‘Beyond Cultural Awareness’: Anthropology as an Aid to the Formulation and Execution of Military Strategy in the Twenty-First Century
Abstract
This article contends that the experience of the early twenty-first century has highlighted a long-term systemic weakness in the formulation and execution of Western military strategy. The need for strategists to focus on people, culture and society is not just a counterinsurgency requirement; rather it should be an indispensible and enduring strand in all strategic calculations. There is a need to immigrate the thinking, methods, products and approach of anthropology into the formulation and execution of strategy. This is no easy task and the article identifies how this could be done through doctrine, education and practice.
The administrator (or strategist) uses social sciences the way a drunk uses a lamp post, for support rather than for illumination.
– War Without Mercy
In the early twenty-first century it would be fair to say that drunks, administrators and strategists have much in common. They face an unpredictable future armed with blurred vision, shifting frames of reference and a deep uncertainty concerning the likely outcomes of their decisions and actions. All are looking for reliable aids and support to assist with the difficult business of getting home in the dark. While drunks can find a bench and sleep off their problems, strategists cannot risk the delay. Under the blowtorch of Iraq and Afghanistan, strategists and administrators have turned to the social sciences, especially anthropology, for both support and, eventually, illumination. Given the political and social nature of counterinsurgency (COIN) it is unsurprising that this has occurred. The challenge of ‘war amongst the people’ has driven a largely ‘bottom up’ resurgent interest in culture, people and society which has now spread widely into areas of national policy, military doctrine, training and education, strategic planning, campaign design, force preparation and tactical action.
This article contends that the experience of the early twenty-first century has highlighted a deeper, long-term systemic weakness in the formulation and execution of Western military strategy. The need for strategists to focus on people, culture and society is not just a COIN requirement; rather it should be an indispensible and enduring strand in all strategic calculations. The realm of strategic theory, long dominated by political scientists, Cold War warriors, game theorists and international relations experts, has ignored, or been unaware of, the insights and illumination that can be gained from paying close attention to the work of the ‘soft sciences’. Recent experience has revealed the weakness and it is time to fix it—we need illumination.
Anthropology, while no ‘silver bullet’, is an undeniable and indispensible aid to those charged with the formulation and execution of military strategy. The article will review the complex nature of contemporary strategy formulation and execution followed by an analysis of anthropology and its inherent strengths and weaknesses. Based on a realistic assessment of the limitations of anthropology, especially in a conflict zone, the article will examine ways to integrate anthropology systematically into the process of strategy, military thinking and practice. The article draws on a variety of sources including a series of targeted surveys passed to a range of highly experienced Australian and American officers (major to brigadier), anthropologists, scientists, academics and officials from other government agencies.
The Challenge of Contemporary Strategy: The Need To Solve Increasingly Complex Problems
A review of the business of contemporary grand and national strategy reveals that it is not getting any easier. Recent experience confirms the observation that military strategy and the use of force are now regularly employed as part of a wider solution to increasingly complex problems.
Contemporary conflicts have been described as ‘war amongst the people’, which demand a ‘whole-of-government’ integrated response founded on a comprehensive understanding of ‘context’.1 At least one leading analyst of contemporary strategy has observed that this has led to a ‘conflation’ of military strategy and national policy.2 This is further exacerbated by the nature of contemporary adversaries who are often diverse, diffuse, complex and non-Western. As one expert concluded strategic effectiveness will increasingly ‘be based on the capacity to think like a networked enemy’.3 Therefore, the military strategist needs to understand a complex environment and a diverse range of interests, actors and issues while retaining the capacity to ‘simplify, focus, decide and execute’.4 This demands increasingly adaptable, informed and capable strategists supported by information and tools that improve understanding and aid in decision-making.
Anthropology: Incomplete But Indispensable Insights
People are everywhere the same except in ways they differ.
– Social & Cultural Anthropology: A Very Short Introduction
It may be surprising to many but it is hard to find a comprehensive, NATO-style definition for anthropology. The American Association of Anthropologists (AAA) defines it as the study of ‘all aspects of human kind’5 and includes archaeological, linguistic, biological, physical, political and socio-cultural studies of humanity. This is a key to understanding both the central limitation and strength of this particular science; it is at once broad, fundamental and all-encompassing, while also ‘soft’, fuzzy and imprecise. It offers profound insight but little certainty.
