Systems of people management are one mechanism of retaining and developing an effective workforce. The administrative sanctions system of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) plays an important role in the career management of military personnel. While primarily intended to protect the ‘efficiency, reputation or operational effectiveness of the ADF’,[1] it also provides an opportunity for individual behaviour change. The effectiveness of this rehabilitation and its real-world impact on an individual’s career is debated.
With many negative personal anecdotes about the system, it is crucial to understand the effects of the administrative sanctions system on individuals’ behaviour and attitudes. Further, as outlined in the Defence Strategic Review,[2] the ADF is striving to increase retention to meet the government’s mandated increase in personnel levels. To accomplish these objectives, Defence must ensure that individuals who are rehabilitated through sanctions opt to remain in the ADF, while effectively separating those who are no longer fit for service.
What Is the Sanctions System?
The administrative sanctions system is designed to balance service interests (those of the organisation) and the interests of the individual when misconduct occurs,[3] with a particular focus on upholding the ‘interests of the Defence Force’.[4] This includes retaining members who have exhibited behaviour contrary to Defence values but demonstrate the capacity for improvement. To function optimally in conjunction with career management, sanctions should actively encourage and promote such behavioural change.
The use of sanctions can encourage service members to modify their behaviour, with the goal of retaining them within the organisation, or terminating their service if they cannot. However, in cases where misconduct is particularly egregious, even if there is potential for rehabilitation, continued service may not align with the interests of Defence. The system comprises various measures that may be imposed when a member’s conduct or performance falls below the expected standard for their designated role, including when their continued retention is deemed to be not in the best interests of the ADF.[5]
The administrative sanctions system complements the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) (DFDA). The DFDA addresses violations of military rules and regulations and provides for the imposition of penalties through a process of charge, trial and conviction. The primary aim of the military discipline system is to punish and deter future misconduct. The administrative sanctions system can sometimes be used for misconduct that may also be dealt with by the DFDA. Rather than a strict disciplinary measure that deters, the administrative sanctions system focuses on organisational risk management. It is a key component of the overall personnel management system and can be a means of motivating and supporting personnel to achieve optimal performance. Specifically for sanctions that are outlined in the Defence Regulation 2016 (Cth), Part 1, regulation 3 describes its purpose as to ‘provide personnel management that supports the appointment, enlistment, promotion and retention of appropriate persons for service in the Defence Force’. Focusing on retention, most sanctions are intended to act as a powerful motivator to achieve compliance with desired standards, or alternatively serve as grounds for dismissal in the most severe cases.
Does this hold true? On paper, the intention of an administrative sanction is to encourage better performance by reducing the risk of adverse impact of the past misconduct and the risk of its recurrence. If the individual improves their conduct, they will not be at a disadvantage after the sanction period has expired. The temporary nature of time-based sanctions reflects an agreement that if a member recalibrates their behaviour, they will return to normal career management. However, while the system of administrative sanctions is intended to ‘reward’ behaviour changes by supporting the member’s continued service, it can still be perceived as having a lasting negative impact on an individual’s career. For instance, expired formal warnings can be taken into consideration when assessing a member’s suitability for promotion within a reporting period. Considering these aspects, although the administrative sanctions system is designed to promote fairness and encourage behavioural change where appropriate, the perception of its long-term impact on an individual’s career and the potential for variation in decision-making can raise questions about its overall effectiveness and fairness.
Endnotes
[1] Australian Defence Force, Military Personnel Policy Manual (MILPERSMAN) (Department of Defence, 2024), Part 9, Chapter 2, para. 2.2.
Trying to quantify fairness and good decision-making is difficult and often subjective. When it comes to sanctioning misconduct or poor performance it can be hard to determine whether individuals are being treated fairly. While the administrative sanctions system generally adheres to procedural justice, there is still potential for decision-makers to introduce personal biases[6] or values or inconsistencies into their decision-making, which can create a perception that the system is unfair. This is a problem because military organisations regard consistency as a core value of administrative decision-making—and military members expect to be treated fairly and reasonably consistently under military processes. As a result, it is important to carefully consider the impact of ADF administrative sanctions and to explore ways to promote greater fairness and consistency in the process of sanctioning service members. To support such analysis, this article uses the ideas of organisational justice and ‘noise’ in decision-making as a point of reference.
