The Multi-National Corps–Iraq Partnership: Interaction and Integration with the Iraqi Army

Purpose

This paper outlines selected tactics, techniques and procedures developed and adopted by the Multi-National Corps–Iraq to facilitate interaction with their Iraqi Army (predominantly Iraqi Ground Forces Command) counterparts.

Background

Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) was established on 15 May 2005 as the operational fighting headquarters for the Iraqi Army. In a command directive dated 4 August 2005, the Commanding General of the Iraqi Joint Forces (IJF) provided his implementing direction to the Commander of Iraqi Ground Forces. IGFC serves the dual functions of operational-level corps headquarters and that of the land component command of the IJF The mature end-state IGFC will not only direct the combat operations of assigned Iraqi Ground Forces (IGF) units, but will also take responsibility for:  

• developing a robust training plan to enable units to maintain their operational capability and combat effectiveness  
   
• identifying training requirements for units in anticipation of forthcoming operations and advising Joint Headquarters (JHQ) where support is required  
   
• collecting and advising on lessons learned in accordance with direction from JHQ

These functions did not exist in this form or level in the former Iraqi Army and, as such, IGFC has met institutional resistance to its raison d’être. This is notwithstanding its key enduring roles as a buffer to politicisation of the IGF, and in delivering effective operational interpretation of strategic direction from JHQ, the Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Government. Other concepts recently introduced include:  

• familiarity and proficiency with C4 (command, control, communications and computers) 
   
• revised application of the Common Staff System (previously inherent, but differently employed to accommodate an autocratic and punitive system of directive control)  
   
• adoption of the military decision-making process (MDMP) as a planning method

These factors impact on Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s effective partnership with IGFC—a liaison that is fundamental not only to the success of the IGFC as a headquarters, but to the entire command and control construct adopted for the Iraqi Army, and thus ultimately key to the transition to the counterinsurgency fight. While the IGFC military transition teams (MiTT) provide technical and individual training, the role of the MNC-I partner provides additional mentorship, contextual understanding and experiential advice to its IGFC counterparts.

The Bottom Line Up Front

The concept of an IGFC is entirely new to the senior Iraqi Army leadership in a variety of personal, professional and functional aspects. The key issues for the partnership include:

• dedication of senior and Action Officer partners  
   
• whole of cell support  
   
• maintenance of dual battle rhythm  
   
• accommodation of and accounting for cultural differences (interpreting, translation, time allocation, work rates)  
   
• meeting structure, layouts, attendance and conduct  
   
• IA–partner parallel situational awareness (JHQ-Transition Team, MNSTC-I [Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq], MSC/IA Division, MiTT)  
   
• Iraqi input to policy and operational decision-making  
   
• personal and institutional constraints and limitations 
   
• personal support and credibility

Partnership Considerations

Dedication of Senior and Action Officer Partners

Effective partnership requires the establishment of rapport not only at the senior representational level, but also at the Action Officer level. Partners at all levels also need to mirror this relationship-building within the relevant MiTT appointments.

At the 06 level and above, partnership manifests primarily through personal professional example, relationship development and rapport, and the provision of timely and accurate functional advice. The senior partner should be drawn from an appointment with sufficient executive power to be credible and minimise later recourse. This partnership dynamic is supported in parallel at the Action Officer level, but here the role is further augmented through the provision of decisionmaking process advice and support and, when necessary, executive assistance in staff procedures that prove unfamiliar and complex. Both partnership levels are best delivered through a consistent and dedicated partnering individual, preferably someone with demonstrated inter-cultural skills and interest.

Whole of Cell Support

Even when combined, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) cell staff, coalition partners and MiTTs cannot provide all the staff support required by their corresponding Iraqi Army partner headquarters. At the MSC and MNC-I level, this is particularly germane when complex decision-making requires staff effort drawn from the full range of divisional and corps-level staff actions and subject matter expertise. It must be remembered that, regardless of their previous experience, senior IA officers served in an Army environment that was far less complex and that was more austere; as such, many staff functions were either conducted differently or perhaps not at all. MNC-I functional staff must be prepared to contribute across all staff responsibilities where necessary. This requirement will increase as Iraqi Army divisions and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command itself begin to assume battlespace and tactical control as well as administrative control of subordinate brigades and divisions respectively.

Recommendation: All MNC-I staff must be prepared to provide operational-level staff support and advice where and when necessary.

Maintenance of Dual Battle Rhythm

For MNC-I and MSC partners, maintenance and deconfliction of a dual battle rhythm will present ongoing time management challenges. Partnership responsibilities demand attendance at and participation in all appropriate conferences and meetings at the Iraqi partner headquarters, in addition to meeting the requirements of the Coalition headquarters battle rhythm. Meeting planners and coordinators must reflect this duality in all programming. Without such programming allowances, partners unavoidably lose situational awareness either of the Coalition or the Iraqi operating picture, or both.

