Author: Robert Bruce
Its historical development, and some thoughts on future use
I never shall forget the way
That Blood upon this awful day
Preserved us all from death.
He stood upon a little mound,
Cast his lethargic eyes around,
And Said beneath his breath:
‘Whatever happens we have got
The Maxim Gun, and they have not’
Hilaire Belloc, “The Modern Traveller, Complete Verse[1]
Introduction
Asymmetry has become pervasive in contemporary Australian defence discourse. It has appeared in all recent major strategic documents, including the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (‘DSR’), and the various iterations of the National Defence Strategy (‘NDS’), the Integrated Investment Program (‘IIP’) and the Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy (‘Army Contribution’). This saturation has filtered to the professional development spaces, with all manner of capabilities, technologies, personnel strategies and training systems recommended based on their asymmetric qualities. Arguably, the term’s application has become so profligate that it has ceased to communicate any real thought or analysis. With such broad usage, the concept’s employment threatens to exceed its utility, and what was once a meaningful theory of war has devolved into another useless staff officer sophism.
This essay attempts to restore the utility of asymmetry as a theory. It will do so by examining asymmetry’s historical development and contributes to the literature by proposing a new genesis for this development.[2] This genealogy forms the basis to then analyse and amend asymmetry’s contemporary use. Importantly, the essay draws attention to LTGEN (ret’d) Phillip D. Shutler’s 1987 article “Thinking about Warfare”, an often overlooked but foundational text on asymmetry.[3] Shutler’s article, together with Andrew Mack’s seminal piece “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”, form the basis of two distinct early theories of asymmetry. The paper will also explore a key critique of the theory of asymmetry, which emerged in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This critique is important as it highlights when the theory of asymmetry ceases to be useful. By examining the re-emergence of asymmetry within Australian discourse (DSR, NDS, IIP and the Army Contribution), this paper will argue that contemporary use is largely derivative of these original approaches, albeit lacking important nuance. This will be achieved through comparative analysis, whereby contemporary approaches to asymmetry will be read alongside the historical theories of asymmetry. The essay will conclude by making recommendations to develop a useable theory of asymmetry in the Australian context.
To restore utility to the theory of asymmetry, conceptual boundaries must be re-established. This paper makes two major recommendations to do this. Firstly, asymmetry should not be expressed as though it is synonymous with technological advantage. Instead, greater nuance is required to ensure asymmetry focusses on the employment of technology. Secondly, the ADF’s conception of asymmetry must be developed in consideration of a particular problem frame. The original theories of asymmetry were designed to address particular problems, which provided, at least initially, the bounds for consistent expression. From these initial markers, the conceptual stretching can be limited and a useful theory of war resurrected.
The current problem with asymmetry
The theory of asymmetry has changed over time, leading to confusion in its meaning and application. The theory is plagued with a lack of clarity and often “incongruent” interpretations.[4] As a 2005 Defence Science Technology Organisation (‘DSTO’) report highlighted:
There is a degree of ambiguity...Definitions range from simple statements relating to the use of non-conventional tactics, through to the broader view that ‘all warfare is asymmetric’. In some publications one combatant is stated as having an asymmetric advantage over another based purely on differences in technology. Many definitions of asymmetric warfare bear a close similarity to definitions of manoeuvre warfare as this relates to seeking ‘asymmetry of force’ (i.e. using strength against an enemy’s weakness).[5]
As the theory’s application has expanded, its meaning and clarity have eroded. Abstracted from the original context, asymmetry has “become politicized rather than being truly analytical.”[6] Thus asymmetry has increasingly been employed for prescriptive purposes, rather than descriptive analysis, hence its meaning has become somewhat mercurial.
Reflecting on the purpose of theory provides a way to address this issue. As Carl von Clausewitz tells us:
Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyse the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgement, and help him to avoid pitfalls.[7]
This essay seeks to restore the utility of the theory of asymmetry by exploring its origins, which it proposes has three distinct approaches. These origins and their context reveal the original problems to which the theory of asymmetry was applied, which is essential to further understanding. The first approach was born out of a desire to explain why “military and technological superiority” had become an “unreliable guide to the outcome of wars.”[8] This approach focussed on political attrition or what might be labelled ‘strategic asymmetry’ and was first articulated by Andrew Mack in his 1975 article “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”. The second conception of asymmetry was an attempt to understand the battlespace more holistically. This second approach focussed on ‘operational/tactical asymmetry’ and is contained in Shutler’s 1987 article “Thinking about Warfare”. The third approach was not so much a unified theory of asymmetry as a series of similar critiques. Typified by Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts in their piece “Regaining Strategic Competence”, it was focussed on describing when the theory of asymmetry ceased to have utility.[9] By situating the first two approaches to asymmetry within their original problem frames, meaning is restored to the theory, which can then be used more purposively in the analysis of contemporary use. The third approach provides a useful measure to guard against sophistry.
