and social support, and a strong economy. This change occurred in spite of significant resistance from within the military, offset perhaps by effective leadership from the Chief of the Army.
The inter-war German Army, often mooted as an exception to military conservatism, is an excellent model for embracing innovative change. The German inter-war military culture was strongly supportive of innovative change, emphasising particularly the value of intellectual excellence in the selection and promotion of general staff officers.49 In the 1970s the US Army attempted to distil much of the perceived German excellence, identifying characteristics of the general staff system such as selection and training, inculcation of initiative and the goal of technical-tactical perfection as desirable military cultural attributes that could be emulated to enhance US military capability.50 The characteristics of the German inter-war military culture have been suggested as the drivers of the mechanisation and supporting combined arms doctrine that led to the stunning military successes of 1939-40. German military innovation is often held in stark contrast to the military conservatism of the inter-war British and French armies. What this argument tends to ignore, however, is the fundamentally different strategic, political and social environments in which those three militaries found themselves during the inter-war period. The ability of the German Army to embrace mechanisation was certainly influenced by the culture of the officer corps and the leadership of such heavyweights as von Seeckt and Guderian. The conditions for innovation and change were, however, highly favourable.51 Germany could easily envisage another continental war and one that would likely involve a fight on two fronts. In a nation humiliated by the perceived injustices of the Versailles peace, military development was socially desirable as a means of regaining national pride. When the Nazis came to power in the 1930s, military spending supported the mechanisation program and the development of advanced aircraft. These developments took place within a military culture more conducive to the development of combined arms doctrine than the British regimental system of the time. However, the close relationship between politics and the military came at a cost. German military culture also influenced perceptions of military capability and power, and this in turn influenced Hitler’s policies and shaped the perilous direction of German strategy in the late 1930s. It can also be argued that the apparent innovative doctrinal changes of the inter-war years were, in fact, the continuation of changes that were initiated as early as 1916.52
The modernisation and professionalisation of armies provides a second counter-argument to the thesis of culture as a minor driver or indeed impediment to change. Towards the end of the twentieth century, Western armed forces became increasingly lean, professional organisations, often in emulation of the inter-war German model. Arguably, militaries have institutionalised the components that require change—doctrinal development, lessons learned, officer training establishments and simulation and experimentation.53 These have, however, become a mechanism not for innovation, but rather for refining existing tools, thereby producing, for example, a better fighter rather than gambling on something new and untried. Indeed the very act of institutionalising the mechanisms for change inducts them into the routine of the organisation, and where change becomes routine, innovation is stifled in favour of the refinement of known concepts.54 The US Army development of doctrine in the post-Cold War era further suggests the significance of external drivers. While the Cold War-developed air-land doctrine had proven its worth during the 1991 Gulf War, the era which followed this victory was one of significant strategic uncertainty. Rather than revolutionise doctrine in the face of new requirements, the US Army merely continued to add to and adapt its successful 1991 formula to the conflicts that followed.55 Professionalisation therefore cannot of itself account for the influence of external drivers such as strategic uncertainty in the post-Cold War era and budgetary constraints imposed by the ensuing ‘peace dividend’.
The most recent response to perceived military conservatism has been transformation. Transformation seeks to institutionalise change by transforming military culture to one of constant change and innovation. This, however, can tend to once more institutionalise change, allowing military bureaucracy to again internalise the process of change. External drivers have perhaps wielded the greatest influence on the transformation agenda in the United States and the reality of current conflicts has done much to hijack that transformation agenda. For example, the mediumweight Stryker Brigade capability, originally the flagship of a futuristic transformed army, was rushed into operational service and adapted for contemporary requirements. Likewise the contemporary environment has dictated the available budget for experimentation and innovation. Perhaps the greatest impediment to transformation is, however, the fact that it attempts to change culture, a culture that is inherently conservative for profound reasons of continuity and stability in the face of uncertainty. Despite the role of military culture in influencing innovative change when appropriate external conditions exist as per the German inter-war model, and despite the modernisation and professionalisation of armies and attempts at transformative change, military culture remains a minor driver of innovative change and, at worst, an impediment to change. The strength of military culture lies in adaptation in time of war.
I am not suggesting that armed forces are incapable of change—particularly innovative change—when the external conditions are set. Military conservatism does, however, play a role in peacetime in guarding the ‘baby’ of tradition—the ‘fighter spirit’ and established and proven doctrine—to ensure it is not ‘thrown out with the bathwater’ as external drivers come into play. Further, it is those characteristics of military culture that can impede innovative change in peacetime that endow the armed forces with the resilience to drive adaptation in time of war. Unlike the perilous art of predicting future threats and challenges in peacetime, in war much of the veil of uncertainty is removed. Threats are relatively clear and immediate. Requirements for new concepts, techniques and technology are more apparent. The traditional and new become fused as the ‘fighter spirit’ is adapted to the new conflict. The hierarchical structures now enable lessons identified to be rapidly spread throughout the organisation. The speedy redevelopment of effective close air support in Afghanistan in 2007 by the Royal Air Force, despite its Cold War focus on air interdiction, is one example of this rapid adaptation. Technology can be tested and adopted where useful and targeted where clear capability gaps exist. In war, innovation and success are rewarded rather than regarded as a threat to the status quo. Importantly, the external drivers for change now play a vital supporting role, with a greater likelihood of political support and adequate resources to provide for urgent adaptation. However, the degree to which the military is prepared to effect the required changes, balancing a capability gap at the outset of the conflict with the requirements of the new threat, will depend on the capacity of the armed forces to effectively prepare in time of peace. It will depend on their ability to acknowledge the uncertain environment, maintain a balanced and dynamic approach and develop a culture that reflects Douhet’s concept of renewal. Where the ground to be made up is too great, any amount of adaptation will likely fall short of requirements or, at worst, see a significant price paid in blood as the 8th Army found in 1941.
