Australian Army Aviation and Command in the Combined Arms Environment: A Cultural Shift Required?

Abstract

This article outlines the current Australian Army Aviation (AAAvn) General Service Officer (GSO) career profile and discusses proposed modifications to career requirements that the author recommends for the AAAvn GSO to function effectively in the combined arms environment.

Introduction

The introduction of the Tiger Armed Reconnaissance helicopter (ARH) considerably expands the role of Australian Army Aviation (AAAvn) and increases the complexities and professional challenges confronting officers who command this capability. In the first instance it represents a significant increase in complexity faced by the individuals who operate the aircraft, something that will take time to address but also something that AAAvn has well in hand. There is a second and more daunting challenge confronting AAAvn, however, a challenge that will require significant cultural change to overcome. The inclusion of AAAvn in the Manoeuvre Battlespace Operating System (BOS) and the corresponding doctrinal requirement to command combined arms organisations in combat raises expectations of AAAvn commanders and their ability to develop the necessary broad skill and experience base. AAAvn’s current General Service Officer (GSO) career construct, based on specialist skill development, is suitable for employment as a supporting arm but not as a manoeuvre arm. In order to gain the trust of the Army to command ground troops and other BOS in combat, AAAvn must redefine the career requirements of its GSO to ensure development of the necessary skills, knowledge and experience.

This article will describe the current AAAvn GSO career profile up to lieutenant colonel, and then compare that structure against manoeuvre arm requirements and against examples from the British Army Air Corps (AAC) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). It will also consider the AAAvn troop command construct, before showing that in order to define AAAvn GSO career development requirements, it is first necessary to identify and address two contradictory assumptions.

The first assumption is that AAAvn GSO need to follow the generic Army GSO model, and the second is that AAAvn GSO need significant flying experience to be capable of fulfilling their duties as aviation commanders. It seems widely acknowledged that it is difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy these two competing requirements simultaneously.¹ This article will show that the first assumption is valid and must be adhered to if AAAvn is to become a true manoeuvre arm. It will challenge the second assumption by suggesting that AAAvn could reduce the pure flying experience it gives to GSO without compromising command or safety. Flowing on from this, this article will show that the AAAvn GSO career profile should be modified to focus less on the development of specialist aviation skill sets, and more on the development of a generalist and wider understanding of the Army and the ADF. It is only by doing this that AAAvn will be able to grow GSO with the requisite intricate and tested knowledge of the employment of combined arms tactics.

Discussion

Army GSO Career Models

The span of employment of a GSO encompasses regimental, training and staff appointments. The rationale for this broad employment is that varied experience contributes to the development of attributes that will enhance an officers effectiveness as a commander or senior staff officer. A GSO may spend up to eight of the fifteen years between graduation from the Royal Military College and promotion to lieutenant colonel in training and staff postings.² These years are used to develop the broad skill set and understanding necessary for command and senior staff positions. While not explicitly stated in any of the guiding documentation, this career structure or profile is based on the premise that officers are employed to command and manage, but not necessarily to do other than in the context of gaining a suitable understanding of what their soldiers do so that they will be equipped to employ the latter correctly.

AAAVN GSO Career Structure and Profile

AAAvn GSO career development is governed by DI(A) PERS 47-1, although it does not refer to AAAvn GSO directly. Other references include the AAAvn Career Guide, and an AAAvn Manning Review from December 2001. There is little evidence of other research pertinent to AAAvn GSO career development, although presumably there was work done in this area at the time the Corps was expanded to absorb RAAF utility helicopters.³

The AAAvn Career Guide defines three pilot specialisations. Officers start in the Regimental stream, where they gain the foundation skills and knowledge ‘necessary’ for subsequent supervisory or staff appointments, and then either continue in the Command and General Staff stream or the Technical stream. Although the Guide acknowledges DI(A) PERS 47-1 as the authoritative document, it differs in its guidance to AAAvn GSO by stipulating that they will spend the majority of their time-in-rank as captain within Aviation units and that some may also compete for career broadening non-corps appointments. In effect, and in contrast to a possible eight years in the generic GSO model, the AAAvn GSO profile allows for a maximum of only four years in career broadening postings prior to promotion to lieutenant colonel, and even allows for none whatsoever. In this can be seen the outline of the unstated assumption about not only how much flying and aviation experience is ‘necessary’ for an AAAvn GSO, but also about how much of the generalist model should apply to AAAvn.

