Rebuilding Afghanistan One Mud-brick at a Time: Lessons from an Aussie Engineer
Abstract
This article, based on personal observations and experiences during this time, highlights the complex nature of reconstruction and development operations in Afghanistan (particularly in the southern province of Uruzgan), examines the approaches of the two Provincial Reconstruction Teams and proposes a way ahead for future PRTs and the Australian RTF.
It is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly than to do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way, and our time is short.
- T. E. Lawrence, 19171
Introduction
For seven months in 2006, the author deployed to Afghanistan, embedded with the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from late March until the end of July, then from August to mid-October with the Dutch PRT. Both teams were located in Tarin Kowt, the capital of Uruzgan Province. For both the US and Dutch PRTs, the author was the sole engineer responsible for the development and delivery of Reconstruction and Development (R&D) projects in the troubled Southern province. As a lead element of the first Australian Reconstruction Task Force (RTF), who deployed in mid-September, the author was responsible for reconnoitring and conducting preliminary construction planning.
The Complex Nature of Southern Afghanistan
Afghanistan has been in conflict for a number of centuries. The Taliban are the most recent in a long line of conquerors, warlords, preachers, saints and philosophers who have swept through the Afghan corridor, destroying older civilisations and religions and introducing new ones.2 Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Greeks conquered Afghanistan in 329 BC, followed by the Arabs in 654 AD, Genghis Khan and his Mongol hordes in 1219, the British (with two unsuccessful wars) between 1839 and 1919 and, most recently, during the Cold War when the Soviet Union unsuccessfully invaded between 1979 and 1989.3 Between invasions, internal fighting for power and control between the major ethnic groups and tribal clans has continually taken place. In fact, the only noted period of stability that Afghanistan has seen was between 1933 and 1973 during the rule of King Zahir Shah, who was removed in a bloodless coup by his brother-in-law. Therefore, the majority of Afghans have rarely experienced peace.
The Rise of the Taliban
Afghanistan was in a state of virtual disintegration just before the Taliban emerged in 1994, the country being divided into fiefdoms where warlords fought, switched sides then fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed.4 The Taliban’s declared aims were to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan. A talib is an Islamic student who seeks knowledge, compared to a mullah who gives knowledge. By choosing their name, the Taliban distanced themselves from the party politics of the mujahideen and signalled that they were ‘cleansing society’ rather than trying to grab power.5 Initially, the Taliban gained considerable support and swept into power when important and wealthy Pashtun tribal leaders around Kandahar hungered for a unifying cause. This arose from what was a wave of popular revulsion over Kandahar’s criminal warlords.
However, the bulk of Taliban forces came from Pakistan and were educated in extreme Islamic madrassas, where they were not taught the history of their native country, their tribal or clan lineages or traditional rural skills—only militant interpretations of the Quran and how to fight.6 The Taliban won over the unruly Pashtun south because the exhausted, war-weary population perceived them as saviours and peacemakers. The Taliban hinted that their militia would become a vehicle for the return to Afghanistan of the exiled King Zahir Shah.7 The initial ‘justified’ support, combined with a well-run Information Operations campaign, which endeavoured to keep Afghans supporting their cause, has ensured that support for the Taliban, while nowhere near as strong as in the mid-1990s, still lingers.
Additionally, there is much speculation as to whether the mysterious Mullah Mohammed Omar, founder of the modern extremist Taliban movement, was born in Kandahar or the Uruzgan Province. What is known, though, is that he was born into a poor, landless peasant family of the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtuns and spent several years during the Soviet invasion in Tarin Kowt, a place described by the Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid as ‘one of the most backward and inaccessible regions of the country where the Soviet troops rarely penetrated.’8 A number of the founding members of the modern Taliban movement—as distinct from the traditional talibs who were as commonplace in the Southern Pashtun villages for many hundred years as ‘frocked Catholic Priests were in the Irish countryside, and who played a similar role’9—also originate from Uruzgan. It appears that this link has resulted in continued, though little-publicised, ‘hometown’ support for the Taliban in Uruzgan. Villagers, whether coerced or willing, often provide sanctuary or logistic nodes for the insurgency, as well as a spy network. Spying does not just involve reporting Coalition troop movements, but also identifying villagers who are cooperating with Coalition or Afghan security forces. Earning the trust of a local Afghan takes a long time and often involves covert meetings—away from prying eyes.
