Skill at Arms Training in Non-combat Units

Abstract

As unconventional forces shift their efforts to attacking ‘softer’ targets—such as supply convoys, logistics bases and headquarters—to avoid the lethal firepower of combat units, soldiers that have traditionally not needed ‘skill at arms’ come under fire. The author argues that non-arms corps troops require a higher level of marksmanship training to cope with an increasing likelihood of engaging in close combat.

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Introduction

One of the stranger actions of the Second World War occurred on 6 February 1944 in the jungles of Arakan, Burma, when the Headquarters (HQ) and Signallers of a Japanese Regiment attacked the HQ of 7 Indian Division and nearly captured its commander, Major General Messervy.¹ Thus started the battle of the Admin Box, where a collection of HQ and logistics units from XV Corps, reinforced by infantry and tanks, held off the best part of a Japanese division for two weeks. There are a number of similarities between the battle of the Admin Box and situations in which the Australian Army could find itself today. The Admin Box was an open plain surrounded by jungle covered hills—under current terminology this would be classed as complex terrain. Most logistic areas and headquarters are now deployed in complex terrain, albeit in an urban environment. Yet, much like the jungle, which provided the Japanese with sufficient cover to infiltrate through a divisional defensive position, the urban environment provides an enemy with many opportunities to close with and attack such a position.

One of the critical vulnerabilities of any military force is the HQ and logistic support element. Both require large areas to deploy in and have limited capacity for self-defence. This has not changed since the Napoleonic era when large standing armies became the norm. What has altered is the complexity of the logistic and communication requirements of an army, which make these assets a prime target for the enemy. The defence of the modern ‘rear area’ is therefore as crucial, if not more so, to operational success as it was at the time of the battle of Admin Box.

Although the Allied superiority in firepower, air support and poor Japanese decision-making led to the Japanese failure to capture the Admin Box,² its successful defence required clerks, signallers, cooks and drivers to defend substantial portions of the perimeter.³ This is no different to the circumstances armies face today, where a HQ or logistics node is responsible for its own defence with the assistance of a Force Protection Company Group.

As described in Land Warfare Doctrine 1, the ‘preparation for conflict must anticipate and incorporate the full array of credible threat capabilities’.⁴ Thus, to ensure that the non-combat arms soldiers of today are as capable of defending their position as were the defenders of the Admin Box, it is essential that our training prepares them for such a situation.

This paper argues that the current marksmanship training regime for soldiers in non-combat arms units does not adequately prepare them for combat. It will examine current doctrine and policies, the operational setting, specific deficiencies in training, and propose a program for improving shooting to a point where soldiers are prepared for combat. Whilst much of what is discussed in this paper is relevant to all weapon systems, only the by-day training for the F88 Austeyr will be discussed. In addition, the term ‘soldier’ in this paper refers to a soldier from a non-combat arms unit, as does the term ‘unit’.⁵ This includes soldiers from all the corps except Infantry, Artillery, Armour, Engineers and Aviation—the Arms Corps. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the Army’s current marksmanship training in preparing non-combat arms soldiers for operations and to propose an improved marksmanship training model.

Minimum Qualifications

The F88 Austeyr is the standard individual weapon (IW) of the Australian Defence Force, including the Australian Army. All members of the Army are trained on the F88 Austeyr weapon as part of their initial training. F88 training consists of three stages: Weapon Qualification; All Corps Marksmanship Proficiency; and Advanced Marksmanship Proficiency.⁶ Weapon qualification requires soldiers to pass the F88 Weapon Training Test (WTT) and a qualification shoot. Passing this stage is a prerequisite for progression to marksmanship proficiency training.

