How Small Nations Influence Great Powers in War

Germany’s rapid conquests of 1939 and 1940 comprehensively reshaped Europe. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland were occupied. The leaders of these states fled to Britain, followed in mid-1941 by the Yugoslavs and Greeks.^[2] Defiant in defeat, all eight nations soon established governments-in-exile in London and set about rebuilding their political administrations and militaries as best they could. Seeking allies and strength wherever they could be found, the governments-in-exile were strongly supported by Britain as they sought to create a unified coalition of ‘occupied allies’ to assist its war effort. This Anglo–exile partnership, while outwardly united, was initially fraught with mutual suspicions, disorder and distrust as all nations adapted their strategy and methods to dramatically altered circumstances. The relationship was always dominated by Britain, and throughout the war the minor allies remained subordinated to their great power sponsor. But subordination is not the same as subservience, and both sides exercised agency to influence the other and to further their national interests. Despite the inequality of power, the Anglo–exile relationship grew into an arrangement that was both equitable and enduring. At war’s end, six of the exiled governments were successfully restored and sought to perpetuate their alliance with Britain. The outcomes of these wartime arrangements still dominate Europe and possess contemporary global influence. The Anglo–exile partnership was the direct antecedent of the most significant Western international organisations of the post war era: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). These wartime arrangements between the European exiles and their British sponsors therefore provide a rich source of examples for students and scholars of strategic alliances.

The Anglo–exile relationship commenced following Germany’s conquest of Poland in 1939 and the Poles’ flight into exile. However, it took its true form following the occupation of Western Europe in the summer of 1940. As each European nation was defeated and occupied, its leaders fled to London. The first Dutch officials arrived within hours of the invasion of their territory on 10 May 1940, soon followed by the Norwegians and Poles in early June 1940, with the Czechoslovaks, Luxembourgers and Belgians arriving progressively over the following months.^[3] Interestingly, of the various Western European nations occupied by Germany, only the Danish and French chose capitulation, the remainder preferring to continue their war from British exile. It was a difficult but logical choice for those who wanted to continue to fight. Many leaders had prepared for this eventuality by evacuating their national gold reserves early in the war, or by withdrawing naval forces from tactically hopeless positions to Britain early in the conflict.^[4] However, fleeing into exile was a traumatic experience for all involved and was very much an option of last resort. Only a tiny number of leaders and officials reached London, and upon arrival their position remained uncertain. Many held little confidence that Britain would be able to resist German invasion and initially avoided committing too deeply to their host’s cause. This manifested as a reluctance to formally ally with Britain, even as they rebuilt their shattered militaries with British weapons, ships and aircraft, and continued combat from British ports and airfields. Instead, the exiles kept their options open by fighting Germany on a nominally independent basis and rebuffed early British attempts to form an alliance.

The exiles’ early notions of independence appear somewhat absurd in retrospect—declining British offers of alliance even as their militaries sortied from British bases using British-supplied ships, planes and ammunition. Nevertheless, they are explicable through the understanding that all parties prioritised their own national survival in the first part of the war.^[5] Most had firm pre-war policies of neutrality that shaped them towards continued independence, and the trauma of their flight inhibited rational examination of their new circumstances. The Dutch, for example, initially considered hedging their bets by moving their government to the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia) colonies, seeking to preserve a semblance of independent authority despite German occupation of the Netherlands.^[6] The first Dutch Prime Minister in London, Premier De Geer, advocated in a BBC broadcast for surrender to Germany and, after being removed by his monarch, fled back to the Netherlands and collaborated with the occupiers.^[7] Similarly, the Belgians were badly divided as a consequence of King Leopold III’s decision to surrender and remain in occupied Belgium, and only a few of their political leaders eventually made it to London. The Norwegians had been dragged into the war in part by British infringement of their neutrality and were therefore initially hesitant about joining too closely to Britain. Only the Polish were eager to arrange an alliance as quickly as possible and did so via a military support agreement.

Yet despite this ambivalence, all the exile nations accepted British assistance to re-create both their political administrations and their military forces within the British Isles. Those exiles with global colonies or sizeable commercial shipping fleets were able to fund their own activities, and the remainder accepted British loans. British forces provided facilities, weapons and training to re-forge militaries from whatever personnel the exiles could find in Britain or recruit from their global diasporas. Through these activities Britain and the exiles became increasingly integrated and mutually dependent. By mid-1941, the conditions were right for a collective commitment. On 12 June 1941, the eight exiled governments and Britain signed the Inter-Allied Declaration and thereby entered an alliance of ‘United Nations’ to fight together until Germany was defeated.^[8] It was an important agreement, but its prominence was short lived.

