Letters and Commentary - Defence of Australia and Forward Defence: Reconciling the Dialectic of Australian Defence Strategies

I note with interest the debate over Michael Evans’s monograph, The Tyranny of Dissonance in the AAJ’s new ‘Forum’ section. I have also recently attended a briefing by Professor Paul Dibb on what he describes as the enduring relevance of strategic geography to Australian defence planning. In light of what are apparently opposite views, I can’t help but think that the antithetical perspectives presented are due for a synthesis that supersedes the old strategic dialectic between the two positions, namely ‘Defence of Australia’ (DoA) and ‘Forward Defence’.

In Defence of Strategic Georgraphy

In a presentation at the Australian National University’s Strategic Defence Studies Centre (2 February 2006), Paul Dibb revisited the strategic debate as he sought to de-construct the recent December 2005 Defence Update (which he referred to by the acronym ‘DUD’). Dibb expressed the view that the ADO has responded to events with an ‘imperial cringe’ by acquiring an expeditionary force to do the

bidding of the United States. He argued that, while the current structure of Australia’s defence forces provides options, it is nonetheless dangerous to have an amphibious focus as a force driver. In his view, the focus on ‘expeditionary’ capabilities plays into the hands of the United States, which would demand its use. Thus, he argues, the alliance weakens our strategic geography. His views reveal a surprisingly simplistic view of Australia’s ability to develop strategy in pursuit of its own national interests—a point Tom-Durrell Young makes very clearly. Indeed, by placing primacy of concern over the prospect of obsequiousness in defence strategy towards America, Dibb seems prepared to argue that Australian Defence capability should be intentionally hamstrung to, in effect, protect itself against itself. Such a view implies that the Army, let alone the Australian Government, can’t be trusted to exercise sound judgement over the use of such forces. This view surely borders on disloyalty.

Dibb's Lesser Role for the Army

Furthermore, Dibb continues to assert that the Navy and Air Force are more important for the defence of Australia. His position is premised on the view that, unlike the Navy and Air Force, the Army never participated in the Cold War stand-off with the Soviet Union. Yet his position overlooks our involvement with the Soviet proxy in Vietnam and Chinese Communists in North Korea. It also overlooks the significance of the Army as an integral part of a joint force team in the fight for stability in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. Indeed, his view is unnecessarily inflammatory as, today, the Army—alongside its Navy and Air Force colleagues—seeks to operate collegially to derive synergistic benefits not available to a force that would pit one Service against another. Today, the Army is as committed as the other Services to viewing our capabilities holistically as part of an inter-dependent team.

Moving Beyond the Dialectic?

Dibb’s enduring stress on strategic geography (as the sine qua non of Australian defence) raises the question of why it should be a zero-sum game between geography and the other determinants of strategy. Surely Australia is capable of handling the complexity implicit in a nuanced and multi-faceted approach. With such complexity in mind, isn’t there a happy medium for our defence strategy with which we can all co-exist? Such a synthesis of the dialectic of Australian strategy (pitting the defence of Australia and its immediate environs versus the defence of our vital national interests further abroad) would acknowledge that many of the tasks set out under DoA have already been accomplished and are no longer contentious. These tasks include: the establishment of RAAF Base Tindal and the bare northern airbases; the relocation of Army’s 1 Brigade to Darwin; the establishment of the two-fleet Navy; the home-porting of more and more capable ships in the north; and the establishment of the Joint Offshore Protection Command, including its component parts. Australian defence strategy has clearly benefited from the period of focus on DoA and many of the concerns that resulted in an emphasis on defence of the north of Australia have now been adequately addressed. Indeed, it is because of the successful groundwork undertaken during the years when Australian strategy revolved around DoA that the ADF is well placed to move forward with the development of more robust capabilities to pursue Australia’s interests beyond the shoreline.

Coming to Grips with Amphibious and Expeditionary Forces

Having acknowledged that much of the DoA terrain has already been covered and is firmly in place, there is scope to recognise the crucial role that amphibious and expeditionary capabilities play in enhancing the direct defence of Australia as well as the pursuit of this country’s wider national security interests. After all, amphibious and flat-top platforms have played crucial roles in Australian military operations over many years. In fact, the deployment of HMAS Melbourne to Darwin after Cyclone Tracy illustrated the potential for ‘expeditionary’ capabilities to be used for the direct defence of the continent itself, as well as in response to other cataclysmic events in our region. Indeed, amphibious ships have been among the most taxed assets in the Navy’s inventory and the current amphibious ships are very capable, although their limitations are increasingly evident. The adage that ‘steel is cheap and air is free’ may seem glib, but the option for procuring larger LHD-like platforms shouldn’t necessarily dramatically increase construction and operating costs. And the increase in size would offer the ADF greater flexibility and the Government more options in the pursuit of Australia’s national interests—both for the direct defence of Australia and its regional and wider global interests.

The Army as Part of the Joint Team

The acquisition of expeditionary-capable platforms and systems will further enable the ADF to improve its ability to operate jointly—as a single ADF team. Indeed, the security of the Australian homeland is further guaranteed by the refinement of its expeditionary capabilities. This has been demonstrated by the positive impact of Australia’s contribution in recent years in the Solomon Islands, Bougainville and East Timor. Surely we are better off recognising this and avoiding a destructive and adversarial approach to strategy.

On Comparisons with Canada and New Zealand

Dibb drew a comparison with Canada and New Zealand, given their benign strategic environments, as not having the same imperative to focus on their immediate strategic geography. Indeed, Canada and New Zealand have retained warfighting capabilities that remain deployed in Afghanistan. Canada is also looking to model itself on Australia’s enhanced amphibious capability and is set to acquire two multi-role joint support ships and a dedicated amphibious ship in the next few years. The intention is to develop a capability not unlike that employed by Australia for INTERFET in 1999.

The Prospect of Concurrent Threats

Dibb’s comparison of Australia with allies facing more benign strategic environments implies that Australia does not have the luxury of being able concurrently to defend itself and operate remotely in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Such a view implies that deployments far from Australia’s shore compromise Australia’s ability to defend itself against threats emanating from within its region. This view presents an unduly stark choice. Clearly, Australia faces no immediate conventional threat to its shores that might present the concurrent threats experienced in 1941. What is more, the ADF’s experience of operating as part of a coalition builds those skills required for challenging conventional operations, should these eventuate in our region.

On the Alliance

Dibb argues that ‘the alliance weakens our strategic geography’. This assertion is made with little substantiation. Indeed, the experience the ADF has gained overseas not only keeps our forces honed, interoperable, and ensures their access to the latest technology, but the contributions are as measured as any undertaken under the DoA rubric of self-reliance.

Glass Half Full?

Dibb has argued that Australian strategy currently bears the hallmarks of confusion and incoherence, leaving us with a less capable hybrid. However, what he is describing is the glass-half-empty version of what is becoming a more flexible, capable, yet lean force that is adjusting to the times. Perhaps the day has come to recognise that DoA appears indistinguishable in current strategic parlance largely because it is now so deeply ingrained in the strategic culture that it is no longer a source of contention. Indeed, arguably, it has synthesised to form part of a more mature and inclusive strategy that incorporates aspects of DoA and Forward Defence. As Defence Minister Brendan Nelson made clear in a statement on 14 March 2006, ‘it seems to me that it is not one or the other. It is a little bit of each.’