A Proactive Mental Approach: Lessons of a Contemporary Combat Team Commander
Abstract
In this article the author contends, from his own experience as a combat team commander, that commanders must first undertake significant self-preparation before preparing for command. This, coupled with a deep understanding of the combat team and the stressors that confront them, will enable commanders to exercise their command with maximum effectiveness.
Introduction
The good general is simply a good company commander in his postgraduate course.
– S L A Marshall1
One of the most rewarding aspects of command is seeing the groundwork you have laid come to completion. I saw this most vividly on the evening of 24 April 2007 when, due to sustaining an injury, I was unable to deploy with my troops as part of a recovery mission to extract a destroyed vehicle. I was forced to sit and monitor the activity from the confines of the Operations Room. During the planning, and then listening to the situation unfold, there was an expectation that contact was imminent. Then it occurred. ‘Contact small arms fire, wait out!’ As the situation developed, nervous energy brewed in my stomach. I realised what this was—it was pride. My soldiers were out there doing their part in the mission and reacting exactly as their training had prepared them. Commanders were commanding and making decisions and soldiers were taking action when it counted most, under fire.
The aim of this article is to provide a discussion of contemporary combat team command on operations. I will examine leadership aspects and the role of the combat team commander to contend that a commander must first prepare themselves for command if they are to reach the full potential in the preparation of their team. Experiences gained during deployment as the combat team commander within the Overwatch Battle Group (West) - Two (OBG(W)-2) force elements in Al Muthana and Dhi Qhar provinces of southern Iraq will be the basis of the discussion that follows.
Sub-unit command in the Australian Army is the culmination of command at the coal face. The compression of strategic, operational and tactical levels of military operations means battle group commanders are increasingly involved in looking outside the organisation because of the requirement to deal with strategic issues. Current operations have demonstrated a heavier emphasis on manoeuvre at the combat team level and below to achieve a battle group directed and coordinated series of objectives. Given these trends and S L A Marshall’s comments above, it is surprising that not much has been written about experiences in command at the sub-unit level. With the aim of engendering discussion, the following ideas originate from my experience as a combat team commander.
Our Operating Environment
The environment OBG(W)-2 faced met all prerequisites stated in the Future Land Operational Concept - Adaptive Campaigning.2 Al Muthana province transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) 3 in July 2006. The previous Australian battle group relocated to the US Air Base at Tallil in Dhi Qhar province to the south of the provincial capital, An Nasiriyah. In doing so, the battle group lost a substantial ability to maintain full situational awareness of Al Muthana due to geographic dislocation. OBG(W)-2 followed the lead of our predecessors and allocated each combat team a province to hold as their primary area of responsibility. This was done to ensure continuity in the personnel dealing with the Iraqi administration and security forces, and it worked very well.
The OBG(W)-2 mission was to provide Operational Overwatch or, put simply, maintain a level of situational awareness of the province, enabling assistance where mandated and to provide training to the security forces. Because the provinces were under PIC and a large fanfare had been made at the handover, it felt as if we had to justify our presence. Our measured presence, however, was essential to maintain the required level of situational awareness. This meant that the information campaign flashed to the forefront. We were not there to conduct direct action against a designated militia. In fact, the operating environment was such that a major contact in the centre of town would signal a degradation of security and, therefore, a decline in complete indigenous control. The result would mean strategic failure. A decisive skirmish would be different to a protracted contact. There remained a need to deal effectively, yet proportionally, with the enemy so as not to be seen as a soft target. At the same time, there was a need to avoid the perception of heavy handedness. There was also the requirement to empower the security forces, without doing their job for them.
Understand Yourself Then Lead Your Team
[The] internal mental place from which a leader operates matters; in other words, the quality of consciousness determines the quality of performance.
– Tacito Nobre4
Commanders cannot reach their full potential if they do not fully understand themselves. Tacito Nobre confirms this in his remarks and Sun Tzu linked self awareness to victory when he said ‘if you know the enemy and yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles’.5 Without a detailed self-understanding, commanders will not know what they stand for or the essence of their command philosophy. Command requires moral choices, but without truly knowing themselves commanders will falter. If commanders do not respect themselves, they do not have a foundation to treat their soldiers with respect. Commanders will be found wanting if they have not developed self-awareness before assuming command.
