Military Public Affairs in Complex Environments

Abstract

The conduct of military public affairs in complex environments is characterised by two prevailing themes: strategic communication to Australian audiences, and the need to build local consent and support within the area of operations. Public affairs, often underestimated at the beginning of deployments, can prove to be a vital ingredient in building and maintaining support from the local population as well as goodwill at home.

The success or failure of a military mission can often rest with the willingness of the public to support the government in the conduct of military operations. Therefore, the ability to accurately inform the government and the public in a timely and relevant manner during military operations remains critical to the success of the operation.

- General Peter Cosgrove,
Chief of the Defence Force, March 2005

There is no doubt that the news media regard conflict as ‘good for business’. The onset of hostilities in Iraq in March 2003 saw media interest set a new benchmark with 137 media agencies registered at the Press Information Centre in Qatar accounting for almost 1000 media staff.¹ The war in Iraq continues to offer all the ingredients of a good news story: conflict, opposing opinions, visual theatrics, debate over ‘right’ and ‘just’ causes, an evil dictator, allegations of chemical and biological weapons, and a bloody insurgency. Despite controversy over the moral and legal justification for the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Australian and international media continue to regard the war as having provided profitable daily fodder.

The Australian Government announced on 22 February 2005 that 450 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel would be deployed to the Al Muthanna Province in southern Iraq.² The Federal Opposition was quick to respond, identifying perceived weaknesses in the preparation of the newly constituted Al Muthanna Task Group (AMTG).³ On ABC Television’s Insiders program of 27 February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade countered the Opposition’s claims concerning AMTG readiness by stating that any shortfall had been rectified and that the Opposition Leader was ‘playing politics’ with the issue. The 1st Brigade found itself in the midst of an intense debate about preparedness, the risk to diggers’ lives, and the political decision to support the Japanese and British forces in Iraq.

The Australian public was also less than enthusiastic about the impending deployment. In March 2005, public opinion polling by Morgan Gallup revealed that sixty-three per cent of Australians disapproved of the Government’s decision to deploy Australian troops to Iraq while forty-five per cent were opposed to Australia’s military presence in Iraq altogether. The Prime Minister told The Age newspaper: ‘I acknowledged at the time that our decision would not be popular and the polls would indicate that it’s not got popular support. But occasionally governments are required to take decisions that involve unpopularity.’⁴

In May 2005, hot on the heels of the Morgan Gallup poll, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released a research report that analysed another facet of public opinion on the war in Iraq. According to the ASPI report, support for Australia’s involvement in Iraq within political circles had slipped since 2001: ‘three-quarters of Coalition candidates strongly approved of the war, nine out of ten Labor and Democrat candidates strongly disapproved of it, as did almost all Greens candidates.’⁵

Miiltary Public Affairs in Complex Environments

Military counterinsurgency operations in urban environments characterised by local political and public opposition are considered the most complex to conduct. The conduct of military public affairs in these complex environments is also considered the most difficult of such campaigns. Military public affairs necessarily includes not only military operations but also consideration of the Australian domestic political backdrop. The conduct of military public affairs in complex environments is characterised by two prevailing themes: strategic communication to Australian audiences, and the need to build local consent and support within the area of operations.

Media and the Military

An interesting characteristic of the media’s reporting on AMTG preparations for deployment was the apparent separation of politics and political commentary from reporting on operational preparedness and military training. While voicing obvious concern about the threat in Iraq from insurgent activities, the media was also prepared to quarantine the military from criticism of the Government’s decision to increase its military presence in Iraq. This was a reversal of the way the media had played the issue in 2003.

The Strategic Corporal

The news media remains fascinated with the opinions of Australian diggers, regarding these ‘strategic corporals’ as credible and highly sought after spokespersons. The AMTG conducted a combined arms exercise at the Mount Bundie Training Area in preparation for deployment and the media and the Australian public were allowed an inside view of the true state of the task group’s preparedness through photographs and video of troops training. The comments made by soldiers about the intensity of their preparation and the quality of equipment were resoundingly positive. The confidence of commanders in their soldiers illustrated the power of the ‘strategic corporal’.

Strategic Imagery

While the impact of the ‘strategic corporal’ in presenting the Defence message has been resounding, photography and vision have also played a part as strategic shaping tools.⁶ The principle that a picture is worth a thousand words was true in every sense of the coverage of the AMTG.⁷ A case in point involved imagery used to support the decision by the AMTG Commanding Officer to remove bar-armour from the Australian Light Armoured Vehicles (ASLAVs) within the first week of operations in Al Muthanna. Additional armour was fast-tracked through the Defence procurement system in a move to provide extra protection to the ASLAVs during their deployment. The armour increased the width of the vehicle and, while it made navigating the urban landscape more of a challenge, the benefits of the change were noted and appreciated.