Ten days after the Inter-Allied Declaration was signed, on 22 June 1941 the Soviet Union entered the war, followed six months later by the United States in December 1941.^[9] The entry of these nations on the Allied side significantly reduced the exiles’ influence with Britain. It also demoted the exiles to secondary concerns in comparison to Britain’s maintenance of a relationship with the other ‘Big Three’ members.^[10] What followed was a period of uncertainty in which both Britain and the exiles were unsure how best to use their relationship for advantage. As small nations, the exiles found themselves excluded from the Allied strategic decision-making process and therefore hostage to the plans of their great and powerful friends. Britain refused to guarantee their restoration to power and began instead conducting extensive subversive operations in the exiles’ occupied homelands without consulting them. The United States showed little interest in their affairs, appointing a single inexperienced ambassador to cover all the exiled nations. The ambassador, Anthony Biddle, was the United States minister and ambassador to the Polish, Czechoslovakian, Dutch, Norwegian, Belgian, Greek, Luxembourg and Yugoslav governments-in-exile while they were resident in London throughout most of 1941–43. The post was then left vacant for the most critical year of the war.^[11] The exiles responded by repeatedly seeking admission to key Allied conferences and planning events. They were just as repeatedly refused. Complicating their challenges, several exile governments were undermined by internal divisions, mutinies, and increasingly depleted resources.^[12] The nadir of their influence came during the North African Operation Torch landings in late 1942. To achieve a local ceasefire, American commanders appointed a German-collaborationist Vichy French leader, Admiral Francois Darlan, to govern the liberated territories of French North Africa.^[13] This was an ominous precedent, and the head of the British Foreign Office labelled it ‘a compact with the devil’.^[14] The governments-in-exile panicked; concerned they might also be replaced by more malleable German collaborators when their countries were liberated.^[15] This panic forced tighter relations between the various exile governments as they sought to apply collective pressure on Britain. Although their economic, diplomatic and military influence had been depleted by the war, the exiles soon found new strength in this nascent form of European unity.

Leveraging this new unity, the exiles increasingly cooperated and formed a ‘united front’ to pressure the British into more exile-friendly policies.^[16] In response to Darlan’s appointment, the Western European exiles launched a ‘frontal attack’ on British officials to gain a guarantee of restoration to power.^[17] They also began cooperating far more closely on post-war plans. This increasingly unified approach was aided by the growing importance of the exiles as the time for liberating their homelands grew closer. By late 1943, many exile governments could rely on considerable support from resistance organisations at home, small but useful exile armed forces in Britain, and substantial moral authority as symbols of unconquered defiance. Recognising their importance to assisting future Allied efforts to liberate, pacify and govern German-occupied territories, the exiles marshalled their collective influence to insist the Allies commit formally to their restoration. The Western Europeans were able to do this most effectively, and the British supported them by pushing aside US resistance to agree a formal Allied commitment to restoring their governments after liberation.^[18] In contrast, the Eastern European exiles grew progressively more fragmented from internal divisions and the growing strength of rivals in their occupied homelands. Soviet influence played an increasingly important role in their fates, and it was evident these nations would only succeed with Stalin’s support.

By early 1944, the British policy was one of clear commitment to restoring all the exiles, and its actions reinforced this intent. After Operation Overlord the governments-in-exile and their various supporters became central to Allied plans for liberating and governing Europe.^[19] These carefully prepared liberations worked largely as intended, and the return to self-government in Western Europe was a relatively smooth and peaceful process. By the end of the war all four Western European governments-in-exile (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway) had been restored to power. Each government made substantial contributions to the security of Allied lines of communication and therefore the offensive into Germany. Conversely, only two of the four Eastern European exile administrations returned home. The Greek government returned with the assistance of British military force, and the Czechoslovaks negotiated an agreement to return with Soviet support. Disappointingly, the London-based governments of Poland and Yugoslavia were usurped by Soviet-backed alternatives, and at war’s end the British withdrew recognition of their exile regimes to placate Stalin. Nevertheless, by mid-1945 the Anglo–exile relationship had played a central role in the restoration of European democracy. It also endured. After the war, the former exiles leveraged their wartime experience to create a series of collective European governance institutions, ultimately culminating in the EU in 1993.^[20] From a security perspective, the former exiles petitioned the British to join the Brussels Pact of 1948, and then incorporated the US to create NATO.^[21] The Inter-Allied Declaration proved the inception point of the UN.^[22] The traumatic experiences of exile convinced the Western Europeans their future lay in European unity, a perspective made possible by the generally fair and respectful approach of their British hosts.

Endnotes

^[2] A group of Free French dissidents under General Charles de Gaulle also sought to create an exiled alternative to the Vichy administration in France but were never a formally recognised government-in-exile.

^[3] The Poles had established an initial government-in-exile in France during October 1939 after Poland’s invasion by Germany, and that government was able to flee relatively intact to London after its chief ally, France, was defeated in June 1940.

^[4] The Dutch and Belgians had evacuated their gold reserves to Britain and North America before the war, and the Polish Navy sailed to Britain just prior to German invasion. Mark Jones, ‘Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and Multinational Naval Cooperation in World War 2’, The Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 (2008): 1185.

^[5] David French, ‘British Military Strategy’, in John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley (eds), The Cambridge History of the Second World War: Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 38–39. See also Colin Strang, ‘War and Foreign Policy 1939–45’, in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 71.

^[6] The Dutch East Indies comprised present-day Indonesia.

^[7] Louis de Jong, The Kingdom of the Netherlands during World War II: Part 9 (Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut Voor Oorlogsdocumentatie Amsterdam), p. 10 (translation).

^[8] Lift up Your Hearts: A Record of the First Inter-Allied Meeting Held at St James’s Palace, London, 12 June 1941 (Edinburgh: Pillans & Wilson, 1941).