All Corps Marksmanship Proficiency consists of grouping and application of fire practices. Successful completion of this stage means that soldiers can engage stationary targets up to 300m and engage moving targets up to 100m using both supported and unsupported, using deliberate and rapid techniques from all conventional firing positions, with a hit probability rate of 70 per cent.⁷ Live Fire (LF) 6 is the stage two qualifying shoot. It is important to note that the minimum engagement distance for these shoots is 100m. Stage two is the standard that recruits are expected to achieve prior to completion of their recruitment course and is the minimum standard required for operational service.⁸ This is also the maximum standard achieved by the majority of soldiers of non-combat arms units throughout their Army career. Advanced Marksmanship Proficiency is the final stage and consists of advanced skills such as firing in bursts, instinctive firing and individual and team battle shooting. Generally only soldiers of arms corps participate in this advanced level of training.

The Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN) dictates that all members of the Army are to be assessed on their individual weapons proficiency every six months. This consists of passing the F88 WTT and LF1 Grouping Practice.⁹ The AIRN requirement ensures that all soldiers are able to handle and fire their weapons safely, but does not prepare soldiers for operational shooting.

Other Doctrine and Policy

Training the Battle Shot

The Manual of Land Warfare Volume Two, Part Nine, Pamphlet One (MLW 2-9-1) entitled ‘Training the Battle Shot’ (now obsolescent but yet to be replaced by LWP-G 7-4-1) describes the Army’s methodology for skill at arms training. This doctrine describes the training stages, frequency and type of shooting to be conducted. Under this doctrine, Weapon User Category (WUC) C units (soldiers who use small arms primarily for self-protection—which equates to non-combat arms corps units) of Readiness Category one and two units (from zero to 90 days Notice To Move (NTM)), were annually required to complete shoots up to and including individual battle shooting. Readiness Category one units (zero to 28 days NTM) were also required to participate in team battle shooting (up to a maximum of section strength).¹⁰ This progression resulted in soldiers being trained up to a point where they had fired under realistic battle conditions.

Shooting is a skill that degrades relatively quickly without practice. As a result, MLW 2-9-1 dictated the requirement for continuation shooting in addition to qualification shooting. This allocated ammunition to WUC C units so that each soldier could fire a zeroing and elementary application of fire shoot twice annually in addition to the annual qualification shoots. Whilst this doctrine has now been declared obsolete, the reason for continuation shooting remains—and will continue to remain—sound. It is unknown what the doctrinal policy on continuation shooting will be in the yet-to-be-released LWP-G 7-4-1 Combat Shooting.

Likewise, the 1st Division (1 Div) has issued a Division Firepower Policy (DFP).¹¹ This document justifies both the ammunition requirements for 1 Div and prescribes the shooting standards that 1 Div units are to achieve according to their Readiness Category and WUC. The DFP only uses two WUC, which delineates between those personnel who are expected to use the weapon in combat (WUC A) as opposed to those expected only to use their weapon in self-defence (WUC B—equivalent to WUC C under MLW 2-9-1). The minimum shooting standards for non-combat units (WUC B) include personnel passing the AIRN requirement (LF1) biannually and completing the Basic marksmanship proficiency practices annually on the WTSS. Live firing is limited to the LF2 (Zeroing practice) and LF6 (Application of Fire practice) annually.¹²

In the Logistic Support Force (LSF), where a large proportion of non-combat arms units reside, the shooting policy for the self protection of small arms users are the same as that required under the DFP.¹³

Comparison

Whilst the shooting requirements, in terms of rounds fired, between MLW 2-9-1 and the Division Firepower Policy does not vary significantly for self protection small-arms users, the type and frequency of shooting does.¹⁴ MLW 2-9-1 contained a progression, which resulted in soldiers participating in individual, and for high-readiness units, team battle shooting. MLW 2-9-1 also ensured the requirement for continuation shooting was specifically stated, with ammunition allocated for two other shooting periods during the year. Thus, according to this now obsolete doctrine, a soldier could, in a well-organised shooting program, expect to fire his weapon with live ammunition at intervals of no greater than four months. The DFP on the other hand, does not authorise any battle shooting for the self protection of small-arms users and, realistically, there is no continuation shooting (apart from grouping practices). Due to the requirement to complete WTSS shoots prior to live firing, a soldier will generally only participate in a shooting period once per year.