The Australian media were quick to note that the armour had been removed and asked Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Roger Noble the reason for its removal. Video and photographs of the ASLAVs attempting to navigate crowded streets in As Samawah soon demonstrated the safety reasons behind its removal. Debate was defused in a few short days and the image of the AMTG and Defence in general remained untarnished.

Strategic Communication

From the first week of vehicle-based patrols by the AMTG, it became apparent that the ASLAVs would need some ‘hard-sell’ to ensure their acceptance by the local population. They were loud, intimidating and, unluckily, very similar in appearance to US LAVs. Community reaction was mixed and it quickly became apparent that a community relations exercise would be necessary to dispel myths about the vehicles and the troops driving them.

Six weeks later, Operation Shoppa was born. It involved Lieutenant Colonel Noble and a number of his soldiers driving into As Samawah, in the company of the British Light Dragoons and the Iraqi Police Service, and conducting a meet-and-greet visit to the souk bazaar. Inviting the media, although beneficial to the ultimate aim of the exercise, was assessed as adding substantially to the risks associated with an already hazardous operation. Instead, an imagery specialist was assigned the task of following the Australian contingent.

The resulting footage showed Lieutenant Colonel Noble and his soldiers chatting with the local people, an image that public affairs analysts knew the Australian public would respond to positively. A media release was quickly crafted and a selection of photographs was sent just hours after the event, aimed at a timely release into the prime-time news cycle in Australia. The best images were quickly cleared for release and news agencies promptly loaded the pictures onto their web-pages. The local media event that had been programmed to build confidence and establish relationships with the people of As Samawah could now be used strategically in Australia.

The images received overwhelmingly positive feedback because they contained the clear statement that, despite the obvious security threat in Iraq, the Australians were welcome in Al Muthanna. The coverage provided endorsement that the Australian Government had made the right decision to send Australian troops to the province and embodied a tangible reassurance to the Australian public that the risk to the troops’ safety was less than previously believed.

Information Operations

The Information Campaign

Al Muthanna is considered the most peaceful province in Iraq. Within the multinational forces (MNF) in Al Muthanna, Task Force Eagle was directly responsible for the development of a robust security structure that could manage security without direct intervention by the MNF, and one in which the public had confidence. However, in the two years since the commencement of operations in Iraq and the subsequent fall of Saddam Hussein, community awareness of reconstruction projects had remained low. Research by the Multinational Division South-East (MND-SE) assessed population awareness of reconstruction projects at just three per cent.⁸ The Japanese Iraq Reconstruction Support Group had maintained an ongoing media engagement strategy with a constant flow of news media events and coverage in the local press. However, when the AMTG and the British Light Dragoons assumed responsibility for security in Al Muthanna, there was no communication with the local media for the first three months. It quickly became clear that the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) team would have to publicise project developments as a matter of urgency.

The local media, which boasted thirteen agencies and more than twenty-one news media representatives in As Samawah, proved the best and most powerful mechanism for reaching the people of the region. The use of the mass media was endorsed by research that estimated that seventy-three per cent of people watched the evening news.⁹

Communication with the local population also carried a political dimension. Iraq’s successful transition to self-reliance depended to a large extent on the ability of Iraqi leaders to communicate key initiatives to the people. The philosophy of public affairs within Task Force Eagle was to progressively distance the MNF from communications and increasingly profile the Iraqi leadership. It was important to recognise that ‘an Iraqi speaking to Iraqis’ was the most effective method of developing strong press relations. The task force commander was soon provided with his own press officer, a strategy quickly adopted across the division as a key initiative aimed at building capacity when engaging the media. The press officer had two primary functions: to encourage and brief Iraqi spokespeople; and to develop strong press relations.

Mass Media

Engagement of the local media was quickly recognised as a powerful and efficient mechanism for communicating Task Force Eagle and AMTG messages to the majority of people in Al Muthanna. The local media campaign relied on regular media engagement, to the order of two to three events each week. The campaign also exploited a weakness in the ability of the Al Muthanna television station to provide a consistent quantity of news by supplying an extended interview each week with the task force commander. A safety and awareness video for television was also produced for local viewing, as was a series of advertisements for the As Samawah newspaper. The constant focus of the AMTG on local media engagement had a significant impact on community feedback. Patrol reports indicated obvious local recognition of Australian soldiers, a reasonable awareness of the mission (security not reconstruction), and that there was some change in the behaviour of children when they approached the troops.

