Send the Reserve to War with Six Weeks Training: The British Experience
Abstract
The authors argue that, based on British Army experience, Australian Army Reserve units and personnel can more easily be deployed than current policy recognises. By comparing competencies between the Australian Active Army Reserve and the British Territorial Army, and considering pre-deployment training requirements, the authors highlight that Australia could easily deploy reservists overseas under existing legal frameworks. All that is needed, they argue, based on first-hand experience, is to change of the ADF’s way of thinking.
Why not compulsorily deploy Active Army Reserve (ARes) sub-units to high intensity operational theatres after six weeks training? Why do we insist on rare voluntary mobilisations by ad hoc units with large lead times to the most benign locations? Why do we presume that the only deployable standard for the ARes is them having the same competencies as an equivalent rank Regular soldier? Time and effort is currently being spent trying to work out the competency gap between the ARA and ARes and raising a High Readiness Reserve, and little effort is spent seeing if the ARes Active Reserve Squadrons and Companies are ready now to deploy for the task at hand. The British Army compulsorily deploy their equivalent of the ARes, the Territorial Army (TA), to high-intensity operational theatres after six weeks training without various levels of Reserve readiness. If they can do it, why cannot we? It seems the answer is simply one of mindset.
In January 2004, members of C Squadron, (Kent and Sharpshooters Yeomanry), The Royal Yeomanry, (C (KSY) Squadron, RY) a British TA Royal Armoured Corps Squadron equipped with Landrover 110s, received notification of compulsory mobilisation to Iraq as part of Operation TELIC 4. After completing six weeks lead-up training, comprising of only thirty-two days actual field training, they helped augment the Regular Army A and D Squadron of the Queens Royal Lancers (QRL) and deployed to Iraq. On completion of six and a half months service they returned to the United Kingdom, went on post-tour leave then recommenced their civilian jobs.
This tour serves as a case study of the compulsory mobilisation of a British TA Squadron for operations in Iraq and can be used to consider the likely successes and limitations of deploying an ARes armoured corps Squadron on a similar operation. This study uses A Squadron, 1/15 Royal New South Wales Lancers as a comparison.
The validity of comparing the ARes and the British TA will be considered at the Squadron (Company) level. A comparison between the training level, role and equipment of C Squadron TA and A Squadron ARes will be made. Then the experience of the compulsory mobilisation of a reserve sub-unit, the integration and performance of reservists on operations and post-tour experiences will be discussed to see how C Squadron did perform and how the ARes may perform. The Australian legislation will also be considered to see what it would take to compulsorily mobilise the ARes. This article looks at Operation TELIC 4, between April and October 2004; the post-invasion rear-area security tasks conducted are similar to the likely tasks of deployed ARes sub-units. Some reference will also be made to Operation TELIC 1, the invasion of Iraq in January 2003.
The successful compulsory mobilisation of ARes sub-units is highly possible based on the British experience. Legislation currently exists to allow this. Thus, all it would take to instantly increase the deployable capability of the Army is a change of mindset about the abilities of the ARes and a use of the existing legislation.
Is it Valid to Compare the British Territorial Army with the Australian Army Reserve?
Before considering the case study, it is first pertinent to discuss if it is valid to use a TA Squadron experience as an indicator of how an ARes Squadron may perform. As both authors have served with the British TA (in C Squadron, Royal Yeomanry) and ARes units such as 2/14 Light Horse (Queensland Mounted Infantry), 4/19 Prince of Wales Light Horse and 1/15 Royal New South Wales Lancers, most of the observations and comparisons outlined below draw on first-hand experience. Thus, the focus will be on the armoured experience. TA infantry Companies also deployed on Operation TELIC 4, but that is mostly outside the author’s experience and knowledge.
Despite there being some misconceptions that the British TA is far superior to the ARes, in the authors’ opinions and in obtainable policy the two organisations are identical in most aspects of conditions of service, dedication, training level, integration with the Regular Army and preparedness for war, with most variation favouring the ARes. In a similar training structure to the ARes, TA units parade one night a week, about one weekend a month and participate in one or two periods of continuous training of one to two weeks a year. As with the ARes the ability of TA soldiers to participate in training activities varies greatly with some who do much more and others who rarely parade.
It can be argued that the skills, training and requirements of the ARes are higher than the TA. For example, the TA equivalent of Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN) is voluntary. That is, if the soldier is AIRN compliant they get a bonus, referred to as a bounty, of around one thousand pounds, tax-free. Additionally, action against a non-compliant soldier is slower than in the ARes; this results in non-compliant TA members remaining in the system for much longer periods, eroding the capability of the force.
The ARes certainly has a higher level of formal training than the TA in all ranks. At the time of Operation TELEC 4, the minimum amount of formal training from civilian to deployable soldier in the TA C Squadron was twenty three and a half days.