Asymmetry and it’s aetiology
Mack and ‘strategic asymmetry’
The theory of asymmetry first emerged in the 1970s and was focussed on the strategic implications of the concept. Andrew Mack’s article “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” provides the earliest articulation of a theory of asymmetry. This is significant, as most modern scholars writing on asymmetry have failed to identify this work.[10] Mack’s aim was to explore the outcomes of “asymmetric conflicts”, an area of study previously neglected.[11] Central to Mack’s analysis was the idea that conventional military superiority could be undermined by a belligerent through the “progressive attrition of their opponents’ political capability to wage war”.[12] For Mack, political attrition was a “function of the structure” of asymmetric conflict.[13] He contrasted the big nation’s relatively limited interests (as an invader) with that of the small nation’s existential interests (as the invaded). Mack quotes from Henry Kissinger’s famous article the “The Viet Nam Negotiations” to underscore this point:
The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, fighting in their own country, needed merely to keep in being forces sufficiently strong to dominate the population after the United States tired of the war. We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.[14]
In doing so, Mack draws attention to a key asymmetry– asymmetry of interest or will. For the invaded country, the threat is existential and therefore creates a unity of purpose and urgency. For the invader, the interest is limited to the extent the war is a priority over competing interests; to use Mack’s words, this is a “guns or butter” argument.[15] At the core of Mack’s concept of asymmetry is a belief that conventional military strength can be dislocated through asymmetric strategic aims.
‘Strategic asymmetry’ re-emerged in the early 1990s, albeit subtly different to Mack’s original thesis. The catalyst was the US’s overwhelming success in the first Gulf War.[16] This led US strategists and policy makers to become concerned that potential adversaries would seek to circumvent US military strength by other means.[17] The US-led coalition defeated the Iraqi Army in such a convincing fashion that it was believed that adversaries would not seek to symmetrically oppose US conventional forces, and would instead seek to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ballistic Missiles or Nuclear Weapons.[18] As such, the strategic concept of asymmetry grew to become associated with conventionally inferior opponents of the US. The Office of Net Assessment report “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” released in 1992, provided one such account.[19] The author, Andrew Krepinevich, would describe the “Streetfighter State”:
Such a threat, while pursuing objectives hostile to U.S. interests, would not want to confront the United States. Rather, it would have every incentive to learn from the lessons of the recent past, avoiding the direct approach practiced by Iraq in the Gulf War, while exploiting the successful, indirect, "unconventional" approaches followed by Iran since the late 1970s, and by North Vietnam in the Second Indochina War.
A "Streetfighter State" would pursue its plans for aggression by emphasizing the social dimensions of strategy. That is to say, the aggressor would attempt to exploit those aspects of the U.S. social culture that would inhibit the effective application of American military power. Specifically, acts of aggression would be low-intensity in nature and ambiguous in execution, with emphasis on terrorism, subversion, and insurgency.[20]
Krepinevich’s articulation of the Streetfighter State, although not explicitly labelled asymmetric, was representative of much of the US Defence discourse of the 1990s.
The theory of strategic asymmetry had effectively been repurposed as a description of future threats to the US in the wake of its conventional dominance. Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II describe this as “American Centrism” which then permeated the theory of asymmetry since the Gulf War.[21] This is evident in the US 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report released by US Secretary of Defence William Cohen, which stated:
Indeed, U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use asymmetric means to attack…That is, they are likely to seek advantage over the United States by using unconventional approaches to circumvent or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities[22] (emphasis original).
Similar rhetoric was employed by the US National Defense Panel in their 1997 report, which observed:
We can assume that our enemies and future adversaries have learned from the Gulf War. They are unlikely to confront us conventionally with mass armor formations, air superiority forces and deep-water naval fleets of their own, all areas of overwhelming U.S. strength today…They will look to match their strengths against our weaknesses.[23]
Independent of Mack, US thinkers became concerned about the future threats to the US and asymmetry was repurposed to describe these emerging threats.
The development of strategic asymmetry presents two different but connected problem sets to inform the theory of asymmetry. Mack’s original thesis was explicitly trying to explain why “Big Nations” lose expeditionary wars. On the other hand, the post-Gulf War version of strategic asymmetry was about describing threats to the US. Both attempt to make sense of how the preponderance of conventional force on one side impacts conflict, with a particular emphasis on strategy. For the purposes of the comparative analysis, contemporary use that seeks to address conventional military power imbalance will find this approach relevant.
Shutler and ‘operational/tactical asymmetry’
In the late 1980s, a different approach to asymmetry emerged that focussed on the operational and tactical aspects of asymmetry. In 1987 the Marine Corps Gazette featured an article by LTGEN (Ret’d) Philip Shutler entitled “Thinking About Warfare”. Shutler’s article was predominantly a reflection on the way in which “technology alters the pattern and form of warfare”.[24] In his conception, asymmetry was defined by the ability for unlike forces to engage.[25] Enabled by advances in technology, forces could engage enemy forces from different “aspects” of the battlespace (what might be described as echelons such as tactical, operational, logistics, and production) and across regimes (what today would be described as domains – space, land, air, sea and undersea).[26] For instance, tactical air forces could attack land logistics. This “mode of combat” was deemed to be “asymmetric”.[27] In Shutler’s estimation, these attacks could prove devastating if not adequately countered. Shutler proposed the idea of “combat shields” as a way to cope with these asymmetric modes of combat.[28] For instance, a theatre commander seeking to conduct an amphibious landing against an adversary who possesses submarines, should generate an anti-submarine shield by employing forces from all regimes to attack all aspects of the adversary’s undersea regime.[29] In essence, Shutler was describing what he called “fighting theatres” in response to advances in technology that increased the range of vehicles, communications and the lethality of weapons.[30] Shutler’s piece was a proposal for a more holistic methodology in appreciation of asymmetry, and this forms the basis of the second distinct approach.