As can be seen, under current formation policies, the types and frequency of shoots have been significantly reduced, whilst the environment in which a non-combat arms soldier is expected to operate has increased in complexity. An understanding of current and future operational environments will be discussed in the next section.

Operational Setting

MLW 2-9-1 describes the operational setting in which a soldier will use his individual weapon. For non-combat arms units (which include Combat Signals Regiments, Joint Support Unit, Combat Service Support Battalions, Force Support Battalions, Health Support Battalions and unit echelons), this will most likely mean a defensive or patrolling role.

In a defensive position, the operational setting is based on an enemy attack over open terrain providing fields of fire out to the maximum effective range of the weapon.¹⁵ This envisages soldiers firing single aimed shots at this range (300m for the F88), with the requirement for short bursts at multiple moving targets as the enemy assault approaches the defensive position. During patrolling, it is likely that the firer will engage, or be engaged by, ‘a fleeting, probably moving, target or multiple targets with quick, aimed single shots, automatic fire or instinctive fire from the waist’.¹⁶ The generic environments described are based on a conventional warfare scenario and do not necessarily reflect the modern battlefield. For example, there is no mention of the urban environment or enemy mixing with civilians.

Modern Environment

Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, describes the modern battlespace.¹⁷ One of the key changes is the replacement of the linear battlefield concept with ‘non-linearity’, where military operations are conducted throughout the battlespace and require greater force protection due to increased threats. As stated in LWD 1, ‘Forces operating in support areas will often face as much risk as those actively conducting combat operations’.¹⁸ Urbanisation on a global scale also increases the likelihood that operations will be conducted in an urban environment.

The Chief of Army’s Directive 01/06, ‘Developing the Australian Soldier of the 21st Century’, further describes the complex environment which soldiers are expected to operate in and the behaviours that underpin success in complex warfighting.¹⁹ Some of the key behaviours (with the italicised portions denoting the author’s reference to shooting) are:

• Every soldier is an expert in close combat. (Every soldier can operate their IW safely, accurately and fast in a complex environment where engagements may take place from zero metres outwards where the enemy may be difficult to distinguish from the civilian population).  
   
• Every soldier is a leader. (Every soldier should be able to direct the fire of a group/ section of soldiers using fire control orders in a combat environment).  
   
• Every soldier is physically tough. (Every soldier should be able to participate in close combat wearing full equipment (helmet, body armour, webbing etc) in extremes of climate, despite being fatigued and still be capable of operating their IW safely, accurately and fast).  
   
• Every soldier is mentally prepared. (Every soldier is confident of their ability to operate their IW safely, accurately and fast in a complex environment where enemy threats are unexpected in their nature, timing and direction).

Combat experience. Recent Military operations, both by Australian and other forces, have shown that the majority of non-combat units will deploy to an urban area and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. These units are also responsible for their own protection, especially during the early and most vulnerable stages of an operation, when the tasks for combat forces outweigh the resources available.²⁰

An example of the situation in which a noncombat arms unit could find itself was demonstrated by the US Army’s 507th Maintenance Company on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah in Iraq. In an action lasting 90 minutes, eleven soldiers were killed, seven captured and nine wounded out of a total of thirty three.²¹ This logistic unit, without any protection, less its own individual weapons and vehicle mounted machine guns, found itself engaged by enemy forces in an urban environment and had difficulty identifying the enemy, some of whom had been waving at them only minutes before contact was initiated. Furthermore, a large number of the soldiers’ weapons malfunctioned during this action. Australian forces could find themselves in similar situations in the future. Given the Australian public’s rightful objection to military casualties, an incident such as this could have political consequences far greater than the casualties caused. Thus, unless we train and prepare our non-combat arms soldiers for similar situations, these units will become not only a critical vulnerability but a soft target as well.