In the ARes A Squadron, the minimum amount of formal training from civilian to deployable soldier is fifty two days. That is, almost two times the amount! Similarly, for a TA 2nd Lieutenant, the minimum number of days from civilian to deployable officer was sixty three, whereas for an ARes 2nd Lieutenant it is one hundred and seventy three and a half days.1 The ARes 2LT has almost three times more formal training than his TA counterpart. So why do the British feel that their TA soldiers and officers are capable of deployment to the most high-intensity operational theatres with this level of training and yet we seem to doubt the ability of our ARes to do the same? Perhaps it is because of the perception of some other abilities the TA has that the ARes do not. Let us consider some in turn.
A common misconception is that the TA has a lot of operational experience. Neither the TA nor the ARes have a lot. More than half of the TA C Squadron prior to Operation TELIC 1 had not seen operational service. Of those who had been previously mobilised, their service was dated, with operations in such places as Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s. These deployments were as individuals on a voluntary basis. A handful of older and ex-regular soldiers had experience in Northern Ireland, the Falklands and the First Gulf War. Only three members of A Squadron ARes have participated in operational activities. Obviously, you obtain operational experience by deploying, so it would be unfair to hold this against the ARes. It was forty-seven years between the last compulsory mobilisation of the TA—to the Suez Crisis of 1956—and the next one, the invasion of Iraq in Operation TELIC 1 in 2003. Are we recruiting two more ARA infantry battalions to meet a similar level of current and projected need as the British experienced at the time of Operation TELIC 4—which resulted in compulsory mobilisation?
At the Squadron and Regimental level there is minimal difference in Regular Army cadre staffs. Similarly, most exercises C Squadron TA and A Sqn ARes have undertaken in the last six years have been by themselves or with other TA sub-units, rather than with the Regular Army.
The British TA is essentially the same as the ARes in conditions of service, operational readiness, integration with the Regular Army and level of operational experience. There are more C Squadron TA soldiers who have operational experience, but the A Squadron ARes has had far more formal training at every rank.
Role and Equipment of C Squadron The Royal Yeomanry Versus A Squadron 1st/15th RNSWL
C Squadron TA, at the time of Operation TELIC 4, had a ‘war role’ of providing individual tank crew reserves. This was generally only at the gunner and loader soldier level. The tank skills were gained by sending individual solders on Regular Army courses. There was little opportunity for continuation training as there were no turret trainers or any other tank training equipment in TA depots. The success of the tank training was, therefore, very limited. Just prior to deployment on Operation TELIC 4, only 50 per cent of the soldiers in C Squadron had actually attained a tank qualification. There were only three soldiers in C Squadron trained as tank crew commanders, and no tank crew officers. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) were expected to fill non-tank crew roles such as duty staff in Headquarters in ‘wartime’.
Thus any comparison between competencies of the TA and the British Regular Army would have revealed glaring deficiencies in tank crew competencies and training levels, C Squadron’s supposed ‘war’ role. C Squadron TA soldiers would not be eligible for service in the High Readiness Reserve. It could have been concluded that C Squadron was, therefore, not deployable without a tremendous amount of lead-up training. Such a conclusion would be wrong when considering the task required on the ground for Operation TELIC 4 and what they subsequently achieved. Thankfully, the British Army is mature enough not to draw such a conclusion.
C Squadron TA had a ‘training role’ of Light Reconnaissance. Using their standard, un-armoured Landrover 110, they trained collectively doing both mounted and dismounted tasks such as route reconnaissance, road blocks, search, convoy escort, observation posts, key point defence and so on. It was in their Light Reconnaissance ‘training’ role with their Landrover 110s that most of the TA soldiers in C Squadron went to war.
This Light Reconnaissance role is very similar to that of Light Cavalry, a role to which A Squadron, along with many of the other ARes regiments, is transitioning. The ARes Light Cavalry regiments are also being equipped with Landrover variants. The Light Cavalry role is also similar to that of A Squadron soldiers, as M113-equipped cavalry, were expected to attain competence in. These skills encompass performing tasks in both vehicles and on foot across the spectrum of offensive, defensive, security and reconnaissance operations, such as convoy escort, route reconnaissance, area search, specific-area search, ambush, attack, defence, withdrawal, and cordon and search. It also includes protecting key points, conducting road blocks, and vehicle checkpoints. As Cavalry Scouts, they are also trained in specialist dismounted skills such as dismounted patrolling, close target reconnaissance, insertion and extraction skills, urban operations, sector search, location and reporting on minefields, including the use of mine detectors. Light Cavalry Troops and their Scouts are also required to be trained and equipped with a wide variety of specialist weapons, such as 84mm and 66mm Direct Fire Support Weapons (DFSW), .50-calibre Heavy Machine Gun, 40mm Grenade Launcher Attachment, MAG 58 General Support Machine Gun, Minimi SAW, 9mm pistol and the full suite of Night Fighting Equipment (Ninox, Night Aiming Device, Individual Weapon Sight).