Prepare Yourself
Mental preparation is the most important element commanders must undertake to sustain the pressures they will be under for the duration of a deployment. Sub-unit command is a great responsibility to be vested in an individual. This responsibility is exhausting due to the constant mental and emotional exertion in all aspects of the command. This commitment ranges from tactical planning and execution of operations, group dynamics of the combat team, and personnel issues dealt with on a daily basis. This preparation should involve an intensive self reflection, including personal moral values, conflicting priorities,6 and who you are as a person. This will provide a better foundation for decisions, not only involving the combat team but also regarding the local population. Do not judge the population and their customs based on a Western mindset. In many cases, they will have operated this way for centuries and it will cloud a commander’s ability to devise workable solutions.
On operations, commanders will be confronted with numerous situations that they have never thought about before. This is by virtue of commanders and their soldiers being tested in battle—operating in a foreign culture where they will see the best and worst of human nature. To assist in preparation, commanders may list those situations they consider relevant and analyse them in the context of the deployment. One of the key issues, given the environment, is the severe wounding or death of soldiers. Some mental health practitioners suggest conditioning through such things as hospital visits or viewing medical photographs.7 Thought must be given, however, to how one will deal as a leader with such a predicament. Commanders need to truly absorb themselves in the situation to gain the most out of this analysis. With respect to my preparations, I asked myself a series of questions. How would I feel? Were there any extra procedural things that I would want to do? How would I assist my soldiers in dealing with the situation? If the nature of the injury allows, would I wish the individual, rather than the system, to notify their next of kin? If so, how would I achieve this, and would I be granted that freedom by my commanding officer or the higher headquarters? I found this analysis was an essential part of preparing myself to fully accept and deal with some of the harder aspects of my command.
My self preparation taught me that a critical element was not forgetting my wife and family. A lesson I would commend to others is not to devote all your time to your soldiers and forgot the people in your life who mean the most. You can run the risk of deploying mentally, as well as be physically dislocated from them. The time to strike a balance needs to be during your pre-deployment training, not after you have deployed. You need to know your family is fully with you in spirit. Being comfortable in your own mental space also means striking the balance between your personal and professional responsibilities.
The first of David Kilcullen’s 28 Articles is ‘Know your turf’.8 From the outset, it must be stated that while on deployment you are a foreigner, and you r understanding of interested parties in your area may be better termed your ‘level of ignorance’. This will ensure you never develop a false sense about your level of knowledge. You must realise the difficulty in assessing second and third order effects of your actions. That said, you should make every effort to have a detailed understanding, but your plan must also take this complexity into consideration. You need to start by asking a series of demographic questions. Do tribes form the social nucleus of the area? What are the inter/intra-tribal relations like and which ones hold the power? Do the tribes have legitimate militia, or are the militia from different tribes? Does this affiliation bring with it a level of tolerance to their actions? Ask questions about the security forces and their dynamics with the population. This is by no means an exhaustive list; however, to answer these will require extensive reading of the situation. A good insight into the tribal society of Mesopotamia is provided by Austin Long of the RAND Corporation in his analysis of the Anbar province.9 Your understanding of these linkages will enable you to use them in shaping and sending key messages to your target audience.
Prepare Your Command
Self preparation will be an ongoing process and one of the most important parts of that process will be establishing who you are. Then, as a commander, you must prepare your subordinates for what they may face. During pre-deployment training, my command team (sergeant and above) sat down and discussed in detail the types of emotions we would expect to encounter. We discussed how this would affect us and our team, including indicators within the group, and some management strategies. This paid dividends during the deployment when incidents occurred and my command team immediately and instinctively began monitoring the emotional rollercoaster that soldiers experience.
Various stages of the deployment will see subordinates influenced by different factors of which a commander must be cognisant. The Deployment Handbook, published by 1 Psychological Unit and issued to deploying members, states that there are three primary phases to the deployment cycle: pre-deployment, on deployment, and post-deployment.10 Irrespective of the indications contained in the handbook, I experienced and observed the emotions outlined in the following paragraphs.
