Harnessing The Spectrum: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) for the Hardened and Networked Army

Abstract

This article reflects on the increased prominence of ISTAR and reviews the spectrum of ISTAR functions for land-based operations, demonstrating the effects of networked technology and the need for improved ISTAR management for complex warfighting. These developments indicate that a visionary repositioning of ISTAR within Army’s warfighting concepts is called for to harness the greater significance and growing range of ISTAR capabilities. A way ahead is offered to better manage the ISTAR functions on operations and at home, particularly within Army’s Training and Land Commands.

As the Army strives to become more networked and hardened to better face a complex warfighting environment, reconsideration is called for of how Army gains and retains the knowledge edge. Until recently, an understanding of the military capabilities and intentions of nation states was almost all that was called for to generate the necessary military posture. Today, however, the demands are far greater, with added complexity arising from sub-state actors whose camouflage is the very societies in which they operate.

This situation is exacerbated by the proliferation of means to collect and disseminate information around the battlefield and the world. This explosion of unprecedented masses of data reinforces the need for the Army to re-think, from first principles, its approach to gaining and retaining superior situational awareness. In other words, the Army needs to be smarter, more efficient and more effective—not just in how much information it can collect, but in the way it processes and distributes that information. To achieve the decisive edge in the Information Age, where every misstep can be publicly scrutinised and exploited by an adversary, value-added or fused intelligence drives superiority in decision-making to an unparalleled degree.

'Situational Awareness', Improved Tactical 'Fusion' and Information Overload

To date, government-commissioned studies have shown that even with this heightened complexity, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has a significant range of information collection capabilities to adequately inform on the tactical and operational challenges it encounters. Indeed, the Army controls a significant portion of the ADF’s collection assets and, when configured into joint task forces (JTFs), the land component invariably is given access to a wide range of Navy and Air Force intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) sources, as well as those from national agencies and allies. This range of sources provides an extraordinary quantity of unprocessed information.

While quite capable in terms of its collection capabilities, the Army is challenged when it comes to timely processing (or ‘fusion’¹) and dissemination of accurate and relevant value-added information. With the plethora of information generated from the various ISTAR assets undertaking collection, commanders today face information overload at a time when clarity of thinking and comprehension is of the utmost importance. The need for corrective action has been recognised with a strategic-level review of ‘ISR’ as well as an Army-led study on the use of land ISTAR assets. Such reviews receive little scrutiny outside select circles, and those consulted often have little time to step back and reflect more deeply on the ramifications of what is at hand within the ISTAR domain.

Recent operational experience points to the benefit of bringing together processed information at the tactical level to generate fused and actionable intelligence. That fused intelligence picture, drawing on a variety of sources of information, can generate an unprecedented degree of tactical and time-sensitive situational awareness for commanders. On operations, this is working relatively well because of the Army’s ‘can-do’ approach. Yet the various components of the ISTAR domain have developed in a number of poorly linked ‘stovepipes’ of specialisations. Indeed, it is largely due to the goodwill and professionalism of individuals that the stovepipes have not turned into ‘smokestacks’. This approach has worked thus far more by goodwill and personal competence than by design.

Where design has contributed well is with the new HQ Joint Operations Command (HQJOC). Resulting from the dramatic surge in operational tempo in recent years and the lessons derived therein, HQJOC has emerged with an intelligence branch under a one-star Director General Intelligence (DGINT) that is also integrally linked to the strategic intelligence agency, the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). For once there is a single point of accountability for all intelligence support required for the conduct of operations, through the Director DIO (dual-hatted as the strategic J2) and his branch head, DGINT, embedded in HQJOC. In effect, DGINT acts as the integrator of intelligence support, capturing the national agency collection and support capabilities and requirements across the various intelligence domains at the strategic and operational levels to deliver unprecedented operational- and tactical-level support. To capitalise on the excellence witnessed on operations and these organisational developments, there needs to be a streamlining within the Army’s ISTAR realm. First, however, we need to be clear about what the ISTAR realm contains.

ISTAR Components

ISTAR has been conceived of the aggregation of information gathering capabilities, with little emphasis given beyond collection. However, the ISTAR spectrum includes not only information-collection but also the staff and analysis functions that are required to process (or fuse) information into actionable intelligence. To date, the Army has managed its ISTAR capabilities largely as discrete and secondary functions, trusting in the ‘can-do’ approach to deliver a refined product from the ad hoc allocation and ‘brigading’ of ISTAR elements. Yet this approach is proving inadequate because of the complexity involved in harnessing the spectrum of ISTAR components outlined below.