^[9] The Soviets on 22 June 1941 following Germany’s invasion, and the United States on 11 December 1941 following Pearl Harbor.

^[10] ‘The Big Three’ was a common wartime term that referred to the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union.

^[11] ‘Ambassador Biddle’, Life Magazine, 4 October 1943, pp. 107–120.

^[12] For example, the Greek and Belgian forces experienced significant mutinies throughout the war, and the Yugoslavs and Greeks were riven with internal divisions.

^[13] Telegram Churchill to Roosevelt, WM(42) 154, T15192/2, No. 193, Churchill Papers/422, quoted in Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy: Volume 2 (London: HMSO, 1962), p. 369.

^[14] Alexander Cadogan, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M. 1938–1945, edited by David Dilks (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 493.

^[15] Letter from Ambassador Biddle to President Roosevelt of 23 November 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt, papers as President: the President’s Secretary’s file (PSF) 1933–1945, Series 3, Box 24, Biddle, Anthony J. Drexel, 1942–1944.

^[16] The National Archives (TNA), W3709/G, Minute by J.G. Ward of 5 March 1943, FO 371/36533.

^[17] TNA, comment by J.G. Ward of 27 January 1943, AT(E)P(43)5 in FO 371/36533. W3927/G, Foreign Office paper ‘Restoration of Allied authority in Allied territory in Europe and the return of the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom to their own countries’ by J.G. Ward of 8 March 1943, FO 371/36533.

^[18] Frank Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe (London: HMSO, 1961), pp. 19–26; for the American perspective see Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, United States Army in World War II Special Studies: Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964), p. 654.

^[19] The account of Allied planning and execution for governing liberated Europe is contained within Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe; Frank Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government Central Organization and Planning (London: HMSO, 1966); Coles and Weinberg, United States Army in World War II Special Studies: Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors.

^[20] The influence of exile is clear through a review of the 11 original ‘Founding Fathers’ identified by the European Union, who include two Germans and two Italians. Of the remaining seven from Allied countries, five spent much the war in London: Joseph Bech (exiled Luxembourg Foreign Minister), Jean Monnet (Free French and British official), Johan Beyen (an exiled Dutch finance advisor), Paul Henri-Spaak (exiled Belgian Foreign Minister) and Winston Churchill. European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, The Founding Fathers of the EU (Publications Office, 2013), at: https://doi.org/10.2775/98747 (accessed 30 March 2023).

^[21] Britain’s military relationship with the Belgians and Dutch evolved into the 1948 Brussels Pact, an arrangement initiated by the former exiles who sought the continuance of the wartime alliance. The pact expanded to the Norwegians, French and others the following year as it became the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The British used the allegiance of the Western Europeans to persuade the United States to remain in Europe and join NATO, and Greece would join them in 1952. John Baylis, ‘Britain and the Formation of NATO’, in Joseph Smith (ed.) The Origins of NATO (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), pp. 8–10.

^[22] The UN explicitly identifies the Inter-Allied Declaration of 12 June 1941 as being the seminal moment for the creation of the United Nations. ‘Milestones: A Selective Chronology’, UN Chronicle 32, no. 3 (1995): 15.

The Anglo–exile relationship was a unique arrangement forged by the particular demands of the European theatre in the Second World War. Nevertheless, it possessed several notable features that are informative for present-day strategists and scholars. First, the British were generally sympathetic hosts who subordinated but did not exploit their significantly weaker partners, paving the way for a more united post-war Europe. This equitable and collective treatment of the exiles enhanced the long-term value of the alliance but also reinforced British determination to treat the exiles consistently and not prioritise any one nation. This led directly to the second feature: that significant exile economic, diplomatic and military contributions were critical to favourable British perceptions of individual exiles and the alliance, but nevertheless generated insufficient leverage to change major British decisions in wartime. However, the goodwill generated by mutual sacrifice was important in transitioning wartime relationships to successful post-war partnerships. Third, the creation of substantial subversion and resistance networks within occupied Europe enhanced the power and prestige of the Western Europeans even as it unleashed internal divisions detrimental to the Eastern Europeans. Finally, the British prioritised the interests of allies that were the most geographically relevant when deciding where to allocate scarce diplomatic and military resources. This was particularly the case towards the end of the war. The result of these factors was that exiles critical to Britain’s core interests—the Western Europeans and Greece—prospered, while the less important Poles, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs did not.

The British executed their policy towards the exiles within a collective, comprehensive and largely equitable framework that prioritised consistency in Anglo–exile decision-making. Despite its unrivalled dominance of the relationship, Britain did not cynically exploit its monopoly on power. The exiles retained genuine sovereignty and agency to act within the bounds of British war strategy. They exercised substantial control over their own finances and personnel, and over the structure and employment of their armed forces. The British continued to treat them as sovereign nations with individual national interests, and managed bilateral relations accordingly. Accordingly, the exiles were not mere puppets or vassal states but instead exercised substantial autonomy, albeit from a considerably diminished position. Nevertheless, there were significant limits to the influence these small states could wield as minor members of a wider coalition. The British consistently treated the exiles as second-tier partners, with the top tier reserved exclusively for Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The relationship was therefore equitable but unequal. In response, each exile adopted different methods to attempt to influence their host, shaped by their individual objectives, policies and available resources. Their relative success or failure illustrates how these diminished nations sought to influence a democratic great power in war.