Soldiers’ morale and operational enthusiasm for the deployment could be seen in three phases. The initial phase commenced with deployment notification, lasting through the departure and commencement of operations, and ended when the combat team took its first pause. The mood of this period was characterised by high individual and group excitement and enthusiasm. The length of this phase will be different for each organisation based on factors such as operational tempo, initial job satisfaction and casualties. In fact, it could very well last through to the final phase, if these external variables provide the right environment. There are some anomalies that may occur when soldiers redeploy for their second or third tour— especially if they deploy into the same area of operations but on a different mission. Expectations will have to be managed, dealing with everything from the types of activities being conducted to how a different battle group conducts its day-to-day procedures.
The second phase saw the organisation reaching a level of operational sustainability, which meant the soldiers’ enthusiasm stabilised. This mood, however, would fluctuate continually as it was dependent on operational stimuli. The challenge for the commander in this phase is to maintain the momentum, to foster enthusiasm and minimise the effects of complacency. Measures to address these challenges may need to include personnel redistribution, conducting trade and other courses and putting the onus on junior commanders and the individuals within the organisation. Combat Team EAGLE was able to deploy into the desert where the threat level was decreased in order to conduct conventional cavalry training in a broad range of tasks. We also conducted an ASLAV gunner’s course, which meant at times I accepted an impact on personnel availability for tasking. The conduct of this course, however, not only provided a break from monotony for the participants, but also increased the number of qualified gunners the combat team had available.
The final phase was the period leading up to the return to Australia, during which there was a general trend of soldiers’ minds drifting towards their return home.
My command team identified that this may have led to a drop in concentration or hypersensitivity to the need to conduct some types operations. The Centre for Army Lessons (CAL) has identified this as a perennial issue for commanders at all levels, particularly amongst personnel who have had multiple deployments.
Understanding what phase Combat Team EAGLE was in assisted my command team to recognise stressful influences and enabled us to be proactive in taking appropriate measures. I found it extremely beneficial to have discussions with my command team during the different phases about the emotional and mental state of the soldiers, as well as any influencing factors. Their feedback ensured that I was not misreading or incorrectly interpreting the situation.
Morale - True or False?
When monitoring soldiers’ morale, it is important to understand the difference between ‘true’ and ‘false’ morale. False morale generates a hype which will crumble under pressure. A general indicator is an organisation that takes short cuts, often done so consistently that the soldiers become convinced that they are acting correctly. Young lieutenants can often be drawn unwittingly into this situation by their soldiers and may require assistance to extricate themselves. True morale is built upon intensive training and disciplined culture that will enable the job to be done correctly irrespective of the external pressures. False morale will not stand up to first contact. Elements of my combat team had false morale at various stages; however, to the credit of the junior leaders, hard training prevailed and resulted in everyone knowing exactly what their job was. True morale won the day, breeding team and individual resilience.
The Essence of Trust
Good training not only develops true morale, but is also vital in generating trust between commanders and their subordinates. Mission command is the command philosophy espoused by the Australian Army. In an article on the practical application of this philosophy, Colonel Roger Noble stated that ‘trust is the essential moral component of mission command’.11 Junior commanders will often say it is not practised. This a something which CAL hears frequently during their lessons seminars with soldiers. We talk about the practice and we articulate clearly that trust is central, but that is often where the discussion stops. How is trust developed and then maintained? Can a new commander immediately adopt a mission command style without truly knowing how the organisation they command operates? In my opinion, it would be foolish to do so.
When a group forms, a commander must be directly involved in developing the team at all levels—from soldiers right through to the headquarters staff. If not directly involved, commanders cannot realistically expect subordinates to understand their expectations or vice-versa. However, this involvement does not necessarily mean running all discussions or plans. Simple oversight and feedback will often be enough. The latter is critical in setting the foundations for mission command and must be both ways. If you as a commander have the right level of self confidence then you will be able to receive constructive feedback from all directions. If you are uncomfortable with this then you need to look internally at your own self esteem. The practical application of involvement is where commanders often overstep the bounds of intent-based command. The better the team’s competence at the commencement of training, the sooner a commander can transition to monitoring instead of supervision.
It must be understood that there are soldiers or small teams that cannot respond to intent-based operations. This may be for a variety of reasons including military cultural background, experience or simply competence level. If training does not rectify an inability to respond to mission command, then either the training is not appropriate or that member may need to be replaced. Replacement should not be the first option exercised because some people take longer to develop. A combat commander should not, however, allow a subordinate to deploy if there is any doubt as to their competence under fire. One of the worst interpersonal experiences I had during pre-deployment training was the removal of a junior commander. Attached personnel may present situations when command styles need to cater for their different unit culture.
