Flying a Plane While in the Process of Building It: Reflections on Iraq
Abstract
This article recalls the author’s experiences at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. During his time in Baghdad, the author came to understand that there was cause for guarded optimism about the future of Iraq, and that success for the US-led coalition was indeed possible. However, he also learned that some significant progress is yet to be made along this path, and he details what he believes are the precursors for such progress.
We are Sunni, we are Shia, we are Christian, we are Kurd. We come together as Iraqis for the good of our country. Down with terrorism.1
This article provides a post-tour perspective of my impressions of Iraq, the Iraqi people, and the US-led coalition in Iraq. Based on observations made from June to December 2007, this article chronicles experiences that have served to reshape many pre-tour perspectives.
Reflections on Iraq and the Iraqi People
It is clear that the Iraqi psyche has been shaped and changed by a history of violence and oppression. The conditioning that has resulted from a generation of subjugation under a brutal regime and frequent wars has altered their perception of life, death and loss.
The traumatic loss of parents, siblings, children and friends is common. Indeed, many have lost loved ones in the current insurgency.2 While this conditioning has developed a very strong survival instinct within most Iraqis, one manifestation of which is that some can mislead without betrayal by any visual tells, there still exists an inner confidence and positive outlook.
Nonetheless there is a significant segment of the population which is comprised of tolerant, secular and progressive people. Many of the educated middle class embrace the separation of religion from public life as a fundamental underpinning of sound governance. They tolerate freedom of religious belief, and the social and vocational emancipation of women. However, many who hold such views do so privately, confining their expression of them to close friends, family members and in-confidence discussions with inquisitive Australian Army officers.
Iraqis are proud and nationalistic residents, children and guardians of the so-called ‘land between the rivers’. While the Iraqi community is comprised of disparate groups, some of whom draw close affiliation with Iraq’s neighbours, such affiliations may be viewed as ‘temporary associations of expedience’, rather than a widely supported desire to secede territorial integrity or sovereignty to a neighbour or foreign power.
Iraqis want for a better future. In working towards this, many Iraqis assume great personal risk. It is widely known that Arabic–English translators have a US$10 000 bounty on their heads—an indication of the critical role that interpreters play in the ongoing rehabilitation effort in Iraq.
Iraqi citizens who volunteer their services as soldiers, officers, police and civil servants within the ‘new Iraq’ are brave souls who are owed a debt of gratitude and recognition, a fact that is rarely acknowledged in Western debates on Iraq. Iraq remains a very dangerous place. Those who opt to serve their country immediately risk their lives, and the lives of their family. This risk, and the everyday bravery demonstrated by Iraqi men, women and children, is not widely appreciated in Australia.
In my time working with the Iraqi Joint Headquarters,3 I heard many accounts of violence directed towards Iraqi military personnel. In order to better understand the risks and the sacrifices that these men and women make daily, it is valuable to consider some actual accounts.
The first account describes the plight of a senior Iraqi officer who was serving in the Joint Headquarters during my time in Baghdad. I was informed that armed militiamen entered an Iraqi two-star officer’s home while he was at work. At gunpoint, the officer’s wife was directed to make a choice between her son and daughter. Knowing what fate may befall a female, the mother made the terrible choice for her young son to depart with the assailants. After being informed of the situation over the telephone by his grief-stricken wife, the officer made contact with the gunmen, who directed that his life may be exchanged for that of his son.
As a Sunni officer within the Iraqi Joint Headquarters—a rare and precious asset because of the need to achieve representative heterogeneity at executive levels—he felt that his life was too important for the future integrity of his country. This belief left him faced with the heart-rending decision to deny the gunmen their request. Instead, the officer offered the gunmen his worldly possessions, cash and jewellery, in exchange for the life of his son.
Thankfully, the exchange was made and the son was returned unharmed, but no doubt severely traumatised. I met the officer two days later at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, where he enthusiastically hosted the Commanding General, Joint Headquarters Transition Team, an Australian brigadier, through a newly established strategic logistics capability. No outward emotion, other than enthusiasm at the progress being made, was betrayed by the officer—an act of extreme composure and professionalism.
A second account describes the last hours of a junior officer within the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, who was captured by gunmen on a Baghdad street and put in the boot of a car. As the vehicle drove away, the officer managed to escape. He was about to leave the neighbourhood when the gunmen contacted him on his mobile telephone and explained that they had returned to his house, had custody of his family, and that if he did not return home immediately, his family would be killed in his place. He returned home and was shot dead.