The principal strand of relevance to strategists is socio-cultural anthropology. This is the study of human culture, society and identity. It is concerned with kinship, marriage, family, institutions, function, caste, tribe, nation, production, consumption, belief systems, ritual, symbols, religion, and concepts of the person and self. As a result there is considerable overlap with other social sciences, such as sociology, and within anthropological areas of specialisation. There is a ‘cross fertilization and blurring of disciplinary boundaries’6 and, for the purposes of this article, anthropology would include any useful social science contribution.
What truly distinguishes anthropology, however, is the scientific method of ‘participant observation’. This requires first-hand observation of the people, culture and society to be studied. This method rests on dialogue and interaction. As a result, the field has ‘elaborated unique and valuable tools for understanding the diversity of human cultures and societies’.7 Perhaps even more importantly, it has given us an informed, if incomplete, way to think about and approach the complex ideas of ‘culture’, ‘society’ and ‘humanity’. That this field is relevant to the contemporary strategist is largely commonsense. It would, therefore, be logical to expect to find the products and ideas of anthropology embedded in the contemporary ‘process’ of strategy formulation and execution. The next section in this article will review the place and role of anthropology in contemporary Western strategy and current military thinking.
The State Of Play: Contemporary Anthropology In Strategy, Operation And Tactics
The rising profile and contribution of anthropology to the conduct of contemporary campaigns, operations and tactics is undeniable. Driven by the pressing need to understand the enemy and the population to counter violent insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military has employed anthropology and its products as part of a dramatic effort to raise the level of ‘cultural awareness’ across the force.8 This trajectory of anthropological inclusion is similar among most Western coalition militaries. With the deployment of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) into Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is arguably at the leading edge of the practical tactical and operational employment of anthropology.9 Survey respondents universally accepted the potential and utility of anthropological insights and products and report their effective, if patchy, use across a diverse range of operational areas including Malaya, Vietnam, Rwanda, the Solomon Islands, Bougainville, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Former Yugoslavia.
Anthropology has had a clear influence in shaping contemporary Western military doctrine and education. The recent US Army USMC FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Field Manual now formally embraces a socio-cultural approach to the analysis of the operational environment, especially in the area of social network analysis and threat evaluation.10 Arguably this has extended into more capstone emerging doctrine such as the ‘persistent conflict’ approach of the new FM 3-0 Operations.11 The influence of anthropology can be seen in the doctrine of key partners and allies.12 There is no end to articles written by enlisted soldiers through to generals covering the need for socio-cultural awareness and understanding of beliefs, social structures, identity, kinship and tribal dynamics.13
Anthropology has recently played a greater but less pervasive role at the strategic level. It has arguably been more limited to solving the ‘intractable’ insurgency problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, General Petreus’ 2006 Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) conducted a systematic review of the campaign in Iraq and included a mix of military and civilian experts, including leading anthropologists.14 The US Department of Defense’s $50 million dollar Project MINERVA initiative is deliberately designed to increase the input of social scientists into the strategy formulation and defence business.15 Some survey respondents report heightened awareness of and interest in socio-cultural issues at the strategic level, notably in tribalism and sectarianism. The trend towards anthropology has clearly been detected by the traditional strategic theory community, and not always without scepticism:
To wage war become an anthropologist. Lose the 50fascination with Clausewitz, and embrace culture as the way to understand conflict.16
The quote above reflects the essential character of traditional Western approaches to strategy and the range of inputs used to shape it. Strategy formulation has been traditionally reliant on international relations theory, military history, the concepts of the great military theorists, game theory, and assessments of ‘technology, numbers and organisation’.17 This approach still dominates with at least one commentator warning ‘we should also be cautious about the culture- driven revolution’.18 It is important to assess whether anthropology threatens to assume a role beyond its worth or station in strategic thinking.
