The ‘Red Rats’ and Phuoc Tuy

A purely academic study of war by itself is today unrewarding. It is important that the future Commander or Staff Officer should understand the inter-action of political, geographic, economic and military factors in the various parts of the world and that our military studies be set in these realistic settings.

- Major-General M AH Butler CB, CBE, DSO, MC
(Commandant, Staff College, Camberly) 1 March 1967

Introduction

On 8 March 1966 the Prime Minister of Australia announced that an Australian task force would be despatched to Vietnam as part of Australia’s increasing military commitment.¹

On 23 April 1966 the reception, disembarkation and processing of personnel and equipment of the major units of the 1st Australian Task Force through the surface and aerial ports of Vung Tau and Saigon commenced. By 5 June 1966 the majority of the task force had deployed by helicopter from Vung Tau to its area of operations in Phuoc Tuy Province, where it established itself at Nui Dat in torrential monsoonal rain.

Province boundaries of South Vietnam

The reasons for the deployment of the task force to Phuoc Tuy Province were two-fold. The military reason was to end the Viet Cong² domination of the area with a view to securing National Highway 15 for major military movement from Vung Tau to Saigon. This was necessary in order to allow the development of the port of Vung Tau and thus relieve the congestion of military shipping in the port of Saigon. The political reason was to assist in providing the security necessary for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to proceed with its Revolutionary Development³ programme in the province.

Aim

The aim of this article is to briefly study the inter-action between the political, geographic, and economic environment of Phuoc Tuy Province and the activities of the 1st Australian Task Force.

The Contemporary Setting

Phuoc Tuy Province is one of eleven provinces comprising III Corps Tactical Zone. It is divided into the five districts of Long Le, Long Dien, Dat Do, Duc Thanh and Xuyen Moc. Phuoc Tuy Province is located some forty kilometres south-east of Saigon. Its average length is approximately fifty kilometres and its average depth approximately forty kilometres, with a total land area of some 1958 square kilometres.

Topography

Most of the land area within the province consists of piedmont alluvial plain which varies from flat to undulating in nature.⁴ Isolated low hills protrude above the plain, the two most notable of these being Nui Dat and Horseshoe Hill on which units of the task force are based. Nui Dat is a granite outcrop 101 metres high and is covered with clear forest and scrub, whilst Horseshoe Hill is an extinct volcanic cone which is almost devoid of vegetation and is eighty-two metres high. Areas of evergreen forest, rubber plantations, padi, and lalang type grass cover the surrounding alluvial plain which has been the stage for many Task Force operations. Readily available helicopter landing sites exist in the numerous cultivations and clearings. During the dry season (November to April) the M113 armoured personnel carrier can traverse most of the terrain, the evergreen forests imposing the greatest restrictions on movement.

Foot movement is unrestricted across open areas but is limited to about 500 metres per hour in the evergreen forests. The rate of movement is slower during the wet season (May to October) when the red brown soil turns to mud and large areas, mainly padi, are inundated. M113 rates of movement are reduced by waterlogged soil, although the higher water level reduces the height of stream banks and makes them easier to traverse. The Song Rai is the major river in the region. From its headwaters in Long Khanh Province it flows generally south through Phuoc Tuy Province before meandering across its flood plain and finally entering the South China Sea.

Rising above the piedmont alluvial plain are four hill regions. In the north-east the May Tao region rises to a height of 704 metres on the boundary of Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces. To the south lies the Long Hai region, a granite promontory which rises to a height of 327 metres. Both these hill regions are shrouded in dense evergreen forest and are dissected by non-perennial streams. To the south-west of the piedmont alluvial plain is the Nui Dinh region in which 6 RAR conducted a search and destroy⁵ operation codenamed ‘Vaucluse’ in September 1966. It is a horseshoe shaped granite hill mass with a deep ravine from north-east to south-west which separates the two arms and forms the draw of the horseshoe. The highest point of the hill mass is 504 metres. The area is deeply dissected with non-perennial streams. However, these streams do not constitute serious obstacles to movement. Gradients vary from 1 in 2 to 1 in 4. Dense vegetation, comprising mainly bamboo and low scrub with vines and creepers, covers the area. Visibility is limited in most areas to twenty to thirty metres and tactical foot movement is sometimes noisy and restricted to no more than 500 metres per hour. Good observation is obtained in all directions from the feature, particularly over the Task Force base camp and Highway 15, although visibility is, at times, impaired by haze, cloud or mist.

Phuoc Tuy Province

Adjoining the north-west edge of this hill region is the Nui Thi Vai and Nui Toc Tien hill region in which 5 RAR conducted two search and destroy operations code-named ‘Canberra’ and ‘Queanbeyan in October 1966. This region is shaped like a butterfly, the two features being joined by a wind gap or saddle. Nui Thi Vai forms the western wing and Nui Toc Tien the eastern wing. The non-perennial streams have their headwaters in the vicinity of the saddle, both streams terminating in the mangrove swamps of the Rung Sat. The region attains a height of 467 metres and is deeply dissected by watercourses, whilst steep gradients, granite outcrops, caves and cliff faces are characteristic. A fairly dense growth of evergreen forest cloaks the area. Foot movement is difficult and slow on the steep slopes except where trails have been established.