Shooting standards. A review of post operations reports from Vietnam, Somalia and East Timor²² all indicate that contacts will continue to take place at close range against a fleeting target. Below are two quotes regarding marksmanship from Vietnam and Somalia respectively:

Marksmanship is still a problem and efforts will continue to be made to improve shooting to the stage where soldiers can engage small fleeting targets (the head and shoulders of the enemy) and be confident of hitting them.²³

Due to the closeness of buildings and dense low vegetation, all contacts took place at ranges of less than 100 metres. Most contacts were in villages and towns, at night, at ranges of less than forty metres. There are a number of similarities to close contacts that may be experienced in northern Australia and the ADMI. Battle shooting training should emphasise the necessary techniques for these situations.²⁴

The above comments are from infantry units. If infantry units have difficulty in effectively engaging the enemy on combat operations, it is natural to expect that shooting standards from soldiers in non-combat arms corps units will be lower.

Threats. Given the environment in which non-combat arms until are likely to be deployed, the likely threats to them will include:

• vehicle ambush (including IED);  
   
• drive by shootings;  
   
• civil unrest;  
   
• conventional attack;  
   
• Indirect attack (Mortar, rockets etc); and  
   
• sniper fire.

Summary

After examining the likely operational environment in which soldiers are expected to use their individual weapons, certain characteristics (with regards to shooting skills) emerge; namely that:

• contacts will be initiated with little, if any, warning;  
   
• contacts will take place at short range. It is probable that most contacts will take place at the 0–100m range. (It should be noted that experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that some contacts will take place at over 300m.²⁵ However, it is more important to be able to react to threats at short range than those at long range);  
   
• the enemy will be a fleeting target, often at short range, and possibly merging into a civilian population; and  
   
• the soldier will have to be wearing helmet, body armour and webbing. (They will also generally be fatigued and have an elevated heart rate due to the stress of the situation.)

Deficiencies in Skills at Arms Training in Non-Arms Corps Units

There is a significant gap between the Australian Army’s doctrine and policies when compared to the operational environment in which a soldier is expected to use his weapon. Whilst our current training may skill soldiers to operate a weapon safely and minimise the number of negligent discharges, it does not adequately prepare them to use their weapon in combat. This is a core requirement of the Chief of Army’s ‘Soldier of 21st century’ vision that every soldier should be an expert in close combat. The major discrepancies are described below.

Frequency of Shooting

MLW 2-9-1 states that soldiers who have achieved the required operational standard should fire their personal weapon on a monthly basis. This compares with current policies which, when implemented, realistically mean that shooting (with the exception of grouping) is conducted annually.²⁶ In addition, dry shooting is rarely, if ever, conducted in units. Because shooting is a skill that degrades quickly, when skill at arms training is conducted, most of the available time is spent maintaining those skills (i.e. training to pass LF6); hence there is no time available to improve so as to progress to more advanced skills.

Types of Shooting

Under current policies, soldiers are not required to practise individual or team battle shooting. The highest standard, which most soldiers achieve, is LF6—a far more challenging shoot than the previous LF9 (Elementary Application of Fire Qualification Shoot).²⁷ Despite this, the LF6 does not replicate battle conditions and is not an adequate preparation for combat. Specific deficiencies include:

• Dress. Shoots are conducted in patrol order. Additional equipment, which will be carried on operations, includes a Kevlar helmet and ballistic vest. Shooting wearing this equipment is quite different to shooting in webbing. 
   
• Stress. Soldiers only practise shooting on a mound in relative comfort and without having to deal with the effects of fatigue or arousal due to physical exertion. This also applies to soldiers’ weapon handling skills.  
   
• Range. Shooting is only conducted at known ranges (100m, 200m and 300m). Shooting is not practised at ranges of less than 100m (the most likely range at which a soldier will use his weapon in combat) or at unknown ranges. Instinctive or close quarter battle is not practised.  
   
• Unconventional firing positions. Soldiers are not practised in using unconventional firing positions (such as firing from a vehicle).  
   
• Rules of Engagement (ROE). Soldiers are not practised in applying ROE.