A review of some recent strategic works indicates that, far from taking over the strategic field, anthropology is yet to be confirmed as a key contributor. For example, Robert Kagan’s recent book, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, approaches the world with a largely traditional emphasis on nation-state power relationships, viewing states as having ‘the attributes of humans who create and live in them’,19 but lacks any detailed reference to the complex nature of particular cultures, societies or belief systems. For example, his analysis of radical Islam concludes that we face a clash of traditionalism versus modernity in which ‘traditionalism cannot win’.20 By adopting this approach he ignores insights from more detailed anthropological studies of radical Islam which paint a complex picture of anti-Western rather than purely anti-modern organisations.21 Perhaps more dangerously he ascribes superiority to Western liberal ideas that he assumes will inevitably trump local culture and identity. Kagan is by no means alone in adopting this approach, nor is he necessarily ‘wrong’, but he has not used the potential insights available through anthropology.
It is reasonable to conclude that anthropology has not yet made itself a default, integrated component of traditional Western strategic thinking, despite the experience of the last few years. This is despite the fact that it offers a range of potential insights that would complement the more traditional strategic inputs and aid in more comprehensive strategy formulation. Nor is it used consistently and systematically to provide a sharp filter with which to assess strategic generalisations and assumptions.22
We should not replace Clausewitz with culture; we need both.
The Organisational Utility Of Anthropology
We should not expect too much from a paper study by some academic in a different country. Whatever we choose to do will be implemented as we shoot people’s sons. Their reactions are at best uncertain.
– Brigadier Justin Kelly23
As the quote above correctly identifies there are limits to the utility of a ‘soft science’ with poor predictive properties. While sceptics and die-hard traditionalists will always question how anthropology can be used effectively to formulate and execute strategy, this field of study regularly provides relevant insight and context across most areas where people, culture and society matter. In this way anthropology offers potential illumination across the full breadth of defence business, from the battlefield to the committee room. Some major example areas of obvious high pay off utility include providing insight into the ethnography of a strategic problem, and the human parameters influencing conflict termination planning and execution. It is also an essential enabler for any effective cross-cultural strategic communications strategies, such as those currently required for the Middle-East and Central Asia. Anthropology can also be turned on ourselves and our allies to better understand our own culture and increase self-awareness. This offers potentially profound support for strategic decision-making across a diverse range of complex organisational areas, including recruiting, retention, force structuring and capability, and investment decision-making. While it is beyond the scope of this article to address these uses of anthropology in detail, it is important to note that the utility of an anthropological perspective is largely only limited by imagination and the limitations imposed by traditional organisational practice and culture.
Integration Anthropology: Problems And Issues
The article so far has outlined the potential utility of anthropology for assisting in the difficult business of twenty-first century strategy formulation and execution. A more difficult question is how to integrate this social science into the process of military strategy? Before this can be answered, it is important to point out a range of issues that inhibit, restrict and shape the practical use of anthropology as an effective aid to strategists. These key issues include cultural disparity between soldiers and anthropologists, the practical limits to anthropology in a conflict zone, and the nature and specialisation of the field itself.
A Potential Cross-Cultural Disconnect
It is not without irony that it must be said that a key impediment to the effective integration of anthropologists into the business of military strategy is cultural. The professional culture and ethical system of anthropologists holds strong biases against the unconstrained application of the science in support of the military or the pursuit of national security objectives. For example, in October 2007 the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association pronounced the Human Terrain System to be an ‘unacceptable application of anthropological expertise’. This view reflects a significant professional body of opinion that anthropology, ‘long the handmaiden of empires’, should not now be used ‘as new military tools-weapons’.24 These concerns stem from an ethical construct and interpretation25 that soldiers will find hard to follow as it bears little resemblance to the military ethic founded on just war theory and international humanitarian law.26 Primary concerns relate to issues of consent with regard to interviews during field work in a conflict zone, the confidentiality of the information collected and conclusions drawn, and whether its use will cause harm. A review of a range of articles27 that hold to this view reveal a limited understanding of the process of national security, the conduct and nature of military operations, intelligence collection and targeting or even the roles and responsibilities of a military force as an agent of a democratic government’s policy. Despite these significant weaknesses, these professional and ethical concerns are seriously held and do serve as a limitation to the availability of anthropologists and the scope and nature of their work.