Organisational Justice
‘Organisational justice’ refers to the fairness and equity of decision-making processes within organisations. Jason Colquitt[7] introduces the idea of procedural justice in relation to the four dimensions of organisational justice. According to Colquitt, there is procedural justice when (1) there is application of the same process, (2) the individual has a voice within the process, (3) there is a lack of bias, and (4) there is consistency (i.e., the fairness of ‘means’ rather than ‘ends’[8]).
The legal requirement for procedural fairness can be seen within the administrative sanctions process when members have the right to reply when a sanction is to be imposed on them, and the decision-maker is not personally biased. Procedural justice is a different framework for analysis. While the military’s administrative sanctions process adheres to Colquitt’s principles of organisational procedural justice, as outlined above, consistency will be compromised when decision-makers fail to make impartial decisions, and this can lead to unfairness. This, in turn, affects the individual’s willingness to accept the sanction, and their motivation to engage in rehabilitation. This further impacts their long-term career progression, competitiveness for promotion, and training opportunities, potentially increasing their likelihood of separation.
While assessments of fairness generally focus on the impact on the individual sanctioned, there are organisational factors that can influence a decision-maker’s ability to make consistently fair decisions. Decision-makers must follow certain rules and procedures to ensure that their decisions are fair and just. Following a fair process means having a transparent, consistent and unbiased decision-making journey. Achieving a fair outcome means having a just, reasonable and proportionate result that takes into account the organisational needs and individual circumstances. However, research has shown that the continual application of a strict process can sometimes lead to decision fatigue where the decision-maker starts to lose their capacity for self-regulation.[9] This makes it harder for them to block out personal biases and other distractions, leading to fewer fair decisions.
The same research showed that interpersonal justice could offset this fatigue.[10] Interpersonal justice is about treating people with respect and fairness when making decisions and involving all parties in the resolution. This includes measures such as informal counselling or trying to find a solution that works for everyone involved. For example, if someone has been accused of not putting in enough effort at work, the supervisor might talk to them and the person who made the complaint to try to find a way to make things better. The use of interpersonal justice can be rewarding and restorative for a decision-maker. Promoting interpersonal justice is important because it helps decision-makers stay focused and make better decisions. Research suggests that decision-makers who rely solely on rules and procedures become more fatigued in the decision-making process, as they strive to suppress more decision influences and adhere strictly to the process instead of assessing the case and making a good decision. This can lead to fewer fair decisions and make people feel that the system is unfair. For example, if someone receives a punishment that seems too harsh or does not make sense, or did not have the opportunity for interpersonal justice, they might start to lose trust in the system.
Noise
The book Noise[11] discusses the phenomenon of noise in decision-making within organisations. In the authors’ view, noise is essentially inconsistency: random variability across individuals in decision-making. It differs from bias as it can be measured without knowing about the decision to be made. Noise has no pattern; if the same average-quality service member would be rated ‘excellent’ by one supervisor and ‘terrible’ by another, the rating process is noisy—even though on average the ratings are accurate.
A good example is a 1970s study that sought to measure noise in decision-making. The study was undertaken to examine the fairness of the judicial system. The starting proposition was that one would expect judges to impose relatively similar punishments for the same criminal offences. Reviewing judgements made by 208 judges in the US criminal system, however, the study found a mean absolute difference of 3.8 years on an average sentence of seven years.[12] This meant that the same crime could attract vastly different sentences depending on the presiding judge. To reduce this variability, ‘guardrails’ were subsequently introduced. This involved the introduction of narrower guidelines on sentencing that preserved judges’ discretion on what sentences could be given, while reducing variability.
While noise can diminish the quality of decision-making, there are circumstances in which it is warranted. Variation in decision-making would be desirable, for instance, when there are many solutions to a problem. The Australian military applies the principle of ‘mission command’ decision-making—simply put, it directs members on ‘how to think’, not ‘what to think’. This is an example of embracing noise in decision-making where random variability has the potential to provide a unique way to solve a problem. While appropriate in warfare, uncertainty does not assist the quality of administrative decision-making. In this setting, noise can cause a wide variation in procedural decisions, which can result in injustice.