The Poles sought to gain influence by making a substantial military contribution, drawing upon existing resources and their large émigré population in France, Britain and North America. The rationale for making a strong military contribution to the war was best expressed by the Polish slogan ‘We do not beg for freedom, we fight for it’.^[23] Indeed, Polish Prime Minister Sikorksi emphasised the military nature of this strategy when it was announced, stating he wanted the ‘Polish Army to weigh heavily when the fate of Poland is determined’.^[24] The Poles proved well placed to execute this plan. Much of the Polish Navy had sailed to Britain at the outbreak of war, and the Admiralty quickly pressed its ships into service, expanding it significantly throughout the war.^[25] The Polish Army and Air Force were re-formed from soldiers escaped from Europe, released from Soviet gulags, and recruited from Polish migrants across the world. By early 1944 Poland possessed the largest exile forces, with a nearly 80,000-strong army, a 3,000-strong navy (one cruiser, six destroyers and two submarines), and a 14-squadron air force.^[26] Far from being a boutique or fragile force, these personnel were engaged in some of the most dangerous and decisive combat operations of 1940 and later in 1944–45.^[27]

The Poles made the greatest military contribution to Allied success of all the exiles and were highly respected for this commitment. For example, the folklore around Polish pilots in the Battle of Britain remains strong even today.^[28] Yet their contribution provided little leverage when it mattered. British and American gratitude did not translate to commitments to restore the Polish government-in-exile or Poland’s pre-war territories. This was partly due to the fact that geography meant the Soviets would dominate post-war Eastern Europe, and partly due to the limited strategic influence that military contributions often generate in practice. The Polish desire to make a valued military commitment necessitated integrating their forces completely into British command and control structures. As an important and relied-upon component of British military power, these forces could not then be leveraged for political advantage without immediately undermining the respect and prestige they had bled to establish. They were in effect decisively engaged within the British war effort, and the only way Polish military leaders could exercise influence was to threaten not to fight. This only happened once, when Polish General Anders threatened to withdraw his forces from the Italian front line because they felt betrayed by the outcomes of the 1945 Yalta Conference. His British superior, Field Marshal Alexander, prevented this action by pointing out that there were no reserves to replace the Polish II Corps, and an American colleague advised that to refuse battle ‘would have an ill effect on the Polish cause’.^[29] The Poles reluctantly fought on until the end of the war but were not even invited to the post-war victory parade.^[30] By pursuing a primarily military strategy, the Poles had found themselves in a true catch 22: their military had to be committed to operations to gain leverage over British decision-makers, but once committed it lost the freedom of action to provide that leverage.^[31]

In a similar manner, non-military contributions to the war effort generated British gratitude towards the exiles but conferred disappointingly little practical influence. For example, the Dutch, Belgians and Norwegians paid for their own war effort by drawing on their substantial global resources, and even financially assisted Britain when the latter’s gold reserves were almost empty.^[32] Their contributions of military forces, merchant shipping fleets and colonial exports often exhausted their remaining resources and were highly valued by their hosts. Nevertheless, these contributions bought these exiles little real influence over the major decisions of the war. The exiles made several individual and collective attempts to access the primary Allied decision-making forums of the British War Cabinet, and later the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. They were consistently refused by British leaders reluctant to cede influence to their minor allies. For example, in early 1942, British leaders denied Norwegian requests for involvement in planning the liberation of Norway on the basis that it ‘would inevitably lead to the Dutch, the Belgians, the Free French—and possibly the Poles and Czechs—demanding a similar privilege when their territories are concerned’.^[33] Soon afterwards, the exiles made an appeal for representation within ‘an Allied General Staff to direct operations on the European Front’.^[34] After discussion of this proposal in parliament and at the War Cabinet, it was firmly rejected on the basis that ‘agreement within such a heterogeneous body would be extremely difficult to obtain … security would be impossible’ and it would lead to ‘the unjustifiable dispersion of effort’ in pursuit of the exiles’ individual objectives.^[35] Britain was determined to retain control over war planning, and the exiles were never granted significant influence over Allied decision-making.

British efforts to establish subversion and resistance networks in occupied Europe provided an alternative but problematic method for the exiles to gain influence. The cultivation of support in occupied territories is hazardous, and Czechoslovakia offers a cautionary example. The exiled Czechoslovak leaders commanded few personnel, possessed no independent financial or colonial resources, and struggled to find means of effectively influencing British policymakers. In an attempt to gain prestige and leverage with his British hosts, exiled Czechoslovak President Beneš sought to spark a popular revolt via a targeted assassination of the German governor of occupied Prague. Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich was killed in May 1942 by Czechoslovak agents parachuted into the country by the Royal Air Force. The result was a propaganda coup for the exiled president, but a disaster for the occupied population. Savage German reprisals followed, largely extinguishing Allied intelligence networks within the country. The goodwill generated among British leaders was therefore short lived, and the government-in-exile responded by looking to other nations for assistance. President Beneš increasingly pursued an accommodation with the Soviets, who sought at least a semblance of legitimacy for the post-war Czechoslovak government, even as they planned its subordination to communist influence. This ‘third way’ worked, and in May 1945 Beneš was restored to the presidency with Soviet support. His victory proved Pyrrhic, and he was progressively marginalised before being deposed by communist rivals in a 1948 coup.

