Enhancing Platoon Groups: Adaption, Diffusion and Empowerment in Land Warfare
Abstract
This article identifies the unique ability a platoon group has to achieve success in the complex battlespace. The author takes his experiences as a platoon group commander in Afghanistan and shows that doctrine and combined arms theory have a place in the modern complex battlespace. The article explains that the fundamental infantry platoon cannot be effective in Afghanistan without key enablers from all corps. It further details the importance of fostering relationships between corps to improve combat power and battlefield effectiveness.
Introduction
The concepts of mission command and the empowerment of junior commanders are not new. This article will illustrate how these two concepts, combined with the employment of an adaptive and flexible platoon group model, facilitated success for Combat Team Spear as part of the Third Reconstruction Task Force (RTF-3) which operated in a complex and unforgiving battlespace. The complex nature of the human and physical terrain in southern Afghanistan, combined with the complexity of conflict, provides challenging and unique problems for students studying manoeuvre warfare. For the duration of their deployments, the RTF-3 combat elements benefitted by adapting to and embracing combined arms theory and practice. Despite environmental exposure and facing an evolving enemy, they were able to survive the first shot, orientate and achieve decisive action.
Background
The examples for this paper are derived from the experiences of Charlie Company 2RAR and, more directly, from 7 Platoon Group—the ‘Unforgiven’. The major operations in which this platoon participated were Operation SPIN GHAR, a multinational clearance operation of Taliban elements within a complex valley system north of Tarin Kowt; Operation TOSHAK, a six-week platoon group deployment to secure a tactical area of responsibility (TOAR) in the Chora Valley; and Operation SHARMARKAZ, a combat team task to secure and facilitate the building of coalition and Afghanistan National Army forward operating bases in the Dorafshan region. RTF-3 was divided into two combat teams: one engineer-heavy and one infantry-heavy. Each combat team had at least one platoon group, which would be augmented and task orientated for each mission.
The Chora Valley in 2006, and particularly in July 2007, was the scene of some significant Taliban actions involving Dutch and Australian Special Forces. The valley system is divided by a 300-metre wide green, fertile zone with numerous complex Quala systems providing housing for the district centre and two factional tribes. Much like the Chora Valley, the majority of the population in the Dorafshan region lives in close proximity to the river system, which flows through from the Chora Valley. The Dorafshan has neither a district centre, nor an identifiable leader, and includes both a large poppy concentration and more than five factional tribes. As a consequence this complex demographic has proven impossible for Western militaries to control.
Platoon Groups
So a military force has no constant formation, water has no constant shape: the ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius.
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War.
For the purposes of this article, the platoon group is defined as any organisation which is led by a platoon headquarters and comprises more than one element of a battlespace operating system. The term ‘platoon group’ is interchangeable with ‘mini combat team’.
Previously, Australian doctrine did not encourage task organising below the company level. However, direction detailed in LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics Developing Doctrine suggests grouping at platoon level.1 The developing doctrine further states that a company second-in-command (2IC) should be appointed in command of the platoon group. This would cause inherent control issues for the combat team as it would detract from the 2IC’s role to manage and control the combat team. Without a combat team 2IC, the commander’s flexibility would be restricted and the ability to properly command would be reduced.2 It would be counterproductive to attempt to improve combat power and flexibility by removing a commander’s own flexibility and control mechanisms. Within RTF-3, the combat team commander established a tactical headquarters to improve his ability to command, and better understand the battlespace. This tactical headquarters encompassed all the additional assets it was allocated. For example, it included a combat engineer captain, an early warning signaller, intelligence/engagement team officers and a combat team tactical headquarters. This resembled a traditional battalion tactical headquarters. The company 2IC was preoccupied with acting as the company operations officer for the two or three platoon groups his headquarters would command in the field. The combat elements of RTF-3, based on Charlie Company from 2RAR, organised into mini combat teams or platoon groups.
The following examples illustrate how using current Adaptive Army initiatives and doctrine as a guide for combat operations works, and why a platoon group or mini combat team, based on a regular infantry platoon headquarters, is a tried and tested option for future land warfare.