Unit Training

Skill at arms training conducted in most units is not of a high standard. Weaknesses include:

• A limited review (if any) of marksmanship principles prior to either shooting (WTSS or Live) or dry firing;  
   
• Limited use of Small Arms Coaches. There are generally few Small Arms Coaches in Units and in many cases they are not used appropriately or at all. Often the approach to rectify shooting weaknesses is for the firer to fire practice after practice until they qualify. This is wasteful in time and ammunition. It is also detrimental to the firer’s confidence with the weapon and fails to rectify any weaknesses;  
   
• The minimal use of WTSS facilities which have excellent diagnostic tools for firers.  
   
• Limited (if any) concurrent training conducted during range practices. As most non-combat units have little time available for weapon or fieldcraft training, much of this time at the range is therefore wasted.  
   
• The lack of appointment of unit master coaches. This means that there is no one appointed to coordinate shooting training within the unit and raise standards. This does not alleviate command responsibility, but shooting is only one of the myriad of responsibilities of a commander and, due to time pressures, is generally well down the priority list.

Minimum Standards

The Australian Army’s doctrine and policies only state the minimum requirements for shooting—with the exception of ammunition. Under the mission command concept, units can use both their initiative and facilities such as the WTSS to improve soldier skills and achieve higher standards. In most units, however, only the minimum standards will be attained. There are a number of reasons for this, most of which relate to time and corporate governance requirements which mean that commanders at all levels are focused on issues other than skill at arms training. There is also no immediate impact on a commander for failing to meet shooting requirements. Unlike financial, equipment management, equity, occupational health and safety (OH&S) or security issues, a commander will not be sacked because his unit’s shooting standards fail to meet the prescribed requirements.

Improving Skill at Arms Standards

As can be seen by an examination of the doctrine, training and policies of the Australian Army when compared against probable operational scenarios, there is a disconnect for all units and non-combat arms units in particular. The doctrine is based on a perfect world, which is impossible for units to implement due to time and resource constraints. There is a requirement to align our shooting doctrine, policy and training with the likely operational environment to give our soldiers the best chance of success (and survival) on the modern battlefield. The next section of this paper will present a program for improving a soldier’s marksmanship skills to a level required for combat operations.

Shooting Program

Weapon handling. The current weapon training tests are safety orientated. There are good reasons for this. For personnel in units other than Land Command, this level of training is sufficient to maintain a soldier’s ability to safely operate the F88. However, for those soldiers posted to a high readiness unit, the WTT does not adequately replicate the conditions of the battlefield. An additional test is required to assess a soldier’s ability to handle their weapon safely under physical pressures (such as fatigue and a heightened heart rate) and time constraints. It is envisaged that this test should be completed in addition to the standard AIRN WTT.

By way of an example, advanced WTT would be conducted after some form of battle physical training (PT)—possibly the Combat Support Fitness Assessment (CSFA)—when the soldier is physically fatigued and has a heightened heart rate, whilst dressed in equipment that is likely to be worn on operations (such as a helmet, ballistic vest and webbing). The activity could be overlaid onto an activity such as the Run Dodge Jump (RDJ) component of the CSFA and incorporate (throughout the course) changing weapon states, immediate action and stoppage drills. Moreover, every soldier would have to complete the course within a specified timeframe.

Marksmanship. As has been identified, both the frequency and type of shooting conducted by units is insufficient. Table 1 contains a shooting program for noncombat arms units with respect to Readiness Category One or Two.

Live versus WTSS. The WTSS is an excellent facility for developing shooting skills, but as described in Command it will never replace the need for live fire.28 The proposed shooting program allocates ammunition to those shoots which soldiers are most likely to face on operations, whilst the remainder are practised on the WTSS.

Frequency. This shooting program will see soldiers shoot every four months, with one of those periods containing the lead up to and conduct of live firing. Whilst it would be ideal for soldiers to fire monthly, this would require an increase in WTSS facilities. Despite this, soldiers should dry fire their weapons each month, which should be incorporated into Unit Non Technical Inspection (NTI) programs. This would not place a great burden on units, as it only requires an additional five to ten minutes for a soldier to dry fire 10 shots from each shooting position after completing a NTI.