There are reasons to think that noise is especially pronounced in military decision-making. First, the military often uses joint (ergo, group) processes for decision-making, which can be affected by noise. Noise can be amplified by groups depending on what should be irrelevant factors, such as doing what is thought to be popular. Kahneman et al.[13] emphasise that ‘ideas about politics and economics are a lot like movie stars. If people think that other people like them, such ideas can go far’. Second, the military expects members to demonstrate certain behaviours and values through their decisions. This can cause variability in decisions made by military members who believe that a certain type of decision will be looked on positively (e.g., an Army infantry senior enlisted handing out a harsher sanction than a non-combat senior enlisted would). This can also come from objective ignorance, the idea that you think your personal instinct is better than analysis. Third, the military inculcates a ‘bias for action’, thus imbuing an overconfidence that creates noise from objective ignorance. Within the administrative management system, the military does not use significant matching or scales to guide decision-making, which introduces noise as everyone must apply their own judgement on each decision they make.
While it may be difficult to achieve, consistent and objective decision-making is a key factor in organisational fairness within a performance management system. When there is a lack of perceived fairness and transparency in decision-making, it can lead to a negative perception of the organisation, as ‘duty and drive do not march in lockstep with discontent’.[14] Negative perceptions of organisational fairness can be a driver of undesirable behaviours such as voluntary discharge or continued poor performance. Ensuring that decisions concerning administrative sanctions are consistently sound is therefore key to maintaining the perception of fairness.
In the context of administering sanctions, decision-makers typically do not have access to previous outcomes from similar situations, making each decision a unique challenge. Ultimately, decision-makers tasked to administer sanctions do not have access to previous outcomes from similar situations. Each time a member conducts himself or herself poorly, the situation is treated in isolation, and the decision-maker is tasked to apply individual judgement in order to determine the appropriate outcome. In these circumstances, it is important that the decision-maker has a frame of reference—either guidelines or another form of anchor[15]—to support efficient and fair decision-making.
Endnotes
[6] The use of the idea of bias in this paper does not reflect the legal test of bias.
[7] JA Colquitt, ‘On the Dimensionality of Organizational Justice: A Construct Validation of a Measure’, Journal of Applied Psychology 86, no. 3 (2001): 386–400, at: https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.3.386.
[8] JW Thibaut and L Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (L. Erlbaum Associates, 1975).
[9] RE Johnson, YJ Cho and DL Stone, ‘The Effects of Justice Strategies on Justice Outcomes and Self-Control’, Journal of Applied Psychology 99, no. 3 (2014): 523–536, at: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035664.
[10] Colquitt, ‘On the Dimensionality of Organizational Justice’.
[11] D Kahneman, O Sibony and CR Sunstein, Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment (Little, Brown Spark, 2021).
[12] K Clancy, J Bartolomeo, D Richardson and C Wellford, ‘Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 72 (1981): 524.
To analyse the administrative sanctions system, research conducted for this article covered full-time Australian Army personnel who served between 2011 and 2021, creating a sample size of 57,230 unique individuals. This used a combination of HR Data Warehouse and sanction steps data from Defence’s Personnel Management Key Solution (PMKeyS) system. This research looked at the collective body of sanctions that were both bound to a timeframe and enduring. Fifty-eight per cent of sanctions recorded in the data were formal warnings, followed by formal counselling at 22 per cent. Notably, a total of 1,536 individuals received one or more administrative sanctions during the observation period. The only sanction excluded from the study was termination of service.
There were some limitations to the study, such as the lack of detail on the reasons for each sanction, which made it difficult to consider the severity of the circumstances. There was limited supervisor and imposing authority data to track decision-makers. It was assumed that each sanction code was applied in isolation, to simplify the modelling—i.e., a member could have received a formal warning after a civil offence was recorded. The study was limited to the Army data; the Navy and Air Force apply the system of administrative sanctions differently. This means that it is not possible draw ADF-wide conclusions based on the study findings. Nevertheless, by leveraging this rich and extensive data, the study aimed to gain insights into the factors associated with administrative sanctions and their impact on the career outcomes of Australian Army personnel.