Reconstruction and development activities, whether by military and/or civilian organisations, cannot be successfully conducted in southern Afghanistan until the numerous issues and hindrances affecting both the area and these activities are acknowledged, identified and then incorporated into all R&D projects. NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission is to:
Conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations to assist the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and contributing to regional stability.10
The ISAF mission will not be achieved until the obstacles currently in the path of the rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan are removed. Southern Afghanistan is still a hotbed of Taliban and Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) activity. When the Taliban were removed from government in late 2001 by the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban and insurgent activity decreased. However, the number of insurgents, often coming across the border from Pakistan, has been increasing to a level where they now have greater freedom of movement in large portions of the south than ISAF forces. At the end of 2006 (as winter commenced) Afghan and Coalition Forces had only tentative control in one or two of the six districts in Uruzgan. There are almost daily attacks on ISAF forces and civilians by the Taliban in Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan or Zabul Provinces—often resulting in serious injuries or death.
The southern region of Afghanistan has seen far less development and modernisation, in terms of education, technology, civic administration, governance and religious tolerance, than the remainder of the country. Unlike the northern and western cities, such as Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, the south is purely a rural area with an agricultural-based economy. Operations in Uruzgan can be compared to undertaking patrols during biblical times. Except for the district centres and large towns, vehicles and modern machinery are rarely seen—transportation by donkey is a common sight, crops are tended and harvested by hand and water is mostly handdrawn from ground wells.
Ethnicities
Afghanistan is home to diverse communities that share common experiences through interaction with the dominant states, empires, invading armies, and trade and cultural movements that traversed the land during their thousands of years of history. The different ethnic groups in modern Afghanistan (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speaking Hazaras, Balochis, etc) straddle the boundaries of the state.11 Southern Afghanistan is predominantly occupied by Pashtun tribes, with a large Hazara population in the north of Uruzgan. The Hazaras seem to experience less infighting than the Pashtun tribes and appear to be more loyal to the government. Atrocities by all ethnic groups that occurred after the Taliban began to seek control of the country had no precedent in Afghan history and may have irreparably damaged the fabric of the country’s national and religious soul.12 Distrust and disdain between these ethnic groups presents a barrier to R&D activities and is particularly noticeable in the north of Uruzgan where the ethnic groups have segregated themselves, each vying separately for support and funding.
It was the Pashtuns, approximately 40 per cent of the population, who formed the modern state of Afghanistan and who experienced the greatest infighting. The Pashtun tribes are divided into two highly competitive sections: the Ghilzai and the Durrani. Ahmad Shah Durrani was elected by the Durranis as the first King of Afghanistan in 1747 after a nine-day Loya Jirga, or meeting of tribal chiefs. He attempted to unify the Pashtun tribes with a series of major conquests throughout the region. The power of the Durrani rule was dissipated over the years due to bitter internal clan feuds. One or another of the Durrani clan ruled Afghanistan for over 200 years until 1973, when King Zahir Shar was deposed. It should be noted that the current President, Hamid Karzai, is also a Durrani Populzai, the tribe of Ahmad Shah Durrani himself. The bitter rivalry between the Ghilzai and Durrani Pashtuns intensified in the power struggle occasioned by the Soviet invasion and the subsequent emergence of the Taliban.13 This rivalry, as well as the infighting amongst the individual Pashtun tribes, is a major cause of tensions and hostilities in the whole of Afghanistan.
What was evident, on attending numerous Provincial Government meetings, was that these tribal differences resulted in decisions being made on a tribal basis, displaying obvious favouritism in provincial affairs, including the distribution of aid. In Australia, this bias would normally be treated as corruption; however, in Afghanistan it is the way of life. To paraphrase British General David Richards, the then-Commander ISAF, minor levels of corruption are to be accepted in Afghanistan, but it is only when the local population feels that an act is corrupt that coalition forces should treat it as corrupt.14 Working in such an environment is a challenge, both legally and morally.
