Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay
Oxford University Press, 2022, ISBN 9780190062361, 496 pp, RRP GBP£27.49 (hardcover)
Author: Craig L Symonds
Reviewed by: Thomas J Rogers
Nimitz at War is a biographical study of Admiral Chester W Nimitz during his time as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) in World War II. Author Craig L Symonds presents a chronological narrative beginning with Nimitz taking control in Hawaii in late December 1941. A prolific naval historian at the United States Naval Academy, Symonds approaches this history with an engaging tone, adding anecdotes and asides that demonstrate a broad knowledge both of the war and of the character of Nimitz himself. The book draws on an extensive bibliography of the expected official sources and secondary literature, and also includes collections of oral histories and family papers relating to Nimitz’s time in Hawaii during the war. The result is a surprisingly intimate portrait of Nimitz, despite its overall focus on his particular brand of command leadership during the Pacific War. Indeed, the analysis of Nimitz’s command style is bolstered by the insights into his personal life and habits interspersed throughout the narrative.
Nimitz at War opens with an overview of the contemporary political and practical questions about command of US forces in the Pacific theatre. The decision of President Franklin D Roosevelt—a self-described ‘navy man’—to make Nimitz CINCPAC had puzzled some in the US Navy, who considered the appointee to be a desk admiral. However, Nimitz had the full confidence of Admiral Ernest J King, who served as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet during the war. As Symonds relates, the two admirals had very different leadership styles. King was cold and logical, quite happy to play up to his abrasive reputation, and had a tendency to micromanage his subordinates. By contrast, Nimitz was warm and genial, could put a roomful of nervous junior officers at ease, and trusted his subordinates to achieve the best results, a theme to which the narrative returns. One thing the two admirals had in common was a disdain for, or caution about, speaking to the media. In this they differed from the Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, US Army General Douglas MacArthur, whose frequent grandiose public statements Nimitz privately disparaged.[1]
In a war that was defined by new applications of air power, tensions arose between the ‘black shoe’ admirals—surface fleet officers who had not undergone aviation training—and the younger generation of ‘brown shoe’ naval aviators. There was a growing lobby of ‘brown shoe’ officers who felt strongly that aircraft carriers should only be commanded by ‘brown shoe’ admirals. Nimitz heard out these arguments but resisted being bound by them, a good example of his overall approach to leadership—ready to negotiate with his subordinates but iron-willed once he had made up his mind.
Leadership is a key theme of Symonds’s narrative. As noted above, Nimitz expected the best from the officers who reported to him, and trusted them to perform their duties under general direction. In part, Nimitz’s style of leadership reflected his character, but it was also shaped by the theatre in which he and his men served. Symonds reminds readers of the sheer size of the Pacific at various points in the text, as well as conveying it very effectively in several charts. Nimitz was out of touch with his task forces for days at a time, often at the most critical points of the war.[2] Symonds captures the tension this produced at headquarters, particularly during the early actions of the Battle of Leyte Gulf.[3]
Trust was central to Nimitz’s style of leadership. After the Battle of Midway, Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher submitted a report to Nimitz that clearly did not represent what units under Mitscher’s command had done during the battle. Not wishing to cause a public controversy that would bring disrepute to the navy, Nimitz accepted the report but ‘shelved’ Mitscher, removing him from seagoing command for several years. The episode adeptly illustrates the ongoing pressures of Nimitz’s command, in which relationships with and between senior officers had to be carefully managed to produce the best possible military capability.
The inclusion of lengthy details about Nimitz’s private life in Hawaii, and particularly his relationship with Sandy and Una Walker, at first appeared somewhat incongruous in a study of war and leadership. However, as the narrative progresses, it becomes apparent that Nimitz’s downtime was as much a part of his approach to war leadership as his time in headquarters. The Walkers’ home was a place of respite for the admiral but it also played an important diplomatic role as the war progressed and the danger to Hawaii lessened, when ever-greater numbers of civilian VIPs came to visit. Nimitz’s vigorous walking and swimming routines, often with less-than-enthusiastic subordinates, similarly allowed him to thrash out issues away from the formal setting of headquarters. His ability to nurture informal relationships meant that in times of crisis, everyone knew what each was expected to achieve. The book really does show the admiral at war in all respects.
Despite being the biography of an admiral, the book’s study of war leadership transcends service boundaries. Anyone considering warfare across the vast distances of the Pacific would do well to consider Nimitz’s example. The style of leadership based on trust, which came naturally to him, remains a necessity in the region. Lengthy periods without communications with subordinates are likely in any future conflict as opposing sides seek to impose communications denial on each other. As case studies, the widely dispersed maritime and littoral operations Nimitz oversaw are worth revisiting.
Eminently readable and engaging, Nimitz at War is both a chronology of the US Navy’s war in the Pacific and a study of Nimitz’s leadership. Illustrated with black-and-white photos and charts, it will appeal to all who have an interest in the naval aspects of the US forces in the Pacific War. In presenting a well-rounded portrait of Nimitz, the book is a particularly worthwhile exercise in the study of war leadership as it happened.
Endnotes
[1] Craig L Symonds, Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), p. 166.
[2] For example, ibid., pp. 21, 326–328, 367.
[3] Ibid., pp. 330–334.