The Czechoslovak exiles were always among the weakest of the exiles, and their decision to seek influence by promoting resistance against the German occupiers ultimately diminished their strength further. Indeed, across Europe resisting German occupation proved to be a largely ineffective strategy, as the ruthless efficiency of German security forces soon destroyed or suppressed most active resistance organisations. Instead, the British and exiles changed their strategy to one which required the occupied populations to bide their time and hide their strength until the Allies returned to the European continent. British and exile tactics therefore pivoted to the creation of ‘secret armies’ that would rise and strike only when Allied liberation was imminent.^[36] This concept proved successful both in directly assisting Allied liberation efforts and in preserving the latent potential of the exiles’ influence prior to liberation. It was most successful in Norway and France, and also to a lesser extent in Belgium and the Netherlands, where the security of British supply lines was critical to the last six months of the war. However, strong and loyal resistance forces did not guarantee success. The strongest of the exile ‘secret armies’ was the Polish Home Army, an organisation wiped out by the Germans during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising while the Soviets watched on passively.^[37] The ‘secret armies’ concept also proved hazardous to exile and Allied post-war plans. In Yugoslavia and Greece, the Allies’ support of resistance forces did little to accelerate German withdrawal but instead produced deeply fractured societies that struggled with the resultant division and recriminations for generations. Even in the comparatively homogenous nations of France and Belgium, the political forces unleashed within competing resistance groups proved difficult to contain. Promoting subversion was therefore an effective but problematic method for both Britain and the exiles.

Finally, geography was a key determinant in exile outcomes. The two Balkan governments-in-exile, the Yugoslavs and Greeks, were similar at first glance. Both possessed meagre resources, had largely ineffectual monarchs and political leaders, and were continually riven with internal dissent and rebellion. Yet while the Yugoslavs dissolved in exile, the Greeks returned home in triumph. The reason was articulated by Sir Orme Sargent, a senior British Foreign official: ‘Greece is and always has been a vital British interest’, in contrast to the minimal importance of Yugoslavia.^[38] Greece’s proximity to Eastern Europe and the Balkans and to British military and economic interests in the Mediterranean, Egypt and the Middle East made it critical to post-war British plans. Britain was therefore prepared to invest significant resources and political capital into ensuring Greek success, including securing the ‘percentages agreement’ for regional influence with Stalin and dispatching an occupation force following German withdrawal from Greece in late 1944.^[39] The Greek government exercised little influence throughout much of its exile, but its importance to British leaders who sought a Greece that was ‘prosperous, our friend, and at peace’ meant it remained at the forefront of British calculations regardless.^[40]

In direct contrast, the geographically proximate Yugoslavs remained only peripheral concerns to Britain but of significant interest to the Soviets. In late 1944, British forces were stretched to near breaking point in Western Europe, and there was little appetite and no military capacity to force the return of the exile Yugoslav government. Most of the government-in-exile’s supporters within Yugoslavia were loyal to General Mihailovic, an individual with whom the Allies had cut ties after he proved reluctant to engage the German occupiers. Britain and America instead switched their support to the communist leader Tito in the mistaken belief that he would be more active and open to ongoing British influence. Tito instead rebuffed the Western Allies after gaining control of the country, and Churchill noted regretfully ‘in Tito we have nursed a viper’.^[41] The Yugoslav government and monarchy then dissolved ignominiously in exile. Yugoslavia’s peripheral importance necessitated Britain’s provision of political rather than physical support, an approach that proved totally ineffective in the face of far stronger communist competitors. The Yugoslav exiles were of distinctly secondary importance to Britain and they suffered accordingly.

In contrast, the geography of Western Europe made it critical to British plans for the post-war era. Any concepts of the governments-in-exile returning to their pre-war policies of neutrality were therefore firmly discouraged by the British Foreign Office throughout the war. Always confident of victory, in early 1941 Foreign Office leaders believed ‘British and American bases in Norway [would be] of utmost interest’ to ‘enable this country to maintain its position vis-à-vis the Continent of Europe’.^[42] Norway’s proximity to the shipping routes to Russia only increased this importance as the war progressed and concern about future Soviet intentions mounted. The exiles of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France were even more essential to British leaders, who perceived Britain’s strategic frontiers as being ‘on the Rhine’ and wanted strong allies to act as their continental shield after the war.^[43] Furthermore, in the short term the British (and Americans) needed these exiles’ support. Allied supply lines ran through the exiles’ territories as the battlefront moved towards Germany, and the secure administration of these rear areas was essential. Short- and long-term strategic calculations therefore necessitated strong mutual commitments between the Western Europeans and their geographically proximate British hosts.

Endnotes

^[23] Imperial War Museum Poster, Haar, Zygmunt and Leopold, Polish Public Relations Unit, 1944, Art. IWM PST 3194.

^[24] George Kacewicz, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile (1939–1945) (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1979), p. 52.

^[25] See reference to Anglo-Polish Naval Agreement of 18 November 1939 in TNA, WO 33/2389.