Training is an investment in stress management. The better an organisation is at their base skills, the better they will instinctively perform their job.12 By the conclusion of training, trust will have been developed between competent commanders and their teams. This will occur because of the level of interaction and establishment of a shared mental understanding of the mission and the team’s capability to conduct the operation.
The level of trust established through training is only the starting point of an effective relationship. The trust must be maintained between both parties. To enable this, commanders must be competent at what they do. They must not get bogged down at their desk at the expense of getting involved in training. Too much time spent at your desk or in meetings will lead to not knowing what your soldiers are really doing or feeling, and will result in a reduction of your basic instinctive skills. Mastery of the basics is an element that wins respect and then trust from subordinates.
On the other hand, commanders must remember their job is also to champion the cause of their organisation. This requires a lot of time meeting everyone from the commanding officer to supporting agencies, not to mention planning for operations. A balance must be found. Listen to senior soldiers, because they will provide objective feedback as to command effectiveness. Commanders may think they have found balance, but it may be evident to an onlooker that equilibrium has not been achieved.
You Command Your Soldiers!
Commanders ‘command’ their soldiers—no one else. A commander will be pressured by ‘supporting agencies’, which do just that—support the chain of command. By virtue of the definition of command, it means that commanders are responsible for the soldiers’ welfare as well.13 Commanders and their command team know their soldiers best and are the continuity in their welfare management. OBG(W)-2 had four medical officers and numerous rotations of psychological support teams over the course of the deployment. This is not conducive to continuity of medical or psychological care. Each new rotation of specialists required deployed members to become familiar with different medical interpretations, priorities and interpersonal relations. Our battle group, thankfully, had an exceptional Padre who assisted greatly in the welfare management of our soldiers by working tirelessly with the chain of command.
On two separate occasions, I had cause to disagree with specialist advice and order a soldier not to deploy until re-examination. The last case resulted in the individual being medically repatriated to Australia as soon as possible. Seek and be open to specialist advice, however, do not be afraid to ask questions or seek a second opinion. The commander should be present with the individual during the delivery of career or tour ending information. They must act as the rational mind and be poised to ask the specialist questions during the interview. There is no easy way to break this news to a soldier. The commander must, however, convey to the soldier that they are not alone and still remain part of the team. The best way for this to be instilled from the outset is for the commander, or their direct representative, to be with the soldier when they receive the information from a medical practitioner.
My policy was that no significant welfare information should be communicated to my soldiers if I was not present or, if I was unavailable, a command team member in my place. For the medical staff to understand this, a relationship must be developed with specialists to ensure they are aware that the best interests of the soldier are being looked after. If I was not available, the command team representative would be briefed beforehand so that a strategy for the interview could be formulated prior to informing the member. Remember, a commander must act in the best interests of the soldier.
As a commander responsible for the lives of your soldiers, you need to be prepared for your command. This will position you with the ability to prepare your team for the experiences you will face together. Building trust in the team needs to follow. Then, and only then, will a team be truly ready to embark on the mission.
Coordinator or Commander?
The most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.
– Clausewitz 14
Commanders must understand the type of operation they are conducting. Clausewitz’s statement, even though talking at the strategic level, is extremely pertinent to sub-unit commanders in the Australian Army. Not fully understanding the strategic reasons for the deployment will make it difficult to understand certain operational constraints. It became evident very soon after arriving in theatre that the operation we were undertaking was not the one I or the rest of the battle group command team was expecting. The Iraqi people did not really care for our presence unless we had something to give. It may be asked, why are you there if the locals do not want you?
The combat team developed an over-arching plan that was information focused. This centred on developing a detailed understanding about the workings and demographic dynamics of the province. The aim of each operation on which we deployed, be that key provincial leadership engagement or security force training, was focused on developing this understanding.
There were many players operating in the province, with most outside my span of command, and some conducting activities of which we were not aware. These included the non-government organisations, the United States State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team, and private security contractors. With all these elements, it was impossible to develop an overarching plan of which we had complete oversight. A lot of these organisations needed security assistance to conduct their activities. This led me to assume an unofficial coordinating role. Heavy synchronisation was required with the battle group operations officer; however, I had the lead for the province and was better positioned to provide this coordination. This function also provided the ability to develop relationships that led to information-sharing, providing not only enhanced situational awareness, but also an opportunity to educate the external agencies about possible negative consequences of some actions. Although termed a combat team commander, provincial coordinator was at times more apt.