Table 1: Proposed self-protection small-arms users shooting program

Ser	Shoot	WTSS	Live	Remarks
1	LF1—Grouping Practice	3
	LF2—Zeroing Practice		1
2	LF6—Application of Fire Practice	3		Each soldier is given two opportunities to pass LF6 on each visit to the WTSS
3	Instinctive Shooting Practice	1
4	Close Quarter Battle Practice	2	1
5	Introductory battle shooting	1	1	Units choose. Could include Section Defence Range, Sneaker range

Type. All regular soldiers are required to qualify in LF6 prior to marching out of the Army Recruitment Training Centre (ARTC). Whilst at ARTC, soldiers conduct all of the shoots from LF1 to LF6. The program noted here does not include these shoots. The majority of soldiers will pass LF6 after one or two attempts and can then progress to more advanced shoots. Those who fail the LF6 after two attempts on the WTSS should be directed to a remedial shooting program, which would include the intervening shoots. After qualifying on LF6, soldiers would then participate in the instinctive shooting practice or close quarter battle practice. The instinctive or un-aimed shoot practices soldiers in engaging targets at close range without taking an aimed shot. The close quarter battle shoot practices snap shooting at distances from 25m to 100m whilst changing positions. These two shoots replicate the types of shooting that a soldier will likely be exposed to in combat. This is the reason why live ammunition is allocated to the close quarter battle shoot.

In addition, each soldier should be exposed to some form of live-fire battle shooting each year, such as a sneaker practice, section defence practice, or fire and movement practice. The reason these shoots have not been stipulated is that units should have the freedom to choose which shoot is most relevant to them. This would also allow units to change the types of shoot each year so that the majority of soldiers, over a posting, would be exposed to different forms of battle shooting. This shooting program is an increase of only three WTSS shoots per year per soldier and one live shoot per year per soldier. Therefore, the resource implications of adopting this program are minimal and, indeed, if viewed from the operational preparedness level of our soldiers, the program is a vast improvement on the current standards.

Dress. All shooting should be conducted in the dress that soldiers are likely to wear on operations. The standard dress should therefore be patrol order with helmet and body armour.

Remedial training. Soldiers who fail the LF1 or LF6 after two attempts on the WTSS should be directed into a remedial training program. This would be coordinated by the Unit Master Coach and include the intermediate shoots between LF1 and LF6 and individual coaching to raise marksmanship standards.

Reporting. Currently there is very little reporting on shooting standards apart from AIRN statistics and Army Capability Management System Post Activity Reports. Marksmanship standards, just like equipment availability and personnel readiness, are an important part of operational preparedness. Units should be required to report annually on the percentage of soldiers who have met the requirements of this shooting program and also the actions being taken to remedy deficiencies.

Summary

This section has detailed a program which is designed to raise the marksmanship standards of soldiers and better prepare them for the type of shooting they would be expected to undertake on operations. It aligns shooting training with likely operational scenarios and will improve a soldier’s confidence in weapon handling and shooting skills by exposing them to more advanced training with a minimal increase in resources.

Some people will argue that not firing the intermediate practices between LF2 and LF6 (Introductory application of fire practices) will result in many soldiers failing LF6. I would argue that the majority of soldiers would indeed pass, because under such a program they would fire this practice more regularly than at present and, in addition, would conduct dry shooting training on a monthly basis. Their marksmanship skills would therefore be maintained at a higher level year round. A further argument is that even if soldiers do fail LF6, this will not prevent them from being deployed on operations. As soldiers deployed on operations will be expected to shoot in combat conditions, they need to shoot in similar conditions during their training.

Conclusion

The Australian Army has gained significant operational experience since the INTERFET deployment in 1999. What has not been gained, particularly for our noncombat arms soldiers is combat experience. This has resulted in the marksmanship standards expected of these soldiers reducing to a level less than that required for combat. Whilst it is easy to adapt a military force trained in conventional warfare to other tasks such as peacekeeping, the reverse is not true. This paper has examined the Australian Army’s current marksmanship training doctrine and policies against likely operational scenarios. It has shown that our marksmanship training for noncombat arms units fails to meet the Chief of Army’s aim of every soldier becoming an expert in close combat. This requires a higher level of marksmanship training than that being currently achieved. As a result, a shooting program has been proposed which would, if adopted, better prepare Australian soldiers for operations. Given that large elements of the Army are expected to deploy on combat operations at short notice, it is imperative that marksmanship skills be improved. Whilst the benefits of improving marksmanship skills are not immediately apparent, our success, or lack thereof, will be measured when Australian soldiers are engaged in combat.

