A Somewhat Heretical Proposal for the Future of Communications in the Army Reserve

Abstract

Communications capability, equipment and training requirements have become increasingly complex over recent years, and this trend is only going to continue. As the subject matter experts, RASigs will have to look closely at communications at all levels, especially those which are traditionally performed by regimental signallers. This trend is even more pronounced in the Army Reserve, where the doctrinal role of the Formation Signals Squadron has been largely negated. Reserve Signals Squadrons have to adapt to this new paradigm if communications capability within the Army Reserve is to be maintained. This article examines three fundamentally different options to address this issue.

Introduction

With current demise of deployable brigades (and arguably battalions) within the Reserve, the doctrinal role of the Brigade Signal Squadron has virtually ceased to exist. If (as thought by many commentators) this is the raison d’être for the existence of RASigs within the Reserve, then its future viability is indeed in question.

It is the contention of this article that this not the case, and that such a view represents a very blinkered and uninformed perspective on communications as a whole within the Reserve. After a brief review of the current situation, the paper will examine a number of options for the way forward for RASigs. These options will be appraised in terms of the partially filled glass analogy—the pessimist saying that it is half empty, the optimist half full, and the engineer that it is overdesigned.

Background

Over the past few years the Reserve has undergone more radical changes to its structure than at any time since the implementation of the Tange report of the 1970s. The first of these, the introduction of the multi-user depot, provided a means of renewing Second World War depots and increasing our recruiting base in the most economic manner by minimising duplication of common requirements. Project FOCUS brigaded virtually all Reserve administrative and logistic functions to free up Australian Regular Army (ARA) clerks, storemen and craftsmen to address shortages within 1 Division units. Project Pozieres combines all the regional training assets into Regional Training Battalions under the local brigade in order to again lower staff overheads. Reserve Field Batteries have become de facto Brigade Mortar Companies due to the lack of resources to renew their gun/howitzers, and the almost total demise of assault pioneers has had the Field Squadrons taking up some of this role.

The common theme arising from all these initiatives is that, regardless of the specific reasons:

a) structurally the Reserve is increasingly diverging from the ARA, and

b) its units are becoming increasingly functionalised around single core/corps functions.

With this in mind, the future of RASigs and communications as a whole within the Reserve can now be examined.

Premise

Communications capability, equipment and training requirements have become increasingly complex over the recent years, and this trend is only likely to become more pronounced in the future. As the subject matter experts in the field, RASigs will have to take a much more active role in communications at all levels, especially those which traditionally fall within the bailiwick of the regimental signaller. This has been illustrated recently on operations where Reserve 266 radio operators were in considerable demand as regimental signallers. Each of the three options outlined below addresses this issue in a slightly different way.

The Glass Half Empty

This option basically retains the status quo. The squadrons provide a centre of expertise of RASigs competencies within each formation—in effect, becoming a remote campus of the School of Signals for on-the-job training. Regimental signallers are retained within their corps though some blue lanyard (RASigs) augmentation, provided by posting the occasional senior non-commissioned officer (SNCO) into a Signals platoon or having a RASigs captain Regimental Signals Officer (RSO) as their ‘non-corps’ posting.

There are many advantages to this option, the primary one being that it provides for maximum competency of RASigs personnel within the Reserve. Despite the lack of brigade level activities within the Reserve, the capability will remain within each squadron to stand up formation level communications facilities. This is necessary for situations as on Operation ANODE, where there is a need for an operationally deployed Reserve headquarters. In addition, Reserve signallers will be able to backfill ARA operations slots with minimal additional training so that High Readiness Reserve (HRR) commitments can most easily be met.

The other brigade units will also retain their autonomous Signals platoons and maintain individual corps affiliations. RASigs personnel can also enhance these units’ own capabilities with an experienced SNCO or junior captain, who can then bring this wider experience back into the squadron on reposting.