To the south-east of the province are the coastal littorals, a wide strip of white sandy beaches bordering the South China Sea. These are backed by lateral sand dunes, stunted sparse vegetation and decaying pillboxes—a remnant of the French colonial era. Inland, the piedmont alluvial plain is flat and low lying with extensive tracts of padi and clear forest interspersed. Foot and M113 movement is generally unrestricted.

Bordering the south-west of the province is the periphery of the Rung Sat. It was in this region that the task force conducted Operation ‘Hayman in November 1966, a search and destroy mission in which task force headquarters (main) deployed forward onto Long Son Island. It is a region of dense mangrove swamp interlaced with tidal rivers and streams and is inundated throughout the year. The island of Long Son is in the centre of this region. The mangroves vary between three and five metres in height and afford protection from air observation. Foot movement is greatly restricted. The many streams and waterways afford easy movement for sampans and other light craft. However, movement by boat is restricted at low tide, the mean difference between high and low tides being eight feet. Tidal currents restrict M113s to operating around the landward periphery. Nui Nua, located on the eastern area of Long Son Island, rises to a height of 183 metres and dominates the skyline of this low-lying area. The main village of Long Son nestles at its base on the eastern extremity of the island. Low brush, clear forest, padi and isolated areas of dense forest or jungle cover the island. Some helicopter landing sites are available in the region and rappelling techniques may prove useful.

Population

The province has a population of approximately 103 000, the major population centres being located in the central, southern and western areas of the province. Those formerly living in isolated settlements have been largely resettled into these areas as part of the Government’s Resettlement Programme. As a result, about 90 per cent of the population are now living in government controlled arras.

Economy

The economy of the province is based upon agricultural production and related agricultural industries. Major cultivated crops are rice, rubber, peanuts and corn. Minor crops are manioc, sweet potatoes, fruits such as bananas and pineapples, pepper, sugarcane, vegetables and coffee. Rubber plantations are scattered throughout the central and northern areas of the province, the three largest being the French owned Gallia plantation at Binh Ba, the Courtenay plantation with its headquarters at Cam My in Long Khanh Province, and the Vietnamese owned plantation around Nui Dat within which the Task Force is based. Neither the Nui Dat plantation nor other plantations which are located in Viet Cong controlled areas of the province are at present being worked by rubber tappers, and subsequent loss of income to owners is reimbursed by war claims payments.

Other industries providing a source of livelihood are fishing, timbergetting. sawmilling, charcoal production, rice milling and salt processing. The majority of the salt evaporating ponds in the province are located in the Long Dien District, with others in the vicinity of Long Son Island and the village of Phuoc Hoa.

Miscellaneous business activities include blacksmith and welding shops, service stations, tailors’ shops, pottery and weaving. The provincial ice works, laundry and a salt processing plant are situated in the provincial capital Ba Ria. Ba Ria is generally out of bounds to Australian personnel, the exception being that selected personnel are allowed to proceed on duty to the laundry contractor and to Sector Headquarters.

The task force has periodically assisted Vietnamese Government forces on Security Operations⁶ at the request of the Province Chief. November to January are particularly important months for the conduct of such operations as this is the period of the rice harvest and its denial to the Viet Cong.

Roads and Towns

Major towns and villages are situated along the three main highways and along the coast. Of these, the most important is National Route 15, covering a distance of approximately 100 kilometres from Bien Hoa City, through the western and southern periphery of Phuoc Tuy Province, to Vung Tau City.

Route 15 has a bituminous surface in fair to good condition which varies in width from fourteen to sixteen feet. The highway traverses a sparsely settled alluvial plain from Bien Hoa City to the village of Phu My, whilst south of Phu My it frequently passes through or adjacent to the mangrove swamps. Those portions of the highway which lie in close proximity to the mangrove swamps require frequent maintenance due to the poor drainage and relatively heavy military traffic. Thirty-one bridges, with widths of ten feet or less are interspersed throughout the 100 kilometres from Bien Hoa City to Vung Tau City. Due to their narrow width the bridges constitute critical points. West of Route 15 the terrain is generally open, whereas the area to the east of the highway is generally wooded. Movement off the road to the east is restricted by swamps in the south and rice padi in the north.

Route 15 was the scene of four Security Operations in late 1966 when the task force secured the route between Ba Ria and Phu My for the movement of newly arrived United States formations from Vung Tau into the hinterland of III Corps Tactical Zone.