Foreign Organisations
The Uruzgan Governor, Mullah Abdul Hakim Monib, is still on the UN Sanctions List, pursuant to UN Resolution 1267 (1999). This is despite his renunciation of the Taliban and his appointment as the Governor of Uruzgan Province by the President on 18 March 2006.15 Several attempts have been made at the United Nations Sanctions Committee to remove Governor Monib’s name, but he still remains listed, resulting in restrictions being imposed on ISAF forces regarding their dealings with him. The United Nations have ordered their own organisations out of Uruzgan due to the security situation—the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UN Operations departed in April 2006. Engaging the Government in R&D operations under such restrictions, and without UN specialist support, seriously affects the likelihood of successful work in Afghanistan.
In addition to the lack of UN organisations in Uruzgan, there is also a lack of non-government organisations (NGOs) and foreign contractors in Uruzgan, with a very limited number in the rest of southern Afghanistan. The only donor representatives present in Uruzgan are those embedded in the PRT—USAID and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main reason for this lack of aid organisations and large contractors is the poor security situation. Even local contractors (competent or not) cannot be persuaded to work in Chora or Cahar Cineh Districts. Undertaking any reconstruction and development activity, especially construction tasks, is impossible in Afghanistan without the support of these absent organisations and companies.
Education
Compounding the above issues is the fact that there are extremely poor levels of education in Afghanistan, especially Uruzgan. A 2006 estimate by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) presents the literacy rate for the total population as 24 per cent, with males being 31 per cent and females 15. 8 per cent.16 This figure has significantly decreased from the 1999 estimate, given in the CIA World Factbook, of 36 per cent, with a break-down of 51 per cent for males and 15 per cent for females.17 Two possible reasons for this decline are the continuing breakdown of an education system that relied heavily on female teachers and the flight of educated Afghans during and after the reign of the Taliban.18 MRRD gave the overall literacy rate for Uruzgan as 4.4 per cent—the average of the four southern provinces being assisted by ISAF forces is 7. 8 per cent. Southern Afghanistan is one of the most poorly educated regions in the world, proving to be a big obstacle to the recovery of the country.
Uruzgan is home to very few government primary and secondary schools. The district centres each have single-sex schools that occupy damaged and decaying buildings; however, the majority of provincial ‘schools’ meet under the shade of a tree and are taught by well-meaning but unqualified elders with no resources. The two main hindrances to education in Uruzgan are the Taliban’s continuing efforts to stop non-religious education and the lack of qualified teachers. During the author’s deployment, the Taliban destroyed two schools (both of which the author inspected and contracted locals to repair) and distributed numerous ‘night letters’ instructing students not to attend, teachers not to teach and builders not to construct or repair the schools. Defiance usually resulted in death. This real danger to the teachers is not worth their salary—only US$40 per month. The Taliban threats and the fact that translators for ISAF forces and other organisations can earn between US$600 and US$1200 per month have ensured that there is no incentive for qualified teachers to re-commence their teaching roles in the south. The Provincial Government is doing its best, recently completing eight new schools in the province. They do not, however, have the funding to increase teacher and other government worker salaries, resulting in poor standards in these schools.
The problems above do not take into account levels of higher education, whether tertiary or technical-trade training. Kandahar University, founded in 1990, was closed by the Taliban and only resumed teaching in 2004. In Uruzgan, the US PRT began funding a local contractor in early 2006 to establish a ‘trade school’ to introduce carpentry and block-laying to boys fourteen to seventeen years old. The quality and level of teaching was quite poor by world standards—acknowledged by the head ‘teacher’ who boasted one-year of carpentry training in Pakistan twelve years earlier. Despite relatively high-standard education institutions functioning successfully in the north, such as the Kabul University and the American University of Afghanistan, the rural areas in the south lack any form of higher education and training. Due to the conflicts over the past thirty-odd years, an entire generation (or more) lacks education and trade qualifications, the few exceptions being those who fled to Pakistan or were qualified before the Soviet invasion. They now fill most medical, legal, engineering and government positions. Without sufficient numbers of qualified locals, the transition from ISAF to Afghan-led reconstruction and development efforts is a very long way off.