^[26] TNA, CAB 66/49/30, Organisation of Allied Naval, Army and Air Contingents, 27 April 1944, Appendices I–IV.

^[27] For example, the Polish Armoured Division sealed the Falaise Pocket in Normandy; the Polish II Corps fought its way up the length of Italy, including the bitter Battle of Monte Cassino; and the Polish Airborne Brigade was decimated in Operation Market Garden.

^[28] See for example Hurricane: 303 Squadron/Mission of Honour (film directed by David Blair, Kaleidoscope Film Distribution, 2018); Lynne Olson and Stanley Cloud, A Question of Honor: The Kosciuszko Squadron: The Forgotten Heroes of World War II (New York: Alfred A Knopf Incorporated, 2003).

^[29] General Wladyslaw Anders attributes this perspective to American General Mark Clark. Wladyslaw Anders, An Army in Exile: The Story of the Second Polish Corps (London: Macmillan, 1949), p. 252.

^[30] Norman Davies, Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Macmillan, 2018), pp. 507–508.

^[31] It is perhaps ironic that this catch 22 for the Polish presented itself during the Italian campaign, which was also the historical setting for Joseph Heller’s novel of the same name.

^[32] The Belgians agreed to lend up to three-quarters of their national gold reserves (£60 million (equivalent to £2.4 billion in 2024)) to Britain in March 1941. Herman Van Der Wee and Monique Verbreyt, A Small Nation in the Turmoil of the Second World War: Money, Finance and Occupation (Belgium, Its Enemies, Its Friends, 1939–1945) (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009), pp. 247–249.

^[33] General Ismay to Hambro, TNA, HS2/127 Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Regarding the Military Organisation in Norway, quoted in Chris Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 1941–1945 (New York: Springer, 2012), p. 62.

^[34] TNA, COS(42) 101 (15 April 1942) Letter and Memorandum by Sikorski in CAB 80/62/3; Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 22 April 1942, vol. 122, cc688.

^[35] TNA, JP(42) 465 Memorandum by Joint Planning Staff of 1 May 1942 in CAB 79/20/41.

^[36] David Stafford, ‘The Detonator Concept: British Strategy, SOE and European Resistance after the Fall of France’, Journal of Contemporary History 10, no. 2 (1975): 208.

^[37] Davies, Rising ’44, pp. 417–422.

^[38] TNA, R7742 Statement by Sir Orme Sargent in FO 371/37198 of 1943, quoted in Richard Clogg, The Greek Government in Exile, 1941–44 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 390.

^[39] Stalin had consented to Britain having ‘90 per cent’ preponderance in Greece, with the Soviets having 10 per cent. This was in exchange for a reversal of these percentages in Romania. Clogg, The Greek Government in Exile, p. 397.

^[40] TNA, FO 371/43747, R 18937 of 25 November 1944. Quoted in Lars Baerentzen, ‘British Strategy towards Greece in 1944’, in William Deakin, Elisabeth Barker and Jonathan Chadwick (eds), British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944 (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 150.

^[41] Margaret A Kay, ‘The Yugoslav Government-in-Exile and the Problems of Restoration’, East European Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1991): 16.

^[42] TNA, N1307/87/30 Letters Sargent to Eden, and response, 8–9 April 1941, FO 371/29421.

^[43] A view espoused by Stanley Baldwin on 30 July 1934 in response to the increased threat from the air: ‘When you think of the defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine. That is where our frontier lies.’ Baldwin was then Lord President of the Privy Council and soon to become the British Prime Minister. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 30 July 1934, vol. 292, cc2340.

Analysis of the Anglo–exile relationship gives rise to several observations that inform contemporary strategists and planners. The first is that alliances require the subordination of individual preference to the collective strategy. Nations enter alliances for reasons of self-interest, but surrender a level of influence to the collective in the process. Power disparities within the alliance often mean the strongest member’s power is enhanced at the expense of the weaker partners. This was certainly the case when Britain was the primary nation fighting Germany during 1940 and 1941, and its moral and military power was bolstered by the exiles’ presence. In turn, Britain also experienced this effect as it found itself the increasingly weaker partner in the Anglo-American alliance, and to a lesser extent in its later dealings with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, its position as one of the ‘Big Three’ ensured that it always dominated the Anglo–exile relationship. In comparison, the meagre resources of the exiles resulted in their complete exclusion from all significant strategic decision-making forums of the war. Consequently, despite their frequent appeals for the Allies to prioritise the removal of their German occupiers, the exiles’ territories were liberated on a timeline and in a manner decided by their more powerful allies. The same intra-alliance power dynamics meant that when the London-based Polish and Yugoslav exiles fell from Soviet favour there was little their British sponsors could do to alter this fact. Britain was simply not willing, or militarily ready, to risk war with the Soviet Union over their fate. It was therefore the demands of realpolitik, not British indifference that condemned these Eastern Europeans to continued exile.