The provincial capital, Ba Ria, is situated at the junction of Route 15 and Inter-Provincial Route 2. The latter highway snakes North from Ba Ria to Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Provincc. Between Ba Ria and Hoa Long it has a bituminous surface in fair condition, but from Hoa Long northward past Nui Dat it is surfaced with laterite. Width of the road varies from ten to sixteen feet. The Nui Dinh hill region overlooks both highways in the vicinity of Ba Ria. Ammunition, equipment, rations, and other supplies vital to the existence of the Task Force base camp at Nui Dat are conveyed by daily convoys along National Route 15 from the Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau to Ba Ria, and thence along Inter-Provincial Route 2.

The district towns of Long Dien, Dat Do and Xuyen Moc are situated along Provincial Route 23, whilst the villages of Long Hai and Phuoc Hai are situated along the coast on Provincial Route 44.

In August and September 1966 the 5 RAR group conducted two ‘Road Runner’ operations⁷ from Nui Dat to Phuoc Hai. Whilst neither of these operations resulted in contact with Viet Cong forces, it was a most impressive sight to see the armoured column of mounted infantry, supported by artillery and an umbrella of air cover, motoring along Routes 2 and 44 at a time when Route 44 was regarded as a Viet Cong domain.

In the centre of the province, along Inter-Provincial Route 2, is the Roman Catholic resettlement village of Binh Gia and the Montagnard resettlement area at Duc Thanh. In close proximity to the task force base camp are the villages of Hoa Long, Binh Ba, and the site of the former Viet Cong fortified village of Long Phuoc.Hoa Long village is located four kilometres north of Ba Ria and two kilometres south of the task force base camp, being astride the junction of Inter-Provincial Route 2 and provincial Route 52. The village is situated on gently sloping ground, is oval in shape, and covers an area of approximately four square kilometres. It is surrounded by an earth embankment varying in height from one to two metres, forward of which is a ditch of corresponding size.

The people obtain their water from wells. Some engage in the family industry of weaving, whilst others labour in the padi fields, the rice mill, or the sawmill. Many of the houses are constructed in timber and are surrounded by vegetable patches and banana trees.

Produce is sold in the local market which was constructed in November 1966 at the request of the people under the auspices of the provincial administration with local material and artisans assisted by task force engineers and financed by Australian civic action funds. By constructing the market in this manner the Governments Revolutionary Development Programme was assisted; the Australians were held in esteem for having the villagers’ interests at heart: the villagers were not forced to accept something which they did not want and their traditional Vietnamese pride was not hurt because they had assisted in the project themselves and did not feel that it was a hand-out to the underprivileged.

Also located in the village is the District headquarters, an old fort, an orphanage, a school, a dispensary, and a pagoda.

During the cordon of Hoa Long by the task force and its search⁸ by Vietnamese military forces on ‘Operation Bundaberg’ in October 1966 the Viet Cong infrastructure⁹ in the village was largely eliminated. The only complaint made by a villager concerning this operation was made by the village chief. Apparently he was so preoccupied in assisting in his official capacity that he missed seeing the Vietnamese movie show which was provided for the friendly villagers by the then ad hoc task force civil affairs unit after the Viet Cong suspects had been detained. To the north, east and west of the village the terrain is generally flat and is covered with a variety of vegetation—open grassland, banana plantations and secondary growth, none of which constitutes a serious obstacle to movement. To the south and south-west the village is surrounded by rice padi. This area was cordoned by the 1 st Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, dismounted so as to not damage the rice crop as harvest time was imminent.

One kilometre to the east of Hoa Long and two kilometres south of the task force base camp is the site of the former Viet Cong fortified village of Long Phuoc. The village was located astride Provincial Highway 52 which bisected the village SSW to NNE and was situated on a gentle slope on the southern side of a low hill sixty-three metres in height. The village was irregular in shape and covered an area of two square kilometres. Between 25 May and 5 July 1966 most of the known Viet Cong in the village were apprehended, the other villagers were resettled in Hoa Long, and the tunnel complexes and fortified houses were subsequently destroyed by 6 RAR and 1st Field Squadron on Operation ‘Enoggera’. Numerous artillery bombardments and air-strikes caused some damage to buildings and extensive cratering of open ground. Prior to this period well constructed dwellings with teak furniture had nestled amongst shade trees and numerous cultivations of bananas, pineapples, grain and root crops. Much of this vegetation and numerous hedges and fences still interlace the area. A stand of mature, generally clean rubber exists to the south of the former village, whilst padi surrounds most of the remaining area. Due to the vegetational cover fields of fire are generally limited, varying between thirty metres and 200 metres, but often being the former.

Some five kilometres north of the task force base camp is the village of Binh Ba. The vegetation between the base camp at Nui Dat, and this village consists of rubber plantations, numerous swamps and disused padi fields.

