World War II Allied Logistics in the Mediterranean
University Press of Kentucky, 2022, ISBN 9780813183770, 282 pp, RRP USD$40 (hardcover)
Author: David D Dworak
Reviewed by: John Nash
As the well-worn aphorism goes, ‘amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics’. Undoubtedly, logistics is at the core of every military operation throughout history, making or breaking battles, campaigns and wars. War of Supply by David Dworak is an excellent examination of Allied logistics in the Mediterranean during World War II, reinforcing just how critical it was to Allied success not only in the Mediterranean campaign but also as a prelude to the northern European campaign that followed. As Dworak reminds the reader from the outset, ‘Logistics alone may not win the war, but absent or ineffective logistics can lose it’.[1]
The book itself is arranged chronologically, divided into three sections that represent different campaigns. Part One examines North Africa, Part Two covers Sicily and Italy (including Anzio), and Part Three deals with Operation Dragoon, the often overlooked landing in southern France in August 1944. Aside from being chronological, these three parts accord with the maturation of the Allied logistics organisation over the course of the war. As Dworak argues, it was its hard-won experience in North Africa and Italy that convincingly set up the Allies for success during Operation Overlord in June 1944.
Dworak begins his analysis with Operation Torch. He provides a quick sketch of the strategic supply situation in 1942, from Allied losses in shipping to the German U-Boats through to the requirements for vast amounts of aid sent to the Russians to keep them in the war.[2] All of this complicated the United States’s ability to build up forces in the UK and impeded its efforts to launch an invasion of North Africa to establish a foothold in the Mediterranean.
Dworak’s analysis spans the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level, there are noteworthy issues that often do not receive much attention. For instance, it is often forgotten that the French troops that went over to fight for the Allied side had to be equipped and armed: 300,000 of them by November 1942.[3] This put an enormous strain on the already stretched Allied supply chain and, as Dworak reminds us, every tank or plane that went to the French could not go to the Russians or the Pacific theatre. Therefore, every allocation of supplies had to be weighed. While the French would develop their own logistics organisation over time, they would remain dependent on the US system throughout the landings in southern France and the Allies’ push into Germany.[4] This realisation is an important reminder not only of the French contribution to the theatre but also of the sheer number of demands placed on Allied logistics from all manner of directions.
There are many salutary lessons in War of Supply for the modern reader, especially when considering a future that will involve the Australian Defence Force conducting expeditionary operations. The first is the criticality of ports and port facilities in supporting a force ashore. When the Allied Western Task Force landed in North Africa in 1942, it took weeks for the supply situation ashore to reach a reasonably ordered state. Some of the delay was due to poor planning concerning what supplies needed to be loaded, and in what order they needed to be landed to maintain combat operations. But one of the main problems was the lack of transportation and the absence of a port unit with trained stevedores who could order and clear the port facilities and sustain the combat units ashore.[5] During the Sicilian campaign, the capture of Palermo and its port was vital to Lieutenant General George Patton’s ability to advance on Messina and drive German troops off the island. Until the capture of Palermo, Patton’s army was reliant on logistics coming over the beach at Gela.[6] In France too it was the capture of ports that was prioritised by the Allied high command. While many historians have focused on the role of the Channel ports, the French Mediterranean ports were of utmost importance and were eventually able to support 35 divisions. Indeed, the port at Marseilles handled more supplies than any other port during the war.[7] This southern front was thus critical to supporting and expanding the Allied foothold in Western Europe in 1944 and into 1945.
In the absence of a port, beaches were the alternative. Logistics over the shore is much more difficult, but almost always unavoidable in some form. Effective beach teams were vital to any amphibious operation during World War II. An issue that arose during many of the Mediterranean operations, however, was a lack of strong leadership on the beaches, especially during the Sicily landings at Gela.[8] At one point, Patton was forced to wade in, deducing that the poor beach party situation was ‘due to a lack of force of character in the men of the Army and Navy commanding them [the beach teams]’.[9] Another problem arose with lines of authority and the misuse of vital assets. The introduction of the DUKW amphibious vehicle was a significant addition to amphibious assault forces; it considerably aided the assault and resupply over the beach. The problem was that during the Salerno landing, in the absence of trucks and other logistics vehicles, DUKWs were also used to haul supplies inland, exposing them to damage and loss and slowing down the unloading of supples from ships. This led the naval commander, Vice Admiral Henry Hewitt, to recommend for future operations that the DUKWs (and their drivers) be under direct naval control until the completion of the unloading phase, so as to keep this considerable specialist capability where it was most needed.[10] This is the kind of command and control / lines of authority issue that will no doubt arise in any future littoral operations.
While the focus of War of Supply is on Allied logistics, Dworak helpfully provides comparisons to some German logistics issues in the theatre. Such comparison helps reinforce his argument that poor logistics can lose a war. He details many of the problems encountered, including a lack of theatre-level control which left room for service rivalry and reprioritisation. Even rank levels could demonstrate the priority given to logistics—where a certain position in the US logistical organisation might be filled by a General, the German equivalent might be a Major.[11] Allied interdiction of the Axis supply route into North Africa, especially from Malta, played a key role in worsening the Axis position there.[12] The Allied landings on mainland Italy near Salerno were hotly contested by the Germans, but a poor German logistics organisation meant they could not muster a sufficiently powerful counterattack to throw back the American and British beachheads.[13] These and other examples demonstrate what can happen when logistics is not prioritised or given due consideration.
War of Supply is essential reading for anyone with an interest in littoral operations. It is an illuminating study of how the Allies were able to sustain their operations in the Mediterranean theatre, building their expertise to a level that helped ensure the logistics success of Operation Overlord. There are many good photos throughout, including several of the personalities involved, and some useful maps to aid the reader. The book covers the topic in detail without becoming bogged down in the weeds. It is an excellent read and highly recommended.
Endnotes
[1] Italics in original. David Dworak, War of Supply: World War II Allied Logistics in the Mediterranean (University Press of Kentucky, 2022), p. 2.
[2] Ibid., 2022, p. 8.
[3] Ibid., pp. 51–54.
[4] Ibid., p. 182.
[5] Ibid., p. 23.
[6] Ibid., p. 92.
[7] Ibid., p. 151.
[8] Ibid., p. 87. In the Australian context, beach teams were essential to Australian operations in the Pacific in 1943–45. See Dayton McCarthy, ‘No Other System Could Have Achieved the Result’, Australian Army Journal 20, no. 2 (2024).
[9] Dworak, War of Supply, p. 99.
[10] Ibid., p. 108.
[11] Ibid., p. 56.
[12] Ibid., p. 67.
[13] Ibid., p. 109. Such lack of logistical aptitude by the German forces was not unique to the Mediterranean. For example, see David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).