This in turn is evidence of the extent to which a ‘specialist’ culture exists in AAAvn, a culture that emphasises the importance of flying hours in credible decision-making. This creates conflict in the minds of AAAvn GSO between their personal desire to specialise in an aviation career, AAAvn guidance that supports this, and their perception that the Army requires them to be managed as generalist officers⁴. While there is a place for some GSO to continue into the Technical stream, for AAAvn to take its place in the manoeuvre BOS and for its GSO to achieve the level of combined arms competence required, this culture needs to change. GSO must be chosen early for the Command and General Staff stream, potentially at senior lieutenant or junior captain level, in order to develop the appropriate attributes.

The existence of this ‘specialist’ culture is further evidenced by the fact that many GSO continue flying throughout their time as junior officers. A recent survey of the careers of a sample of AAAvn lieutenant colonels revealed that only 30 per cent had completed the four years in non-flying positions outlined in the AAAvn Career Guide,⁵ with some completing only half that time. The trend to specialise remains current and is reflected in the fact that in 2007, two squadron commanders had remained in flying positions throughout their careers. While this may be suitable for GSO who wish to continue in the Technical stream, it does not satisfy Army requirements for the Command and General Staff stream and is potentially detrimental to both the individuals’ future careers and to AAAvn’s place in the Manoeuvre BOS.

GSO/SSO Dichotomy

Since the introduction of the AAAvn Specialist Service Officer (SSO) Pilot Scheme in the late 1980s, there seems to have been a merging or overlapping of GSO and SSO career streams. This has been caused partly because the two schemes run the same rank structure, making it difficult to differentiate between the two types of officer. In fact, the Manning Review goes so far as to suggest that the AAAvn Officer structure has diverged so far from the standard Army model that recovery is no longer practicable; instead, it postulates a removal of all boundaries between GSO and SSO. It does this despite also recognising the increasing importance of AAAvn Officers developing the skills, knowledge and experience for command in a manoeuvre environment.

This situation has been exacerbated by a desire, and plan, to see GSO and SSO as equals. While it may be possible for an SSO to follow a GSO profile and build GSO competencies through on-the-job training, this does not take into account the eighteen months training invested in GSO at RMC. To assume that this training can be replicated for SSO by the rank of captain is akin to suggesting that pilot qualifications could be achieved by the rank of captain without completing a pilots course. Of course, this would be very difficult to achieve without moving all the training mechanisms from Tamworth and Oakey to the regiments. The Review does not specify how eighteen months of RMC training would be achieved in the regiments other than through attendance at the normal career courses; courses that are designed to further develop officers who did attend RMC This assumption becomes even more invalid when considered in the context of the introduction of ARH, its requirements for synchronisation within the combined arms team, and the development of the Aviation Battle Group. Command can no longer be confined to aviation elements, but now includes the potential of responsibility for ground troops in combat.

The Rand Symposium on Pilot Training and the Pilot Career: Final Report⁶was published in 1970 for the US Air Force; however, it not only retains relevance but also identifies critical information relevant to AAAvn. One of the principle problems that it grapples with is the dichotomy of pilot/officer⁷ and the competing requirements of technical proficiency and the development of future leadership. It identifies that the staff officer of the future will need to manage even more complex systems and that, as a result, even more diverse staff training and experience will be required,⁸ and, while acknowledging the lack of an accepted definition, suggested that between 1000-1500 hours might be enough to satisfy experience requirements⁹ (for squadron command). This could reduce the number of years required in a flying role to perhaps four to five and would leave potentially three to four years at captain level to complete career broadening postings. The symposium report gives further credence to the Army GSO model and the requirement that AAAvn GSO destined for the Command and General Staff stream follow it.