Change and uncertainty provide a volatile mix, one that constitutes an enduring challenge for any armed force. This challenge was recognised by General Douglas MacArthur when he addressed the US Military Academy at West Point in 1962:
Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars. 56
The ability to prepare to fight the next war is fundamental to the profession of arms, and the drivers to achieve the necessary change have been examined in this article. Military organisational culture is not a major driver for innovative change in peacetime. The degree to which military culture is an impediment to change, however, is not wholly due to stereotypical or inherent military conservatism and traditionalism, based on bureaucratic protection or military elitism. Rather this conservatism can be seen as a result of the imperative to maintain a degree of stability in the face of uncertain strategic, political and technological drivers. Where external drivers set the conditions for change, military culture can act as a positive driver to pursue that change. The true strength of military culture in driving change is in times of war, when the ability of the military to adapt and the immediacy of the threat combine to produce rapid and, at times, revolutionary change. The challenge for the military is to maintain balance in the face of uncertainty during time of peace, and yet continue to debate, develop and change in order to ensure that when conflict comes, it is a matter of adaptation and not the shock of defeat that drives the required change.
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Winter has served in a variety of regimental appointments within the 1st Armoured Regiment and has held staff appointments within Headquarters 1 Division, the US Army’s Headquarters V Corps and the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. Operational deployments have included East Timor in 1999 and Iraq in 2003. A French and Dutch linguist, he has been detached to the French and Dutch armies and the USMC. Lieutenant Colonel Winter holds a BA (Hons) (UNSW), a Master of International Relations (Deakin) and a Master of Defence Studies (Kings College London). He is currently Senior Officer Manager-Army.
Endnotes
1 Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, Castle Books, New Jersey, 2004, p. 103.
2 Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, quoted in Peter G Tsouras (ed.), The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, Greenhill, London, 2000, p. 75.
3 Major General J F C Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, quoted in Tsouras, The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, p. 76.
4 General Giulio Douhet, quoted in Tsouras, The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, p. 76.
5 Harold R Winton and David R Mets (eds.), The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities 1918-1941, University of Nebraska Press, Nebraska, 2003, p. xi.
6 Ibid., p. xii.
7 See Colin S Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, Phoenix, London, 2006, particularly Chapter Four: ‘Grand Narratives of War 1800-2100’.
8 See Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin, London, 2006, Part Three.
9 Winton and Mets, The Challenge of Change, p. xii.
10 Williamson Murray, ‘Armored Warfare: The British, French and German Experiences’ in Murray and Allen (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 8.
11 Winton and Mets, The Challenge of Change, pp. xii-xiii.
12 Ibid., p. xii.
13 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 2.
14 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘The Sources of Military Change’ in Farrell and Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2001, p. 6.
15 Ibid., p. 5.
16 Ibid., p. 9.
17 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 9.
18 Secretary of Defense Donald H Rumsfeld, 31 January 2002, quoted in The Elements of Defense Transformation, Pentagon, Washington, 2004, p. 2.
19 Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change, p. 10; Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, p. 18.
20 Stephen Rosen, ‘Thinking about Military Innovation’ in Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995, p. 8.
21 Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change, p. 3.
22 Dennis E Showalter, ‘Military Innovation and the Whig Perspective of History’ in Winton and Mets, The Challenge of Change, p. 220.
23 Barnett, The Desert Generals, pp. 104-05.
24 Showalter in Winton and Mets, The Challenge of Change, p. 223.
25 Winton and Mets, The Challenge of Change, p. xiv.
26 An exception to this might be lateral transfers between the armed forces of different nations, although the impact of such transfers on organisational culture is likely to be minimal.
27 Winton and Mets, The Challenge of Change, p. xiv.
28 Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, pp. 235-36.
29 Ibid.
30 Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 2.
31 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Macmillan, New York, 1971, pp. 22-23
32 Ibid., p. 23.
33 Ibid., p. 24.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 25.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 27.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
40 E W Spine-Padde (pseudonym), ‘The regimental system - myth and reality’, British Army Review, No. 108, p. 49.
41 Winton, The Challenge of Change, p. xi.
42 Ibid., p. xii.
43 Ibid.
44 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 25-26.
45 Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, p. 27.
46 Winton, The Challenge of Change, p. xii.
47 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 24.
48 Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, p. 26.
49 Ibid., p. 36.
50 Colonel TN Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, Nova, Virginia, 1997, p. 303. The full list of attributes cited: selection, examination, specialised training, historical study analysis, inculcation of initiative, responsibility, goal of technical-tactical perfection, objectivity in analysis, regeneration and the leavening process.
51 Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, pp. 15-17.
52 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
53 Winton, The Challenge of Change, p. xiv.
54 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 27-28.
55 With acknowledgment to Dr Richard Lock-Pullen, lecture to ACSC, 8 February 2008.
56 General Douglas MacArthur, address to West Point, 12 May 1962, quoted in Tsouras, The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, p. 76.
