Support to Operation Victorian Fires Assist: Four Lessons in Defence Base Support
Abstract
The Victorian bush fires of February 2009 swiftly destroyed nearly two thousand homes and took over 170 lives. Yet, equally as swift, and in spite of the extensive damage, the ADF responded quickly and efficiently to this disaster with Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST. While the success of this operation was obvious for all to see, the author identifies several lessons that can be drawn from this unique experience, examining what worked as well as what did not—and how matters could be improved. To this end, the author offers a number of practical and innovative suggestions for how the ADF can better utilise its mix of contractor and military provided base services to better support ongoing warfighting tasks while mounting an equally effective response to similar contingencies in future.
On Saturday 7 February 2009, bushfires devastated 400,000 hectares (988,400 acres) of land in the state of Victoria, killing 173 people, an estimated one million wild animals and 13,000 livestock.1 The fires destroyed 2029 homes, in 78 communities, along with 61 businesses, five schools and kindergartens and three sporting clubs.2
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) quickly responded by raising Joint Task Force 662 (JTF 662) led by Headquarters 4 Brigade from Watsonia, on the northern outskirts of Melbourne. Combined with fire authorities, police, emergency services and community organisations, JTF 662 coordinated engineering, aerial fire spotting, search, medical, counselling, liaison, forensic, catering, and relief effects for victims of the fires under the ADF codename: Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST.3
In support of JTF 662, but with no command and control relationship, was Victoria’s largest Defence base—the Puckapunyal Military Area (PMA).4 ADF doctrine defines a Defence base as ‘an area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support’.5
The aim of this article is to identify four lessons from PMA’s role as a Defence base in supporting Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, and to relate these lessons, more broadly, to support for ADF operations. These four lessons involve: supporting/supported relationships, influence versus command, Defence base designation, and community support.
PMA was established as a Defence base in 1939, at the outbreak of the Second World War. It consists of 50,000 hectares (120,000 acres) of land, and hosts 2260 people including regular and reserve ADF personnel, Australian Public Service personnel, Defence families and contactors.6 The February bushfires came to within 20 kilometres of the Puckapunyal Military Area.
Supporting/Supported Relationships
The command and control arrangements for PMA, and all Australian Defence bases, are designated in Defence’s Base Accountabilities Model.7 At PMA, command and control consists of a supporting/supported relationship8 between the Senior ADF Officer – Puckapunyal (SADFO-P)9 and the Base Support Manager – Puckapunyal (BSM-P). BSM-P is a member of the Australian Public Service.
SADFO-P provides broad leadership of PMA’s military personnel and represents ADF interests on PMA through a collegiate ‘whole-of-Defence’ approach.10 The SADFO-P’s management of whole-of-Defence matters includes Defence assistance to the civil community, community engagement and ADF reputation management. Importantly, a key measure of effectiveness for a change in the supporting/supported relationship between SADFO-P and BSM-P is that the SADFO-P assumes command of the PMA in the instance of a security, safety or emergency event requiring coordination of Defence base personnel and resources.11
Despite the devastation in Victoria caused by the bushfires, the ‘security, safety or emergency event’ metrics for a change in base command relationships were not enacted. Therefore, SADFO-P and BSM-P continued their cooperation on issues by employing a continuation of the extant supporting/supported relationship.
Defence base support for ADF operations – Lesson 1: The peace-time supporting/ supported relationship established for Defence base SADFO and BSM may not be adjusted even in the most extreme security, safety or emergency events. Therefore, leaders should not predicate plans on changes in command and control arrangements. Instead, they should develop cooperative, transparent and trustworthy relationships between Defence base SADFO and BSM in order to ensure a supporting/supported relationship functions effectively even in the most extreme circumstances.
Influence Versus Command
In addition to the SADFO-P and BSM-P relationship, PMA has resident ADF units that, apart from their PMA lodger status have, in the main, no command and control relationship with the SADFO.12 Instead, PMA resident units and organisations have separate chains of command to Defence Support Group, Defence Health, Defence Housing Authority, Defence Community Organisation, Joint Logistic Command, Land Command – Army, Training Command – Army,13 and Defence contractors. To complicate this arrangement, PMA has resident organisations that are outside of the Australian Defence Organisation including: a State primary school, childcare services, retail businesses, banks, PMA newsletter The Boomerang, and the Puckapunyal District Neighbourhood Centre.