This is in stark contrast with C Squadron TA, who were not equipped with nor were they trained in any DFSW, grenade launchers, Minimi or Heavy Machine Guns. The only exceptions were a couple of General Purpose Machine Guns held in the depot as training weapons. This was not enough to equip the Squadron vehicles or train collectively. Similarly, C Squadron TA night vision equipment was limited to Combat Weapon Sight, a 1960s–70s vintage sight that fits on a rifle, and again, not enough to go around.
Therefore, with the exception of a very limited tank crew capability, C Squadron, TA Light Reconnaissance and A Squadron ARes Light Cavalry are almost identical in role and primary equipment. In specialist weapons and night vision equipment, A Squadron ARes is far better equipped and trained than C Squadron TA. Let us now examine how A Squadron might perform and C Squadron did perform when sent to war.
Compulsory Mobilisation: The British Experience
There is a significant disparity in the soldier’s and their civilian employer’s mind between ‘voluntary’ deployments and compulsory mobilisation. This article advocates compulsorary mobilisation on the British model rather than the voluntary approach for the ADF’s Operations RESOLUTE and Operation ACOLYTE. It is unfair to say that the ARes may have difficulty manning operations when the Australian experience to date has been voluntary deployment of small ad hoc units made up of soldiers drawn from across formations. The message is very different in the minds of reservists and their employers between ‘Can I go?’ and ‘I have to go!’
The British process for compulsory mobilisation of the TA varied between Operation TELIC 1 (the invasion of Iraq in 2003) and Operation TELIC 4 (between April and October 2004) for a number of reasons, especially changed requirements and lessons learnt. These lessons should be well noted by the ADF. During Operation TELIC 1, the requirement was to deploy a force of 45–46 000 men to Iraq as quickly as possible. Approximately 8000 TA and Reservists were eventually compulsorily mobilised, including the Royal Air Force Reserve and Royal Naval Reserve.2
A number of important lessons were learnt from this experience. Prior to 2003, the British Army had always considered its ex-regular ‘reservists’ (similar to Australia’s Standby Reserve, with no training obligation) to be the first choice for mobilisation, followed by the TA. This was largely due to the proportion of ‘reservists’ being far greater than serving TA soldiers. What very quickly became apparent was that it was necessary to mobilise about eight British ‘reservists’ to actually get one soldier into theatre, whilst with the TA the ratio was far lower at 1. 25 mobilised to every one soldier in theatre.3
Having considered the lessons learnt from 2003, the British Army rapidly adjusted its process to one of ‘Intelligent Mobilisation’, where a TA Regiment would be asked for a certain number of soldiers or complete sub-units. The Regiment would provide the numbers by first checking which soldiers (and at times their employers) would support the deployment. Those men were then compulsorily mobilised to protect their jobs under law. The expectation, however, was always that this was a compulsory mobilisation unless there were very compelling reasons not to go. The numbers requested were also high, 50 per cent of posted strength in C Squadron’s case. There were higher percentages in other sub-units. Intelligent Mobilisation served to reduce the number of appeals that were made by soldiers, and sometimes by employers against the wishes of the soldiers. Appeals were made through the governmental and legal systems.
In January 2004, C Squadron was required to provide four officers and thirty-one men from a posted strength of sixty eight to support the Regular Army A and D Squadron of the Queens Royal Lancers (QRL) for their tour of Iraq during Operation TELIC 4. Another Royal Yeomanry Squadron provided a further twenty-two officers and soldiers, bringing the total TA Royal Yeomanry personnel deployed to Iraq with the QRL to fifty-seven. Note this was a compulsory mobilisation. Relying on volunteers and accepting that none were available was not an option.
The QRL are usually equipped with Challenger tanks but typically deployed to Iraq as infantry mounted in Landrovers. Fourteen tanks were held in-theatre by the QRL as a reserve. The British have often sent tank crews as infantry to places such as Northern Ireland. This is another example of the British pragmatically applying troops to the task at hand rather than being blinded by Corps or perceived differences in competencies.
Mobilisation for Operation Telic 4: From Suit to Soldier4
Mobilisation and pre-tour training for C Squadron TA was conducted over a mere six weeks and consisted of three phases. The first phase involved reporting to Reserve Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) in Nottinghamshire for two days. RTMC’s role is to administratively, physically, mentally and materially prepare TA soldiers for mobilisation. Administration activities included pay adjustments to transfer the TA members into the Regular Army. A Reservist Hardship Allowance can be awarded to an individual to match their military salary with that of their civilian package. No similar allowance exists for the ARes. Physical activities included the conduct of medicals, which only three TA soldiers failed. These soldiers were replaced by three other members one month after the unit deployed to Iraq. Mentally, each soldier had the opportunity to discuss their concerns with counsellors and psychologists about mobilisation and/or issues at home, such as paying bills and family. Finally, soldiers were issued with desert camouflage uniforms, other personal equipment and personal weapons for the duration of the deployment at RTMC.