Shutler’s methodology quickly became derivative. The following year, COL J.J. Edson (ret’d) wrote a review article in the Marine Corps Gazette entitled “The Asymmetrical Ace”.[31] As the title might suggest, Edson focussed primarily on the idea of asymmetry, neglecting Shutler’s nuance in proposing combat shields or in thinking holistically about the “fighting theatres”. In 1991, asymmetry made its debut in US doctrine in JP - 1 Joint Warfare of the United States (1st edition, 1991) (“JP-1”). In this doctrine, asymmetric engagements were defined as:
…battles between dissimilar forces. These engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the force being attacked is not ready to defend itself against the threat. An example is air versus land (such as the air attack of land targets ...).[32]
It is worth noting that Shutler’s article was cited in the endnotes of JP-1. Again, but in a more pronounced fashion than Edson, asymmetry was emphasised at the expense of Shutler’s nuance regarding combat shields and fighting theatres. JP-1 goes on to highlight the power of asymmetry when employed by a joint force:
The properly functioning joint force is powerful in asymmetric attack, posing threats from a variety of directions with a broad range of weapon systems to stress the enemy's defenses. The land attack on a submarine pen, the sea-launched cruise missile strike or special operations force raid against a key air defense radar, the air strike against a vital ground transportation node - such asymmetric attacks afford devastating ways to attack or create enemy weaknesses and can avoid casualties and save resources.[33]
This saw a more rudimentary concept of asymmetry develop, which had become increasingly divorced from Shutler’s original thesis. The emphasis shifted from thinking holistically about “fighting theatres” to simply attacking in the most devastating fashion.
For the purposes of comparative analysis, only Shutler’s original theory of operational/tactical asymmetry provides a useful problem frame and theory to consider. Shutler presented a novel way in which to understand the battlespace. Its devolution into simply a description of unlike forces in pursuit of advantage represented an unfortunate regression.
The revisionist turn: critiquing asymmetry as a hollow theory
In the 2000s and 2010s, a revisionist turn emerged out of frustration with the West’s lack of progress in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This frustration was best expressed by Rupert Smith in his seminal text, The Utility of Force:
Labelling wars as asymmetric to me is something of a euphemism to avoid acknowledging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not winning.[34]
Smith was not alone in his critique of asymmetry. Stepen Blank observed of the term’s devolution:
in media discussions of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the concepts of asymmetry and asymmetrical threat have been repeatedly invoked. In other words, the terms “asymmetric” and “asymmetry” have become mantras or slogans that are trotted out for any and all occasions but which have been devoid of useful analytical content.[35]
Many other scholars have also critiqued the concept. Colin Gray labelled the concept of asymmetry as “hollow”[36] and “empty”.[37] Hew Strachan would state that the term ‘asymmetric’ was reflective of “the weakness of war’s conceptual vocabulary”.[38] Lawrence Freedman, whilst slightly less critical, noted that if the concept were logically expanded to include asymmetry of a stronger belligerent, it would be “deprived of useful meaning”.[39] The theory of asymmetry was accused of being too broad and therefore useless.
Examples of conventionally strong belligerents exploiting asymmetry formed a key argument to critique the existing theory. Dr Bell’s broader critique of asymmetry was explicitly that all colonial wars of the nineteenth century were asymmetric.[40] The Battle of Omdurman (1898) in Sudan, is a case in point, where machine guns and magazine-fed rifles were used to great effect against a technologically inferior foe.[41] During the battle, 11,000 Dervish were killed, whilst Lord Herbert Kitchener supposedly rued about the “dreadful waste of ammunition”.[42] A Major Watson recalled the battle in a letter to his father:
Now they are getting closer and the Martinis of Blacks [Sudanese] and Egyptians speak. Guns, Maxims, Rifles, a terrible concert. Our mens’ black powder [from the Martini-Henry rifles] stopped the view but you could hear the shouts, and occasionally through a rift in the smoke catch sight of a banner and black face. This part of the fight was at its height. Modern weapons versus numbers, the din was terrific and stretchers were plying. Then their fire slackened, and great cheers began to go up. They were stopped. Cease fire sounded. We got the first clear view of what we had done, and it was sufficiently appalling…[43]
In return, the British suffered just 140 casualties.[44] The battle was terribly “one-sided”, demonstrating the powerful effects that non-symmetrical forces can impart on each other.[45] The presence of machine guns on colonial battlefields ensured both force structures before the battle and casualty estimates after, were ‘asymmetric’.
The corollary of asymmetry being exploited by either conventionally strong or weak belligerents is that exploiting asymmetry is simply a function of good strategy. Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts provide a cogent account of this position in their paper “Regaining Strategic Competence”.[46] They state:
Strategy is fundamentally about identifying or creating asymmetric advantages that can be exploited to help achieve one’s ultimate objectives despite resource and other constraints… At its core, strategy is about finding asymmetries in competitive situations that can be exploited to one’s advantage.[47]
Gray provides a similar assessment that “choices for asymmetric activity merge with common-sense approaches to strategy”.[48] This critique is both compelling and logical. If asymmetry is reduced to such an extent that it becomes simply a euphemism for good strategy, then it ceases to be a meaningful theory of war. For the purposes of comparative analysis, the revisionist turn therefore marks the limits of a useful theory of asymmetry.