A secondary observation emerges from the various successes and failures of the Anglo–exile alliance. When threatened or stressed, states prioritise the protection and advancement of their core interests. Lesser powers must therefore ensure their interests align closely to the greater power’s priorities. For the British, their image as the ‘sole champion of Europe’ was essential to their early grand strategy of recruiting the United States into what remained a principally European conflict.^[44] This image required an alliance with the exiles, an arrangement Churchill labelled ‘a symbol of our common determination to see the war through to a successful conclusion’.^[45] Once the US had entered the conflict, British priorities for the Anglo–exile relationship shifted to the practical requirements of liberating Western Europe, and the promotion of post-war British interests in that region. In contrast, the desire of the Eastern Europeans for a restoration of the pre-war status quo became increasingly divergent with British prioritisation of a constructive relationship with the Soviets. This led to the British ceding influence in Eastern Europe. By the time the Poles and Yugoslavs identified this shift they were ideologically and diplomatically incapable of transitioning from British to Soviet sponsorship, and were usurped accordingly. In contrast, the Czechoslovaks’ meagre resources and limited alliance contributions meant they were not as committed to Britain and instead independently negotiated a return to power with the Soviets in return for accepting substantial communist representation in parliament. Ironically, their comparative irrelevance to the British had preserved their freedom of action and granted them success.^[46]

The third observation is that the Anglo–exile relationship confirmed the aphorism that geography is destiny. The Western Europeans and Greece prospered under British sponsorship precisely because they were central to British post war interests. In 1943, the British had demonstrated the importance of maintaining sympathetic governments in these nations by arguing for their restoration against the objections of United States officials. Fearing that American preferences for maintaining post-conflict military rule would do ‘lasting harm to our relations with the small Allies’, the British argued instead for the restoration of the governments-in-exile.^[47] This often-acrimonious disagreement raged within Anglo-American headquarters for a full year until the Americans finally agreed to exile restoration.^[48] Similarly, British officials provided troops to support the Greek government’s return and to keep it in power by force even at the peak of the British personnel crisis of late 1944. These examples demonstrate the British were ‘deeply committed’ to the smaller allies whose geography made them most important to Britain’s post-war position.^[49]

A fourth point is that the exiles’ future potential importance to Britain consistently outweighed the importance of any previous contributions. Some nations were able to ‘get away’ with making lesser contributions and still prosper because they were important to Britain’s post-war plans. For example, the Belgians made only minor contributions to the war effort and were resented for their previous indecision and prominent role in the fall of France. Nevertheless, Churchill informed their prime minister ‘my policy is to look forward and not to look back’, and repeatedly put aside his personal view that they were the ‘most contemptible’ and ‘ungrateful’ ally for the sake of Britain’s strategic objectives.^[50] He believed suppressing such animosity was worthwhile if it ensured British-aligned rulers dominated the Low Countries after the war.^[51] Similarly, the Norwegian exiles were initially viewed as of marginal importance, but Churchill’s persistent fascination with potentially re-entering Europe through Norway meant they became increasingly involved in Allied operations as the war progressed.^[52] Norway remained prominent in British post-war plans due to the advantages an Anglo-Norwegian alliance conferred on the Royal Navy’s dominance of the North Sea and the sea-lanes to Russia. The Greek exiles were consistently supported despite their internecine politics and deadly mutinies among their army and navy.^[53] Likewise, France’s immense importance to Britain’s long-term security saw Britain initially employ a hedging strategy in dealing with the competing administrations of Vichy and de Gaulle. Early in the war Britain sought to ‘ride two horses at once’ by maintaining a pragmatic relationship with the nominally neutral French Vichy administration while simultaneously backing de Gaulle as the leader of the separatist Free French.^[54] This approach paid dividends when de Gaulle later emerged as the dominant force in a deeply divided post-war France. Although de Gaulle was never as compliant or as invested in the Anglo-French alliance as Britain would have preferred, British officials supported him throughout the war despite strenuous American objections.^[55] The same British officials also restored France to eminence by lobbying for it to play a role in the post war occupation of Germany, and later to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It is perhaps unjust, but nations that will be important after a war will retain influence that may far outweigh their wartime contribution.

A fifth observation is the importance of prioritising grand strategy over shorter-term military strategies or operational concerns. This depends on proficient and appropriately focused political leaders being advised by experienced and well-resourced diplomatic and military establishments.^[56] The Norwegians recognised that their pre-war policy of neutrality had been comprehensively destroyed by Germany’s invasion. They therefore quickly pivoted to becoming a reliable and committed British ally while maintaining cordial relations with Soviet Russia, with whom they shared their northern border. They were deeply disappointed by the low priority assigned to the liberation of Norway, but remained faithful allies nonetheless and benefited from this loyalty after the war. The Dutch were slower to grasp the immense strategic shift the war had imposed on their fading empire, but identified the considerable benefits of partnering with Britain during the war and afterwards. They were therefore able to navigate the loss of their colonial possessions and implosion of their neutrality policy to emerge secure and relatively prosperous in the post-war years, ideally placed to benefit from the increasing integration of Europe. Conversely, the Czechoslovaks prioritised their assassination of Heydrich to achieve a moment of admiration and influence, and had their resistance networks comprehensively destroyed in response. Their later failure to prevent a communist takeover was a direct result of this diminishment. The British understood both their own central role in post-war Europe and the importance of having faithful European partners to realise it. Initial plans for widespread revolt against German occupation were therefore quietly dropped in favour of the more controllable and predictable ‘secret armies’ of resistance. British diplomats and military leaders were also prepared to forcefully challenge their American partners for the exiles’ return so that a more stable and united post-war Europe could emerge. None of these positions were inevitable, and the transitions to them were sometimes traumatic and often required the sacrifice of military or operational objectives. But by prioritising their strategic aims the participants eventually succeeded.