Given these disparate organisations and stakeholders, achieving unity of command is not viable for PMA.14 Few people in PMA work for SADFO-P, and the majority of people in PMA have their own chains of command for orders, direction and reporting. Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST did nothing to change this command and control construct.
Therefore, to support Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, SADFO-P, in partnership with BSM-P, was required to synchronise capabilities and effects from PMA resident units on an ad-hoc basis. Initially, this synchronisation occurred at twice daily SADFO-P meetings, but in less than a week these meetings were cancelled, and thereafter PMA synchronisation was made on an as-required basis.
The command and control situation in PMA for SADFO-P sounds bleak. For an outside observer it appears that at PMA, commonly understood ADF command and control arrangements, including unity of command, are ignored. And yet, support from PMA to Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST occurred—on time, at the correct locations and in appropriate quantities to support the efforts of JTF 662.
PMA’s independent, and stove piped, command and control structures established to support peace-time functions can work in a coordinated manner through simple influencing actions by a SADFO. There is no magic involved in influencing actions. To influence units and organisations outside a SADFO’s command chain, all the SADFO needs to do is talk to people; visit people; make sure Defence base emergency procedures are current, understood and preferably rehearsed; and keep in contact with key leaders both on the Defence base and in positions that may influence Defence base operations in the wider community and ADF.
Defence base support for ADF operations – Lesson 2: A SADFO can expect to command few people, but have responsibility for all. Except in the most extreme circumstances, it is likely Defence base command and control arrangements will not change to support a SADFO’s authority. Therefore, a SADFO must concentrate on influencing people through visits, discussions and procedures in order to gain an optimal outcome for all Defence base stakeholders, including Defence as the paramount stakeholder.
Defence Base Designation
PMA’s primary role is training and support. As a result of this role, many Defence base functions and services have been outsourced to civilian contractors, including logistic support, medical support, transport services, catering, mess services, cleaning, range control, fire services and security.
During Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, PMA’s outsourced functions and services, especially logistic support, provided by the contractor BAE Systems through the Joint Logistics Unit – Victoria, were timely, responsive and complete. Support of logistics and equipment to JTF 662 included graders, dozers, heavy lift equipment, troop lift, bulk fuel, potable water, rations, tents, sleeping bags and stretchers.
Given the performance of PMA’s outsourced functions and services during Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, Defence could be satisfied that the current model of contractor support to Defence bases is both efficient and effective.
But the issue of Defence base designation requires careful consideration.
PMA as a training and support base—without high readiness ADF units in residence—has fewer mobile force elements and greater reaction time in responding, almost exclusively, to domestic emergency and/or security events.
In contrast, Defence bases with high readiness ADF units in residence—which are required, almost exclusively, for offshore deployments—contain highly mobile units on varying degrees of notice to move. Defence provides these Defence bases with proportionally less outsourced functions and services than bases such as PMA, especially in the areas of logistic support, medical support, transport services and catering. However, Defence bases with high readiness ADF units do utilise some outsourced functions and services, especially in mess services, cleaning, range control, fire services and security.
In the ADF’s current and expected future high tempo operational environment, are these mixed contractor support arrangements for Defence bases still appropriate? Should Defence consolidate outsourced functions and services on training and support bases such as PMA? And should Defence allocate additional highly responsive ADF-owned support functions and services to operate on high readiness Defence bases?
To help answer these questions, perhaps Defence may consider two distinct designations for Defence bases: Force Projection Bases and Force Support Bases. Force Projection Bases could be Defence bases from which the ADF would seek to project forces in order to support Australian national interests, especially offshore. Force Support Bases, such as PMA, could be Defence bases from which the ADF trains and supports other ADF and Australian community activities, including domestic emergency and/or security events.
The advantage of unequivocal Defence base designation is that the ADF’s allocation of base support assets could be clearly demarcated so that Force Projection Bases could be provided with the bulk of highly responsive ADF-owned functions and services, while Force Support Bases could be provided with more constrained contractor based functions and services.
This system would assign limited ADF assets, and perhaps reduce the number of single-Service Defence bases in the ADF inventory, to support short-notice and long-term ADF deployments from Force Projection Bases, while contractors could be employed to support more predictable rear support and training functions from Force Support Bases.