Asymmetry in current Australian discourse
Asymmetry is referenced in all the major public facing strategic documents of the last few years (DSR, NDS, IIP and the Army Contribution) and has gone on to permeate many of the ADF’s and Army’s intellectual spaces. It simultaneously describes the Australian Defence, Innovation, Science and Technology Strategy, “Accelerating Asymmetric Advantage”,[49] while featuring in Army-branded professional development articles on mobilisation and training.[50] This pervasiveness is underscored by a breadth of expression that has diluted the meaning of asymmetry.
Within the major Australian Strategic documents (DSR, NDS and IIP), there is a disconnect between the way asymmetry is defined, and the way it is then discussed. These documents tend to define a broad application of asymmetry to include capabilities, tactics and strategies. However, overwhelmingly in the body, ‘asymmetric advantage’ is only discussed in relation to technology. The DSR defines asymmetric advantage as:
Asymmetric Advantage: Asymmetric warfare refers to military actions that pit strength against weakness, at times in a non-traditional and unconventional manner, against which an adversary may have no effective response.
In relation to cost imposition or denial, asymmetric refers to the application of dissimilar capabilities, tactics or strategies to circumvent an opponent’s strengths, causing them to suffer disproportional cost in time, space or material.”[51]
NDS 2024 broadly repeats this definition,[52] and whilst NDS 2026 does not restate the definition, it approaches the topic in similar terms.[53] NDS 2026 momentarily appears to advance the discussion on asymmetry in relation to employing “innovative approaches”, but unfortunately, it does so primarily in the context of capability and technology.[54] When it comes to the discussion of asymmetry in all the documents, this is mostly confined to their respective technology chapters (“Technology and Asymmetric Advantage” in the DSR, “Defence Innovation, Science and Technology” in the NDS (2024 & 2026)). In the DSR, the term ‘asymmetric’ is used 14 times, and but for twice in the definition, only ever in relation to technology. Within NDS 2026, ‘asymmetry’ is used three times and ‘asymmetric’ 15 times, and in IIP 2026 they are used one and 10 times respectively; once again, the usage is overwhelmingly in reference to technology or capability.[55] This inspires a degree of conceptual confusion, where asymmetry is defined as all-inclusive (capabilities, tactics and strategies), but expressed throughout the body of the documents as simply technological. To be clear, technological asymmetry may be an important source of advantage, but this seems overly emphasised in the current discourse. As textual analysis reveals, asymmetry’s expression within the documents is almost entirely weighted toward being a function of technology.
The Army Contribution focuses on a different aspect of asymmetry, preferring to consider asymmetry in the context of relative mass i.e. the small and the few versus the large and the many. In the 2024 version, this was evident from the introduction, where generating asymmetry is held to allow the army to be “more than the sum of [its] parts”.[56] The 2026 iteration goes on to state:
Small, well-prepared Army units can generate asymmetry against larger forces, especially when fortified; any potential adversary requires a high ratio of soldiers to dislodge even a modest defensive position.[57]
This excerpt typifies the Army approach to asymmetry, with an operational and tactical focus. This position was reinforced in a recent article in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings Journal, by COMD 1 DIV, MAJGEN Ash Collingburn and the Director of the Chief of Army’s Initiatives Group, COL Tom McDermott. Their paper states “no military force ever seeks a fair fight. Instead, it seeks ‘asymmetry’”.[58] Again, the article invokes the image of a small force preparing defensive positions to defeat a larger adversary through the generation of asymmetry. This interpretation is more than an expression of technological superiority; it is a conceptual modus operandi for defeating larger opponents. Thus, the Army, at least in the declared contributions to the strategy, has preferred to view asymmetry through an operational and tactical lens.
Comparative analysis
Australian contemporary use of asymmetry can be distilled into two strains for the purposes of comparative analysis: ‘asymmetric advantage’, and asymmetry in the Army Contribution. This analysis uses problem frames as the starting point of comparison between Australian contemporary use and historical approaches. By comparing approaches with similar problem frames, their nuances provide the substance for analysis.
Asymmetric Advantage
‘Asymmetric Advantage’ is employed in the DSR, NDS and IIP. Somewhat problematically, the all-encompassing approach to asymmetry defined in the documents is not supported in the body of the text. Overwhelmingly, asymmetry is discussed in the context of technology, leaving strategic asymmetry underdeveloped. This means despite the espousal of strategic form of asymmetry in Australia’s strategic discourse, ultimately technology emerges as the implied impetus to generate both asymmetry and advantage. Prima facie, this seems comparable to the problem frame of Shutler’s original theory of asymmetry, as both approaches attempt to grapple with the effects of technology on the battlefield.
However, Shutler indirectly opposes the premise of ‘asymmetric advantage’, namely that technology is the animus for advantage. Shutler argued that technology provided an opportunity for cross-domain and echelon strike (regime or aspect in his words). His point was that modern advances permit unlike forces to engage one another in novel ways. Importantly, the effect of this was to circumvent traditional “shields”, which emphasised the tactical or operational employment of these forces to exploit asymmetry. This is evident in Shutler’s entreaties to “adjust doctrine and modify organizations in order to fight in new ways”.[59] Recent criticisms of the ADF’s technological focus, vide asymmetric advantage, expose a similar point. In a piece published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, it was alleged that Australia’s defence policy reduces asymmetry to “basically the idea of weapon overmatch”.[60] This is not asymmetry. To be clear, technology can convey advantage, but this does not necessarily “strip away” the enemies’ shields in line with Shutler’s prescriptions.[61] Technology is not asymmetric; its employment is.