The British Army Air Corps (AAC) has a similar concept to AAAvn in terms of specialist aircrew and a command/staff stream; however, the way this is accomplished is markedly different. SSO equivalent within the AAC are senior non-commissioned officers (SNCO) rather than officers, and this makes it substantially easier for the AAC to manage its officers under the same construct as the rest of the officer corps. In fact, the staff officer responsible for AAC officer management reported that ‘Basically, AAC officers follow a career structure identical to other officers within the Army, with the [only] added requirement being to complete Pilot Training and Conversion to type.’¹⁰ In effect, the AAC gives its officers enough ‘aviation experience’ to equip them to make appropriate decisions while ensuring that they are also developed as generalist officers. AAC officers are given the experience to understand what their soldiers do in order that they can plan their employment effectively. In contrast to AAAvn, the AAC has demonstrated that not only is it possible to do this, but that it has also yielded good results on operations from Northern Ireland to Sierra Leone and Iraq.

Would the AAC structure be employable in AAAvn? The principal reason it would not is the common rank structure within AAAvn. A sergeant who has more aviation experience than an officer and who provides advice while respecting the rank difference is somewhat different to the SSO captain who provides that specialist advice to the GSO troop commander, who may be of equal rank. In AAAvn, the common rank structure does not provide the optimum situation for the GSO to make command decisions while at the junior captain level, and militates against early troop command. However, the principal concept that can be drawn from the AAC example is that officers in AAAvn would have command capability by being able to rely on specialist advice rather than by being the holders of specialist knowledge themselves.

Troop Command

Aviation is one of the only places in any military, if not the only place, where junior officers are placed in command without appropriate provision of separation between themselves and those they command. The troop commander is generally placed in command of a group of his peers who are possibly from the same troop, likely from the same squadron, and highly likely to be from the same regiment. The situation exists because of a combination of a number of factors including common rank structure, the size of the organisation, and an attempt to mirror the generic Army model as closely as possible. It poses a difficult circumstance for the junior leader who is now in command of those other troop members who until ‘yesterday’ were his peers. Some, perhaps many, AAAvn troop commanders have had the strength of character to perform strongly despite these conditions; however, few have been tested in combat. It is interesting to note that when deploying AAAvn capabilities on operations, the level of command has often been increased relative to the level of capability. Perhaps this has been done in recognition of the flaw in our command structure.

The cultural differences between the Army and the RAAF are large enough to militate against broad comparison; however, there is one area from which AAAvn could draw ideas. Perhaps to cater for specialisation requirements, all command positions in the RAAF are now filled by one rank higher than the Army equivalents. For example, a flight is now commanded by a squadron leader instead of a flight lieutenant, a squadron by a wing commander, and a wing by a group captain. One of the benefits of this model is additional time for pilots to generate experience prior to command. It also builds in a time and space gap between the flight commander and the other members of the flight provided by a posting away from the operational unit during the mid-late flight lieutenant period.

While the increase in rank may not be suitable for Army, the model does bear some consideration in the AAAvn context as it may help to resolve the time conflict present in the current GSO career profile. A potential solution would be to move some way toward the RAAF model without crossing the rank boundary. Most GSO currently achieve troop command in their early years as captain. Moving that milestone back to late captain would provide additional time to achieve flying competencies as well as broadening experience. More importantly, it would provide time separation between the troop commander and the troop members by allowing (or requiring) an intermediate posting away from the regiment. In the context of ARH this would mean that troop commanders would be given a broader understanding of the wider army and their place in it. It would also allow time for completion of the Combat Officers Advanced Course, something that would further enhance the synchronisation of ARH effects in the combined arms team.