Initial polling by MND-SE on community satisfaction with MNF in each province found that ninety per cent of people believed that their quality of life had improved while thirty per cent felt that crime levels had fallen since the transition to a democratically elected government. This poll contradicted anecdotal evidence of community dissatisfaction with the MNF and flew in the face of localised protest action calling for the MNF to withdraw. The situation remained complex, however, with political activities organised by the Jayish Al Mahdi that tapped into anti-Coalition force sentiment, insurgent attacks on infrastructure which degraded services to levels below that experienced by the population during the Hussein regime, and poor governance at the local level.

Targeting

With the conclusion of the kinetic phase of operations in Iraq, particularly in the southern provinces, an opportunity arose to use information to shape and influence behaviour. Public affairs became the key methodology for achieving outcomes and strategies included inviting the media into the Provincial Joint Operations Centre to discuss the preparedness and progress of the Iraqi Police Service in acting as a first-line response agency to incidents and emergencies. Invitations were also issued to media outlets to interview the task force commander each month to discuss the progress of CIMIC projects and security sector reform.

CIMIC was tasked to develop a projects program that was to help build and maintain consent in areas frequented by Australian patrols, as well as those areas where there was discontent. Patrols were also given briefing cards outlining and summarising reconstruction efforts across the region. This briefing card took the form of a simple ready-reckoner to assist troops to explain where money was being spent and infrastructure developed.

While psychological operations were possible, the effort required in Al Muthanna centred on public information rather than propaganda. Public affairs assisted with the development of task force messages and products that supported a coordinated and integrated communications campaign focusing on themes such as peace, safety, security and reconstruction. These were messages that were factual and truthful. The tactical-operational public affairs effort was recognised as the most effective mechanism for reaching mass audiences in Al Muthanna Province.¹⁰

Conclusion

Lieutenant Colonel Roger Noble, AMTG Commanding Officer, readily admitted that he was only broadly aware of the capability of public affairs before the task group’s deployment to Iraq. He argued that the most impressive and influential component of the public affairs capability was the ability to use images to shape and influence. ‘I have been able to [achieve this] through ... the [public affairs] team, in particular [through their use of] video and stills, and ... [their] expertise in how to exploit [these] in the community.’ He remarked that the integration of public affairs into the command and operations decision-making cycle through the engagement of the news media helped achieve public support, both at home in Australia and locally in Iraq. Within the battlegroup itself, Noble said that the public affairs team was treated in the same way as the other staff specialists and participated in daily briefings, targeting, the military appreciation process, incident and issues management, and interacted more generally within the staff group. ‘I cannot over-emphasise how critical [public affairs] is in terms of the mission on the ground and also [in] managing the message back in Australia where it is quite difficult to [achieve results].’

Endnotes

1    Military public affairs support to Operation Bastille and Operation Falconer, Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO), Post Operational Review, 4 February–9 May 2003.

2    Transcript of press conference with the Prime Minister, the Hon. John Howard MP, Parliament House, Canberra, 22 February 2005, http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview1251.html.

3    2003–04 Defence Department Annual Report, Chapter 2, Outcome 3: Army Capabilities.

4    The Age, 15 March 2005.

5    Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘Representative views: mass and elite opinion on Australian security (2005)’, www.aspi.org.au

6    ADFP 01.1.1 Defence Public Information Policy, 2002.

7    The Founder of the Washington PR firm, The Rendon Group, John Rendon, told cadets at the US Air Force Academy in 1996 that when victorious troops rolled into Kuwait City at the end of the first war in the Persian Gulf, they were greeted by hundreds of Kuwaitis waving small American flags. The scene, flashed around the world on television screens, sent the message that US Marines were being welcomed in Kuwait as liberating heroes. ‘Did you ever stop to wonder,’ Rendon asked, ‘how the people of Kuwait City, after being held hostage for seven long and painful months, were able to get hand-held American, and for that matter, the flags of other coalition countries?’ He paused for effect. ‘Well, you now know the answer. That was one of my jobs then.’ See Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, ‘How To Sell a War’, In These Times, 4 August 2003.

8    MND-SE Scientific Research, April 2005.

9    MND-SE Scientific Research, May 2005.

10  Personal comment from Colonel Andrew Nikolic and Lieutenant Colonel Roger Noble.