Binh Ba is located on flat ground. The village is rectangular in shape with minor cultivations of fruit and vegetables existing within the area. It is situated adjacent to, and to the west of Inter-Provincial Route 2 and is surrounded by the French owned Gallia rubber plantation which is the major source of income for the villagers. A dispensary is operated by the French for the mutual benefit of themselves and their employees and two short range transport airfields are also located in the area. In order to keep the plantation operating, prior to the development of the task force influence in the area, the French owners paid taxes levied by the Viet Cong. In August 1966 the task force cordoned and searched the area and rendered the Viet Cong infrastructure ineffective during ‘Operation Holsworthy’. The pacification of the village was carried out by 5 RAR in conjunction with Vietnamese Government forces. Activities such as medical treatment, soccer matches and soldiers attending church with the villagers assisted in improving relations with the villagers. Inter-Provincial Route 2 was secured and people were able to travel without paying Viet Cong tax for the first time in three years. Thus villagers were able to travel to Ba Ria, market their produce and return home without losing most of their profits to the Viet Cong toll-keepers.

It is in this geographical environment that the Provincial Government has been faced with the task of defeating the Viet Cong in the field whilst simultaneously trying to govern and develop the province politically, economically and socially. The government has strived, with notable success, to achieve these ends due to a co-ordinated military and civil effort.

Local Government

Within Phuoc Tuy Province military officers occupy key governmental positions in every level of the local government organization, their positions combining military and civil functions in a single office. This is a foreseeable long term trend as many of the most able and experienced Vietnamese administrators are in uniform. It is important to note this distinction between those officers with both military and civil functions, and the purely military officers in field units, as the actual responsibility of the former officer category varies considerably from rank held.

The Province Chief

Until September 1967¹⁰ the Province Chief of Phuoc Tuy was Lieutenant-Colonel Le Duc Dat who had been appointed by Ngo Dinh Diem when he was President of the Republic of Vietnam. Like so many of the recent leading figures in South Vietnam, Lieutenant-Colonel Dat was born in the north. Furthermore he was the only province chief who had retained office since Ngo Dinh Diem’s assassination on 1 November 1963 in spite of numerous Viet Cong attempts on his life.

Due to the insecurity in Vietnam and the need for the concentration of civil and military power in the hands of province chiefs they are usually chosen from military men of the rank of major, or, as in the case of Le Duc Dat, lieutenant-colonel. Although he is assisted by various staff organizations (Chart 1) the Province Chief is personally responsible for all governmental functions within his province.

The functions of the Province Chief are political, administrative, financial, and military. In many respects these functions resemble those of the prefect in France (a resultant influence of the period of French colonization).

Politically, the Province Chief is directly responsible to the Prime Minister as the representative of the Government in the Province. In this capacity he has the overall responsibility of supervising the operations of all services in the province; the authority to recommend the transfer of civil servants working in field offices of the ministries; the authority to recommend his own candidates for appointment as district chiefs, and the symbolic duty of presiding over all official ceremonies.

Administratively, the Province Chief is consulted on and makes suggestions on the establishment or implementation of government projects in the province, and co-ordinates all activities performed by both the overhead services under the provincial administration and the technical services under the supervision of the Government Ministries concerned. In this and in his financial capacity he is assisted by the Deputy Province Chief for Administration who is a career-civil servant.

Chart 1. Province organisation

Co-operating with the Province Chief in the administration of the province is the Provincial Council whose members are directly elected by the electorate. Its meetings are attended by the Province Chief or his representative and are open to the public except when matters concerning national security are being considered. Before implementation, decisions on some matters must he ratified by the Prime Minister, or by the Minister concerned.

Whilst a detailed analysis of the foregoing is beyond the scope of this article, an example of how this provincial machinery has affected the operations of the 1st Australian Task Force is of interest. After the decision was made to deploy the task force to a forward operational base at Nui Dat the task force commander decided that, in order to enhance the security of the base, it would be necessary to resettle civilians living in isolated hamlets in close proximity to the base. This would give task force patrols, artillery, and mortars a free fire zone surrounding the base. It necessitated not only the resettlement of the local populace but also an order restricting civilian entry to the zone and explaining the dangers inherent in such entry. In order to realize this aim it was necessary for the Province Chief to be advised, for the matter to be considered and approved by the Provincial Council, and for local government agencies to resettle civilians and promulgate the warning. The difficulty experienced by the District Chief in ensuring that all people in the area were advised of this decision was compounded by the fact that there were no newspapers or radio and television stations in the province (such modem media were confined, in the main, to Saigon).

Financially, the Province Chief directs the execution of the provincial budget after its formulation by the Provincial Council and its approval by the Prime Minister through the Minister for Finance. Funds for the budget are derived from income from provincial lands, property taxes and licence fees, taxes paid for the ownership of boats, vehicles and draft animals, and other taxes such as those on amusements and patronage of bars and restaurants, parking fees for communal vehicles and junks, vehicle inspection and registration taxes, and head taxes on residents born outside the province. However, the funds raised from these sources are insufficient and the budget is subsidized by funds allocated to the Province Chief in the national budget. Additional funds are allocated by the national government to the heads of technical services in the province.