Throughout history, Afghani insurgents have recognised combat power and strength. Subsequently, through their insurgent attempts, they have been able to identify alternate tactics or move on, for the fear of defeat.3 Defeating insurgents through sheer combat power and size is often the preferred method, but it is difficult to achieve and is not always feasible. Having a force capable of surviving the first contact and responding with immediate lethality would assist in winning the hearts and minds of the local population. The conflict in Afghanistan is described as being the ‘platoon leader’s war’,4 and the RTF-3 experience further reiterates this: Afghanistan is a ‘Platoon Group Commander’s’ war. The platoon group is not directly mentioned in Adaptive Campaigning; however, the principles and foundations of the platoon leader’s group resonate throughout Adaptive Campaigning and Complex Warfighting. On a modern battlefield land forces fight for, rather than with information, and the lowest unit of action sustainable in contact is a platoon group. The doctrinal infantry platoon in a complex battlespace is not sustainable and cannot fight in isolation.
The Platoon Group - Adaptive And Combat Effective
Land forces have recently approached warfighting with recon-fight complexes characterised by pre-engineered connectivity between joint fires.5 This has meant that the platoon rarely fights alone. This hypothesis is in line with Adaptive Campaigning and the Adaptive Army cycle. In the present battlespace there is a need for land forces to be able to gain and retain the initiative through constant and rapid adaptation to an emerging situation in a complex battlespace.6 This was proven by RTF-3 and its platoon groups, and can continue to be achieved by using platoon groups and empowering junior commanders through mission command. Platoon groups achieve a decisive response to action through their improved lethality. For example, during one contact, a platoon’s Mortar Fire Controller executed danger close missions, while their Joint Terminal Air Controller coordinated the airspace and planned close air support. The platoon group headquarters disseminated the fire controllers in line with the platoon’s main effort. The result was improved lethality and defeat of the enemy through a coordination of fires to defeat an insurgent attack. The Adaptive Campaigning paper refers to this concept as Joint Land Combat and recon-fire complexes, ‘which are ad-hoc joint combined arms teams in which joint fires become a temporary but essential component of the team...’.7 A joint fires control capability is crucial within a platoon group and, where possible, having numerous controllers to allocate throughout the platoon group is preferred.
Current doctrine coupled with the Adaptive Army concept will set the foundation for future warfare and further reiterate the requirement for platoon groups. Trends and analyses from the United States indicate that the platoon group is now the suggested unit of action for combat missions. The United States now ensures that every platoon has access to joint fires. These include constructs such as the universal forward observer, which reinforces the impetus of the platoon team in the complex fight. Other doctrinal papers suggest the need for infantry forces to operate in smaller, semi-autonomous teams8 with mobility, firepower, protection and improved situational awareness.9 Platoon groups achieved adaptive action in contact and had the force strength to deter enemy contact in Afghanistan. The combat team headquarters employed mission command, which allowed the effectiveness and lethality of the platoon group to be confirmed in the battlespace.
Platoon Group Identity
The platoon group’s flexibility and robust combat power was maximised through integrating small teams from all corps: combat, combat support and combat service support. The amalgamation of different corps into mini combat teams or platoon groups provides a difficult task for commanders. The complexities of assimilation are often compounded when platoon groups are immediately placed into situations where success relies on the leverage/combat power that each element provides. A key to operating a successful platoon group is ensuring corps rivalry is nullified, and that faith and trust is fostered as the keystone of the group.10 The different experiences and training of each soldier are vital considerations for commanders when establishing a platoon group. The trust and identity of the platoon group was the key enabler in giving this mini combat team the flexibility and the quick reaction time required to employ mission command and achieve decisive action.
Platoon group cohesion was initially achieved through harnessing the different characteristic strengths of the variety of corps within the platoon group. Lead up training and nursery patrols provide the enabler for commanders to foster this cohesion. The cohesion of the team and the strength of 7 Platoon Group was demonstrated in Afghanistan through the conduct of a live fire exercise while securing the Chora Valley. All elements of the platoon group demonstrated what they would bring to the fight, and in turn this gave everyone an immediate confidence in the others’ abilities. Subsequently, when the platoon group was in its first contact everyone had confidence in knowing how the other corps would react, and this allowed a swift and smooth reaction to contact.