Recommendation: Coalition battle rhythm must allow for the battle rhythm of the partner Iraqi headquarters.

Accommodation of and Allowances for Cultural Differences

(Interpreting, Transaltion, Time Allocation, Work Rates)

Beyond the superficial cultural niceties of greetings and politeness, there are numerous inter-cultural challenges facing coalition partners which may include:  

• Interpreting. Rule number one is that there are rarely sufficient interpreters to meet the operational requirement. In addition to this limitation is the care necessary in the appropriate utilisation of this scarce resource. Individual interpreters have different levels of education and experience, both civil and military, and, as such, may have difficulty with jargon, abbreviations or complex concepts, the vocabulary for which they may not have used in either one or both languages.  
   
• Time. Time taken to explain concepts to ensure the interpreter understands what they are trying to convey is never wasted. Depending on skill and experience, interpreters have individual limits on information packets that they can digest before mental translation and relaying in the target language. Unless the interpreter is at the professional superlative level where they can interpret simultaneously, a failure to control conversation to allow interpretation to occur will result in unavoidable information loss, which can have dire consequences.  
   
• Work rates. While a coalition partner’s deployment is long, it will never equate to the magnitude of the task ahead of the Iraqi counterpart. For Iraqi Army personnel, leave is vital as a mechanism to maintain and convey financial and personal support to their families, while weekends allow both rest and the opportunity for religious observance. Similarly, Middle Eastern culture does not demand the same frantic approach to work found in most Western cultures. A greater sense of fatalism stemming from a history of autocracy—whether theocratic, tribal or dictatorial—also influences the Iraqi approach to tasks, often preceded by the epithet ‘Insh’ allah’ [If God wills it]. Accept these as cultural norms and work within them.

Recommendation: Remember the three ‘P’s: Pause, Patience, and Practical vocabulary. While you as a partner may be running a sprint or, at best, a middle distance race, your Iraqi counterpart is only just beginning a marathon.

Meeting Structure, Layouts, Attendance and Conduct

Within the Iraqi culture, meetings traditionally serve a different purpose to that typical of most Western cultures. While clear outcomes and decisions are the result sought from a Coalition meeting, this is culturally odd for many Iraqis (though less so within the military). Meetings are intended more to facilitate information transfer and achieve minor staffing resolutions, with weighty decisions more comfortably arrived at in intimate command group meetings. In practical terms:

• Meeting layouts. The layout of the meeting should cater for both partners: consideration should be given to interpreter placement, bilingual agendas and supporting slides (half the bullets with information in both languages presented simultaneously). Where available, interpretation headsets should be provided for those speaking the non-predominant language of the meeting.  
   
• Meeting preparation. Partners should be prepared for limited Iraqi input to meetings if translated read-ahead guidance and topics have not been provided to both MiTTs and Iraqi counterparts. The onus is on the partner to ensure such preparation occurs; counterpart meetings are long enough (always factor double time to allow for worst-case interpretation rates) without the need to conduct them twice. Consider conducting pre-meetings with key Iraqi counterparts.  
   
• Meeting conduct. Loss of face is as important in Arab culture as it is in most Asian cultures. Nothing is gained and much is risked if an Iraqi counterpart is needlessly put on the spot for a snap, under-informed decision. Iraqis come from a military heritage where the wrong answer was dealt with summarily and, at times, terminally. As such, Iraqi counterparts will, at times, not answer a topic directly if it is unfamiliar, but choose to provide all manner of ancillary and nebulous peripheral data that seeks to demonstrate that, while they may not know the answer to the question at hand, they do know something. This is best dealt with firmly but gently to bring the conversation stream back on track. However, there is little point pressing the topic if it is clear the Iraqi partner cannot provide the input sought.

Recommendation. Prepare for all meetings with due consideration for time taken, membership, topics covered and decisions sought. Cater for both partners in supporting documentation, allocation of seating and interpreter support. Prepare the way for decisions through pre-meetings.