These are but two tales in a long line of horrors that provide some insight into the risks that Iraqis face, and have faced, in rebuilding their country. Despite the risks, Iraqi men, women and children continue in their quest for a better future.
Reflections on the Incidence of Sectarianism within Iraq
While there is no doubt that much killing, intimidation and reprisal in the past has been along sectarian lines, sectarianism should not be overstated by Western observers. In times of improved security, it is neither polite nor appropriate to discuss one’s sectarian affiliation. Indeed, it is said to be common for urban couples in Iraq to become engaged prior to divining the sectarian persuasion of their betrothed.4 To moderate Iraqis, there is no cause to delineate a person from the Middle East region beyond their national identity. Moderate citizens see themselves as Iraqi first and foremost.
Throughout the second half of 2007, Baghdad underwent a demographic reorganisation from mixed suburbs to neighbourhoods of greater homogeneity. It would be inaccurate for observers to conclude that this shift was a result of deep and irreconcilable rifts within the Iraqi community along sectarian, religious or ethnic lines. Rather, the shift has arisen through fears for personal safety and the need for enhanced protection. In mixed areas, it proved easier for accelerants to the conflict, defined later, to move between and within a community and commit atrocities such as killings, kidnap and intimidation.
Many residents of Baghdad have either relocated or have been forced to flee their homes. Some have become refugees in countries neighbouring Iraq. Others, lacking the means or resolve to relocate, maintain a low profile within their dwellings and disguise their personal circumstances through fear of persecution.
Based on the accounts of translators who reside in the wider Baghdad area, security has improved somewhat. The presence of illegal checkpoints in Baghdad—a routine occurrence in 2006 and early 2007, as militias sought to regulate human movement, extort graft and target supporters of the new Iraq—has greatly reduced.
Trust, A Fundamental Underpinning of Improved Security
Any lasting security and peace must arise from a paradigm shift within the Iraqi community. A culture of silence and acceptance persists and has an impact on improved security within Baghdad. Although the frequency of attacks is decreasing markedly as territory is cleared and then retained, consolidation will not occur until Iraqis learn to communicate wrongdoing and expose malevolent elements of their community to the appropriate authorities.
The cornerstone of Iraqi stabilisation and rehabilitation is the level of trust that the average Iraqi has in their security agencies to act ethically, legally and impartially. At present, the average Iraqi’s trust in their security agencies is quite limited. Trust may come in time, but would require a series of significant confidence building activities. For now, an important strategic message for the people of Iraq is that the Coalition cannot sustain a presence in Iraq indefinitely. In order for the security situation in Iraq to improve, anti-Iraqi Government people and groups must be identified. If you do not presently have confidence in the Iraqi Police, you must inform Coalition or Iraqi Army personnel. By providing this vital human intelligence, the situation will improve as divisive elements will be dealt with by Iraqis, in accordance with Iraqi law. This, in turn, will serve as a positive demonstration to other members of society, including those holding public office, that anti-social behaviour will not go unpunished. This will also serve to assist in the regulation of security forces, who equally are required to conduct their business in a defined manner. If you do not report such acts, the situation cannot get better, indeed it is doomed to deteriorate further.
Reflections on Forces Opposing the Coalition and Government of Iraq
In order to understand the counterinsurgency fight within Iraq, it is necessary to consider the threat to the Coalition and the Iraqi Government. Threat or opposing forces within Iraq are heterogeneous. It is trite to say that the Coalition and Iraqi Government face ‘terrorists’, or to label all groups hostile to the government as terrorists. Indeed, from a strategic communications perspective, the word ‘terrorist’ should be excised from our professional lexicon as it is unhelpful and oversimplifies the problem at best; and is inaccurate and dehumanises a potentially reconcilable demographic at worst.
To my mind, the following groups may be identified as hostile to the Coalition and the Iraqi Government, and are improperly labelled as terrorists: criminal groups or individuals, irreconcilable militias, ideologically driven organisations, opportunistic businessmen,5 thugs, foreign government operatives, aggrieved citizens, citizens deficient in their ability to generate commerce through lawful endeavour, blackmailed citizens, armed citizens in the wrong place at the wrong time, and hostile international non-government actors and organisations.
This complex threat environment warrants careful planning, management and engagement. Strategies required to ‘treat’ or ‘manage’ these disparate groups require careful thought and consideration, not a reductionist approach.
Indeed, the mistreatment of one anti-Iraqi Government organisation can damage the ongoing war effort by providing a ‘cause celebre’, which other anti-Coalition groups may use to swell their recruiting base. Commanders at all levels, both Iraqi and Coalition, face such realities in their operations in Iraq, where a mistake may have strategic consequences and undo considerable good work.