• Geospatial intelligence (or GEOINT), for instance, is largely the domain of the Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) normally associated with 1 Topographical Survey Squadron (1 Topo Svy Sqn). This increasingly sophisticated capability merges geospatial and thematic data with imagery to deliver value-added environmental data. Linked with this is the emergent Rapid Environmental Assessment capability being developed within HQJOC to support a spectrum of GEOINT components across the maritime, land and air domains.
   
• Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is shared between RAE in 1 Topo Svy Sqn and the Intelligence (AUSTINT) Corps imagery analysts (IA) trained at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre (DIntTC). 16 Brigade and the Army Aviation Corps, as well as the RAAF, have a stake in IMINT. The requirement for IAs is burgeoning with the acquisition of armed reconnaissance helicopters (ARHs) and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). Yet IAs have no real champion within Army and the DIntTC training focuses on high-end, often highly-classified, overhead imagery analysis. In the meantime, the training requirements for analysis of fast moving, oblique, time-sensitive and often grainy tactical video imagery associated with ARHs and UAVs have yet to be fully scoped. At the strategic level, the geomatic and imagery functions are managed by the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organization (DIGO).
   
• Locational intelligence (LOCINT), or target acquisition (TA), is another growth industry. Traditionally, artillery has provided a locating capability through Army’s 131 Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Battery. In fact, both 20 STA and 2 Cavalry Regiment also operate ground thermal surveillance radar systems that add to the TA picture. However, Army’s rapid acquisition of UAVs has led to a rethink. UAVs are being managed by Artillery and this has led to the expansion of 131 STA Battery into 20 STA Regiment, where locating skills are more closely linked with those of IAs than ever before. Moreover, LOCINT is increasingly dependent upon fusion to generate the necessary precision required in modern warfare. In addition, there is a virtually insatiable demand for such tactical information to be networked to commanders for rapid decision-making. Once again, at the strategic level, DIGO has a prominent role, preparing target intelligence for use by HQJOC.
   
• Electronic warfare (EW), with its role in electronic reconnaissance, surveillance and signals intelligence (SIGINT), has tended to be the domain of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals (RASigs), particularly 7 Signal Regiment (7 Sig Regt), with more narrowly defined aspects of SIGINT analysis and staff functions falling to AUSTINT. Yet for both RASigs and AUSTINT corps personnel, the SIGINT/EW domain is not considered mainstream, inhibiting the prospects of developing a greater level of professional mastery. The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) is Defence’s strategic-level agency responsible for SIGINT. Like DIGO, DSD’s focus is not on resolving Army’s internal split-personality approach to this crucial specialist field.
   
• Human intelligence (HUMINT) is conducted by the Army’s 1st Intelligence Battalion (1 Int Bn), which consists almost exclusively of AUSTINT Corps personnel trained in ‘field HUMINT’ techniques at DIntTC. The formal HUMINT discipline in Army is less than a decade old and, due to operational demand, is in a significant growth stage. Yet in large part because of a lack of understanding of HUMINT amongst commanders, the use of 1 Int Bn’s full capabilities has tended to be unduly constrained. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that a majority of actionable intelligence gained in recent operations has been derived from this form of ISTAR. Not surprisingly, therefore, this thinly resourced unit is being beefed up under HNA. Like the other ISTAR functions, the HUMINT domain lacks a higher-level champion within Army. Such a champion could coordinate and support operational deployments in the form of trained staff while also ensuring that the raise, train and sustain (RTS) functions are streamlined and actioned with the necessary organisational strength.
   
• Soldiers as ISTAR nodes. While not trained as a HUMINT specialist, the individual soldier remains vital as an information collector, much as Australian soldiers have always been. Today, however, the soldier is increasingly networked; thus elevating the individual’s significance both as an ISTAR node and as potential ‘strategic privates’. What is more, the concept of every soldier as a sensor is only meaningful if the output of the soldier’s sensors value-adds to the wider picture. Such value-adding can only take place if the architecture and personnel are in place to take the information and process (fuse) it into timely and actionable intelligence. Indeed, the increased prominence of the strategic private points to the increased complexity of ISTAR management at battlegroup headquarters—and it is this complexity that makes the requests for better ISTAR management within Army such a pressing concern. In turn, this complexity points to the growing need for the orchestration of the full spectrum of ISTAR assets.
   