The cultural issue cuts both ways, with the military holding concerns over the viability of integrating anthropologists into military organisations and cultures. This was a common concern among survey respondents and is summed up by the warning by one officer that ‘they are not of the company and their loyalties lay elsewhere’.28 Further, while the majority of survey respondents readily understood the specialised, academic nature of anthropology, they were concerned with its practical utility as summed up by the comment that ‘adolescent sexual practices in Samoa might be interesting on DVD but are unlikely to engage the institutional Army’.29 Or to reverse the observation, ‘our (military) work is national security, not academics’.30 This is also a reservation expressed by some anthropologists working with the military now who have noted that anthropology is a ‘marginal contributor to US national security policy at best’ and is ‘intent on studying the exotic and useless’.31 This is exacerbated by the dense academic writing style and preference for scientific jargon adopted by many anthropologists. The political concerns of anthropologists are perhaps also returned by certain sections of the military community who fear ‘the potential “dangers” of civilian liberals lurking within the HQ or staff’.32 A non-military survey respondent succinctly summarised the ‘worst case’ challenge:
Every military needs integrated professional anthropological advice. Every military is allergic to integrated anthropological advice.33
The logical conclusion that can be drawn from this cross-cultural assessment is that the integration of anthropology and anthropologists requires careful thought and must account for significant cultural, ethical and professional differences.
The Nature of Anthropology
The specialist nature of anthropological studies and the method of participant observation constrain the practical application and integration of anthropology into the process of military strategy. The specialised nature of anthropological study and the often bounded socio-cultural nature of particular military problems mean the available pool of experts is almost invariably limited:
We are not looking for ‘anthropologists’ but ‘anthropologists with a research background in Afghan tribal dynamics in the late 20th and early 21st Centuries, deep contemporary experience on the ground in Afghanistan and a Top Secret clearance.34
A linked issue is the time consuming, ‘face to face’ nature of participant observation. The conduct of such work in conflict zones is often complicated and limited by the threats to both the anthropologist and the subject. The influence of the situation on the subject, anthropologist and information gathered must also be carefully considered. The complex, violent nature of armed conflict poses security risks and ethical uncertainties beyond that found when conducting ‘peacetime’ interviews with adolescent Samoans. The record shows that it is done and can prove effective. One study of Fatah al-Islam extremists through third-party observers is an excellent example of the considered application of the anthropological method in a high threat environment.35 The work of the Human Terrain Teams operations ‘on the ground’ in Afghanistan has been also proven effective with one claim of a 60-70 per cent reduction36 in ‘kinetic’ operations as a result of practical, on the ground integration of anthropology and military operations. Any integration of anthropology must take account of the specialist nature of the science, the limited pool of experts, and the practical difficulties related to the practice of anthropology ‘on the ground’ in a conflict zone.
How To Integrate Anthropology Into The Business Of Military Strategy
The integration of anthropology into the business of military strategy must begin and end with the nature of the military strategic process. As described earlier the formulation and execution of contemporary military strategy requires dynamic, complex problem solving within the context of grand or national strategy. Strategy has increasingly become an iterative, ‘accordion like’ ‘process ... where the result— also called strategy—is a compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to implement it’.37 Therefore, the integration of anthropology into the strategic ‘process’ will require action on the philosophical, doctrinal and practical levels. A longer-term and deeper cultural integration founded on education is also required.
The Culture Of Strategic Planning: Towards A Mindset Of Inclusion
A ‘mindset of inclusion’ must become the norm for strategic planning and execution activities. Consideration of anthropological perspectives needs to become ‘habit’ and must be noticed if missing. The recent use of anthropologists in strategic planning groups provides a potential template for their employment in future strategic and campaign planning. This should be extended to other areas of organisational strategic action and policy-making. The US employment of anthropologists as strategic advisors is an example of their practical utility when the right person is used in the right place. 38 Anthropological products and perspectives must be sought and provided as a matter of course. This inclusion will need to be military-led with a view to expanding the idea, by example, into broader inter-agency forums. The new draft Australian Counterinsurgency manual captures the idea that ‘the operating environment [is] a complex system’ and concludes that successful twenty-first century problem solving will ‘involve expertise from outside the military and there is no theoretical limit to the resources and personnel that may be used’.39
How Do We Get More Anthropologists And Anthropology?