The second phase, which was common to both the TA and Regular soldiers being sent to Iraq, was a ten-day Operational Training Advisory Group (OPTAG) package. This package consisted of testing of all the basic soldier’s skills, including: Combat Fitness Test, Basic Fitness Test (like a BFA), NBC, first aid, armoured fighting vehicle recognition, weapon handling and marksmanship. It also covered Iraq-specific subjects based on the latest intelligence, such as law of armed conflict and rules of engagement, being taken hostage, mine incident drills, patrolling, the use of interpreters and some introductory Arabic lessons. They also practiced urban and rural patrolling, arrest operations, observation posts, vehicle check points and convoy escorts. Most of the scenarios were based on actual incidents and the instructors had recently returned from tours of duty in Iraq. To add to the challenges, the weather dropped to sub-zero and snow fell. During the training de-brief it was found the TA soldiers scored on par or higher (on average) in every area except physical fitness than the Regular soldiers.5 In this area, the lack of anaerobic physical fitness and the greater average age of the TA soldier were apparent. At the end of the ten days, the TA soldiers were sent to A and D Squadrons QRL, who had already done their OPTAG training and were under command of their respective Battle Groups for further pre-tour training.
The third phase was conducted over twenty days with the Battle Group commanders exercising their companies/squadrons in the type of operations considered likely to be encountered in Iraq. This included company-sized riot control, cordon and search, vehicle patrolling, foot patrolling and defensive operations. Individual, section and platoon/troop exercises also continued and commanders were able to practice live-fire section and platoon/troop attacks. Weapons training with the Battle Group consisted of training on the baton rounds (25mm riot control weapon), 5.56mm Minimi, GPMG (7.62mm) and Underslung Grenade Launcher connected to the SA80. This was ‘from scratch’ for the TA. Remember, A Squadron ARes soldiers are already qualified on most of these weapons. The rest of the six weeks was administration, including travel and leave.
Thus, in terms of actual training, a TA soldier received two days of induction, ten days of OPTAG and twenty days of Battle Group training over the course of six weeks, from normal peace-time soldiering to war. Thirty-two days to prepare a Reservist for war. It should again be noted that, with the exception of the first two days, the training conducted by the TA was identical in length and content to that which the Regular Army did in preparation for Iraq.
Combat Readiness of the TA
Many opponents would suggest that the ARes (or the TA) would not be appropriately combat ready for a mobilisation to such a volatile location. So, how combat ready were the TA? It is a difficult question to answer; however, the C Squadron personnel met and often exceeded the expectations of Regular members. It is believed that this is due to a number of factors.
Based on comparisons between one of the author’s troop of Regular soldiers in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in 1994 and both A Squadron ARes and C Squadron TA, the TA and ARes soldier is, on average, eight years older than his Regular counterpart.6 The Regular soldier is fitter, much faster at some specific trade skills and is used to a regimented life; however, the TA soldier is generally better educated, has experienced a more varied life and approaches problems drawing on that experience and maturity.7 This sort of life experience cannot be measured by competencies or trying to determine relative levels of training. An additional advantage the TA soldiers had was their familiarity with Landrovers, unlike their Regular QRL counterparts who were tank crew converted to Landrovers, although this demonstrates again the British troops approach to task pragmatism.
The subsequent performance of C Squadron TA proved that the TA soldier who was fit for role (AIRN compliant) and had two years service came up to speed very quickly and integrated easily into the Regular QRL. It also demonstrated that the thirty-two days lead-up training the TA received was as adequate for them as it was for the Regular soldiers. It is believed factors such as Intelligent Mobilisation and the minimum two years of service allowed C Squadron to be ready in time. Significantly, a number of young Regular Army soldiers straight out of their corps schools deployed to Iraq with less soldiering experience than their TA colleagues. This is also missed in competency comparisons. This would be the case with the Australian Army as well. Why then can the British TA deploy and not the ARes?
TA Tasks in Iraq: Integration and Performance
Of the twelve troops in A and D Squadron, QRL, ten were bought up to strength with TA soldiers and two troops were entirely TA, commanded by TA Lieutenants. Complete TA infantry companies also deployed on TELIC 4. The TA SNCOs and officers, who were not in the TA Troops, were employed in HQ positions such as Battle Captain, Operations Officer and Intelligence Officer. They were also employed on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) tasks such as being the staff officer of border enforcement. The tank-qualified TA soldiers rotated through the fourteen tanks that formed part of the armoured reserve. The remainder undertook Security Sector Reform (SSR) tasks in Landrovers. In the case of the QRL, it was usually the standard Landrover 110 with roof removed to allow for two soldiers to stand up in the back, providing top cover with 7.62mm GPMG or 5.56mm Minimi. This was achieved by resting the weapon bipod on the cabin roof rather than at an actual weapon mount. Their operations were conducted with a totally unarmoured, unstabilised weapon positioned in an unarmoured vehicle.