• Ground reconnaissance has always featured cavalry playing a prominent role. For the Australian Army, the infantry has been the predominant reconnaissance and surveillance tool, with foot- and vehicle-mounted patrols and observation posts. Today the cavalry and infantry arms (also now aviation, with the introduction of the ARH) are being equipped with more capable and sophisticated equipment, making them, more than ever, part of the networked ISTAR realm. Their ISTAR capabilities at the tactical level are vital, and their warfighting functions distinguish them from other ISTAR elements. The warfighting characteristics of cavalry and infantry also hold true for the special forces that, while equipped for surveillance and reconnaissance, are not generally considered as functionally specialising in ISTAR. Still, the important and increasingly networked ISTAR components of the cavalry, infantry, aviation and special forces need to be fostered holistically, considering their complementarity with Army’s other ISTAR capabilities.
   
• Battlegroup HQ ISTAR. The information gathering roles of infantry, cavalry and special forces receive less emphasis than their more dramatic manoeuvre role. For cavalry, in particular, the need in recent years to generate battlegroups to support operations has meant that the manoeuvre-unit role has been emphasised above the reconnaissance role. Yet the ‘find’ battle needs to be adroitly managed at the battlegroup level. It follows that the battlegroup headquarters could also be re-arranged to better accommodate ISTAR elements involved in the tactical ‘find’ battle. Such an adjustment would capitalise on the function of the S2 staffs on brigade and battlegroup headquarters, but would go beyond that functionality to more effectively exercise command and control over the ISTAR spectrum as an integral aspect of the battlegroup’s method of operating. Here, perhaps, the cavalry could play a prominent role, aided by other ISTAR domain practitioners, particularly once trained in ISTAR management.
   
• AUSTINT Role. Traditionally, AUSTINT personnel draw on their training in intelligence analysis and staff work, with specialisations in the ISTAR collection and reporting fields of HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT, and as well as field security (FS) and counterintelligence (CI). The ‘competitive advantage’ of AUSTINT personnel in key staff positions is that, in addition to their career focus on managing aspects of the ISTAR spectrum, they come with appropriate security clearances and working knowledge to perform these functions (including access to highly sensitive material) as their primary specialty. For personnel from other corps, these tend to be secondary or tertiary disciplines. While some AUSTINT personnel may be faulted for not fully understanding the fast-evolving capabilities of certain tactical collectors, they remain best placed to control the directing and processing components of the ISTAR cycle. After all, they are the only ones currently trained specifically to understand how to direct the collection efforts of ISTAR elements (the ‘sources and agencies’), process the collected material and then ensure appropriate and timely dissemination of fused and actionable intelligence. Theirs, however, is a small pool of specialist personnel that are in great demand. Consequently, other ISTAR component managers need to be prepared to play more prominent roles, advising on their collection capabilities, working more closely with the S2/J2.
   
• Joint ISTAR. Land force ISTAR managers also need to understand the capabilities of the other Services and national agencies’ ISTAR functions. Such capabilities include blue-force trackers, the Royal Australian Air Force’s Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) and Orion aircraft, as well as Royal Australian Navy’s multi-array ships platform sensors. The latter is best suited for the collection of acoustic intelligence (ACINT).
   
• Measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT) is a further aspect of the ISTAR realm that few understand let alone conceive of its tactical applications. This emerging field is likely to have considerable impact on the conduct of military operations once emergent capabilities evident at the strategic level are made available for ready access at the tactical level. Yet Army lacks a natural centre of excellence for integrating such developments.

This review of the ISTAR components demonstrates that, at the deployed operational and tactical level, currently the ‘go to’ place for ISTAR is the S2 staff. Essentially, this arrangement should continue, with the S2 providing that expertise, but the S2’s resources should be bolstered by an improved and increased ISTAR staffing footprint drawn from those domains that focus on specific ISTAR components. The solution is not simply to subordinate the S2 beneath a ‘patrol master’—who thinks he or she knows best but in fact has little if any exposure to and understanding of niche, complex, sensitive (often highly classified or compartmented) and networked collection systems. The solution is to more centrally place ISTAR in Army’s thinking about the way to train for and conduct military operations. Such repositioning would help raise a pool of officers who are trained to better manage the ISTAR spectrum. This review of ISTAR components also demonstrates that, beyond the new DGINT structure within HQJOC and the tactical-deployed operational domain, a ‘go to’ land ISTAR entity does not exists within Army to (1) manage the raise, train and sustain functions, (2) provide the operational planning advice and (3) coordinate in-barracks, developmental and operational requirements. This capability gaps points to the need for urgent organisational change.