Militarily, the Province Chief is responsible to the Commander of III Corps Tactical Zone for security and public order. He co-ordinates the activities of the Police,¹¹ the Military forces,¹² and special agents within the province. He is assisted by the Deputy Province Chief for Security a career Army Officer, by his District or Military Sub-Sector Chiefs, and by the Sector Senior Advisor (a United States Army lieutenant-colonel).

The Province Chief is also Chairman of the Provincial Revolutionary Development Council This council has a Permanent Bureau of nine military officers and two civil servants as its executive agency. Enhancing continuity of effort and improving administration within the Revolutionary Development structure, the chairman at each echelon is a member of the council at the next higher level. Hence the Province Chief is a member of the Divisional Revolutionary Development Council which is subordinate in turn to the Regional and Central Revolutionary Development Councils whilst the District Chiefs are members of the Provincial Revolutionary Development Council.

The Province Chief prepares the Revolutionary Development Plan for his province based on the guidelines published by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development in Saigon. After review and approval of the plan at Divisional, Regional, and Ministry level, the Province Chief is then responsible for its detailed execution. Military plans, including those of the task force (when appropriate), are co-ordinated with the Provincial Revolutionary Development Plan.

The task of the military forces in support of Revolutionary Development is to attain the requisite level of security in and around selected hamlets and villages so that civil activities can proceed. Within areas selected for Revolutionary Development military forces conduct Clearing and Securing Operations to rid the areas of Viet Cong Main Forces¹³ and to establish and maintain local authority. Concurrently, other military forces are employed in surrounding areas to establish a protective shield against Viet Cong forces that seek to penetrate the areas where Revolutionary Development is in progress. Military psychological operations¹⁴ and civic action¹⁵ are conducted as part of the military support for Revolutionary Development with considerable effect.

Civilian moves to improve political, economic and social development within the hamlets and villages run concurrently with the military operations. They aim to win over the population and to establish firm governmental control of the area. South Vietnamese Civil Revolutionary Development Teams¹⁶ and Province Representatives of the United States Mission Agency, designated as the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS),¹⁷ assist in this regard.

The District Chiefs

Subordinate to the Province Chief are the five district chiefs who constitute the lowest territorial echelon of governmental administration (Chart 2). These district chiefs are career military officers of the rank of captain who are appointed by the Minister of the Interior on the recommendation of the Province Chief and the Commander of III Corps Tactical Zone. They are prepared for their administrative functions by training courses at the National Institute of Administration. They co-ordinate all administrative activities in their district and are in continual contact with the local population, directly through inspection tours and matters requiring their decisions and indirectly through communal committees chosen from the people. In technical matters they can call on the services of the ministries represented in their districts.

Each district chief is assisted by two deputies (administration and security) who deal with routine matters and hence allow the chief to give more attention to Revolutionary Development in his area. In his military capacity he has direct control over the Vietnamese military forces stationed in the district and the head of the district branch of the National Police is responsible to him. He is assisted by the Sub-Sector Advisor (a United States Army captain).

Within each district, every village and hamlet has its own administrative organization consisting of a popularly elected Village or Hamlet Citizens’ Council and a Village or Hamlet Chief who is appointed by the Council.

Chart 2. District organisation

Political Development

Since mid-1966, in spite of hostilities, the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam has introduced democratic methods of

Election, viz:

• On 11 September 1966 for a Constituent Assembly.
   
• In April 1967 for Village and Hamlet Councils.
   
• On 3 September 1967 for the Presidency, Vice-Presidency and Senate.
   
• On 22 October 1967 for the Lower House of the National Assembly.¹⁸

Despite Viet Cong threats to kill some voters, officials and candidates; to bomb polling booths and to destroy ballot boxes, a very high percentage of the eligible voters in Phuoc Tuy Province cast their votes. Understandably however, the political maturity of the electorate is still in its infancy. The report of the Australian delegation on the election of 3 September 1967¹⁹, for example, describe how:

Very few of the candidates have any substantial organized support, and political parties in the Australian sense do not exist. In some areas it is ton dangerous to hold election meetings unless armed protection is provided, and often it is not possible to move by road from one place to another without protection. When the election was first announced, many people did not understand what an election of this sort meant, and some means of explaining this to poorly educated people was needed. It was necessary therefore in this election for the government administration to lend assistance to candidates in situations where in other countries it is customary for the candidate to be left to his own devices.

The Australian Task Force

Channels of Command, Co-ordiantion and Operational Control

From the foregoing it is understandable that the 1st Australian Task Force channels of command, co-ordination and operational control²⁰ are complex in nature (Chart 3). The task force is under the operational control of II Field Force Vietnam—the United States Army Corps deployed in the III ARVN Corps Tactical Zone; is under command of Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam in Saigon on national, administrative and logistic matters; and effects co-ordination with the Headquarters of the ARVN Division in whose tactical area it operates, the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau, and the provincial authorities. These authorities include the Province and District Chiefs, the Sector and Sub-sector Advisors, and the Provincial representative of CORDS.