A Squadron QRL, under command of 1 Princess of Wales Royal Regiment Battle Group in Maysan Province, concentrated on equipping, training and recruiting the police, whilst D Squadron QRL under command 1st Mechanised Brigade in the Um Qsar Port and Basra area concentrated on port security reform and customs and immigration training. This included securing the border, recruiting and training a force of 6000 border police and customs officials, and collecting taxes on imported goods. This also included supervising the ports, airports, land crossing points, river crossing points, immigration and passport issue.
Both Squadrons were still required to perform normal foot and vehicle patrolling through the towns and perimeter security of their respective bases. The types of urban operations the TA soldiers conducted were: patrols, liaison visits, convoy escorts, vehicle check points, road blocks, mobile HQs, re-supply, crowd control at recruiting events and general vehicle movement while undertaking other activities such as driving to training locations. It also included movement into and out of contact and pursuing fleeing enemy in urban, semi-urban, industrial and rural areas, including the coast and along river banks.
There was some initial concern by the Regular majors commanding A and D Squadron QRL about the skills, knowledge and attributes of the TA junior officers and soldiers. It was only after the pre-tour training and the first few weeks in Iraq that one OC said he was completely comfortable allowing the TA troops to go out by themselves. Even in the British Army the Regulars had what proved to be unfounded concerns as to the abilities of the Reservist. Concerns such as these are inevitably alleviated when ignorance is replaced by contact, trust, familiarity and facts.
Other tasks enabled the TA personnel to take advantage of both their civilian and military expertise. A TA lieutenant, who in civilian life was a Personal Assistant to a Member of Parliament in Westminster, mentored the Iraqi judiciary. A warrant officer whose civilian job was Auditor for the Royal Bank of Scotland become, by the conclusion of the tour, the pay-master for the entire Department of Border Enforcement. Similarly, a corporal who was a civilian fireman directed the training of the Um Qsar Port Fire Station for a four-week period, and a trooper who was normally a civilian IT specialist wrote software programs for the Customs Service computers as they were being installed. It also serves as another example of the wide range of skills and life experience TA (and ARes) can draw upon that is also hidden in competency comparisons. However, it must be noted, these jobs were mostly temporary and local solutions to problems. These soldiers were not deployed to Iraq for this purpose (in accordance with British policy); it was a case of local commanders employing an asset on hand to help achieve their goal. The British experience is that Reservists would rather deploy in their Army role, regardless of their civilian skills and experience.
The TA soldiers commented favourably on the advantages of deploying on operations with most of their TA Squadron. This was especially so with the fully TA troops, but even those soldiers who rounded out the regular troops were never sent by themselves. Naturally, deploying with their mates had a good effect on morale during the tour and offered post-tour mutual support. This is in contrast to the earlier, voluntary tours individual C Squadron soldiers had undertaken with Regular Army Regiments to Bosnia and Kosovo. This is also in contrast to the voluntary deployment the ARes has done, such as Operation ACOLYTE and Operation RESOLUTE, which were also comprised of individual volunteers formed into ad hoc groups.
By the end of the tour, integration had been accomplished. Most TA soldiers performed the same jobs and tasks in Iraq as Regular soldiers.
Contact and Casualties
Many of the TA soldiers were involved in contacts both major and minor. These experiences are used to illustrate how intense the operational situation the British TA experienced and therefore how our ARes may perform in a similar situation: not in the most benign locations, but very high levels of operational intensity.
The worst area for the deployment was in the north of the British Area of Operations, in the town of Al Amara. There the ‘outstation’ CIMIC house was attacked with alarming regularity. The TA, along with the rest of A Squadron QRL, rotated through CIMIC house for periods of one or two weeks. They were involved in contacts in Landrovers, during foot patrols, on perimeter security and, on one occasion, giving emergency first aid to civilian contractors after two mortars had exploded in their office. At one point in August, CIMIC house, defended at that stage by Y Company Prince of Wales Royal Regiment with C Squadron TA personnel attached, was attacked continuously for twenty-four days by Sadr Militia. During that period, 595 mortar rounds, fifty-seven RPG rounds and seven 107mm rockets were fired at CIMIC house and the Company had eighty-six small-arms engagements.8 At another time, in the vicinity of Al Amara, seventy-six contacts were recorded in a twenty-four hour period, and a base was mortared forty-four separate times.9
Qualified TA soldiers were also rotated onto tanks during the Sadar Militia’s uprising in August as they tried to de-stabilise Al Amara and Basra. Patrols in Landrovers frequently came under fire. In most cases, there were no hits. Incidents mainly consisted of the enemy driving past TA soldiers in the street or bases and firing an AK-47 from the window of their vehicle. Alternatively, TA soldiers might have a grenade thrown at them, be fired on by an AK-47, or endure RPG rounds by an enemy on foot who then withdrew into the urban environment. One of the authors had a burst of AK-47 fired at him as he guided a Dutch patrol of four Landrovers on a familiarisation tour of Basra. His vehicle, leading the convoy, was stopped at traffic lights. A person stepped up to the side of the road, raised their weapon and fired at the Landrover. At the moment he fired, a truck drove between them so the enemy’s rounds hit the back of the truck. The quick-thinking crew simply ran the lights and broke contact.10
Other incidents included a contact approximately 200m outside the perimeter fence with an enemy mortar crew who were setting up. They were found by a dismounted clearing patrol at 22:30hrs. Despite the level of fire there were no casualties on either side. The enemy withdrew into the urban environment, leaving the mortar base-plate behind. Several TA soldiers also experienced improvised explosive devices detonating near their vehicles, again with little result.