Command Expectations

An Infantry platoon commander must rely on the experience of his platoon sergeant to help him as he gains his own experience. The AAC flight commander relies on the experience of his flight second in command (normally a SNCO). AAAvn, however, appears to have arrived at a position where GSO are expected to have gained sufficient experience to command the troop without having to rely on a more experienced member of the troop for advice. This relates back again to the question of what is expected of AAAvn GSO. Jans identifies a ‘professional-identity conflict’ for AAAvn GSO between their roles as professional aviators and military officers.¹¹ They are required at once to be both ‘the best aviators they can be’ and capable of answering their own specialist questions, while at the same time they are expected to conform to the Army generalist model.

RMC trains GSO to be able to accept specialist advice and make appropriate decisions. AAAvn confounds this training by expecting its GSO to know enough about aviation to be able to provide their own specialist advice. Why does AAAvn have SSO if not to provide that specialist advice? How is it that the other corps can train their young GSO to make appropriate decisions in dangerous environments without having to provide years of additional experience, but AAAvn cannot? In this lies the key contradiction that must be resolved. AAAvn has created a command climate in opposition to that of the rest of the Army a climate where GSO are expected to be ‘specialist’ rather than generalist. This paper proposes that AAAvn GSO must be trained to make good decisions as combined arms commanders, not necessarily trained to be ‘the best aviators’ This will entail a significant cultural shift and will require mentoring from senior aviators to ensure that junior AAAvn GSO are prompted in the right direction.

Combined Arms Requirements

The introduction of the ARH, and the coincidental inclusion of AAAvn in the Manoeuvre BOS, makes it even more important that we get the career development of our GSO right. It means that AAAvn GSO must be capable of commanding air and ground assets in combat. AAAvn officers are able to learn quickly, but this is no substitute for experience and repetition. Jans and Schmidtchen¹² suggest that Air Force people of all ranks pride themselves on their technical excellence and tend to be more narrowly technically expert than those in the Army. They note, by way of comparison, that the Air Force pilot might be considered a Samurai Knight, with the commanding officer (CO) of the squadron being the Head Knight, while the CO of an Army regiment might instead be likened to a Chess Master. Air Force commanders have an explicit requirement to be as technically proficient as those they are commanding. The Army, however, relies on its soldiers to be the holders of technical proficiency, and requires its officers to understand the best tactical employment of those soldiers. The RAAF specialist approach to career progression, in-line with Jans’s ‘Knight’ metaphor, seems to have been transferred to AAAvn culture, perhaps at the same time as the transfer of responsibility of battlefield helicopters from RAAF to Army.

Of course, AAAvn sits uncomfortably between these two positions, being neither entirely part of ground manoeuvre nor part of the Air Force. It is perhaps in an attempt to straddle this divide that AAAvn has arrived at a juncture where it must choose what it requires from its GSO. In any event, as part of the Manoeuvre BOS, AAAvn GSO now have a responsibility to understand the best tactical employment not only of their aircraft but also of Infantry, Armour, and the other BOS. In essence, AAAvn GSO need to become Chess Masters rather than Head Knights. To do this, AAAvn GSO in the Command and General Staff stream must be equipped with suitable non-corps experience to the same standard as their peers from the other combat arms.

Trust

Mission command is a core element of the Army’s philosophy and is underpinned by trust and strong leadership.¹³ Mutual trust between superior and subordinate is essential to the application of mission command. The commander must be able to trust his subordinate to carry out tasks in accordance with his intent, while conversely the subordinate must be able to trust his commander to make appropriate decisions. The development of this trust takes time and training, and is based on common understanding and respect for rank, position and experience.