Operations - Concept and Execution

The Task Force was allotted a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR)²¹ which either included the major centres of population or which was interposed between these areas to the South and the suspected locations of the Main Force Viet Cong to the north. The Task Force has been successfully conducting operations in the province which have progressively removed Viet Cong influence from the TAOR and established a vacuum zone in which the Viet Cong can gain little or no intelligence and from which he cannot supply local force²² or main force troops. These TAOR operations, and operations in areas outside the TAOR,²³ have created a security umbrella over the densely populated areas which has enabled the implementation of the Provincial Revolutionary Development Plan in these areas.

As operations have progressed the Viet Cong have been forced to react by attacking Task Force combat elements and by attempting to penetrate back into areas which have been thoroughly searched and cleared by the Task Force and which have subsequently been kept under ground and aerial surveillance. This is understandable as the alternative course of action open to the Viet Cong, namely to accept loss of control over the civil population and loss of influence over the main lines of communication, has been unacceptable.

Chart 3. 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) channels of command, coordination and operational control

It is now history that a Viet Cong Main Force Regiment—reinforced by a North Vietnamese Battalion, and a Viet Cong Local Force Battalion reacted to the early achievements of the Task Force by attempting to attack the Task Force operational base at Nui Dat on the night 18/19 August 1966. D Company of the Sixth Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, was on a routine company fighting patrol in the area of Long Tan, some 3000 metres east of the Task Force base, when it encountered the enemy force. In conjunction with the Third Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop, and supported by Task Force artillery and air support, heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy force. The enemy sustained 245 killed, confirmed by body count the following morning, and extensive equipment and material losses, whilst the Task Force units suffered seventeen killed and twenty-two wounded (one soldier subsequently dying of wounds) and negligible equipment and material losses (one M16 Armalite rifle).

Despite achieving heartening results in reducing the influence of the Viet Cong Main Force and Local Force units, which still pose a constant threat however, the Task Force has still had to contend with Viet Cong Guerrillas²⁴ and the Viet Cong infrastructure. Small guerrilla groups are frequently encountered by patrols in the TAOR and it is a difficult process to identify and eliminate clandestine Viet Cong organizations operating in government controlled villages.

Operation ‘Bundaberg’, planned and conducted by the Task Force Headquarters and Phuoc Tuy Sector Headquarters in October 1966, is a notable example, not only of the difficulty of eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure, but also of the co-ordination and co-operation between the Task Force and the Provincial military and civil organisations.

Until late May 1966 the village of Long Phuoc was Viet Cong dominated. It was used as a Viet Cong base area and safe haven and was extensively fortified and tunnelled. As a result of a combined²⁵ joint²⁶ United States and ARVN operation Long Phuoc was cleared of known Viet Cong and the remainder of the population was resettled in Hoa Long and Long Dien. Some 1460 people were relocated in Hoa Long which itself had been Viet Cong dominated until May 1966.

Since its arrival in the area on 5 June 1966, the Task Force had expended considerable effort in the pacification of the village by supporting the operations of the District Chief in providing armour, artillery and infantry support to the Regional Force and Popular Force units stationed in the village with a view to enhancing the security of the village, and by conducting civic action programmes in the village. A government census in September 1966 recorded the village population as being 3756.

Despite the combined efforts the province intelligence agencies²⁷ found that the village population was infiltrated with Viet Cong guerrillas, families and relatives of the Viet Cong, Viet Cong intelligence agents and cadre members. Viet Cong sympathisers and previously neutral villagers and refugees who were anti-government and anti-allied forces due to recent resettlement and curfew restrictions.

Viet Cong activities in the vicinity of Hoa Long had consisted of:

• Attempts to aggravate the obvious grievances of previously neutral villagers and refugees in order to recruit Viet Cong sympathisers, agents and guerrillas, and to foster anti-government and anti-Australian sentiments.
   
• Continual intelligence gathering activities by Viet Cong agents within the village.
   
• Infiltration within the village in order to commit acts of terrorism against the village elders, the District Headquarters, and pro-government citizens; to collect food and taxes and to visit relatives and friends.
   
• Attempts by Viet Cong local force units to carry out harassing and intimidation raids against friendly forces in the village.
   
• Attempts at mining, booby trapping and sniping which were primarily directed against government and allied forces in the area—especially along Inter Provincial Route 2.

It was therefore decided to conduct a combined Task Force/Phuoc Tuy Sector operation to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure in the village. A planning conference was then held at Task Force Headquarters to co-ordinate the operation, the conference being attended by the Province Chief (Sector Commander), the United States Sector Senior Advisor, and Task Force officers holding key appointments.