Somewhat ironically, the only significant historical use of the exact phrase “asymmetric advantage” is by Krepinevich and Watts in a fashion inimical to the current expression. As part of the previously described revisionist turn, Krepinevich and Watts made clear that the search for asymmetric advantage could simply be described as strategy.[62] Their point is that if asymmetry is equally applicable to both sides of a conflict, there is little analytical utility.
Furthermore, technology is an unstable source of advantage. In the article “Cavalry to the Computer: The pattern of military revolutions”, Krepinevich condemns the reliance on technological based advantage.[63] This article tracks several technological revolutions of adoption and adaptation cycles, such as the cavalry and pike revolution and adaptation. Advantage delivered through technology is likely to be short-lived. Alternatively, this might be conceived as the “innovation cycle” between adversaries, in which the benefits of technological innovation in a particular operation become increasingly more brief.[64] This is a well-documented finding, both in strategic studies literature,[65] and current writings on the war in Ukraine.[66] It is also why the colonial examples of asymmetry should be treated with caution; the advantage conferred is fleeting and contextual.
Recommendation 1. The concept of ‘asymmetric advantage’ as a function of technology should become more nuanced. Currently, overstated as it is in the strategic discourse, it threatens to create reliance on dubious ideas of technological overmatch. We cannot afford to become “enamoured” with our own “digital mythology”.[67] We should continue to pursue technological advantage, but this should not undergird our strategy or concepts,[68] and we should avoid empty and misleading aphorisms wherever possible. Asymmetric advantage should be recast to focus on asymmetry through the employment of new technology, rather than simply ascribing the technology itself as asymmetric. Ultimately, as a concept, ‘asymmetric advantage’ requires sensible conceptual boundaries and an agreed definition for disciplined use in the ADF that extends beyond simply being synonymous with advantage or technology. Shutler’s model provides an appropriate starting point.
Asymmetry in the Army Contribution
The problem frame of the Army Contribution appears to lend itself equally to a comparative analysis with both Mack and Shutler’s approaches. On one hand, there are strong similarities with Mack’s strategic asymmetry with its focus upon relative size and conventional combat power. On the other hand, Shutler’s version of operational/tactical asymmetry lends itself to the Army Contribution’s specific examples of “dug in” defenders and the local correlation of forces. However, reflection on the broader strategic context reveals that Mack’s strategic asymmetry is invalidated as an approach for the Army by the NDS.
The Army Contribution’s logic is not its own; it is subordinate to the NDS. This means Army conceptual approaches are confined to supporting a strategy of denial, with the primary strategic objective of deterrence. This is an issue for the potential use of Mack’s strategic asymmetry by Army, as the NDS articulates a strategic context in which Mack’s theory can’t apply. Although arguably there is a theme of conventional military “inferiority” in the NDS,[69] the logic of Mack’s strategic asymmetry is not present. In his conception, the smaller power prevails because it is motivated by an existential threat against an opponent who might otherwise prefer “butter” over “guns”.[70] The smaller nation can exploit this “political asymmetry” by imposing cost,[71] knowing that they will better endure sacrifice than their opponents. The NDS describes no such situation. Instead, the NDS articulates a context in which Australia desires to preserve regional peace and prosperity, not defend the homeland at all costs.[72] This is not to say that the ADF would not do this, it’s just not the current context, guidance or funding of the NDS and IIP.[73] Australia’s interests as reflected in the NDS are not any more compelling than a potential adversary’s, at least not compared to the dynamic which Mack articulates as the invader vs. invaded. Were Mack’s theory to be used by Army in the current context of the NDS, it would be denuded of its logic, leaving the Army unable to take advantage of the political attrition inherent in strategic asymmetry’s structure.
Therefore, Shutler’s focus on operational and tactical asymmetry is more pertinent to the Army Contribution. This is evident in Shutler’s descriptions of the local correlation of forces. For example, Shutler states:
Use your maneuver capability to go quickly to an area where your enemy is weak, but which he can’t ignore. Then take advantage of terrain and asymmetric shields to shift the local correlation of forces in your favour…Strip away your enemies defending shields. Use your forces in asymmetric modes to systematically reduce his forces where and when they are most vulnerable. If you must fight symmetrically use your maneuver capability to achieve high local correlation.[74]
The connection can be seen in discussions of force ratios of “dug-in” defenders present in the Army Contribution.[75] In both approaches, there is a sense that asymmetry is situational; it is a description of the structures and dispositions of forces in time and space. However, Shutler’s model takes this further, and proposes clear conceptual boundaries and structures. According to Shutler, asymmetry can be analysed through the respective regimes and aspects (domains and echelons). Furthermore, Shutler describes the product of this analysis as an understanding of the various “combat shields” within broader theatres.[76] Shutler’s approach, whilst addressing a similar problem frame to the Army Contribution, provides a model of asymmetry theory worth emulating.