Holistic Land ISTAR Management

For Army, its corps-specific approach to the management of the various ISTAR functions may have worked adequately in the major wars of the twentieth century, although even this is debatable. For those who have chosen their particular ISTAR field as a specialty, their parent corps have tended to view them as unnecessarily narrow to maintain their promotion prospects within that speciality. Thus, for instance, an officer trained in EW is well advised not to linger in the EW domain if he or she values a successful career in RASigs. Indeed the same has held true for those in AUSTINT and the survey domain of RAE. This approach is no longer tenable. After all, the Army needs to foster such specialists to a greater extent than ever before, offering them career prospects that do not frighten them into leaving the Army too soon. Arguably, the better generalist is one who has a degree of expertise in at least two of the ISTAR fields. In the case of AUSTINT, for example, anecdotal evidence suggests that J2/S2 staff that do not have a detailed understanding of more than one ISTAR domain (such as SIGINT or HUMINT), are too generalist. What this points to is the need to foster the right level of expertise within Army for an integrated approach to the whole ISTAR domain while still offering career development.

Making matters more complex is the fact that, until recently, most of the Army’s assets have been optimised to face a ‘low-level’ conventional threat. They have not necessarily been optimised for the complex counterinsurgencies—sometimes described as ‘war amongst the people’—that are being faced in the context of instant and global media coverage. Today, however, effective operations are dependent upon not generating undue resentment arising from ‘collateral damage’, which is caused by applying blunt lethal force against precise but poorly identified targets. Remote from home, in a culturally foreign land, such targets tend to be difficult to discriminate from the many others that they closely resemble. Yet the significance of making such mistakes is considerable and the consequences for Australia’s dispersed and vulnerable forces have never been greater.

In today’s world, the ISTAR detection ‘threshold’ has dropped below the level of detection capable of any particular ISTAR domain. No longer is it sufficient to be able to identify a village or town with insurgents just from a single-sourced report or grainy video picture. Under the watchful eye of the media and with tight legal and procedural constraints on using lethal force, a far greater level of precision and veracity is demanded by commanders from the ISTAR-enabling functions. Often the level of detail and reliability required resembles police-like forensic work in its quest for accuracy. The combination of the lower ISTAR ‘threshold’ and greater scrutiny points to the need for even better equipment, matched with superior ISTAR-focussed training and more refined procedures. Consequently, the calls for holistic management of the ISTAR spectrum are more important than ever.

The demand for holistic management of ISTAR support at brigade and battlegroup levels is reinforced by the need to enhance situational awareness, particularly for force protection purposes. Today, battlegroup commanders and even combat team and platoon commanders on operations near and far have a remarkable spectrum of forces allocated from the various ISTAR-related units. Yet that allocation has occurred with no-one other than the unit S2 staff being trained to maintain comprehensive oversight of the ISTAR spectrum available at the tactical level. While the S2 staff function remains pivotal, there remains a need for a wider pool of personnel trained in ISTAR management, much like the need for a pool of personnel from the combat arms who fully understand combat operations.

The importance of ISTAR management is illustrated by recent experience. For the Australian Overwatch Battle Group West (OBG(W)) in southern Iraq in 2006 and 2007, and the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) in Afghanistan in 2006, the mission of the combat and manoeuvre elements was not just informed by ISTAR but often driven by ISTAR priorities. Yet concerns have been expressed about the appropriate fusion point for all ISTAR assets. For instance, having a commanding officer (CO) as the single point of fusion for a plethora of information sources, rather than a subordinate ISTAR manager, has proven to be a risky arrangement. With the masses of information available, COs need the ISTAR fusion to be undertaken for them, enabling them to exercise unencumbered and clear-headed command. Recent experience points to the need for Army to provide a more systematic and well-rehearsed way of managing the complex and surprisingly pivotal tactical ISTAR domain.

Perhaps Army’s difficulties with regard to managing complex battlegroup ISTAR would best be addressed if the Army recognised the key unit of action as the battlegroup and configured the battlegroup ISTAR function accordingly. Conceivably, such a reconfiguration, even for periods in barracks, could act as a catalyst for some intuitive and creative thinking about how the Army can best reconcile the new centrality of ISTAR for modern-day complex warfighting. This would then prompt a reconsideration of doctrine to better explain how the ‘find’ battle should be conducted once deployed.