A key issue is how to access expert anthropologists, or an anthropological perspective, when needed given the limitations of the nature of the field? The first step is to cultivate and grow the small number of experts already effectively operating in these areas. This will require ongoing support for their involvement beyond the needs of counterinsurgency. It requires the clear articulation of the coherent ethical logic behind their work and refuting any professional ‘blanket moral condemnation’.40 This should be backed by moves to expand the field of ‘capable’ anthropologists through initiatives such as Project MINERVA and establishing ‘long-term relationship building between the military and reputable academic institutions to facilitate the participation of high quality anthropologists’.41 One officer suggested the entirely prudent ‘back up’ concept of developing a comprehensive situational awareness of the ‘field’ in order that the military can identify:
A ‘pool’ of people who knew enough in an anthropological sense to find the right anthropologists to ask them the right questions (at the academic level) that may be enough to assist the development of sensible early actions.42
An alternative approach is for the military to ‘grow its own’ anthropologists. This approach runs into familiar difficulties related to time, expense, and the opportunity cost of educating military anthropologists. The idea of ‘pumping some bright young arms captains through mission focused’43 anthropology studies is appealing, and for a select few this may be a reasonable option. Alternative ideas include the expansion of the US Foreign Area Officer program to include options for anthropological study and possibly field work.44 A number of survey respondents identified that expert, ‘trusted advisors’,45 who held an anthropological or cultural perspective rather than a formal qualification, also provided high quality advice and assistance. It is likely, given the nature of the science that the military will need to adopt a combination of all of the measures outlined above if it is to generate the required body of expertise on an as required basis.
Doctrine And Practice: The Integration Of Anthropology Into Military Practice
There is a clear need to integrate anthropology and the social sciences more fully into military doctrine and practice. This has already begun and is well advanced in the area of strategic and campaign planning. A number of intelligence survey respondents stressed the need to absorb anthropological sources and information into the process of threat and environmental assessment. One respondent termed this an effort to develop ‘cultural intelligence’46—another development of a ‘societal Order of Battle’.47 This construct would see an expansion of the US COIN doctrine of social network analysis into broader strategic and generic doctrine for the conduct of military appreciations. A linked issue is to delineate clearly the operational security rules governing anthropological information and to address the need for ‘balancing sharing information (across multiple ‘whole-of-government’ stakeholders) with security requirements’.48
The most pressing area requiring attention is the conduct of anthropology during strategic execution. Integration is currently strongest at the tactical level, especially in the area of ‘cultural awareness training’ and the conduct of mission specific pre-deployment exercises. The employment of anthropologists as part of an ongoing campaign has highlighted the need for comprehensive doctrine that explains and integrates anthropological actions into the broader military framework. This is required to protect the anthropologist’s professional and ethical interests and to explain those limitations to the broader military force. Clarity over the use of information and its relationship to the targeting process will also assist in developing an understanding of the benefits and impacts of anthropological work in support of the military. One detailed ethical study argues that if military processes and the role of anthropologists were better understood, then the current Human Terrain Team analysis effort in Afghanistan would be seen as ‘not only morally permissible, but praise worthy’ by a far broader professional audience.49
Education: The Critical Long-Term Action
The key to the systematic integration of anthropology into the process of military strategy is to establish it as a constant presence within the military education continuum. One survey respondent noted the important point that, ‘for the military commander, all we can do is educate his judgement’.50 It is critical that anthropology and the broader social sciences provide perspectives and information that will shape the commander’s world view and enable him or her to ask key questions that span critical social, political and cultural issues. This must become a matter of course for future effective strategists. One survey respondent summarised the way to approach education:
Socio-cultural anthropology is relevant at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Its understanding should be incorporated in early professional military education, developed through ongoing study (including language training and/or exchange postings), and be ultimately reinforced through pre-deployment cultural training.51
There is, however, a need to insert the work and products of anthropology into the standard military body of reading and information sources. Not only is the work of political scientists, soldiers and strategic theorists required to educate a commander’s mind, but also broader theories of culture, society and identity. A general understanding of the complex and dynamic concepts of culture as argued over by anthropologists will alone provide significant insight and illumination. This should be further supported by the use of specific anthropological case studies in support of practical problem solving exercises to show how the specific can help our ‘understanding [of] what is, and is not, possible in a cultural context’.52 Anthropological papers and perspectives should be provided through all military problem solving exercises at both War and Command and General Staff College. Currently, in the case of the Australian Command and Staff College, this style of information and perspective is notably absent.53 Consideration should also be given to the approach already adopted by the United States Marine Corps of including selected anthropologists as members of military academic faculties.54 In short, the future commander must be educated to look for and ask informed socio-cultural questions as a standard part of making tactical through to strategic judgments.