On 30 October 1966 the Task Force cordoned Hoa Long village with two battalions (5 RAR and 6 RAR), the Third Special Air Service Squadron, and the 1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, and provided civil affairs, civic action, and psychological operations Support. This support was provided for both the civilians evacuated to the Province Interrogation Centre at Ba Ria and to those civilians permitted to remain in Hoa Long. Every effort was made to display to the civilians that the action being taken was for their own benefit and with sincere intentions. This action included medical treatment, dental treatment, provision of Vietnamese entertainment type movies and music, assistance in feeding arrangements, distribution of psychological leaflets, and the use of a psychological operations audio broadcast aircraft and vehicles. Phuoc Tuy sector forces, comprising an ARVN infantry battalion, a NFFP company, and another company size unit, conducted a search of all dwellings in Hoa Long Village and arranged for the evacuation of selected villagers to the Province Interrogation Centre at Ba Ria. Determination of status of evacuees after interrogation was done by members of the Task Force assisted by Phuoc Tuy Sector personnel.

Despite the collection and collation of detailed intelligence information on the people in the village, co-ordinated planning, the maintenance of security regarding the operation—which included a credible cover plan—and the efficient conduct of the operation, in retrospect it was only possible to assess that the Viet Cong infrastructure in the village had been severely disrupted and not eliminated, despite the interrogation of 630 detainees which resulted in thirty-eight Viet Cong, forty-one Viet Cong suspects and eighteen draft dodgers being apprehended.

In summary, the 1st Australian Task Force has:

• Conducted operations to clear Viet Cong Main Force and Local Force units from areas of the Province in accordance with the Provincial Revolutionary Development Plan.
   
• Conducted combined operations with ARVN and/or NFFP to destroy Viet Cong guerrillas and infrastructure in selected villages.
   
• Conducted Population Control and Resource Denial Operations in the coastal areas to prevent infiltration of Viet Cong personnel and supplies from outside the province.
   
• Conducted Military Civic Action in accordance with the Provincial Revolutionary Development Programme.
   
• Assisted the Province Chief and District Chiefs in training ARVN and RF units.
   
• Conducted psychological operations in support of the Vietnamese Chieu Hoi Programme.²⁸
   
• Constructed RF and PF posts.
   
• Repaired some provincial roads and bridges.
   
• Constructed, recorded, and maintained minefields.
   
• Provided tactical support to provincial military units when requested by the Province Chief.
   
• Liaised with provincial agencies in the dissemination of intelligence.
   
• Conducted route security operations along National Route 15 during major military movement from Vung Tau to the hinterland.
   
• Conducted other security operations, such as rice denial, at the request of the Province Chief.
   
• Conducted ‘Road Runner’ operations along major provincial highways.

Conclusion

In Phuoc Tuy Province, as in other provinces in Vietnam, Allied military and civil authorities are endeavouring to fight a war against an enemy from without and within its borders whilst simultaneously striving to satisfy the basic aspirations of the people, to establish firm governmental control, and to initiate political, economic, and social development.

Working arrangements based on mutual respect and trust have developed between the Province, District, Village and Hamlet Chiefs, the United States military advisors, and those members of the Task Force who daily co-ordinate matters affecting the well-being of the province.

Tangible results of operations by the Task Force were reflected in a survey conducted by the Provincial Government in early 1967 into the attitude of the villagers in government-controlled areas towards the Task Force. The villagers appreciated the protection provided against Viet Cong forces, the military civic action, and the professional competence of the Australian Task Force.

Endnotes

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1     ‘Vietnam—February 1966 to October 1966’, Select Documents in International Affairs, (Department of External Affairs), December 1966. No. 9, pp. 11–12.

2     Individuals of either South or North Vietnamese origin who actively and willingly support activities of the National Liberation front of South Vietnam, by participating in or supporting attacks, subversion, or sabotage directed against nationals, facilities, installations or military units of the Republic of Vietnam, United States, or Free World Military Assistance Forces. (This, and similar footnotes in this article, state the working definitions approved by the various allied military forces in South Vietnam).

3     The integrated military and civil process to restore, consolidate and expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It consists of those co-ordinated military and civil actions to liberate the people from Viet Cong control; restore public security; initiate political, economic and social development; extend effective Government authority and win the willing support of the people toward these ends.

4     Data for this article was obtained by research and field experience during the author’s tour of duty in South Vietnam.

5     An offensive operation conducted for the purpose of seeking out and destroying enemy forces, installations, resources and base areas.

6     Operations designed to protect friendly resources or installations. For example: district capitals, populated areas, lines of communication, food stores, production areas, depots and base areas.

7     The concept of ‘Road Runner’ is a specially tailored force traversing main and secondary roads to demonstrate the intention and ability to use and keep open existing roads.

8     An operation in which forces encircle a village, hamlet or area to prevent entrance to or exit from the area, and to provide security to forces inside the encircled area while they perform searches for Viet Cong, Viet Cong infrastructure, draft dodgers, illegal residents, contraband, etc.