Not all contacts were initiated by the enemy. One of the authors was engaged in an SSR patrol on the Iraq–Iran border with the TA Squadron Sergeant Major, a Royal Navy officer, some Royal Marine commandos and two Iraqi border personnel. They surrounded a group of illegal immigrants and took five prisoners. One of the prisoners then indicated where the actual people smugglers were. Acting on this intelligence, the patrol then advanced up the road to a small berm. On the other side, about eighty metres away were three people in two vehicles, the suspected people smugglers. The patrol formed a skirmish line, with a fire support base commanded by the TA Squadron Sergeant Major off to one side. Advancing to arrest the people smugglers, the suspects decided to shoot it out. Between the skirmish line and fire support, thirty-five rounds were fired at the suspect’s vehicle. It took several hits but there were no casualties on either side. The patrol arrested two people, but at least one evaded capture. The next night a further fifty-seven people were arrested at the same spot after an observation post and Quick Reaction Force were emplaced.11
In total, despite the level and intensity of contacts, the QRL—TA and otherwise—did not suffer any battle casualties on Operation TELIC 4. It must be stated, however, that the authors attribute this not only to good training but also to remarkably good luck and the incompetence of the enemy. During Operation TELIC 4, major uprisings and contacts involving casualties and fatalities of TA and Regular soldiers occurred in other units. For example, a TA lieutenant’s Landrover took two RPG hits (both failed to detonate) and twenty-five AK-47 rounds during an ambush. His driver was shot in the foot but recovered. They managed to fight and drive through the ambush.12 In another incident, two Landrovers were destroyed by RPG hits, yet the crews survived. The Warrior vehicles in the Quick Reaction Force then went through two ambushes on the way to assist the Landrover crews and the lead Warrior took seven RPG hits. This resulted in five British wounded and one dead, as well as a Warrior driver being awarded the Victoria Cross.13 Another dismounted section patrol was contacted by fifty enemy in a hasty ambush. A British soldier was killed when he was shot through the throat. His section commander decided to attack the enemy position. In the ensuing firefight there were twenty enemy killed and another British soldier slightly wounded.
Thus, despite being less well-equipped and with less formal training than A Squadron, ARes, the TA soldiers of C Squadron with only thirty-two days mobilisation training performed admirably in circumstances of far more intense levels of enemy contact and casualties than most recent Australian operational deployments. Their success was highlighted when one of the fully TA troops was named best troop of the tour, having competed for the title against the other eleven Regular and TA troops of the QRL. The TA Troop Leader, Lieutenant Howles, was awarded a Commander in Chief’s Commendation for leadership and performance.
Post-Tour Return to Work, Training and Retention
After returning to the United Kingdom, all TA personnel were ‘demobbed’ and sent on post-tour leave. Once their leave time expired, soldiers reported back to their civilian employers, who were required by law to keep their jobs open for them.14 This aspect of return was largely successful, although there were a few cases of small businesses re-structuring during the nine-month absence, resulting in the soldier being made redundant.
After the post-tour leave, C Squadron started a new training year in January 2005. The mobilisation and subsequent return to civilian work and family life after many months away did have an initial effect on retention. Six of the thirty-five soldiers deployed to Iraq discharged. Most of these were planning to leave before the tour, so the Army received good service from them. The experience of compulsory mobilisation and an operational tour, therefore, had no noticeable effect on retention.
During weeknight and weekend training, the Squadron hierarchy was required to show a greater level of leadership, initiative and man-management to keep retention high. Soldiers were attending parade nights, but it was to see their mates from the tour rather than to continue to train. This practice had to stop, so training had to be planned with more care to ensure it was varied and exciting. As a positive outcome of the tour, the soldier’s operational experience became a valuable training resource.
The Australian Legal Setting
Having viewed the British experience, does Australia have the legal ability to do the same? When considering this question, the distinction needs to be made between a Reservist asking their employer ‘Can I go?’ on the volunteer model and saying ‘I have to go!’ of the compulsory mobilisation model. With Intelligent Mobilisation, the British seem to have struck a good balance.