Endnotes

^[44] Winston Churchill, ‘The Few’, Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 August 1940, vol. 364, cc1168.

^[45] TNA, Telegram Churchill to Roosevelt, PREM 3/45/3.

^[46] This success was only temporary, as the communist takeover of 1948 would oust President Beneš and cement Soviet dominance of Czechoslovakia.

^[47] TNA, W3927/G, Foreign Office paper ‘Restoration of Allied authority in Allied territory in Europe and the return of the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom to their own countries’ by J.G. Ward of 8 March 1943, FO 371/36533.

^[48] Coles and Weinberg, United States Army in World War II Special Studies: Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors, p. 677.

^[49] TNA, W3927/G, Foreign Office paper ‘Restoration of Allied authority in Allied territory in Europe and the return of the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom to their own countries’ by J.G. Ward of 8 March 1943, FO 371/36533.

^[50] TNA, Letter Churchill to Prime Minister Pierlot of 21 February 1941, PREM 3/69A, 69; TNA, Churchill Minute 639/4 of 27 May 1944, 58, PREM3/69A.

^[51] TNA, Memorandum of Churchill–Pierlot meeting record of 1 June 1944, 37–38, PREM 3/69A.

^[52] Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, pp. 170–174.

^[53] Churchill’s account of the April 1944 mutinies is found at Churchill, The Second World War: Volume 5, pp. 470–488.

^[54] Quote from a Foreign Office official in 1940. Philip Bell, A Certain Eventuality: Britain and the Fall of France (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1974), p. 94.

^[55] See for example the Giraud episode in Peter Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French: From Occupation to Liberation, 1940–1944 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 179–207.

^[56] David Horner, High Command (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 445.

Britain’s championing of the Western European nations was simultaneously both generous and self-interested. For centuries, Britain had managed the challenge of containing the dominant European power by maintaining coalitions of various European allies, and it continued this policy.^[57] The wartime coalition of Europeans that assisted in defeating Germany was rapidly repurposed to contain further Soviet expansion. However, the prominence of the Europeans in creating NATO indicates the co-dependence that evolved as a result of Britain’s wartime arrangements. For it was the Belgians, Luxembourgers, Dutch and French who initiated the Brussels Pact of 1948 with Britain.^[58] The further incorporation of the United States and Norway soon afterwards evolved this pact into NATO proper. Britain had initiated the Anglo–exile alliance to keep all available nation's in the war in mid-1940, but by mid-1945 was most supportive of those it judged most essential to its future security and broader interests. British power was increasing limited by its crippling war debts, its limited population, and the growing strength of its American and Soviet competitors. It therefore prioritised the nations most vital to its future position. Abandoning the exiled Poles, Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks may seem callous, but Britain’s success in focusing on Western Europe to enhance its post-war position is undeniable.

Australian strategists and planners can learn much from these experiences despite their geographical and chronological distance from our current strategic situation. Britain designed a comprehensive policy towards its alliance partners that considered them as a collective, and prioritised consistency in their treatment. But alliances reduce the individual agency of their members and can place harsh limits on the influence of smaller nations. The junior partners were denied significant influence over wartime strategy and excluded from the most consequential decision-making forums. As a junior alliance partner Australia can similarly expect to be a strategy-taker, not a strategy-maker. However, as long as our interests align sufficiently with that of our great power sponsors this may not be a grave concern. The exiled nations were subordinated but not subservient, and they worked individually and collectively to steadily increase their influence and power by identifying and employing various elements of hard and soft power that mattered to their British sponsors. Australia must likewise continually consider the resources it brings to any strategic partnership or alliance, and ensure it promises future value rather than relying on often worthless historical contributions or unquantifiable goodwill. In war difficult and selfish decisions may have to be made to balance the force contributions required to be a faithful ally with the necessity to preserve power for later needs. Most importantly, Australia must keep the desired strategic ends at the forefront of its policy and actions, and not squander forces, resources or diplomatic capital on objectives that do not directly further those ends. Advancing our own national interests and setting clear boundaries at the start of a conflict may be necessary to preserve sovereignty through the difficult times that will likely follow.

Winning a war is hard. Turning a military victory into an enduring peace is harder still. The Anglo–exile relationship provides a recent and useful example of a military alliance that both achieved victory and created the most important Western institutions of the past century. We should learn from their experience.

Endnotes

^[57] Stafford, ‘The Detonator Concept’, p. 187; Strang, ‘War and Foreign Policy 1939–45’, p. 69.

^[58] Olav Riste, ‘Norway’s “Atlantic Policy”’, in Nicholas Sherwen (ed.), NATO’s Anxious Birth (London: Hurst, 1985), pp. 19–29; Robert Rothschild, ‘Paul-Henri Spaak: Future Secretary General’, in Sherwen, NATO’s Anxious Birth; Paul van Campen, ‘Abandoning Neutrality: How the Netherlands Joined the Alliance’, in Sherwen, NATO’s Anxious Birth, pp. 116–123.