Defence base support for ADF operations — Lesson 3: Defence could consider a base designation review to determine national requirements for Force Projection Bases and Force Support Bases in order to allocate scarce ADF-owned functions and services effectively to support short-notice and long-term ADF deployments, while allocating outsourced functions and services in support of other ADF and Australian community activities including domestic emergency and/or security events.
Community Support
PMA is blessed with strong community support, generated from a combination of PMA’s 70-year connection with the people of country Victoria, and some strong-willed and experienced people in PMA involved with Defence Health, Defence Housing Authority, Defence Community Organisation, pastoral and philanthropic care, retail businesses, PMA newsletter The Boomerang and the Puckapunyal District Neighbourhood Centre.
Of these organisations, clear leaders during the aftermath of the 7 February 2009 bushfires were the Puckapunyal District Neighbourhood Centre (PDNC). PDNC is a small, volunteer, self-trained, experienced and highly motivated community-based organisation located in PMA.
PDNC quickly adapted to the conditions in local communities resulting from the Victorian fires, and immediately provided support to families within the Puckapunyal and surrounding areas, encompassed by the Mitchell Shire. 15 Importantly, PDNC provided tailored and focused support to communities, based on experience PDNC had gained from caring for Kosovar and East Timorese refugees in 1999.16
The value of PDNC’s tailored and focused support is not to be underestimated. Once the full devastation of the bushfires was understood, Australians gave generously to bushfire victims, both in cash and household goods. The support was overwhelming and it took some time for charity and government organisations to create the infrastructure and knowledge to effectively synchronise support to shattered communities.
In parallel to these efforts, and employing tailored and focused support, PDNC’s leaders showed significant agility and were able to identify community needs, move critical household necessities to affected communities, link as required into ADF capabilities, and adjust to new and unexpected contingencies.
Demonstrating the enduring efforts of the PDNC, the organisation intends to coordinate fundraising and material support for the victims of the Victorian bushfires, through an adaptive and evolving plan over the next 12–15 months.
Defence base support for ADF operations — Lesson 4: The ADF begins and ends with the communities with which it interacts. The ADF must understand that the communities from which we originate, interact and influence hold significant capabilities including local knowledge, self-organisation and enthusiastic drive. If these community capabilities are synchronised with ADF efforts, they can become significant partners in ADF mission success.
Conclusion
The 7 February 2009 Victorian bushfires created a tragic set of circumstances in southern Australia. The Puckapunyal Military Area, given its geographic location, was able to support whole-of-nation efforts to assist the affected people of Victoria.
This article has identified four lessons in Defence base support relating to the PMA’s role in supporting Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, and has related these lessons, more broadly, to support for ADF operations.
First, in the most extreme circumstances, and despite demands being placed on people, infrastructure and resources, the supporting/supported relationship between the Senior ADF Officer (SADFO) and the Base Support Manager (BSM) must continue to operate.
Second, due to multiple chains of command, a SADFO can expect to influence rather than command Defence base resident units, in order to gain an optimal outcome for all Defence base stakeholders, including Defence as the paramount stakeholder.
Third, Defence could consider a base designation review to determine national requirements for Force Projection Bases and Force Support Bases in order to allocate scarce ADF-owned functions and services to support short-notice and long-term ADF deployments, while outsourcing functions and services in support of Australianbased ADF and community activities.
And finally, efforts to synchronise community capabilities with the ADF should be encouraged and nurtured, so that communities, both in Australia and internationally, can become significant partners in ADF mission success.
About the Author
Colonel Chris Field is the Director of Future Land Warfare and Strategy, Army Headquarters, Canberra. During Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, he was the Acting Senior Australian Defence Force Officer – Puckapunyal.
Endnotes
1 Nichola Clark, ‘Out of the ashes: Lessons from the Victorian bushfires’, Company Director, Australian Institute of Company Directors, Vol. 25, No. 5, June 2009, p. 29.
2 ‘About the Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority’, <http://www.wewillrebuild.vic.gov.au/about-us.html> accessed 27 May 2009.