Governance and Infrastructure
A flow-on from these inadequacies is the general lack of governance and administration skills by both provincial and district officials. Most officials are illiterate. They do not know how to undertake basic governance and civil administration functions, such as writing a forward-looking Provincial Development Plan and budgeting. This lack of skill and the overall disconnection between all levels of government, where the few policies formulated at national level are not passed down to the next level of government, results in frustration and wasted time as the local efforts always linger behind those of the PRT. Doing everything for them would be easy but will not steer them towards a successful independence from ISAF.
Civil infrastructure in the rural south of Afghanistan is very limited, even by other developing-country standards. The existing infrastructure is in a very poor condition, a combination of the ongoing conflict, poor initial standards of construction and non-maintenance. The only sealed road in Uruzgan is the road south to Kandahar—and that is to a poor standard with the middle forty-kilometre section yet to be completed. Only one bridge crosses the Teri Rud (Teri River), allowing access to the north of Tarin Kowt, and is thus a dangerous choke-point. Although each district has a medical centre, the only official hospital is located in Tarin Kowt. It is clean and tidy but has insufficient equipment and facilities and a shortage of qualified medical staff. Uruzgan has no reticulated potable water supply, no sewage-treatment infrastructure and no solid-waste disposal facility, contributing to the reduced state of health. There is no publicly available source of electricity in the province; private diesel and micro-hydro generators only provide minimal lighting. Government buildings are run-down or incomplete and lack any form of communication because of very limited landline telecommunications. A mobile telecommunications network was established in Tarin Kowt in September 2006, reducing the population’s reliance on satellite telephones. All in all, amenities and infrastructure taken for granted elsewhere are non-existent. Reconstruction work is more often first-time construction work.
Status of Women
The status of women in Afghan society declined dramatically with the rise of the Taliban, who ordered women to disappear. Eight thousand female undergraduates at Kabul University lost their places and a similar number of female school teachers lost their jobs, with school closures affecting more than 70 000 female students. Thousands of female civil servants in bloated government ministries, contributing meagre but steady salaries to their extended families, were banned from their offices.19
Unlike the rest of Afghanistan, Pashtun women in the south have always been treated as a lower class than Pashtun men. Ahmed Rashid summarises the issue in his book Taliban:
The Taliban leaders were all from the poorest, most conservative and least literate southern Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan. In Mullah Omar’s village [in Uruzgan and/or Kandahar] women had always gone around fully veiled and no girl had ever gone to school because there were none ... The rest of Afghanistan was not evenly remotely like the South ... Outside the Pashtun belt, all other ethnic groups vigorously encouraged female education. Afghanistan’s strength was its ethnic diversity and women had as many roles as there were tribes and nationalities.20
In general, the status of women throughout Afghanistan has not recovered and women do not play a large role in public life. They are rarely seen at all in the south; the author did not speak to a local female during his seven-month deployment. Therefore, the size of the available workforce is only at 50 per cent of what it could be if women were fully integrated. Again, this impacts on the type, scale and effectiveness of reconstruction and development activities, particularly in the areas of health and education.
Narcotics
The final issue confronting the reconstruction of a viable Afghanistan is opium cultivation. The economy in southern Afghanistan, prior to the Soviet invasion, was heavily reliant on the agriculture industry, much as it is today, despite only 12 per cent of the country being arable land.21 Orchards were plentiful with a large and well-developed export industry distributing Afghan fruit around the world. The orchards and complex irrigation systems, especially in Kandahar, were destroyed by the Soviet forces, although they did not advance very far into Uruzgan. When the refugees returned to their devastated orchards, they grew opium poppies for a livelihood, creating a major source of income for the Taliban.22 Now Afghanistan is the single largest producer of opium in the world and Uruzgan is the third-largest province in production terms. In spring, the ‘green zone’ areas near the few water ways in the province were a beautiful sea of pink as every available field bloomed with poppies.