I have heard al-Qaeda in Iraq described as an accelerant within the contemporary Iraqi construct. This term is most appropriate and one that warrants further consideration. Horrific attacks cause mass casualties and erode the trust that Iraqis have in their political representatives and in each other. Attacks on areas of national or religious significance, such as the attack on the Great (or Golden) Mosque of Samarra in 2006,6 can trigger a maelstrom that may not have otherwise occurred. Intimidation, extra-judicial killings and reprisals by militias and death squads reduce trust. Unfortunately, it is far easier to attack and undermine trust than it is to nurture and develop it.
The targeting and removal of accelerants at the fringe of society is a necessary line of operation to defeat any insurgency, particularly in Iraq. One may argue that it is not realistic or possible to eradicate all accelerants, particularly in the Middle East—a region characterised by numerous fault lines, friction points, grievances and porous borders.
While al-Qaeda’s freedom of manoeuvre has been reduced in recent times, to the point where some observers are announcing its strategic defeat in Iraq, it could re-emerge. Pressure must be maintained on the leadership, financiers, materiel supporters and soldiers (the network) of these accelerant organisations, criminal elements and irreconcilables.
Reflections on the Iraqi Army - An Opportunity to Train and Develop a Nation
It is generally conceded that Iraq had a burgeoning middle class and highly effective educational institutions in post-colonial times and through the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq War. It was not until the war in Kuwait that education became less accessible. At that time, the country appeared to undergo a profound change as the ruling party felt more threatened, and resources dried up as a result of sanctions. The lack of funding to education, training and development institutions was compounded by the loss of a large portion of the middle class, who departed Iraq for a more secure future abroad. For Iraq to move forward and rehabilitate, strategies must be developed to encourage the reversal of this lamentable loss of intellectual capital, and to avoid a recurrence.7
A generation of Iraqis, from 1990 to the present day, has passed through their adolescence without the same educational opportunities that were enjoyed by their parents. This is a cause for ongoing concern as it provides a ready-made pool of poorly educated men and women from which to recruit and sustain an insurgency or a private army. The Iraqi Government will need to formulate policies to reach out to this demographic and enhance their employment prospects within a stabilised Iraq. One approach to addressing this is to continue to recruit military formations as an expedient to improved security, employment and vocational skilling, and the development and rehabilitation of Iraqi infrastructure.8 The Iraqi Army is one of the few organisations that presently receive near universal support from the Iraq people. It is seen as an honourable career for young men to enter and is an organisation that may play a positive social role in reshaping the nation.
In mid-2008, fourteen Iraqi Army divisions were being generated to constitute the new Iraqi Army. To place this force into context, Sadaam’s Army boasted a strength of fifty divisions in 1990.
Provided that oil export revenue can sustain increasing costs, which it almost certainly can, force generation activities should be continued in Iraq for many years to come. Effort may focus on the creation of mounted infantry or light cavalry manoeuvre formations—suited to counterinsurgency and rear area security operations, but less suited to cross border force projection.9
Embedded within these manoeuvre formations are the human resource enablers to capability: logisticians, electrical and mechanical engineers, civil engineers, linguists, pilots, medics, teachers, mentors and leaders. Hence, continued army recruitment would provide the tangible benefits of employment, population empowerment, up-skilling and economic stimulus, and the intangible benefits of increased national and institutional pride, trust and hope.
A policy of continued army recruitment would, however, require a defined end state. An end state could be based on a number of factors, either quantitative (number of divisions, soldier to citizen ratio), time-based or conditions-based.10
Reflections on the Character of the New Iraqi Army
I was fortunate to have observed the training of Iraqi Junood (junior soldiers) and new recruits during my visits to Iraqi bases. These soldiers showed great spirit, a love of their country and a determination to improve the security situation within Iraq. On a visit to Besmaya Training Facility with General Babakir, the Chief of Staff, Iraqi Joint Forces, on 6 November 2007, soldiers from the newly formed 3rd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, enthusiastically welcomed their chief with much song and dance. With the aid of a translator, I learned that they were chanting:
we are Sunni, we are Shia, we are Christian, we are Kurd. We come together as Iraqis for the good of our country. Down with terrorism.