A bond of trust and mutual understanding was created between superiors and subordinates, both at combat team level and within the platoon group.11 This was for more than just control; commanders must establish a command climate of trust and mutual understanding that encourages subordinates to exercise self-adaptation and battlefield cunning. A harmonious environment and understanding of the team results in mission success when coupled with improved lethality and mission command; all were paramount to the success of RTF-3.
Operation Toshak - Securing TOAR Cherokee
During Operation TOSHAK, a mission to build an Afghan Army patrol base, 7 Platoon Group was tasked with securing a TAOR in the Chora Valley for six weeks. This is an area rife with warring tribal factions and Taliban extremists, and jagged mountains frozen in the middle of an Afghan winter. The flexibility that the platoon headquarters had—from access to five protected mobility vehicles, an Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) patrol, an engineer section, forward observers, a sniper pair and mortar section—allowed all emerging situations to be prosecuted with severe lethality and achieve all desired outcomes. This platoon group was able to react to Taliban attacks on indigenous security forces, and deter direct enemy action for the duration of this mission. The deterrence tactic was effective as a result of the platoon group’s persistence and pervasive presence combined with appropriate combat power, capable of dealing with any arising enemy action. The recon-fire complex was adapted and the platoon attached fire controllers had access to coalition air; Dutch 155m indirect; and Australian/Dutch 81mm mortar fire support. The self-sufficient nature of the platoon group enabled a reduced reaction time and a capability to provide aero-medical evacuation and assistance to coalition and indigenous security elements.
The flexibility and mission command afforded to the platoon team, combat team and task force headquarters allowed a variety of operations to be conducted. These included screening operations that utilised an array of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance—such as ASLAV screens, dismounted infantry observation positions and sniper pairs—to interdict enemy elements transiting weapons and reinforcements through the TAOR. On ten separate occasions during Operation TOSHAK, the platoon group would task organise into small combat elements,12 giving junior non-commissioned officers (JNCOs) more flexibility, and concurrently would provide a larger footprint in the battlespace. The section-based teams conducted satellite and night reconnaissance patrols, and established observation positions and satellite vehicle check points. This shaped the enemy decision cycle and meant that simultaneous objectives could be prosecuted. Moreover, the enemy was reluctant to initiate contact with its limited ability to track multiple coalition elements in the battlespace. Adaptive Campaigning explains this as the future direction that land forces will take to defeat adversaries, and is described by the two complementary philosophies of ‘adaptive action’ and ‘mission command’. 7 Platoon Group’s experience illustrates that this can be done at the platoon and section level.
Traditional combat teams, being further broken into mini combat teams/platoon groups, were able to formulate successful approaches for dealing with arising situations that were unknown to other teams and coalition partners. Ideas, situational awareness and successful tactics were laterally transferred. This limited any time-lag by platoon headquarters speaking directly to other platoon headquarters, and any delay in the conduct of a formal after action review upon return to the main base in Tarin Kowt. The information disseminated between teams improved the overall effectiveness of the force and further contributed to overwhelming the enemy. The lessons that were learnt by each platoon group were quickly passed onto other groups who were not in the battlespace, through a deliberate combat team after action review. These two methods are adaptive and are spurred by a need to survive and thrive in a complex threat environment. The ability to communicate was further enhanced by the communication capabilities of the armoured and artillery elements within the group. The improved communications enhanced the platoon group’s freedom of movement. It was common practice for the Bushmaster section commander to be the communications hub for the platoon group. This Armoured Corps sergeant assisted with command and control by relaying intent to subordinate teams and concurrently communicating with the combat team headquarters. The extra radios from both armoured and artillery units assisted greatly in situational awareness and control of the platoon group.
Operation Sharmarkaz - Decisive Action
The success of the platoon group is dependent on its ability to react and carry out an action at a key point to achieve its mission against regular and irregular forces. One particular example that reflects the flexibility, robustness and effectiveness of the mini combat team was a 36-hour period during Operation SHARMARKAZ in the Dorafshan region. 7 Platoon Group overcame a vehicle breakdown, a roadside improvised explosive device, and a dismounted Taliban ambush to support the Special Operations Task Group. This was not an unusual day for any of the platoon groups during this operation; however, it illustrates their robustness and flexibility. The conventional infantry platoon would have been unable to enter the battlespace because it did not have the inherent logistical support required to execute recovery/management of a vehicle breakdown. Conventional infantry platoons and companies, in past and present conflicts, have attempted to stabilise the Dorafshan and other similar regions in Uruzghan and Afghanistan with little success. 13 There is no doubt the success of the Australian mission hinged on the ability to reduce reaction time and improve lethality because of the elusive and refined nature of Taliban tactics. The commander’s flexibility enabled quick reaction, planning, and decision execution with minimal assistance from higher headquarters, resultant in decisive action.