The British have been given the unenviable task of eliminating the huge opium problem. The solution is not as simple as a total slash-and-burn operation. The farmers must be given a viable option; currently the danger of losing their opium crops is not great enough a risk to get them to change. Lately, skirmishes have occurred between crop minders and Coalition forces who were wrongly thought to be seeking to eliminate the poppies. To find an equal financial option is proving almost impossible. Until then, a blind-eye is being turned on the poppy fields as attention focuses on the larger issue of removing the Taliban and the insurgents. Unfortunately, workers required for R&D activities will continue to be lured away to work in the lucrative poppy industry, especially around harvest time.
To summarise the problems in Afghanistan: a wise old Afghan Mujahed once told Ahmed Rashid the mystical story of how God made Afghanistan:
When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw that there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. He collected them all together and threw them down on the earth. That was Afghanistan.23
Approaches to Reconstruction and Development
This section will highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach to reconstruction and development activities in Uruzgan by the American and Dutch PRTs. The two countries approached their missions completely differently—a combination of differing personalities, national doctrine, past experiences and strategic goals as well as dissimilar guidance from the separate Coalition headquarters for which they worked. The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom placed a much greater emphasis on destroying the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups than the ISAF who, while still placing great emphasis on improving the security situation by neutralising the insurgent threat, put a greater emphasis on rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan and helping their people.
US Provincial Reconstruction Teams
The author was the Engineer Officer for two consecutive US PRTs based in Tarin Kowt and provided the continuity for their projects when they rotated at the start of May. The two US PRTs had a similar structure, although the second PRT was more junior, had less experience and relied heavily on US Navy and Air Force staff. The group of seventy had twelve headquarters staff, a Civil Affairs team of eight, a Force Protection (FORCEPRO) platoon and logistics staff. Lacking in both teams, however, was a civil/construction engineer—a necessity in a situation where 75 per cent of PRT activities in Afghanistan are construction related. The second US PRT did have a US Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) engineer officer who was a qualified computer hardware engineer—an unneeded qualification in Uruzgan where the only computers the locals own are those donated by the Dutch in August.
Having a dedicated FORCEPRO platoon allowed great mission flexibility in planning, deploying and then modifying missions once ‘outside-of-the-wire’. The PRT was able to deploy at will, independent from the remainder of the US Task Force (primarily special forces), and with whatever force composition required. Force protection would be increased from five or six High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMVWs, or ‘Humvees’) for a visit to a site in Tarin Kowt and its immediate surrounds to up to ten vehicles for a mission to another district. On a few occasions, usually arising from issues in the weekly Governor’s or Security Meetings, missions were modified to extend and visit additional sites where problems needing immediate addressing had arisen—something taken for granted in Australia. Without this flexibility, high-priority projects would have been delayed, incurring an increase in the project cost.
The Civil Affairs Team (CAT; similar to Australian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams, but with less emphasis on cooperation) planned all aspects of reconstruction and development activities and scheduled missions as required. Project inception (including liaison with Government officials, users and potential contractors and requesting budget approval), project administration, monitoring and close-out of projects were all the responsibility of the CAT. In effect, they were the backbone of the PRT. The members of the CAT were all National Guardsmen, who performed a twelve-month tour and who came from a wide variety of backgrounds: a university professor, business development manager for an executive jet company, two policemen and a recalled ex-regular officer, to name a few. Unfortunately, none had engineering or project management experience, resulting in poorly run projects that suffered numerous, but avoidable, problems. The worst example was the Provincial Administration Building in Tarin Kowt, which was opened by the US Ambassador in January 2006, completed at a cost of nearly US$250 000. In September, on inspection of the building after local officials reported cracks forming in a wall, it was found that, as the result of lack of supervision by a qualified engineer, the roof was unfinished and building defects in structural members had been hidden by cement-rendering. Rectifying the defects was another major issue as the contract documentation was extremely poorly written and almost impossible to enforce. The problem of deploying CAT or CIMIC Teams without engineers is not limited to the US; the Dutch and Australians in Iraq did the same. The addition of an engineer to the US PRT ensured that tendering and contract management were properly completed, suitable contractors were selected and projects were completed within budget and to the required standard.