Conclusion: Indispensable Insight But No 'Silver Bullet'
The metaphor of the silver bullet applies to any straightforward solution perceived to have extreme effectiveness. The phrase typically appears with an expectation that some new technology or practice will easily cure a major prevailing problem.55
Colin Gray has made the key point that ‘for every complex problem there is a simple solution, and it is always wrong’.56 Anthropology provides no simple solutions, or silver bullets, for the dilemmas and uncertainties faced by the contemporary military strategist. Embracing anthropology will not simplify a problem, remove the need for a comprehensive understanding of traditional strategic theory or political science, nor will it provide greater certainty or comfort. It will, however, explain the context, assist in framing problems and potentially shed invaluable light on the nature of a conflict, what outcomes may or may not be realised, and how we may successfully proceed. The latest round of contemporary counterinsurgencies has reminded us of the central importance of people and populations and has highlighted the potential utility of anthropology in assisting the struggling strategists to ‘simplify, focus, decide and execute’.
The strategic utility of anthropology extends well beyond the battlefield and into the many diverse areas of military organisational strategic action including net assessment, capability development, force preparation and force structuring. Anthropology must be cemented as an accepted and normal aid to judgment. This will require the adoption of a mindset of inclusion, the careful fostering of effective players within the military anthropology community, and an expansion of the available base of anthropological support through a combination of flexible ‘in-house’ and external policies. Military doctrine and practice must continue to systematically incorporate the work and products of anthropology into organisational business. Finally, the military must adopt ‘a very deliberate not so fast approach’ to education that broadens the career-long exposure of soldiers to anthropology and opens their minds to the potential illumination it may offer them in the trying strategic times ahead.
About the Author
Colonel Roger Noble is a serving Regular Army officer. In 2008 he was awarded a Monash Scholarship and is currently completing a Masters of International Public Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. He has operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor.
Endnotes
1 R Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin Books, London, 2006, p. x.
2 H Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’ in T G Mahnken and Maiolo (eds), Strategic Studies: A Reader, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 426.
3 B Hoffman, ‘From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency’, Current History, Vol. 105, No. 695, December 2006, p. 429.
4 C S Gray, ‘Why Strategy is Difficult’ in T G Mahnken and Maiolo (eds), Strategic Studies: A Reader, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 395.
5 American Anthropological Association, <http://www.aaanet.org> accessed 21 October 2008.
6 J Monaghan and P Just, Social & Cultural Anthropology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 73.
7 Ibid, p. 146.
8 An example of the scale and depth of this effort is the US Army Battle Command and Training Program’s effort to prepare Army formations for the Contemporary Operating Environment by focusing on Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment and Time elements of that environment. Battle Command and Training Program Briefing, US Army Combined Arms Centre, February 2008.
9 HTTs are a recent development by the US Army to provide brigade commanders in counterinsurgency environments with cultural support in the form of ethnographic, social, and cultural information research, as well as social data analysis. BN Karabaich, US Army, Memorandum – Human Terrain Team (HTT) Debrief, 31 October to 1 November 2007.
10 The US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, US Army Field Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, Appendix B.
11 FM 3-0 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, Final Approved DRAFT 5 February 2008.
12 For two examples: Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, 12 June 2008; and UK Joint Discussion Note 4/05 The Comprehensive Approach.
13 For example: D Petreus, ‘Leading Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq, Military Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, January–February 2006; F G Hoffman, ‘Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs’, ORBIS, Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 2006; N R F Aylwin-Foster, ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’, Military Review, Vol. 85, No. 6, November-December 2005.
14 L Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petreus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, pp. 98–99.
15 J Stevenson, ‘We Need a New Think Tank for the War on Terror’, The Wall Street Journal, New York, 7 August 2008, p. A11; T G Mahnken, ‘Partnership for Mutual Benefit: The Pentagon’s Perspective’ Anthropology Today, Vol. 24, No. 5, October 2008, p. 3.