The leaders of this welcome were not officers. The chants and songs were led by raw recruits and the act appeared unscripted. This experience left a most positive perception of the spirit and motivations of young Iraqis. It also demonstrates a fundamental and profound shift away from that of a conscript army. It should be remembered that as recently as 2002, an officer was entitled to shoot Junood to assist with enforcing collective discipline. I was informed that an officer had a quota—approximately five per year—where no paperwork of consequence would result. It was only after that quota had been reached that an officer would refer future matters to a superior, with a higher ‘quota’.11
A challenge the Iraqi Joint Forces faces is the development of a robust and professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. The old Iraqi Army had no relevant NCO corps. Under the old regime, junior officers would perform some of the roles and responsibilities that we in Australia would expect NCOs to perform, while other roles were neglected.
Notwithstanding this fundamental change in paradigm, an NCO corps is emerging and positive signs are apparent. The Coalition invests considerable effort into this cause. Indeed, on 24 November 2007, Lieutenant General Dubik, Commanding General Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, hosted a dinner in honour of the Iraqi Army Non-Commissioned Officer and Soldier of the Year. Soldiers and NCOs were selected from each division of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Special Forces, under the Iraqi Army Recognition and Incentive Program as Non-Commissioned Officer and Soldier of the Year, 2007. Incentives, mentoring and positive example is helping to grow a non-commissioned culture within the new Iraqi Army.
Increasingly, it is observed that NCOs are wearing rank in order to distinguish them from junior soldiers. Anecdotally, this had not always been the case—another positive sign that augurs well for the future of the Iraqi Army. A challenge will be to continue to identify and progress the better soldiers from basic training to non-commissioned officer or officer training, and then employment in counterinsurgency operations.
Reflections on the Challenges Confronting the Iraqi Government
The work being undertaken by the Coalition and the Iraqi Government is profound and advancing simultaneously on all fronts. At times, it has proven difficult to develop and maintain a main effort, when urgent action is required in so many areas. Conceptually, the generation of whole divisions and the establishment and operation of government institutions, concurrent with the prosecution of the counterinsurgency fight, has been likened to flying a plane while you are in the process of building it.12
The consequences of failure that this metaphor evokes holds true and is as a strategic message to various audiences. Whole divisions and their headquarters are being formed along with brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and sections, and their command elements, concurrently. A similar tempo is evident in the generation of non-military Iraqi Security Forces and departmental civil servants. Such endeavours would be beyond the capacity of many nations in less complicated and trying circumstances.
Reflections on the Growth of Democracy and Civilian Institutions within Iraq
Corruption, the perception of corruption in Iraq, and how this perception interrelates with elections and the forming of government in a democratic country should be considered further. I have been informed anecdotally by Iraqi citizens that they believe that elements of their government are corrupt. Such a statement requires due attention, whether it be founded in truth or not.
Iraq is a fledgling democracy. Democracy, democratic principles and the concept of free and open voting are all new to Iraqis, let alone the intrigues of party politics, associations, party loyalty and their implications. Democracy in Iraq will take time to bed down as Iraqis grow to appreciate the ways in which representative governments operate, and the notion that a government works for the people and is accountable to the people. In the climate of present day Iraq, an important strategic communications message is that if you do not like, trust or respect your officials, then vote them out of office at the next opportunity ... and incidentally, do not pick up a rocket propelled grenade launcher and take matters into your own hands mid-term.
To the realist, forms of corruption exist in all societies; only some are more refined and better concealed than others. It is possible, indeed highly probable, that corruption does exist in Iraq at this juncture. Corruption is unlawful and cannot be tolerated in Iraq any more than it is tolerated in Australia or the United States. But when dealing with Iraq, its government and the generic causes of corruption, a position of sanctimony is unhelpful and should be dispensed with from the outset.
I have heard the generic accusation from Iraqi citizens that ‘Iraqi police are corrupt’. Let us consider this in greater detail. To serve as a policeman is a public and visible expression of one’s desire to work to rehabilitate the country of Iraq. There endures an element of the community, whether they be foreign fighters or irreconcilable Iraqi citizens, that have visited unspeakable acts of horror and cruelty on their fellow human beings for association with the Coalition in rebuilding Iraq. To understand this is to understand a fundamental cause of corruption and militia association. And we may ask ourselves, if faced with such circumstances, would we act differently?
Iraqi police and government officials are public figures who are deprived of a paramount survival mechanism in today’s Iraq, one that was closely guarded by my interpreters: anonymity. Presently, to serve as a public figure in Iraq is to mark yourself, your associates and your kin as a target for people who can only be characterised, through their actions, as evil. In such an environment, ‘associations of convenience’ with militias and other forms of quasi-protection, must be expected until such time as ‘security’ improves to a point where anonymity is no longer a primary means of survival.
But in making this point, it is possible, indeed probable, that malefactors continue to seek employment with the Iraqi Security Forces, to wield power and influence on behalf of divisive forces, and for ill-gotten gain.