On observation, it appeared that the dominant assumption of the US forces at all levels was that elimination of the Taliban and insurgents would resolve the Afghanistan issue. As such, US PRT projects were only ‘gift’ projects rather than part of a long-term development plan for the province. Their sole purpose was to win hearts and minds by giving things such as school books, medical supplies or school buildings to the local population. Government officials, in particular two very proactive and intelligent Soviet-trained engineer ministers, were consulted on individual projects and activities to ensure they met the requirements but they were, however, quite random, disjointed and occasionally ineffective in meeting the expectations of the locals. Originally, roads were built without bridges, schools were built without teachers and farm machinery was provided without a maintenance plan, issues that subsequent PRTs had to address. Projects in the six different districts of the province were uncoordinated and the Provincial Government was not consulted about long-term planning as this was not part of the US strategy.
A New Approach
The Dutch PRT, heavily governed by ISAF directives, brought to Uruzgan a different approach to reconstruction and development. The fears of the United States—that ISAF forces would not involve themselves in kinetic actions but simply bring a ‘touchy-feely’ approach—were proved unjustified as ISAF forces, in all southern provinces, combined kinetic and non-kinetic activities, attempting to overcome the increasing insurgent problem. The biggest issue that the Dutch PRT faced, aside from the security situation, was a lack of dedicated force protection.
The bulk of the Dutch PRT, including their commander and his headquarters staff, came from the 42nd Tank Battalion, with the staff having successfully worked together for several years, ensuring that both operational planning and logistic administration were executed efficiently and effectively. Once again the CIMIC component was the backbone of the organisation—the face of all R&D activities and planners and schedulers for the PRT missions. The CIMIC group comprised a Major-led headquarters section and included development, medical and agriculture specialists (effectively civilians in uniform) and three CIMIC field teams, led by a Tank Battalion Major and Warrant Officer plus a CIMIC-qualified officer and senior non-commissioned officer. Again there was no dedicated, qualified engineer, the role being filled by the author, then later on a part-time basis by the RTF. Inclusion of specialists, particularly in engineering and health, maximises the outcomes of all meetings and streamlines R&D efforts.
The efficiency and effectiveness of these specialists was counteracted, unfortunately, by a lack of dedicated force protection for the PRT—an issue raised by the PRT commander prior to deployment. Initially, having eleven platoons in the Task Force Uruzgan Battle Group appeared sufficient to provide a platoon to the PRT when required, which was virtually every day. The large amount of proactive patrolling required to keep abreast of insurgent activity, as well as participation in Brigade (Regional Command – South) kinetic operations, quickly resulted in the PRT having to compete for force protection. As a result of insufficient force protection, over half the PRT missions were cancelled, sometimes with only a few hours notice, including missions to: inspect ongoing construction works, attend shuras (a consultative meeting of elders), assess buildings, and conduct meetings with proactive local women’s groups. Many of these meetings had taken weeks of planning and could not be re-scheduled, causing delays in the overall plan. Construction works were not inspected for up to three weeks, meaning neither progress nor quality could be enforced. By not prioritising protection for the PRT, their effectiveness was reduced and Task Force Uruzgan could not back their kinetic activities up with non-kinetic ones to win the hearts and minds of the local population, the key to defeating an insurgency.