Section 50D, 51A, AA, AB, B, C and CA of The Defence Act 1903 gives the Governor General the power to issue a proclamation that has been recommended to him by the Executive Council and call out the ARes for a wide variety of tasks for either a limited duration or indefinitely.15 Originally, this was a blunt instrument to be used in times of a national defence emergency. However, an amendment was made to the Act in 2001 and entitled Schedule 1 of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Enhancement of the Reserves and Modernisation) Act 2001: Calling out the Reserves.16 The intent of this amendment can be found in the Second Reading speech of the Bill by Minister Scott, then Minister Assisting the Minister for the Defence and with responsibility for Reserves. He states:
The legislation will enable the call-out of reservists for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, civil aid and disaster relief, as well as for warlike service and defence preparation. These historic changes will greatly enhance the contribution made by the reserves and will permit the Defence Force to operate in all circumstances as an integrated total force. We will have a more useable and effective reserve, making an important contribution to the generation, delivery and sustainment of defence capability. The government does not intend to lightly or frequently call out the reserves. Call-out will be used only when it is necessary.17
The Act now allows for ARes units, sub-units and or individuals to be called out where necessary for war, war-like operations, peacekeeping or peace enforcement as required. Therefore, the legislative ability currently exists to apply the concept of Intelligent Mobilisation. The British found it necessary to use their equivalent legislation for Operation TELIC 1 and Operation TELIC 4.
Where it comes to job protection of the mobilised ARes, Australia is already well served by the provisions under the Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001.18 Ordinary reserve service, protected and unprotected Continuous Full Time Service, is protected under this act on the same lines as anti-discrimination legislation, but the provisions for protected Continuous Full Time Service are most relevant. If an ARes member is required for Continuous Full Time Service then they can get employment, partnership and education protection if ‘A service chief requested the member to give the undertaking on the basis that the service would be protected.’19 Indeed, our legislation is very strong in this regard and whilst employers retain the right to have any concerns or objections considered, they have no legislated right of appeal. Employers and soldiers will always have a right of appeal to Defence, to the Service Chief, the Commonwealth Ombudsman and their local MP. The Act provides no specific avenue for appeal but before the Service Chiefs deems a period of CFTS to be ‘Protected’ they are mandated to consider a number of criterion including, Section 12 (2)(d): ‘the effect that rendering the service might have on the member’s employment and education (including the effect that it might have on third parties such as employers)’.20 Applying Intelligent Mobilisation would keep those appeals to a minimum.
Within current legislative frameworks, the Australian Government can compulsorily mobilise a sub-unit or unit of ARes for operations in a place like Iraq and protect their employment by applying the British model on Intelligent Mobilisation. The Reservist can tell their employer ‘I have to go’.
Conclusion
Based on the experiences of the British TA soldiers in C Squadron, RY, the following summations can be made. Using the British Army’s Intelligent Mobilisation model, ARes Light Cavalry Squadrons could be compulsorily mobilised and deployed alongside their Regular counterparts on operations similar to those in Iraq after six weeks extra training. It could be presumed that other ARes sub-units could do the same. Reserve soldiers integrate well with Regular soldiers. Their performance is at least on par with their Regular counterparts if Intelligent Mobilisation is used. Additionally, they bring a different skill-set from their civilian life to the mix, benefiting the operation. Complete Reserve sub-units can be a very successful deployed element rather than using Reservists as individual replacements in Regular units. Indeed, deploying with their mates has a positive effect on morale, both on tour and back home, for the deployed reservists. The job protection legislation as adopted by the British on the whole worked well and Australia has even stronger legislation. Unexpectedly, the impact of compulsory mobilisation on subsequent retention remains good if due attention is paid to post-tour training and administration. The ARes A Squadron 1/15 RNSWL is better equipped and has more formal training than the TA C Squadron RY and yet C Squadron RY was able to perform very well in Iraq after thirty-two days lead up training. The argument that the ARes A Squadron is under-trained and under-equipped and needs six to twelve months lead-up training to achieve the same level of competency before deployment does not stand up to this comparison. The argument that ARes deployments should be to the most benign locations does also not bear close scrutiny, nor does the idea that, as the ARes courses are shorter than some Regular courses, there exists a capability gap that must be bridged before deployment can be considered. It is not about the Regular Army being better trained than the Ares; the question is can the ARes do the job at hand. The legislation exists to be used and was written with that intent in mind. All that is required is the will.
An Australian officer encountered by one of the authors in Iraq was amazed that the TA deployed after the standard six weeks training. He said ‘Australia would never do that’. The question has to be asked, ‘Why is this case?’ A change of mindset to consider compulsory mobilisation of the ARes on operations is an inexpensive capability increase.