Common understanding is something that AAAvn must build. This will be achieved, to some extent, through common training and will be facilitated by the co-location of 1 Aviation Regiment with 1 Brigade. However, respect for the ‘experience’ of AAAvn and AAAvn GSO will only be developed by broader exposure of AAAvn GSO to demanding staff appointments, particularly at the tactical level. In essence, in order to gain the trust of the Army, AAAvn and AAAvn GSO will have to show that they are worthy of it, to prove that they are capable of planning and conducting combat missions to the same standard as their Infantry and Armour peers. It is difficult to see this being achieved under the current ‘specialist’ structure.

Time Span of Discretion

Jans and Schmidtchen¹⁴ also discuss the notion of the time span of discretion, a notion that each position has a time span of discretion associated with it, and that that time span increases with the amount of responsibility associated with the position. It is related to the time that it may take to implement policies and see them through to fruition. It is important to note, however, that Jans makes a distinction between command positions that do not have a long time span of discretion (at least at sub-unit and unit level) and staff positions that do.

In junior ranks this time span can be measured in months, so a junior officer can learn and implement much in a year. The corollary is that the same junior officer may be moved relatively frequently, to the mutual benefit of the individual and organisation. Current retention concerns relating to short-term postings to multiple locations could be offset by back-to-back postings to the same location, but to different units and roles. In relation to AAAvn, this adds weight to the possibility of increasing the number of postings that an AAAvn GSO could fill and still meet flying experience requirements. In essence, in a two- or three-year period, the GSO could be exposed to two or three different training and staff positions. There is a small risk to the organisation in terms of consistently having to train people in a new role flowing from reduced tenure at the junior officer level; however, the added benefits to AAAvn would be significant.

Conclusion

The introduction of ARH and inclusion in the Manoeuvre BOS requires AAAvn to be capable of fielding combat teams and battle groups and commanding not only air assets but also ground troops in combat. This in turn requires GSO with more than just specialised aviation knowledge. It requires AAAvn GSO with an intricate and tested knowledge of the employment and tactics of all aspects of the combined arms team. To achieve this, AAAvn must redefine what it requires from its GSO and must develop a career profile that guarantees provision to AAAvn Command and Staff GSO of the necessary knowledge and experience. Transition to true generalist GSO will be a significant cultural transformation for AAAvn, and it will be only through strong leadership from Army and senior AAAvn officers that it will succeed. Young AAAvn GSO must be convinced of the benefits of a generalist career that leads to becoming a Chess Master. Failure to do so may be detrimental to AAAvns ability to be employed effectively as a manoeuvre arm, and will be manifested by an inability to understand, command and employ combined arms in combat.

Endnotes

1     D Schmidtchen, Strategy and Research at Jacobs Australia, email dated 23 October 2007.

2     Department of Defence (Army Headquarters), Defence Instruction (Army) Personnel 47-1 Career Management of Australian Army Officers, Department of Defence (Army Headquarters), Canberra, 4 May 2007.

3     M Wheatley, email dated 14 November 2007. Colonel Wheatley was the inaugural Career Advisor AAAvn (1990-91).

4     N Jans, To become ‘the best aviators they can be’: Retention strategies for Rotary Wing Pilots and Observers, Sigma Consultancy, Canberra, 2005, p. 2.

5     D McEvoy, Careers Advisor AAAvn Directorate of Officer Career Management, email dated 6 November 2007.

6     W A Stewart & E S Wainstein, Rand Symposium on Pilot Training and the Pilot Career: Final Report, Rand, Santa Monica, 1970.

7     Ibid, p. 6.

8     Ibid, p. 9.

9     Ibid, p. 20.

10    G Owen, Staff Officer Army Air Corps, Manning and Career Management Wing, email dated 5 September 2006.

11    Jans, To become ‘the best aviators they can be’, p. 2.

12    N Jans & D Schmidtchen, The Real C-Cubed: Culture, Careers and Climate, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2002, p. 123.

13    Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), LWD 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 2006, p. 47.

14    Jans & Schmidtchen, The Real C-Cubed, p. 93.