ISTAR Professional Mastery

Regardless of the centrality of the battlegroup, to be most effective the managers of ISTAR functions at the tactical through to the strategic level must better capitalise on the network of systems and capabilities available to them. Such effectiveness is best achieved by harnessing the various ISTAR components of the Army as well as the other ADF, national and allied intelligence assets that can support a deployed force. To capitalise on this latent capability, a new level of professional mastery of the ISTAR domain within Army is required. After all, recent operational experience has highlighted the primacy of intelligence as the driver of precision and effects-based operations. It is no longer adequate for the Army to consider ISTAR as a domain not requiring holistic and professional mastery. Expertise in, say, HUMINT, SIGINT or UAV’s alone does not offer commanders’ staff with the expertise to manage the increasingly complex spectrum of ISTAR functions required to deliver actionable results.

What is becoming increasingly clear is that, for land force operations to be effective, they need to be driven by well-managed and fused ISTAR, delivered to the commander with an unprecedented level of timeliness and fidelity. The so-called ‘all sources’ cell managed by the S2 is intended to be the point of fusion for the range of ISTAR-sourced information required by the commander for effective decision-making. Yet incidental evidence suggests that, with the exception of the special forces’ focussed and resourced all-source cell known as the fusion analysis and targeting cell (FATC), the approach taken to date is inadequate. After all, no-one ‘owns’ the ISTAR function and no-one is really mandated to be the champion for full spectrum ISTAR within Army. In other words, no-one has the mandate to coordinate Army’s adaptation to the rapid change evident in the ISTAR domain. Although managing ISTAR operations are technically an ‘ops’ or S3 function, S3 staff usually lack the expertise. What is more, with the numerous other functions they are responsible for, the management of ISTAR at battlegroup and formation level is often relegated to a lower priority—and so it typically falls back on the AUSTINT S2 to drive the ISTAR coordination. Yes, there are other staff officers with an ISTAR remit, but other than a small number of experienced officers, particularly in AUSTINT Corps, the Army offers them little in preparation. For most, their experience is from on-the-job experience or in narrowly defined components of ISTAR associated with their specific corps background and ISTAR specialisation. There is no organisational structure currently designed to harness and foster ISTAR support holistically at the various levels of land-force command on operations.

To date, the ‘all-sources’ intelligence cell has tended to be the exclusive domain of AUSTINT Corps officers trained primarily in intelligence staff functions, analysis and HUMINT operations. There is no question that the management of the processing (or fusion) and dissemination functions is a challenging field that requires a degree of specialisation apart from the specific operational management of ISTAR collection functions. To date, the AUSTINT Corps has focussed on performing these S2 functions, with training undertaken at DIntTC. Yet officers thus trained can lack sufficient experience in other ISTAR functions, and their skills do not necessarily extend to expertise in running a command and control node of an ISTAR asset such as UAVs or EW teams. After all, the collection operations function is performed in large part by members from other corps, ranging from artillery, engineers, aviation, armoured (cavalry) and infantry. In other words, line-managers of ISTAR information collection functions tend not to be AUSTINT Corps personnel and ISTAR commanders tend to be excluded from management of the ‘all source’ direction, processing (or ‘fusion’) and dissemination functions, being left instead to focus on their single-source collection activities.

In the Information Age, however, at a time when situational awareness and information dominance plays such a large part of the commanders’ conceptual space, professional mastery of ISTAR is arguably beyond what can be reasonably expected from any one corps within Army—particularly a small corps such as AUSTINT. Without question, AUSTINT maintains an advantage in usually having the requisite security clearances (and access to sensitive information) and in having robust training and experience in managing the intelligence process. As the Army becomes more networked, the imperative is growing for holistic ISTAR mastery beyond the scope of any one corps. The requirement for a higher-level ISTAR champion within Army is becoming increasingly apparent. What is more, such a champion needs to have an adapted organisation that supports such a focus, with ISTAR focal points formalised throughout the chain of command—both for the raise, train and sustain functions (including force development) that Army performs at home and for the tactical functions performed as part of deployed JTFs.