Recommendation 2. If Army seeks to employ asymmetry in the manner articulated in the Army Contribution, Shutler’s model provides a good starting point to develop a more rigorous theory. Key to this recommendation is recognising the limitations of the current problem frame, as a subset of the NDS. A new theory should seek to reify its conceptual boundaries and discourage further spurious use of the term. The original theories of asymmetry were designed to address particular problems, which provided the structure for consistent expression. By providing a common problem frame to which asymmetry is applied, the conceptual stretching can be limited and a useful theory of war resurrected.
Toward a new theory of strategic asymmetry for the ADF
As the above analysis demonstrates, there is a gap in the ADF’s expression regarding strategic asymmetry. The strategic asymmetry espoused by Mack is an inappropriate model for an ADF theory of asymmetry. The ADF is committed to a strategy of denial, seeking the primary objective of deterrence. From the outset, this minimises the political attrition that theories of strategic asymmetry seek to exploit. By design, the strategy of denial in the Australian context cannot rely on the will of the people generated by a dynamic of invader versus invaded. A new theory of strategic asymmetry is required to address the ADF’s needs.
For a new theory of strategic asymmetry to be applicable to the ADF, it needs to approach political attrition in a new way. A recent article by Andrew Lambert, entitled “How does asymmetric advantage differ from strategic advantage?” provides an interesting perspective on this topic.[77] Lambert’s argument advocates “abandoning conventional military balances to favour approaches which exploit and enhance national interests, aptitudes and capabilities.”[78] His key example is the British blockades during the Napoleonic Wars. Britain was unable to contend with Napoleon’s France on land and therefore turned to a strategy of maritime blockade. The analogy of that time was the elephant on land (the French) versus the whale at sea (the British Navy).[79] Lambert’s idea has profound implications for the theory of strategic asymmetry by providing a new dimension to Mack’s focus on will. It means that Mack’s focus on will was simply a focus on a competitive advantage peculiar to the circumstances of invader versus invaded. To synthesise Lambert and Mack, strategic asymmetry should be considered as politically attriting an adversary through a competition advantageous to the nation’s “interests, aptitudes and capabilities”. This requires a more sophisticated theory of asymmetry than what is currently conveyed in the Australian strategic discourse.
Conclusion
There is a way forward for the ADF and Army to continue to use asymmetry in a meaningful way. This starts with establishing sensible conceptual boundaries, and delimiting asymmetry’s employment as a catch-all aphorism. An immediate improvement in the use of asymmetry as a concept would be to decouple it from a simplistic association with technology. At the operational and tactical level, per Shutler’s model, asymmetry should be considered through the employment of new technology, rather than simplistically ascribing the technology as asymmetric. Additionally, if asymmetry is to be used at the strategic level, careful consideration should be given to the structural implications of the relevant conflict and political will, in alignment with Mack’s thesis. For Australia and its strategy of denial seeking deterrence, this may require an entirely new theory. In either case, a prudent first step to establishing the conceptual boundaries of asymmetry would be to determine what problem asymmetry is being used to solve. Successful remediation of the term would see an agreed foundational theory, with clear and disciplined expression, used in defined circumstances.
Without reform, asymmetry is at the precipice of becoming another staff officer sophism. A hollow term, deployed carelessly to cultivate support for whatever project requires it. The original conceptualisation of asymmetry by Mack and Shutler was not like this. They proposed distinct, mature approaches worthy of consideration and use. However, as these increasingly became shallow derivatives, a revisionist turn critiqued the concept of asymmetry to the point of disuse. This does not have to be fate of the current iteration of asymmetry. With the appropriate effort and development, the disciplined use of the theory of asymmetry can provide utility to the ADF and Army’s thinkers at all levels.
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Lambert, Andrew, Memorandum No. 29.2025, "How Does Asymmetric Advantage Differ from Strategic Advantage?," Britain's World (Memorandum). Council on Geostrategy, 17 July, 2025, https://www.britainsworld.org.uk/p/the-memorandum-29-2025.
Leahy, Peter. "Defence Cops Blame for Strategic Mistakes - but This One Belongs to Our Leaders." Article, The Australian (National, Australia), 02 June 2025. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A842528199/GIC?u=defence&sid=ebsco&xid=6f8e801d. Gale.
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Major General Ash Collingburn, and Colonel Tom McDermott. "Australia's Army Is Adapting for the Littorals." Online. Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute) 151/5/1467 (May 2025). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/may/australias-army-adapting-littorals.
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Endnotes
[1] Hilaire Belloc, Complete Verse (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1970), 184.
Dr Coral Bell in her presentation to the 2005 Rowell Seminar and Chief of Army’s Conference references Belloc’s verse to support her argument about the term ‘asymmetric’ also applying to Colonial Wars.
Coral Bell, "Asymmetric Wars," in Asymmetry and Complexity: Selected Papers from the 2005 Rowell Seminar and 2005 Chief of Army's Conference, ed. Scott Hopkins (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2007), 10.
[2] The genesis of the concept is confused in the literature with a variety of suggestions about periods and authors.
Dr Coral Bell states that it had roots in the Revolution of Military Affairs concept as early as the 1980s. Bell, "Asymmetric Wars," 10. Michael Mazarr claims that the concept of asymmetry emerged from the 1980s and makes reference to Martin Van Creveld, despite no explicit mention of the term in his cited work.