Endnotes
1 The table below details the difference in formal training time between the TA soldiers of C Squadron at the time of TELIC 4 and the current requirement for ARes soldiers of A Squadron as Light Cavalry. It is acknowledged that some courses will be completed at different times and at different ranks than shown:
| C Squadron British Territorial Army at the time of Op TELEC 4 | Total days | A Squadron Australian Army Reservist Light Cavalry | Total Days | |
| Soldier | Soldier | |||
| Civilian | 3 weekends in unit | 7.5 | 1 RTB Kapooka, | 28 |
| Recruit Course | 16 | Advanced Soldier Course | 8 | |
| Tank loader / gunner course | 16 | Cavalry Scout Grade 1 | 16 | |
| Deployable Soldier | TA Trooper Op TELIC 4 | 39.5 | ARes Trooper | 52 |
| TA Trooper Op TELIC 4 | 23.5 | |||
|
Note: 1. Not all C Sqn soldiers were tank qualified. Therefore minimum formal training to deploy to Op TELEC was 23.5 days 2. C Sqn also included a self imposed minimum two years TA service which is not shown |
||||
| Signals course | 12 | Cavalry Scout Grade 2 | 16 | |
| Basic Instructors Course | 2.5 | Landrover Driver or Combat First Aid | 16 | |
| JNCO Cadre Course | 5 | Subject 1 Corporal | 16 | |
| Tank course | 16 | |||
| Lance Corporal | TA LCPL | 35.5 | ARes LCPL | 48 |
| Tank Course | 16 | Patrol Commanders Course | 16 | |
| Corporal | TA CPL | 16 | ARes CPL | 16 |
| Instructors /Trade course | 16 | Subject 1 Sergeant | 28 | |
| Subject 2 Sergeant | 16 | |||
| Sergeant | TA SGT | 16 | ARes SGT | 42 |
| Range management and weapons course | 16 | Subject 1 Warrant Officer | 28 | |
|
Staff Sergeant. Promotion to WO2 follows with no further courses |
Squadron Quartermaster course | 16 | Subject 2 Warrant Officer | 21 |
| Warrant Officer 2 | TA WO2 | 36 | ARes WO2 | 49 |
| Total days formal training civilian to Warrant Officer | 143 | 207 | ||
| Officer | ||||
| Civilian / Officer Cadet | 6 weeks in unit training | 42 | University Regiment | 97.5 |
| RMA Sandhurst | 21 | RMC Duntroon graduate as a 2LT, not deployable | 28 | |
| Second Lieutenant | TA 2LT | 63 | ARes 2LT | 125.5 |
| No Regimental Officer Basic Course | Regimental Officer Basic Course 3 modules | 48 | ||
| Deployable Officer | TA 2LT | 63 | ARes 2LT / LT | 173.5 |
| No formal training | Module 1 Bravo | 16 | ||
| Lieutenant | TA LT | ARes LT | 16 | |
| Junior Officer Training Exam | 4 | Staff Officer Grade 3 | 16 | |
| Captain | TA CAPT | 4 | ARes CAPT | 16 |
| Staff college | 14 | Staff Officer Grade 2 | 16 | |
| Combat Officers Advanced Course | 21 | |||
| Note: The OC of C Squadron was not mobilised. The highest rank was Captain. | ||||
| Major | TA MAJ | 14 | ARes MAJ | 37 |
| Total days formal training civilian to Major | 81 | 242.5 | ||
2 Lecture notes from the UK Staff College Junior Staff Course TA 2005.
3 Ibid. Some soldiers and/or their employers appealed against mobilisation and sometimes won, causing the discrepancy between mobilised and in theatre.
4 Most of the information is from CAPT Fisher’s recollections supported by a series of emails sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart and the Royal Yeomanry diary of Operation TELIC 4.
5 Verbal training debrief by the Regular Army OPTAG team and the Individual Training Dirtective (ITD) records.
6 The average age of a 2 Cavalry trooper was 22, A Squadron ARes Troopers average age is 30.
7 The average education of a 2nd Cavalry Trooper was Year 10 or Year 12. None had further education, could speak another language or had a trade qualification. There are three A Squadron ARes Troopers with degrees, one studying for a PhD. There are also two machinists and an electrician. Troopers in A Squadron can speak Arabic, Vietnamese, Polish, Mandarin and Hokkien.
8 Private photograph of the Coy 2IC and HQ staff in the CIMIC house Ops room during August 2004 at the height of the attacks. In the photograph, a whiteboard displays the running tally of incidents. The CIMIC house battle is also described in Dusty Warriors Modern War, Richard Holmes, Harper Press, London, 2006. pp. 266–83.
9 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart 16 August 2003.
10 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart 2 August 2003.
11 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart, based on CAPT Fisher’s contact report 11 May 2004.
12 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart 16 April 2004.
13 Richard Holmes, Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers at War, Harper Press, London, 2006. pp. 246–50
14 Job protection legislation is part of UK Reserve Forces Act 1996.
15 The Defence Act 1903.
16 Schedule 1 of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Enhancement of the Reserves and Modernisation) Act 2001 – Calling out the Reserves.
17 <http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?locid=SRS/20010010/00001>.
18 The Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001.
19 The Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001 Section 12 (1).
20 Ibid, Section 12 (2)(d).