Training for 'All ISTAR', Like 'All Combat Arms'

The solution is not simply to replace AUSTINT Corps officers as managers of the intelligence function with those from arms corps. Yet the fact that this has been primarily the domain of the AUSTINT Corps has perhaps added to the inertia from those with other corps backgrounds who have resisted such change, perhaps unwittingly, not seeing the need to overcome the bureaucratic sluggishness because of not sensing that they owned the problem that requires solution. Indeed, on their own, the facts about ISTAR addressed in this article amount only to a series of interesting observations; but when drawn together, they clarify the urgency of the issue at hand.

The call for broader ISTAR mastery also points to the need for the currently disparate aspects of Army’s ISTAR capability to be aggregated and re-positioned as a force-multiplying arm of the Army and as part of the joint and Defence-wide team. Indeed, Army’s current arrangements concerning the traditional ISTAR disciplines are no longer adequate for the task at hand. No doubt, continued development of expertise is required in the core ISTAR specialisations of HUMINT, IMINT, LOCINT, GEOINT, SIGINT and EW, as well as the other capabilities normally associated with target acquisition, reconnaissance and surveillance and the emergent MASINT field. Today’s challenges point to the need to breakdown the expertise ‘stovepipes’ and develop a reliable cadre of cross-trained experts and staff specialists who are trained on an ISTAR course. Such a course would specifically enable them to ‘manage the intelligence battlespace’, exercising command and control over the spectrum of ISTAR assets and contributing to intelligence fusion of ISTAR product. Only then will Army be able to fully benefit from emerging technologies across the ISTAR-related disciplines. Until an effort is made to start breaking down these barriers in the training environment, and making exposure to full-spectrum ISTAR part of the standard collective training cycle for each organisation involved, then Army will not be able to achieve the requisite level of ISTAR fidelity on operations. This approach is needed to develop staff who can, on behalf of commanders, manage the full spectrum with a sound understanding of its components. At the same time, that will only happen when commanders themselves have a clear understanding of the new centrality of ISTAR management.

Critics may contend that such a proposal dismisses the inherent value of having the traditional corps allocation of responsibility for various ISTAR functions. The argument made here is not intended to overturn those arrangements but to enhance them. In fact, a wholesale rush to abandon, for instance, the specialist intelligence management of the four phases of the intelligence cycle (direction, collection, processing [or fusion] and dissemination) would be harmful for Army. A solution lies in opening up the realm of ISTAR management to members of ISTAR-related corps who have experience in the field and who can be given intelligence staff management training. An ‘all ISTAR’ management training program could be developed (much as the Army has already developed for its ‘all combat arms’) for those who have worked with the various ‘INTs’ and who have the aptitude and inclination to take up the ISTAR challenge, regardless of their corps background. The argument made here is that the time has come for such an outcome. Training Command, particularly DIntTC, is the logical repository for such a course.

Training Command, Land Command & Management of ISTAR

To date, Training Command has recognised the similarities in management requirements for some of the schools covering aspects of the ISTAR spectrum. Thus, the Schools of Signals, EW and Languages (a critical enabler for HUMINT) are to be grouped under a Command Support Directorate within Training Command. Yet there is scope for this to be expanded further, incorporating the full spectrum of ISTAR-related training courses across Training Command. Such an expansion could include DIntTC, where IMINT and HUMINT, as well as intelligence staff and management training, is conducted. Other schools could also be tied in, particularly the School of Military Engineering’s Geomatic Engineering Wing and the School of Artillery’s Surveillance and Target Acquisition Wing.

Within Land Command, a similar re-alignment is called for. At the end of 2006, ISTAR-related units were delegated from Land Command to an already busy Headquarters 1st Division (HQ 1 Div). This new arrangement coincides with the greater prominence of ISTAR capabilities resident in 1 Topo Svy Sqn, 20 STA, 7 Sig Regt and 1 Int Bn for the current types of operations conducted in Australia’s region and in the Middle East. Without other adjustments, this potentially creates an internal staff imbalance whereby HQ 1 Div commands three brigades and six direct command units.