There are two aspects to the Dutch approach that appear superior to that of the Americans. Firstly, the Dutch PRT completed a ‘Conflict Analysis’ to determine all obvious and underlying factors contributing to the security situation. Whereas the US mentality was that the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other insurgents were the only source of conflict, the Dutch determined that, as well as the insurgents, there were other factors that ensured conflict would continue even if the insurgency is defeated. Once all sources had been determined, they were then factored into the overall campaign plan. The biggest cause of conflict after the insurgency, although intertwined with the Taliban, was the intense rivalry between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns—an issue never raised (at PRT-level at least) by the Americans. In the Chora District particularly, the Ghilzai Pashtuns were supporting the Taliban instead of the Durrani tribes. One reason for this was that the Durrani Pashtuns lived in the district capital, effectively receiving all the aid and US support, while the Ghilzai Pashtuns, on the other side of a mountain in Kala Kala, received none. Essentially the Ghilzai saw the Durrani tribes being favoured by the Americans while they received no support—they were not being won over and their support, therefore, was not with the Coalition Forces. Once this issue had been identified, both tribes were then given special attention by the Dutch PRT, with results yet to be seen.
The second major difference with the Dutch PRT methodology was their plan to assist the Provincial Government in developing a longterm and integrated strategy for reconstruction and development in the province. This would usually be undertaken by UNAMA, who were absent from Uruzgan due to the Governor being on their sanction list. This plan, written by the author and endorsed by the Dutch and Australian political advisors and the US Department of State Representative, had the aims of providing an update on the Government of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development activities and strategies and providing a plan of attack for furthering both the Provincial Government’s strategies and the PRT’s activities.24
At national level, and ratified internationally at the London Conference in February 2006, the plan for reconstruction and development, called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), is the Government of Afghanistan’s five-year operation-level poverty reduction strategy within the overall development framework for Afghanistan. The ANDS will support Afghanistan’s efforts to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals by 2020. Unfortunately, the Uruzgan Provincial Development Council (PDC) is in its infancy, only being formed after prompting by the US and Dutch PRTs between July and October 2006. None of its members have any experience in formulating long-term strategies in any of the areas of government or budgeting for their plans. Guidance is lacking from the national Government and it will take several years to introduce the ANDS as the planning and budgetary tool for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan at all levels.
To jump start the process, the Dutch PRT are deliberately taking only a supporting role in the Provincial Development Council, minimising the ‘foreign-face’ and attributing PDC activities to the Government of Afghanistan. Through a six-step plan, over a period of nine to twelve months, the Dutch will assist with the functioning of the Council (by mentoring, workshops, etc), help with the formulation of the Provincial Development Plan and help integrate the PRT’s reconstruction and development activities. The ultimate goal, to be achieved within the two years which the Dutch and Australians have committed to ISAF, is that the Uruzgan PDC will have a well-established plan, integrated into the ANDS and National Budget, and that they will be able to implement and continue to evolve this plan with time.25
The Way Ahead
After working closely with the US and Dutch PRTs, the following recommendations should be implemented by future PRT/RTF-type organisations in medium-to-high threat environments for the delivery of reconstruction and development:
- Ensure the PRT has dedicated force protection to maximise reconnaissance and monitoring missions and maintain flexibility in a highly fluid environment.
- The PRT must contain full-time specialists who are qualified and well-experienced in reconstruction and development activities—primarily engineering, health, education and agriculture (as applicable to the area of operations).
- At a minimum, a CIMIC Team of four should consist of a qualified technical engineer, a medical specialist (doctor or administrator) and two others with relevant specialisations, for example logistics, transport or communications.
- Complete a Conflict Analysis from the outset to determine all factors contributing to the security situation. Account for all factors in the campaign plan and continually update this analysis.
- Base the PRT on an existing unit headquarters (for example, an Engineer Regiment or an Infantry/Armoured Battalion) and supplement this with reconstruction and development and CIMIC specialists.
- Ensure that all projects aim to achieve a long-term development plan for the area of operations, developed in consultation with local government and representative bodies. This will ensure that local people have a voice, helping to win their hearts and minds, and reconstruction and development will continue after military forces have been withdrawn.