When attempting to forge relationships with other government agencies and non-government organisations, I would emphasise the coordination role I was undertaking. This softer approach helped to break down the barriers and open the information flow a lot quicker. Informing the combat team of this approach and the reasons for it, ensured that the soldiers understood the necessity of these relationships, and provided support in their day-to-day operations.
Given the current nature of stability operations, combat team commanders are often likely to be in the middle of contacts. A heavy schedule of meetings with local elements means commanders might find themselves getting shot at, while the majority of their force elements are on the periphery. This has two implications. First, commanders must be good at the basics of their craft. Second, commanders will have to command from inside a fire-fight. The implication for preparatory planning is that it should provide enough information to enable attachments to be proactive in support of contact. During orders a heavy emphasis needs to be placed on the ‘what ifs’ or ‘actions on’ to deal with contingencies. This situation will also highlight heavy reliance on the combat team’s second-in-command to provide relevant information from headquarters, while being capable of relaying information to provide much needed breathing space. A primary function of command will be the ability to generate the appropriate level of combat power at the right time. The complex operating environment will provide a challenge where another mental recalibration is required.
Conclusion
Contemporary combat team command not only provides individuals with a rewarding opportunity, but also enormous responsibility. There will be competing demands on priorities from the time of notification through to the post-deployment leave. It may be unrealistic to say that you will meet all priorities appropriately.
I certainly learned more from my mistakes than from conducting the correct course of action initially. The more preparation you conduct, however, the better foundation you have to deal with the unexpected. Self-preparation and developing self-awareness will enable you to be more balanced when preparing your command. You need to understand what is influencing your command at any point in time and the stressors your team may be experiencing. This will enable you to act or, if necessary, modify action as appropriate, and this should flow through into your training. Setting the foundations for the practice of mission command will develop trust within your organisation. This will enable you to truly command. A commander who is prepared and has prepared their team, and then demonstrates the flexibility required, will do just that. Soldiers will follow you because they trust you, not just out of hope.
Endnotes
1 S L A Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, Peter Smith, Gloucester, 1978, p. 177.
2 Adaptive Campaigning: The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting, Department of Defence, 24 November 2006, pp. 5–6.
3 Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) is where the security and governance responsibilities for the province are given to the Iraqi authorities. Coalition forces operate under a Memorandum of Understanding, which dictates what they can and cannot do, where they can and cannot go, and methods for assistance to the provincial authorities in the case of emergency. Al Muthana was the first province in Iraq to transition to PIC, and Dhi Qhar was the second.
4 T Nobre, ‘Giving Up Your Soul is Bad Business’, The System Thinker, Vol. 15, No. 6, August 2004. <http://www.axialent.com/uploaded/papers_articles/documentos/Giving%20Up…; accessed 11 April 2008.
5 P G Tsouras (ed), The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, Greenhill Books, London, 2000, p. 502.
6 Conflicting priorities refers to you as a commander and the positions you will find yourself in. You will not just be torn between the individual, the team and the mission, but also between elements of the local population and national objectives. At any point in time your priorities may be different.
7 M Evans and A Ryan (eds), The Human Face of Warfare: Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2000, pp. 119-20.
8 D Kilcullen, ‘Twenty Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company level Counterinsurgency’, Military Review, May-June 2006, p. 103.
9 A Long, ‘The Anbar Awakening’, Survival, Vol. 50, No. 2, April-May 2008, pp. 67–94.
10 ADF Deployment Guide, 1st Psychological Unit, Department of Defence, 2006, p. 5.
11 R Noble, ‘The Essential Thing: Mission Command and its Practical Application’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. III, No. 3, Summer 2006, p. 119.
12 Evans and Ryan (eds), The Human Face of Warfare, p. 192.
13 Land Warfare Doctrine, LWD 0-0 – Command, Leadership and Management, 2003, pp. 1–7.
14 M Howard and P Paret (eds), Carl Von Clausewitz: On War, Alfred A Knoph, New York, 1993, p. 100.