9     The overt and covert administrative, political, and intelligence organization and networks which have been established by Viet Cong to control and administer areas they dominate or to carry out their subversive programmes in areas they cannot control.

10    John Bennetts, ‘Slow War in the Villages’, Canberra Times, 5 October, 1967.

11    National Field Force Police (NFFP). The basic operational unit is the company. Personnel are trained to perform the tasks of civil police or soldiers as required. The Company-size unit is lightly armed and is capable of operating in a minor field tactical context (e.g. mobile defence of villages and hamlets against Viet Cong guerrilla groups, whilst PF platoons provide static defence). NFFP unites operate in ‘task districts’ which are selected by the Province Chief and included in the Provincial Revolutionary Development Plan. NFFP also participate in combined operations with the Australian Task Force to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructure in selected villages.

12    Vietnamese Military Forces

a.    Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units stationed in the province in support of the Provincial Revolutionary Development Programme are under the operational control of the Province Chief—the Commander of Phuoc Tuy Military Sector. Tasks include the conduct of clearing and securing operations, security operations, psychological operations and military civic actions. On occasions they participate in combined operations with the Australian Task Force to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructure in selected villages.

b.   Regional Force (RF) units in the Province are under command of the Province Chief, although he may place some of them under the operational control of his District Chiefs. The basic combat unit is the infantry company, RF units are normally recruited and deployed within the province. Tasks include the destruction of Viet Cong guerrilla forces and Viet Cong infrastructure; the security of key points and lines of communications’ assistance to Popular Force units in protecting villages, and the provision of a province reaction force for assisting village and hamlet defence forces.

c.    Popular Force (PF) units are recruited from and deployed in their parent villages. They are organized and equipped as infantry platoons, their commanders being responsible through their Village Chief to the District Chief. Their task is to maintain security in and around their village.

13    Those Viet Cong military units which are directly subordinate to the Central Office South Vietnam, a Viet Cong Military region, or sub-region.

14    These operations in Phuoc Tuy Province are designed to:

a.    Win the hearts and minds of the people with a view to gaining their co-operation. To achieve this aim it is necessary to instil in the people confidence in their government—its measures to improve their well-being, defeat the Viet Cong and ensure their security.

b.   Lower the morale of the Viet Cong and induce them to defect by capitalizing on weaknesses of leaders, defeats and shortages, and the advantages of surrender.

15    The term describes the use of military forces on projects contributing to social and economic development of the local population in such a way as to improve the standing of the established government with the people. The Australian Task Force Civil Affairs Unit is employed directly on such projects but seeks to remain in the background and assist indirectly through civilian agencies. In this way the maximum possible credit accrues to the Provincial Government.

16    Once the many and varied government military forces have achieved the required degree of security in an area, Civil Revolutionary Development Teams, each fifty-nine men in strength, are deployed into each village. Their tasks are to plan, motivate and assist the villagers in self-help projects; to develop the political, cultural, social and economic posture of the village; and to organize and train a village self defence force.

17    The Province Representative of CORDS is responsible for all United States civil activities within Phuoc Tuy and for the co-ordination of civil activities with military operations. CORDS is supported by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Activities include New Life Development, psychological operations, participation in the Chieu Hoi Programme, and aspects of public safety. As a specific example, the Office of Public Safety, USAID, is responsible for providing advisors to the NFFP.

18    ‘Current Notes on International Affairs’, Republic of Vietnam: Elections, (Department of External Affairs), September 1967, Vol. 38, No. 9.

19    Ibid.

20    The term indicates that the commander who has operational control can employ the formation, unit or sub-unit in accordance with his operational plan, but the parent formation or unit remains responsible for administration and logistics.

21    That area within which a commander, after co-ordination with and approval by the commander having senior tactical responsibility for the area, assumes primary tactical responsibility and need not obtain further tactical approval to conduct operations. The commanders of the TAOR does have the following continuing responsibilities to be co-ordinated as necessary with the responsible military and civil authorities:

a.    Defence of key installations,

b.   Conduct of operations, including such reaction operations as are necessary to secure the area against organized military forces,

c.    Support of Government Revolutionary Development activities as required.

22    Those Viet Cong military units which are directly subordinate to the Provincial Party Committee.

23    An area outside the TAOR in which a unit will operate tactically for prescribed periods of time. These areas and the responsibilities and authorities of the military units within them will be co-ordinated with responsible military and civil officials in the course of operational planning.

24    An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together for the stay in their home village or hamlets. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities. Guerrilla elements are subordinate to village and hamlet level Viet Cong organization.

25    An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

26    An operation conducted by two or more services of one nation.

27    These include the National Police and Military Security Services (MSS).

28    This term, when literally translated, means ‘Open Arms’. The aim of the Chieu Hoi Programme is to cause insurgent forces to surrender to government forces and become normal citizens.