Reflections on the Relationship between Security and Economic Recovery in Iraq
Iraq is a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma. What comes first: security, or employment and economic recovery? To those enlightened, the answer is that they both come together, but slowly and over time. In the interim, policies must be developed to assist with the protection of Iraqi Security Forces and public figures in order that they can commit to their employment in the rehabilitation of Iraq while safe in the knowledge that their families and friends are not at the mercy of the wolves.
Reflections on Lessons Learned
Progress is being made, but it remains to be seen whether progress will be achieved before one of any number of deadlines—domestic to Iraq, regional and international—expire. One may applaud the current commanders in Iraq for their vision and leadership. The partnership of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker has been a remarkable success. General Petraeus’ leadership and management will provide academics and military historians with a wealth of material to analyse and investigate, and a new generation of military professionals with a wealth of strategy and policies upon which to build.
It is apparent in today’s operational environment that it is no longer enough for the modern military professional to be technically proficient. At all levels, a commander is a soldier, leader, strategist, policy analyst, diplomat and statesman. Such is the reality of military involvement in the information age, where all elements of national power must be brought together to achieve a national effect.
The principles of combined arms warfare, where disparate capabilities come together to mitigate individual weaknesses and augment the collective strength, must be taken to the next level and applied to achieve national objectives through true whole-of-government endeavour. Such ideas are not new; indeed, General Zinni, former Commander, United States Central Command, wrote of such a requirement in The Battle for Peace.13
Until Western nations adapt to coalesce disparate lines of operation, from a cabinet of portfolios into a homogenous arm of national and international policy, the timely resolution of future mid- to high-intensity stabilisation operations and counterinsurgency warfare may remain elusive.
Conclusion
There are several overriding realities when considering Australia’s continued involvement in Iraq. First, the Middle East will continue to remain of strategic importance to the West for many years to come. Second, strategic goals within Iraq will take time to achieve and consolidate. Third, the United States will continue to be an ally of profound strategic importance to Australia.
At the working level, the mood of the Iraqi people may be described as one of cautious optimism. While tangible improvements are being made, many maintain their anonymity with the knowledge that a greater commitment on their behalf may leave them exposed and persecuted in the event of a hurried withdrawal of Coalition forces.
The opportunity to serve with the US-led Coalition in Iraq was both challenging and rewarding. The deployment was a source of professional development that money cannot buy and academia cannot teach. It has served to change some of my perspectives on Iraq, the Iraqi people, and the strategic importance to Australia of the US-led coalition in Iraq.
Endnotes
1 A translation of a welcome chant sung by soldiers from 3rd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, on the occasion of a visit to the Besmaya Training Facility by General Babakir, Chief of Staff, Iraqi Joint Forces, 6 November 2007.
2 The insurgency commenced in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
3 The command element of the Iraqi Armed Forces. An organisation that loosely resembles the structure and functionality of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4 One may equate this to a Westerner seeking knowledge about whether their interlocutor was Catholic, Anglican or Agnostic, during an initial exchange of pleasantries.
5 Kidnappers who on-sell their victims to irreconcilables or ideologically driven groups.
6 The bomb attack and destruction of the Golden Mosque of Samarra on 22 February 2006, a site of profound significance to members of the Shia faith, ignited widespread rage and reprisals throughout Iraq.
7 The haemorrhage of translators from Iraq to Western countries on Special Immigrant Visa Programs, while beneficial to people that many soldiers have grown to know well, trust, and become attached, including myself, may have the long-term effect of denying Iraq a critical human resource. Notwithstanding, my dealings with Iraqi interpreters have suggested a high probability that the Iraqi middle class would integrate very well into contemporary Australian society.
8 The current process to recruit, screen, equip, train, employ, remunerate and sustain Iraqis of military service age is working and is essential to reduce the manpower pool from which an insurgency can draw.
9 The development of offensive formations, based on armour, may spark a regional arms race and/or draw the ire of Iraq’s neighbours, both unhelpful second order effects given the present internal challenges facing Iraq.
10 Reduction in insurgent activity to a defined level, reduction in unemployment, the achievement of sustainable growth levels in terms of Gross Domestic Product, foreign investment levels and/or confidence in Iraq and its government by the World Bank and international lending institutions.
11 Anecdotal account in September 2007 from an Iraqi interpreter, and ex-officer within the old Iraqi Army.
12 A fabulous description, of unknown origin, it well captures the challenges and risks of stabilising Iraq.
13 General T Zinni and T Koltz, The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2006