From the author’s perspective, the single biggest activity that the Australian RTF can undertake in Uruzgan in the next two years is the establishment of a fully functioning and relevant Trade Training Centre that will continue once Australian tradesmen have departed. The trade school will address a large number of the problems found in Uruzgan: poor levels of education and training, shortages of capable contractors, the re-integration of women into the work force and, ultimately, improvement in infrastructure and civil services. The trade school could not only be Australia’s legacy in Uruzgan but in the whole of Afghanistan where it appears that every province, and PRT supporting the province, use different construction standards and produce tradesmen and trained workers of varying skill levels and abilities. If Australia were to develop Training Management Plans (TMPs) for three- and four-month courses in disciplines such as carpentry, plumbing, electrical, small motors maintenance, first aid and food preparation, the TMPs could be passed up through the Provincial Government for implementation on a national level. This would ensure consistent levels of training, producing qualified workers employable anywhere in Afghanistan. Qualified Australian ‘Train-the-Trainers’ would be required to implement the TMPs until local tradesmen were skilled enough to take over. This initiative is what that the locals want and they have offered to add local trades such as carpet and basket weaving to the syllabus. This would ensure that Australia gives an enduring legacy to Afghanistan and its reconstruction.
Conclusion
Bringing reconstruction and development to Uruzgan is a very challenging, but achievable, mission for Task Force Uruzgan. The Province is currently ‘behind the eight-ball’ as there is still a major conflict occurring, poor governance at all levels, no NGOs or International Organisations present and a severe shortage of educated and skilled workers.
Uruzgan must develop and follow a long-term and integrated plan for reconstruction and development to ensure that no funding or effort is wasted. In order to assist in this, both in Uruzgan and in future deployments, PRT-type organisations must conduct a Conflict Analysis to determine all the factors that need to be addressed in the campaign plan. The Taliban and insurgents are not the only ‘enemies’.
Rebuilding Uruzgan cannot be done alone with a troop of Australian engineers—regard-less of how hard they work to live up to their reputation of always getting the job done despite the adversities they face. The three big areas for reconstruction and development in Uruzgan are infrastructure, education and health. As such, the organisation must be structured to undertake all of these activities. The only way that ISAF, and similar assistance forces in the future, will succeed in Afghanistan is if non-kinetic activities are carried out, addressing these needs, as well as kinetic actions. This is the only way to win hearts and minds.
Endnotes
1 T. E. Lawrence, Twenty Seven Articles, Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, pp. 126-133.
2 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban – Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2001, p. 7.
3 Ibid, p. 9.
4 Rashid, p. 21.
5 Ibid, pp. 22–23.
6 Ibid, p. 32.
7 Ibid, p. 283.
8 Ibid, pp. 23–24.
9 S. Coll, Ghost Wars – The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin Books, London, 2004, p. 283.
10 Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF), ISAF Placemat, <http://www2.hq.nato.int/isaf/ media/pdf/placemat_isaf.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2007.
11 A. A. Jalali and L. W Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain – Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, Quantico, Virginia, 1995, p. xiii.
12 Rashid, p. 83.
13 Ibid, pp. 10–11.
14 General D. Richards, Introductory Presentation to July 2006 PRT Conference, Kabul, 30 July 2006.
15 United Nations Security Council Press Release, Security Council Committee Adds One Individual in Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, Approves Changes of Information Regarding 25 Individuals, <http://www.un.org /News/Press/docs/2006/sc8798.doc.htm>, accessed 9 January 2007.
16 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Literacy Rates and Primary School Enrolment, <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/aird/Literacy%20rate%20and%20primary%20education…;, accessed 9 January 2007.
17 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications /factbook/geos/af.html>, accessed 16 December 2006.
18 US Department of State, Background Note: Afghanistan, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm>, accessed 9 January 2007.
19 Coll, p. 334.
20 Rashid, p. 110.
21 Ibid, p. 8.
22 Ibid, p. 20.
23 Ibid, p 7.
24 Captain M. Scott, Report on the Current Status of Reconstruction and Development in Uruzgan Province and the Way Ahead, Task Force Uruzgan PRT, 22 August 2006, p. 1.
25 Ibid, pp. 7–9.