This surge in workload for the divisional headquarters, without an intermediate headquarters for ISTAR-related units, portends the need for the brigading of ISTAR assets to act as the coordinator and fusion master for the 1st Division and the wider Army. An ISTAR group could be structured to provide both collectors and the ISTAR staff bricks to perform the C2 and fusion functions at any level of deployed command. Already Army has seen the wisdom in brigading its aviation and logistics elements, with considerable benefits accrued. Their experience, and the increasing prominence of ISTAR assets for the effective conduct of operations, suggests brigading of ISTAR is also required. Such an arrangement would see a one-star headquarters basically dedicated to championing the ISTAR cause— in capability development, training, planning, and ongoing support and sustainment of operations. This would then become Army’s logical focal point for furthering all of the issues and deficiencies identified in this article. Indeed, as per the aviation and logistic examples, the ISTAR components’ habitual relationships with the combat brigades would remain. The creation of an ISTAR brigade would be intended to enhance rather than detract from such relationships.

One way in which an ISTAR brigade could provide that enhancement would be to act as the focal point for the input into the development and science and technology domains concerning emergent ISTAR capabilities. Such an arrangement would facilitate focussed research and rapid acquisition in conjunction with key agencies. Such agencies include the Capability Development Executive (CDE), the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), the Intelligence and Security (I&S) Group, HQJOC and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), particularly the Land Operations and ISR Divisions. It is not too late for such changes to be incorporated in the HNA plan.

The imperative for such change within Army is growing thanks to the continuing emergence of technical solutions, often developed at the national level, that tend to take years before deployable tactical applications are readily available. Such applications are slow to ‘trickle down’, in part because of the lack of an organisational conduit through which to deliver them quickly into the tactical domain, not as an afterthought. The creation of an ISTAR brigade would help ensure that respective national and tactical capabilities are properly aligned and networked.

Detractors may argue that such an aggregated arrangement was tried and failed in the early-to mid-1990s with the creation of the RISTA Regiment, which attempted to merge what was then the 1st Intelligence Company and 131 Divisional Locating Battery. However, that attempt sought to bring together two dissimilar entities at unit level. The arrangement was complicated by inappropriate oversight and by being poorly resourced. What is more, it was attempted in a period when ISTAR functionality had not yet proven to be so central to Army’s ability to conduct complex warfighting. After all, at the time there was no operational imperative for making ISTAR work because Army was not deployed on operations, and ISTAR was ‘out of sight, out of mind’. Today, it is the very complexity—both of the ISTAR systems and the battlespace—that now demands a more holistic approach to the management of these disparate but crucial elements. It is these ISTAR elements that enable the combat forces to excel in the midst of adversity and complexity.

Such holistic ISTAR management needs to include a reconsideration of how to employ ISTAR staff at each level, from HQJOC down to JTF and battlegroup level. Unless each level of headquarters has a properly trained and resourced staff dedicated to managing ISTAR coordination, then the practical application of this ISTAR concept will likely not improve very much. After all, Army has already learnt the lesson about the need for dedicated information operations (IO) and civil-military-cooperation (CIMIC) staff to be allocated to JTFs. This article points to the need for a similar concept for ISTAR management, with properly trained and resourced ISTAR staff.

Conclusion

On operations near and far, ISTAR is playing a much more prominent role in the effective conduct of land-based operations. Not only has the available spectrum of ISTAR assets increased significantly with the advent of new and better-networked technologies, but the demand has grown for the delivery of fused ISTAR-derived information down to the lowest tactical levels. The prominence of ISTAR stems from the complex and volatile nature of today’s conflicts against fast-adapting adversaries who are difficult to distinguish from non-combatants within the communities in which they operate. This prominence also stems from the societal expectations for precision, accountability and casualty minimisation.

The criticality of ISTAR for modern land-based operations points to the need for it to be re-positioned more centrally in Army’s intellectual construct. Indeed, the circumstances that have led to the development of the Hardened and Networked Army have also led to the increased significance of ISTAR for land-based operations. In order to capitalise both on the experience gained incidentally in managing ISTAR on operations to date, and on the organisational developments at the operational and strategic levels, there needs to be a re-organisation of Army’s ISTAR components. Such a move would see the brigading of ISTAR assets within Land Command with a clear ISTAR ‘champion’ identified, the holistic management of ISTAR training domains within a single directorate of Training Command, and the creation of an ISTAR staff management training program that encompasses officers from all the ISTAR domains, much as has already taken place with ‘all combat arms’ training. Admittedly, the ISTAR training program would require development and fine tuning, but the organisational change could take place quickly. The result would be an Army operationally focussed by its networked ISTAR capability—a truly amazing Army.

Endnote

1  In this sense, fusion involves the processing (analysis and integration) of information from a wide spectrum of collection sources to provide high quality, timely and actionable all-source intelligence.