3 Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST: The ADF nomenclature for civil assistance operations have, in recent years, assumed the common title of ‘assist’ to designate military operations performed in support of essential civil functions. Other recent ‘assist’ operations include: Operation BALI ASSIST 2002 (Bali bombings); Operation SUMATRA ASSIST 2004-05 (Boxing Day Tsunami); Operation PAKISTAN ASSIST 2005 (Earthquake, Dhanni Pakistan); Operation LARRY ASSIST 2006 (Cyclone Larry, Innisfail, North Queensland); Operation PNG ASSIST 2007 (PNG floods, Oro (Northern) Province); Operation KIRIBATI ASSIST 2008 (World War II UXO). ‘Global Operations’, Department of Defence website: <http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/index.htm> accessed 6 April 2009.
4 Puckapunyal is an English rendering of an Aboriginal word, the meaning of which is obscure. It has been variously translated as ‘death to the eagle’, ‘the outer barbarians’, ‘the middle hill’, ‘place of exile’ and ‘valley of the winds’. Australian Military Units: Puckapunyal, Australian War Memorial website, <http://www.awm.gov.au/units/place_557.asp> accessed 24 May 2009.
5 ‘Base’, Australian Defence Glossary, v5.1.1, accessed 29 April 2009.
6 These 2260 personnel comprise: 450 Australian Regular Army, 100 Army Reserve, 240 Australian Public Service, 370 contractors, 700 Defence dependents and 400 trainees.
7 Chief of Army Directive 22/09, Appointment of Senior Australian Defence Force Officers (SADFO) for Army Bases (R3839733), Department of Defence, 30 March 2009.
8 In the context of a support command relationship, the Supporting Commander aids, protects, complements or sustains another commander’s force, and is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. Source publication: US JP 1.02 (2006), Australian Defence Glossary, v5.1.1, accessed 14 April 2009.
Supported commander: (US Joint) In the context of a support command relationship, the commander receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. Status: Authorised Term. Context: Military Operations > Joint. Sponsor: Vice Chief of the Defence Force. Source: Publication: US JP 1.02 (2006). Australian Defence Glossary, Version: v5.1.1, accessed 14 Apr 09.
9 SADFO in PMA, in February 2009, was locally known as the Senior Army Representative – Puckapunyal (SAR-P).
10 Secretary and Chief of Defence Force Directive 04/08, Control, Management and Accountability at Defence Bases and Establishments, Department of Defence, 3 November 2008. For the purpose of this article, ‘whole-of-defence’ consists of the Navy, Army, Air Force, and civilians in the Australian Public Service integrating and working cooperatively in order to fulfil the requirements of the Defence Service Charter, <http://www.defence.gov.au/charters/> accessed 28 April 2009.
11 Chief of Army Directive 22/09.
12 The exception is the Land Warfare Development Centre which, as an Army Headquarters unit, is also commanded by the Senior ADF Officer in the Puckapunyal Military Area. Annex A to Secretary and Chief of Defence Force Directive 04/08 does try to bolster a SADFO’s ability to influence disparate chains of command on a Defence base, by stating the SADFO may issue a ‘relevant command or general order ... for the purposes of good order and discipline, security, emergency, or safety matters’ over common areas or facilities on a Defence base ‘which are not allocated for the long-term exclusive use of a particular resident unit on that [Defence] Base.’
13 From 1 July 2009, Land Command – Army and Training Command – Army merged to form Forces Command – Army.
14 ‘Unity of Command’ is a method of command where one commander is vested with the authority to plan and direct operations, and is solely responsible for success or failure. The commander also has the authority to direct and control personnel and resources assigned to the task. Australian Defence Glossary, v5.1.1, accessed 14 April 2009.
15 The southern boundary of the Mitchell Shire is situated just over 30 kilometres from the centre of Melbourne, with its northern boundary approximately 90 kilometres from that city. The shire covers a total area of 2864 square kilometres. Mitchell Shire Council website: <http://www.mitchellshire.vic.gov.au/Page/Page.asp?Page_Id=328> accessed 27 April 2009.
16 ‘Operation Safe Haven April–June 1999’ in Defence Annual Report 1998–99, Department of Defence, Appendices, <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/98-99/dar/dar99app.pdf> accessed 24 May 2009. ADF Outcome: Contributed personnel and logistics support to Kosovar refugees [which included: Puckapunyal in Victoria and Leeuwin Barracks in Western Australia]; ‘Current Emergency Assistance to East Timor’, ReliefWeb, 13 December 1999 <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64CJB7?OpenDocument> accessed 24 May 2009.