Michael J. Mazarr, "The Folly of ‘Asymmetric War’," The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 33, https://doi.org/10.1162/wash.2008.31.3.33. Christofer Berglund and Emil Souleimanov state that “the notion of asymmetric conflicts caught on in the 1990s”. Christofer Berglund and Emil Aslan Souleimanov, "What is (not) asymmetric conflict? From conceptual stretching to conceptual structuring," Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 13, no. 1 (2020): 88, https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1680855.
Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson provide one of the most comprehensive histories of the term, but claim the first “explicit” use of the term occurred in 1995 in JP-1 Joint Warfare of the United States edition 2. This is not strictly correct as the 1991 1st edition of JP-1 also details the term.
Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (2001), 2, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11225.
Only Sir Lawrence Freedman has rightly pointed to Andrew Mack’s 1975 article “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”. Lawrence Freedman, "The Third World War?," Survival 43, no. 4 (2001): 70, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330112331343135.
[3] This article is no longer available in the Marine Corps Gazette archives online; I am indebted to the Defence Library Service for locating a copy.
[4] Berglund and Souleimanov, "What is (not) asymmetric conflict? From conceptual stretching to conceptual structuring," 88.
[5] W Hobbs, P Dexter, M Egudo and D Grieger, An Analytical Framework for the Study of Asymmetric Warfare (Restricted), Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), Land Operations Division Systems Sciences Laboratory, 2005, pp. 1–2. Quoted in Chris Field, "Asymmetric Warfare and Australian National Asymmetric Advantages: Taking the Fight to the Enemy," (Land Warfare Studies Centre, Australian Army, November 2009), Working Paper No. 136, 12.
[6] Stephen Blank, "Rethinking Asymmetric Threats," Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (2003): 4, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep11640.
[7] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 90.
[8] Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880.
[9] Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, "Regaining Strategic Competence," (Washington DC, United States: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009). https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2009.09.01-Regaining-Strategic….
[10] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." It should be noted that Mack references his own earlier work entitled “The Concept of Power and its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict”.
See footnote 2 for a description of various academic accounts of the first theory of asymmetry. I concur with Sir Lawrence Freedman who identifies Mack’s article as the first to use the term. Freedman, "The Third World War?," 70. I note that Henry Kissinger uses the term “asymmetry” twice in his seminal article “The Viet Nam Negotiations.” But not with the fidelity or conceptual maturity of Mack. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs 47, no. 2 (1969): 212 & 27, https://doi.org/10.2307/20039369.
[11] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 175-76.
[12] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 177.
[13] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 184.
[14] Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," 214.
[15] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 184.
[16] Ahmed Hashim, "Conventional war is dead! Long live conventional war?," Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies 5, no. 2 (2023): 236, https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/research-publication/202….
[17] Hashim, "Conventional war is dead! Long live conventional war?," 236.
See also Metz and Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, 2-3.
[18] Hashim, "Conventional war is dead! Long live conventional war?," 236.
[19] Andrew Krepinevich, "The Military-Technical Revolution A Preliminary Assessment," (Washington DC, United States: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002), 46-47. https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/the-military-technical-rev….
[20] Krepinevich, "The Military-Technical Revolution A Preliminary Assessment," 47.
[21] Metz and Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, 4-5.
[22] US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review," (United States of America Department of Defense, May 1997), 4. https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/Quadrennial-Defense-Revi….
A similar version of this quote cited in Metz and Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, 3.
As previously noted, Metz and Johnson incorrectly date the first mention of asymmetric warfare in US doctrine as 1995.
[23] National Defense Panel (US), "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century," (United States of America Department of Defense, December 1997), Report, 11. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA332664.
Cited in Metz and Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, 3.
[24] Phillip D. Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette 71, no. 11 (1987): 18.
[25] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 20.
[26] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 20.
[27] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 20. See also Figure 8 of Shutler’s article.
[28] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 20-21.
[29] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 21. See Figure 9 of Shutler’s article.
[30] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 21-22.
[31] J.J. Edson, "The Asymmetrical Ace," Marine Corps Gazette (1988), https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/the-asymmetrical-ace/.
[32] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces," (Ed. 1, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 11 November 1991), 59. https://archive.org/details/jointwarfareofus00unit/page/76/mode/2up?q=s….
[33] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JP-1 Joint Warfare," 60.
[34] Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London, England: Penguin Books, 2006), 6.
See also Berglund and Souleimanov, "What is (not) asymmetric conflict? From conceptual stretching to conceptual structuring," 88.
[35] Blank, "Rethinking Asymmetric Threats," 3.
[36] Colin S. Gray, "Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror," Parameters 32, no. 1 (Spring 2002), https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2079.
Gray, like Freedman below, acknowledges that a more contrived version of the concept may be used.
[37] Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters," Strategic Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 43, https://doi.org/10.2307/26267370.
[38] Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 82.
[39] Freedman, "The Third World War?," 70.
[40] Bell, "Asymmetric Wars," 5.
[41] Azar Gat, War and Strategy in the Modern World : From Blitzkrieg to Unconventional Terror, Case Military Studies, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 72.
[42] David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, Conflict (London: William Collins, 2023), 199.
[43] Stephen Manning, Bayonet to Barrage : Weaponry on the Victorian Battlefield (Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2020), 170.
Manning quotes from Major J.K. Watson’s letter dated 07 September 1898 (NAM 1983-04-112).
[44] Gat, War and Strategy in the Modern World : From Blitzkrieg to Unconventional Terror, 72.