Endnotes

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1     Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941–45, Phoenix Giant, London, 1984, pp. 175–76.

2     Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941–45, p. 177.

3     Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941–45, p. 184.

4     Commonwealth of Australia, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Australian Army, Puckapunyal, VIC, 2002, p. 34.

5     The term ‘non-combat arms unit’ does not mean that the unit will not be involved in combat, but rather that its primary battlefield role is to provide support, in one form or another, to the combat forces.

6     Commonwealth of Australia, LWP-G 7-4-12 5: 56MM Austeyr Individual Weapon Family F88, F88C, F88SA1. F88T and 40MM Grenade Launcher Attachment, Vol 1, Australian Army, Puckapunyal, VIC 2004, chapter 1, paragraph 1–6.

7     Australian Army LWP-G 7-4-12 5: Vol. 3, chapter 9, paragraph 9–11.

8     Ibid.

9     Department of Defence, Defence Instruction (Army) 80-1, Army Individual Readiness Notice, Army Headquarters, Canberra, ACT, 2005, p. 3, paragraph 10f.

10    Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), Manual of Land Warfare 2-9-1: Training the Battle Shot, Headquarters Training Command, Georges Heights, NSW, 1993, annex A to chapter 2, p. 2A–1.

11    Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), DJFHQ Standing Orders—Part 1, chapter 5, ‘Shooting in the 1st Division’, Enoggra, QLD.

12    Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), DJFHQ Standing Orders—Part 1 annex B, p. 5B-2.

13    Commander Logistic Support Force Training Directive 07/04, annex C—Shooting.

14    It should, however, be noted that the majority of shooting under the DFP is conducted on the WTSS with only zeroing and qualification shoots being fired live. All shoots were fired live under MLW 2-9-1.

15    Australian Army, 1993, Manual of Land Warfare 2-9-1: Training the Battle Shot, chapter 1, paragraphs 1–5 to 1–10.

16    Ibid, paragraph 1-14.

17    Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2002.

18    Ibid, p. 44.

19    Australian Army, Chief of Army Directive 01/06, Developing the Australian Soldier of the 21st Century, 2006.

20    The 1st Joint Support Unit, during both INTERFET and Operation ANODE, was responsible for providing its own Force Protection during the initial stages of the operation prior to security being established. During INTERFET, soldiers from DJFHQ, 1 JSU and co-located units were responsible for perimeter security during the hours of darkness.

21    United States Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003 An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 2003, p. 15.

22   Australian Army, 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, Operation Citadel Post Operational Report, appendix 1 to annex D, 2001, paragraph 36.

23    This refers to 6 RAR in Vietnam in September 1966. See Australian Army, Training Information Bulletin Number 69 Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam 1965–71, 1988, chapter 6, p. 6–4, paragraph 616.

24    Australian Army, 1 RAR Battalion Group Post Operation Report Operation Solace, 1993, p. 12.

25    Centre for Army Lessons, Command: Observations and Lessons from Army Operations, 2005 ed., p. 18.

26    Under the DFP, a self-protection small-arms user is authorised to fire LF2 to LF6 once a year using the WTSS and LF2 and LF6 once a year live fire. In order not to waste live ammunition, lead-up shooting is conducted at the WTSS to give the firer the best possible chance of qualifying with live ammunition. This WTSS and live fire will generally occur within a week or two of each other. Therefore the soldier realistically fires their weapon (in a block of time) once annually.

27    LF6 includes shorter exposures, smaller targets (figure 12 targets represent the upper body and head of a human), moving targets and both supported and unsupported shooting positions.

28    Centre for Army Lessons, Command: Observations and Lessons from Army Operations, p. 19.