Iraqi Army-Partner Parallel Situational Awareness

(JHQ,TT, MNSTC-I, MSC/IA Division, MITT)

More frustrating than losing situational awareness of your counterpart’s operating picture is the need to redress dysfunction between your own headquarters and your superior/subordinate Coalition partner headquarters. Both partners must strive to achieve ‘lockstep’ when dealing with counterpart headquarters above and below, to ensure that mutually agreed positions are clear and articulated. Additionally, Coalition partners need also to ensure that a unilateral Coalition operating picture is shared between higher and lower headquarters, so as to avoid unintentional or calculated circumventing by Iraqi partners with their corresponding commands. Judicious (as opposed to relentless) accompanying of partners on representative missions to superior and subordinate headquarters not only increases situational awareness, but also builds rapport and, where mutual objectives exist (as they always should), enhances the credibility of both. Moreover, early advice to superior/subordinate Coalition partner headquarters of bilateral positions on issues will assist in preparing the way for dealing with them on the day. Finally, important FRAGOs (fragmentary orders) relating to Iraqi Army operations and training need to be issued bilingually, with carbon copies to Iraqi Ground Forces Command.

Iraqi Input to Policy/Operational Decision-Making

While sometimes tiresome, obtaining Iraqi involvement in joint planning teams and planning activities provides significant advantages not only in gaining Iraqi buy-in and ownership of a problem, but also through facilitating the transfer of responsibility for decision-making in the future. More importantly—and unsurprisingly—Iraqis know a great deal about the geographic and human environment of their country. Views that have been dismissed by Coalition planners as expressions of Iraqi self-interest or bias have, on several previous occasions, been proven otherwise. Though generally relatively unsophisticated as an intelligence source, Iraqi assessments are certainly worth considering during the planning process, and should not be discounted out of hand. If nothing else, an alternative, local perspective provides another lens through which to view a situation.

An Iraqi solution that works is ten times more valuable than a perfect Coalition solution, and may well turn out to be a better solution in the long term.

Recommendation: Early and considered involvement by Iraqis in decisionmaking, while sometimes tiresome, pays considerable dividends. Listen and learn—in one way or another.

Personal and Institutional Constraints and Limitations

Iraqi Army officers are drawn from an extremely diverse range of backgrounds which include former regime battle-hardened commanders and staff officers; former National Guard officers with varied civilian careers; those who left the Army decades ago; and rapidly promoted favourites. Senior-level military professional education is not prevalent, and Staff College-qualified officers are, unsurprisingly, highly sought after. The previous workplace of former regime officers was also radically different to the current environment, both in institutional mechanisms and the professional relationships between superiors and subordinates. Many officers are professional and often dedicated—given the risk to themselves and their families—but many still require firm guidance and ‘handling’ to inculcate appropriate ‘New Iraqi Army’ values and practices.

While the Army is undoubtedly one of the more eclectic institutions in Iraq, sectarian and tribal loyalties do and will continue to influence decisions and behaviour in an irrational manner. This is no different to Western cultures, although perhaps more clear-cut and binding, with trust and reliance in a perilous society often being based on filial and theological kinship. Personal education standards are similarly diverse, which again should not be surprising given the predominantly agrarian nature of provincial Iraqi society.

Recommendation: Harbour no preconceptions of the ability, capacity or attitude of Iraqi officers, but don’t be astounded when one or some fail to meet expectations. It is the Coalition’s job to develop them, personally and professionally.

Personal Support and Credibility

Early and sustained development of personal professional-level rapport with Iraqi counterparts requires no little effort, but is no less rewarding when achieved. The Coalition partner’s trust, mutual respect and cultural regard must be demonstrated from the outset and, while not everyone can be Lawrence of Arabia, an understanding of and empathy with Arab and Iraqi culture and language is an investment with undoubted return. Iraqis know far more about American culture than Americans know of Iraqi culture—Hollywood, Fox and CNN have done their job well; as can be imagined, those aspects do not necessarily reflect the honour, respect and professionalism that Americans uphold. Start from a pretext of genuinely demonstrating that Coalition members are not all Mafiosi, licentious drug-crazed gamblers or violent, uncultured thugs, and rapport will soon develop. Reinforcing counterpart credibility and providing personal support is also important in obtaining mutual trust. This does not equate to ghost-writing all of an Iraqi counterpart’s staff work efforts, but rather ensuring the prerequisite information, tools and systemic techniques are available and accessible. Personal interest in and time devoted to a counterpart’s responsibilities not only increase situational awareness of the Iraqi headquarters, but also build your credibility as someone who is truly interested in the security and stable future of Iraq.

Recommendation: Institute early and sustained development of personal-level professional rapport with Iraqi counterparts, accounting for and deconstructing cultural differences.

The Way Ahead

Never forget that, as a partner, you are ultimately training and preparing your replacement. It is the partner’s job to ensure an Iraqi counterpart knows what is required, and when and how to perform and execute a given role. The lessons described above are more or less applicable across most of Iraq’s broad ethnic mix. The most important lesson, however, is to remain committed and never expect Iraqis to act like Westerners: they are not, just as you are not Iraqi.