The fundamental disadvantage of this option is that it is not sufficiently flexible to cope well with the current dynamic environment. Already Operation ANODE is in the process of being modified to incorporate a full-time ARA Headquarters and future operations in Timor Leste and other likely locations will be similarly structured. The number of senior Reserve officers who have utilised even a portion of the range of capabilities provided by a Signals squadron, as part of a deployed brigade headquarters, is very small and diminishing rapidly. Will a customer who has never utilised or even experienced a particular capability value retaining it?

In addition, the other brigade units are hard pressed enough to fill their own corps specific roles without having to dual hat a regimental signaller, especially when the regimental headquarters does not deploy. Already RASigs personnel occupy most of the Signals roles (of all varieties) within the various Reserve Response Forces.

Finally, the likely RASigs HRR roles, being with 17 Command Signals Regiment (CSR), do not mirror the ARA/Reserve brigade relationships established within the rest of the HRR, which further distances us from our local customer base.

The Glass Half Full

This option extrapolates the trend discussed in the introduction and quite simply brigades all Signals roles. Regimental signallers either join their formation Signals squadrons or revert to their primary corps role in either infantry or artillery. All unit signals requirements become task requests on the Army Capability Management System (ACMS) to the Brigade Signal Squadron.

The advantages of this option is that it provides (in the very short term) an increase in squadron numbers, a much greater range of interesting tasking for unit members, and a ‘one stop shop’ for all communication queries and tasks. It enhances the standard of communications procedures throughout the Reserve and provides for a measure of communications security (COMSEC) oversight which it is currently lacking, merely by having all these responsibilities under the control of the subject matter experts.

The introduction of new personal communications equipment and the upgrade of the existing equipment will be greatly simplified and there will be a net reduction in unit training liability, as the old regimental signaller courses are dropped and everyone attends Exercise BALCOMBE SPIRIT. There will also be economies in facilities and Q accounting. Complete communication capability bricks can also be supplied by the Signals squadrons in this model.

There are, however, a number of quite significant disadvantages to this approach. The number of personnel who would be prepared to change corps affiliations and move from units which have been their home throughout their Reserve service would be small. The Signals squadrons are already hard pressed to complete the required training to maintain competencies with their current levels of support requests; if these increase markedly then overall competency levels will most likely fall.

The supported units will also experience a reduction in communication capability due to either poor forecasting or poor administration in preparing or forwarding support requests. Even if a support request is received it may not be able to be filled as it may conflict with higher level needs known only within the squadron. While the correct decisions will most likely be made by Squadron Operations, the end result will often be a unit without communications.

The other issue with this option is that BALCOMBE SPIRIT does not currently address the requirements of a regimental signaller and, if adopted, a number of already content heavy courses would become even heavier. A unit’s communication needs are generally an order of magnitude simpler than those practiced by a squadron. Having the squadron provide all the communications runs the risk of unnecessarily (in their eyes at least) over complicating the unit’s communications procedures.

By brigading all signals personnel, there may be a real degradation in the provision of intra-unit communications. The negative implications in the HRR context are also noteworthy as this option tends to lock RASigs out of any integrated brigade contribution.

The Glass Is Overdesigned

The model chosen for this option, and the recommended one, is that of a classical RAEME structure.¹ While this may at first glance appear bizarre, there are a number of close analogies between the considerations for RAEME support and that of RASigs.

Both corps have a strong, centralised and accredited trade structure, both have to maintain a formation level unit to ensure that all trade competencies are maintained, and both have a formation or higher focus. Where the analogy is most applicable, however, is in the provision of support to other units.

A field workshop provides second line (i.e. formation level) logistic support, which can be considered roughly analogous to the communications support provided by a Signals squadron. Similarly, the range of capabilities within a field workshop, like a Signals squadron, are really only exercised to their full potential in a complete classical brigade setting.

It is the technical support sub unit (TSSU) where the analogies become more interesting. A TSSU provides first line support to a unit, generally an order of magnitude simpler in extent, scope and equipment complexity to second line support. To phrase this in a Signals context, the communications support provided by regimental signallers is an order of magnitude simpler in extent, scope and equipment complexity to squadron level support. Most RASigs personnel would consider this a given.