The reason the Australian elements had success in this region is because of the planning and coordination of the platoon groups at the company level. Combat team headquarters built the platoon groups around varying assets, and employed mission command to allow each platoon headquarters to synchronise its effects inline with the combat team plan. Synchronicity was achieved through control by combat team headquarters or platoon group headquarters coordinating manoeuvre over the combat team radio net. Platoon group headquarters could liaise and achieve simultaneity with an effective plan and mission command from the combat team headquarters. In turn, this meant an effective reaction to all enemy actions was achieved when the platoon group was operating independently or as part of the combat team.
Platoon Groups And The Coalition
While deployed on Operation TOSHAK, 7 Platoon Group worked daily with the Dutch Observer Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) to assist and mentor the Afghan National Army (ANA) platoon, which was permanently operating in the Chora Valley. The Dutch OMLT was able to develop a strong relationship with the platoon headquarters due to the similar rank structure and training. This relationship between the OMLT and the Australians enhanced the ability to conduct and coordinate joint operations with the ANA every second day of the six-week mission. It was not unusual to see a force of up to 100 Australian, Dutch and Afghani soldiers on the ground, commanded by an Australian Infantry platoon headquarters. The footprint of this force in the battlespace dominated two or three grid squares, with an ability to concentrate or disperse as required. The ability to laterally disseminate information meant that dominating and controlling the battlespace was a relatively simple task.
The JNCOs within the platoon group were able to break down barriers which led to better relations with the indigenous security force. The improvement in the ANA’s knowledge and skills that resulted from the interaction with the Australian soldiers was significant. Being able to trust and rely on indigenous security forces meant that joint missions were achievable and could increase in complexity. The platoon group and ANA conducted an interdiction mission over an area of six square kilometres on known Taliban infiltration routes, with the ANA patrolling and conducting snap vehicle inspections. Indigenous security forces could be relied upon to carry out a synchronised task with the coalition combat force with minimal coalition support (OMLT present). This allowed greater manoeuvrability in the battlespace and also gave the local population confidence that progress was being made with their security forces.
Conclusion
Platoon grouping tests the bond of trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates. It is Mission Command, Complex Warfighting and Adaptive Campaigning combined to create a more effective, flexible and decisive combat element. The RTF-3 model of platoon grouping empowered junior commanders and enabled success in a complex threat environment. The strength gained from the platoon group coupled with coordination of assets and coalition partners gave a preview of the potential success Adaptive Campaigning can have in the future. Platoon groups revitalise the regular infantry platoon, improving flexibility and lethality. Furthermore, platoon groups can achieve a broader spectrum of tasks compared to a conventional infantry platoon. RTF-3 conducted the full spectrum of warfare, with new techniques reinforced by doctrine, and achieved success. A force that does not adapt, evolve or reduce its reaction time will not be successful in complex warfighting.
Endnotes
1 LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 2004, p. 6.
2 LWD 0-0 Command, Leadership and Management, Land Warfare Development Centre Puckapunyal, 2003.
3 Edgar O’Ballance, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land – 1839 to the Present, Brassey’s, London, 2002, p. 250–54; L W Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, London, 1998, pp. 24–27.
4 Grau, ‘The Bear Went Over the Mountain’, p. 101.
5 Adaptive Campaigning: The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 2006, p. 12.
6 Ibid, pp. 7–9.
7 Ibid.
8 Future Land Operating Context, Complex Warfighting, Future Land Warfare Branch, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2004, pp. 14–16.
9 LWP-CA 3-3-3 Combined Arms - Dismounted Combat, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 2007, p. 4.
10 R Leonhard, The Art of Manoeuvre: Manoeuvre-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle, Ballantine Books, New York, 1991, p. 253.
11 Adaptive Campaigning, p. 11.
12 Combined Arms -Dismounted Combat, p. 4.
13 Grau, ‘The Bear Went Over the Mountain’, p. 67.