[45] Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, 191.
[46] Krepinevich and Watts, "Regaining Strategic Competence."
[47] Krepinevich and Watts, "Regaining Strategic Competence," 19.
[48] Gray, "Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror," 6-7.
[49] Defence, "Defence Innovation, Science and Technology Strategy, 'Accelerating Asymmetric Advantage - delivering More Together'," (Australian Government, 2024). https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/accelerating-asymme….
[50] This is reinforced simply by searching for the terms “asymmetry” or “asymmetric” on the Land Power Forum or the Australian Army Journal. The point here is to demonstrate its pervasiveness; two examples that demonstrate the breadth of application are:
Jarrod Brook, "Finding Asymmetry With Army's Train, Advise and Assist Capability," Land Power Forum, Australian Army Research Centre, 2023.
McLeod Wood, "Finding Asymmetry During Mobilisation in the Australian Army," (Australian Army Research Centre, 24 April 2025 2025), Australian Army Occasional Paper No. 30 .
[51] Defence, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review," (Australian Government, 2023), 71. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-re….
[52] Defence, "National Defence Strategy," (Australian Government 2024), 64. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defen….
[53] Defence, "National Defence Strategy," (Australian Government, 2026), 80-81. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2026-national-defen….
[54] Defence, "NDS 26," 81.
It is worth noting there is a singular reference in the in NDS 2026 Ch 1 – where a discussion on the character of war indicates that asymmetry is generated through a combination of technology and novel employment. But again it stands alone in this chapter until the more significant discussion in the technology chapter (Ch 9).
[55] In 2024 asymmetric was used nine times in the NDS and five times in the IIP.
[56] Australian Army, "Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Stategy 2024," (Australian Government 2024), 1. https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/strategy/australian-army-contribution-….
[57] Defence, "NDS 26," 24.
A very similar version of this quote was present in the 2024 Army Contribution - Australian Army, "Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Stategy 2024," 22.
[58] Major General Ash Collingburn and Colonel Tom McDermott, "Australia's Army is Adapting for the Littorals," Online, Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute) 151/5/1467 (May 2025), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/may/australias-army-ada….
[59] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 1.
[60] Jason Thomas, "Asymmetry is more than Technology," The Strategist, ASPI, 05 June, 2024, https://www.aspi.org.au/strategist-posts/asymmetry-is-more-than-technol….
[61] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 26.
[62] To be clear, Krepinevich contributes to the idea of strategic asymmetry through his writing on the “street fighter state” but as stated above, he does not explicitly label this “asymmetric”.
[63] Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National Interest, no. 37 (1994), https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=ca1bd342-2728-3e8b-92….
[64] John Stillon and Bryan Clark, "What it takes to win," (Washington DC, United States: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015), 19. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/What-it-Takes-to-Win.pdf.
[65] In the following examples, the discussions range from outright critique of relying on technological advantage to more general discussions on the difficulty of predicting the impact of future technology:
Murray Williamson, War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Ch 3 "Clausewitz out, Computers in: Military Culture and Technological Hubris".
Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, Ch 9 "Technology and Strategy" .
Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions."
Gat, War and Strategy in the Modern World : From Blitzkrieg to Unconventional Terror, Ch 4 "The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) compared with earlier military-technological revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries".
[66] David Betz and M.L.R. Smith, "Smart Weapons, Dumb Assumptions: Western Strategic Delusions Meet Industrial Reality in Ukraine," Military Strategy Magazine Exclusive (26 June 2025), https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/exclusives/smart-weapons-dumb-….
[67] Betz and Smith, "Smart Weapons, Dumb Assumptions: Western Strategic Delusions Meet Industrial Reality in Ukraine."
[68] Thomas, "Asymmetry is more than Technology".
[69] Sally Burt et al., "Unconventional Deterrence in Australian Strategy," (ASPI, October 2025), Special Report, 4-5. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/unconventional-deterrence-in-australian-….
[70] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 184.
[71] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 188.
[72] See Michael Pezzullo, "NDS 2026 - The right strategy for the wrong era," The Strategist, ASPI, 30 May, 2026, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nds-2026-the-right-strategy-for-the-w…. He states: “NDS 2026 does not seek to rapidly build a heavier force that could defend us against an attack before 2030 by a great power in a major war. That should be the immediate focus of policy… However, there is nothing in current policy to suggest that we are undertaking an urgent and expansive mobilisation of the Australian Defence Force or that we are preparing our economy and population for war.”
[73] Former Chief of Army Peter Leahy has made a similar argument, although more critical, reagrding funding for the defence force. Peter Leahy, "Defence cops blame for strategic mistakes - but this one belongs to our leaders," Article, The Australian (National, Australia), 02 June 2025, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A842528199/GIC?u=defence&sid=ebsco&a…, Gale.
[74] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 26.
[75] Australian Army, "Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Stategy 2024," 22.
[76] Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," 20-21.
[77] Andrew Lambert Andrew Lambert, Memorandum No. 29.2025, "How does asymmetric advantage differ from strategic advantage?," Britain's World (Memorandum), Council on Geostrategy, 17 July, 2025, https://www.britainsworld.org.uk/p/the-memorandum-29-2025.
[78] Lambert, "How does asymmetric advantage differ from strategic advantage?".
[79] Lambert, "How does asymmetric advantage differ from strategic advantage?".