This is not to say, however, that supported units do not require some particular skill sets which are not practiced at the higher level—the requirements for communications and repairs in a cavalry squadron or artillery battery being an example.

Before examining how this can be applied in the Signals context, it is instructive to see how the RAEME model is structured and how it operates.

The TSSU is an integral part of the supported unit, under the full command of the commanding officer. The members, while retaining their corps affiliation, are in all other ways considered unit members. As the centre of expertise, the field workshop retains technical command, oversees all trade related issues, and manages the careers of the TSSU members and the make up and competency mix of the TSSUs themselves— balancing resources brigade-wide.

In practice the system works in the following manner. Craftsmen Spanner and Wrench, after scraping through their recruit camp, join the field workshop. On completion of their respective Initial Employment Training courses, Craftsman Spanner goes to Foxhound Battalion Tech Support while Craftsman Wrench stays in the workshop. During the next few years, Wrench and Spanner meet up often at trade courses at the school. On completion of their respective promotion courses, Spanner moves back into the workshop on promotion to corporal, while Wrench gets the corporal spot in the battalion. Over the next ten years Wrench and Spanner often cross paths, sometimes serving together and sometimes following each other until they have both been the Artificer Sergeant Major (ASM) of a TSSU and of their specific trade in the relevant workshop platoon. They are both then eligible to become the overall brigade ASM.

This model entails RASigs taking over all regimental Signals platoons, though these maintain their command status within their parent units. The platoons will be run by blue lanyard SNCOs (with RASigs RSOs) with the troops being primarily ECN 660 on their second posting after completing training at Kapooka. While at the unit the 660s have to complete their basic trade courses and only stay in the unit for a year or two (depending on vacancies and qualifications). They then return to the Signals squadrons to enhance their collective detachment skills, and it is within the squadron where they have their first experience as detachment commander. Once they have gained experience in this role they would then return to the supported unit as the communications detachment section commander and prepare for sergeant.

The advantages of this model is that it the unit commanding officers do not lose their integral communications capability; COMSEC requirements are better met by subject matter experts; the introduction of new kit can be much better managed; and the overall standard of unit level communications should improve. RASigs becomes much more customer focused, and the posting and promotional opportunities within the corps are enhanced. There will also be much greater scope to integrate training and a net reduction in overall training liabilities, as all formal Reserve communications training comes under the auspices of BALCOMBE SPIRIT. In addition, the corps will be able to supply complete capability bricks at a number of levels and would considerably increase its employment flexibility. Complete blue lanyard communication capability bricks can also be provided in this model.

The disadvantage, however, is that to operate successfully this model requires considerably more signalmen and women than is currently the case—otherwise we will always be in a position of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’. Once such tradeoffs become the norm, overall capability suffers and individual competency levels fall. It can be argued that it is only within a squadron that many of the collective skills required by the corps can be maintained. There are also potential problems with rotating members out of units who may not want to move, or commanding officers who are not prepared to release specific personnel. The question of whether there are sufficient SNCOs in the corps must also be considered, as well as the issue of whether a RASigs corporal is purely an ECN specific detachment commander or a generalist communications detachment section commander. While this model may suit operators, what about the ‘lineys’ and ‘geeks’?

In the end, this last option presents many problems and raises even more issues. Where it is different to the first two presented above is that all these problems and issues have arisen before in the RAEME context and have, by and large, been solved. Despite appearances, they are not insurmountable, unless of course you believe the RAEME contention that they are supermen.

Conclusion

The radical changes in Army Reserve composition and responsibilities over the last five years means that all of our established roles and structures can no longer be taken for granted. If RASigs as a corps does not plan ahead to deal with these and any future changes, they may be forced upon it, and in a manner which may possibly not be in the best interests of communications in the Reserve as a whole. The options presented above hopefully provide some indication of likely courses of action and their implications. This list is neither exhaustive nor complete. The recommended RAEME model is only one of a number of potentially successful options. It is, however, the only one that we know works.

Endnotes

1          Traditional names for RAEME units are used in order to best illustrate the point.