16 P Porter, ‘Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War’, Parameters, Summer 2007, p. 45.
17 Smith, The Utility of Force, p. xii.
18 Porter, ‘Good Anthropology, Bad History’, p. 53.
19 R Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 2008, p. 80.
20 Ibid, p. 81.
21 A Simmons, ‘Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part 1 and Part 2, From the War Files Summer/Autumn 2006’ The American Interest, Autumn 2006, p 36. One comprehensive anthropological study concluded that they may be better described as ‘a thoroughly modern, global Diaspora inspired by religion and claiming the role of vanguard for a massive, media driven transnational political awakening’. S Attran, ‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism’ The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, p. 128.
22 Anthropology also potentially serves to arm the critical strategist with a new way to question and assess strategic proposals. For example, the popular author Robert Kaplan has claimed that ‘criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic danger” in an “undeveloping world’’’ One anthropological critique of this statement notes ‘people always self-organise somehow, and they know who is gunning for who ... Anarchy—case after case suggests—is nothing more than an intellectual construct ... it never really exists.’ A Simons, ‘War: Back to the Future’, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 28, 1999, p. 92.
23 Brigadier Justin Kelly, Australian Army, Australian Anthropology Questionnaire Response.
24 D Vine, ‘Enabling the Kill Chain’, Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 54, No. 14, November 2007, p. 2.
25 American Anthropological Association, Code of Ethics, Approved June 1998, <http://www.aaanet.org> accessed 21 October 2008.
26 One work giving detailed work dedicated to the Just War Theory and the Laws of War is M Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th Edition, Basic Books, New York, 1977.
27 Some examples include: Vine, ‘Enabling the Kill Chain’; R Gonzalez, ‘Phoenix Reborn: The Rise of the Human Terrain System’, Anthropology Today, Vol. 23, No. 6, December 2007; H Gusterson, Anthropologists on the front line, New Scientist, August 2008; C Lutz, ‘Selling Ourselves? The Perils of Pentagon Funding for Anthropology’, Anthropology Today, Vol. 24, No. 5, October 2008; H Gusterson, Anthropology and Militarism’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 2007.
28 Colonel M Brewer, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
29 Brigadier Justin Kelly, Australian Army, Australian Anthropology Questionnaire Response.
30 Professor G Rudd, USMC SAW, US Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
31 G R Lucas, ‘The Morality of Military Anthropology’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, p. 168.
32 Lieutenant Colonel M O’Neill, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
33 C J McNicol, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
34 Professor G Rudd, USMC SAW, US Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
35 M Taarnby and L Hallundbaek, Fatah al-Islam: Anthropological Perspectives on Jihadi Culture, Working Paper 6/2008, Real Instituto Elcano, 2008.
36 M McFate, ‘Cultural Knowledge and Common Sense’, Anthropology Today, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 2008.
37 M R Gordon and B E Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, Vintage Books, New York, 2007.
38 For example, the political anthropologist Dr David Kilcullen has been employed as Chief Strategist. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State.
39 Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, ACSC Draft, Department of Defence, 12 June 2008, p. 59.
40 G R Lucas, ‘The Morality of Military Anthropology’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, p. 173. This paper provides an alternative, well argued ethical construct with which to assess anthropological contributions in support of military operations.
41 Colonel M Brewer, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
42 Ibid.
43 Colonel J J Frewen, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
44 Professor G Rudd, USMC SAW, US Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
45 Major M Bye, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
46 Name not disclosed, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
47 Lieutenant Colonel M Ryan, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
48 Name not disclosed, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
49 Lucas, ‘The Morality of Military Anthropology’, p. 179.
50 Professor G Rudd, USMC SAW, US Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
51 Colonel J J Frewen, Australian Army, Australian Anthropological Questionnaire Response.
52 Ibid.
53 The author was Director of Studies – Land at the Australian Command and Staff College over the period 2007–2008 and was responsible for joint operations instruction in which no specific anthropological texts or products were issued to inform campaign or strategic planning.
54 Dr Paula Holmes-Eber is a Professor of Operational Culture at the Marine Corps University and one of the authors of Dr B Salmoni and Dr P Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications, Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, 2008.
55 ‘Silver Bullet’ Idiomatic usage as defined in Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Silver_bullet>.
56 C S Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characteristics’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2007, p. 51