What Does the Data Say?
The raw data provided useful insights into the administrative sanctions system. The analysis found that there was, on average, a 1.1 per cent chance of anyone getting a sanction each year, indicating that only a small section of the Army population were found to have committed violations. However, over the 10-year period to 2021 there was a substantial increase in the number of sanctions, as illustrated by Figure 1. Across this period, the population size of the Army stayed relatively stable between 29,000 and 30,000 people.
Figure 1. Percentage of Fulltime Army Receiving Sanctions: 2011-2021
In 2014, the year after the withdrawal of Australian troops from Tarin Kot, Afghanistan, there was a significant jump in the number of sanctions. With fewer overseas deployments, the Army refocused on the ‘raise, train, sustain’ cycle of domestic operations and placed more emphasis on training and performance management than on operational preparedness. This factor may account for the rise in sanctions. Further, this article contends that increased media scrutiny[16] and cultural reviews from 2012 onwards[17] may have led to a change in focus on discipline over the period 2018–2020, potentially contributing to a significant rise in sanctions over the period. By contrast, in 2021 there was an almost 30 per cent drop in sanctions. This reduction could be attributed to the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns and responses. The lockdowns may have led to less focus on workforce performance management, particularly in New South Wales and Victoria, where many people were working from home for extended periods. In this environment, there may have been less opportunity and desire to conduct performance management.[18]
Another interesting insight was around the most common durations of sanctions (that had a timeframe), as presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Fraction of Sanctions by Duration
Formal warnings make up the majority of the sanctions that have timeframes. Commanders exercise complete discretion in determining the duration of these administrative sanctions, but they tend to cluster around similar timeframes. Notably, while most sanctions are for a one-month to three-month period, there are also relatively high percentages of sanctions imposed for six to 12 months and for 24 months. These clusters may be associated with the Army’s standard 12-month performance reporting period (which includes a six-month review). Specifically, commanders may be determining the appropriate sanction length with reference to the member’s reporting period. Such an outcome may be representative of ‘anchor bias’, a situation that can result an unfair appraisal of a member’s culpability.[19] The concept of ‘anchor bias’ refers to a reference point that a person uses when making a decision but can be irrelevant. For example, a decision-maker could impose a sanction of six or 12 months’ duration based on a reporting cycle, even though they have the option of any length in between. While such a decision may fit best with the reporting cycle, it does not necessarily provide a suitable duration for the member to demonstrate rehabilitation.
Are We Making Noisy Decisions?
As discussed by Kahneman et al., a prerequisite for identifying strong noise is the detection of a wide variation of sanction durations across reason types by supervisor. To test this factor, the dataset was collapsed so that each observation was delineated by supervisor and sanction reason. For each unique combination of supervisor and sanction reason, a calculation was made of the average duration. This enables analysis of supervisor-level averages across reasons.
Table 1 illustrates the variation in sanction lengths among supervisors for different types of violations. The top row shows that for alcohol-related violations, 114 supervisors issued sanctions with an average duration of 11 months. A quarter of the sample received sanctions of less than seven months, while another quarter received sanctions of more than 13 months for the same violation. The middle 50 per cent of sanctions for alcohol-related violations had durations between seven and 13 months, indicating that some supervisors were more lenient while others were stricter. The second to last row shows that unsatisfactory conduct had a similar mean duration but a greater range of variation, nine months, between the 25th percentile (P25) and 75th percentile (P75). This result indicates a higher degree of variation in the length of sanctions among supervisors for this type of violation. In contrast, physical fitness failures had the narrowest variation, four months, likely due to the presence of policy-mandated guidelines for this type of violation.
Table 1. Average supervisor-level sanction length (in months) by reason
Average Months
P25
P75
Total
Alcohol
11.11
7.00
13.00
114
Civil conviction
12.34
6.00
15.00
179
Civil offence
13.20
7.50
16.00
70
Non-medical use drugs
9.57
2.75
15.00
72
Personal qualities
12.68
6.00
18.00
62
Physical fitness failure
5.74
2.00
6.00
331
Police report
15.00
6.00
29.00
5
Security violation
7.00
1.00
13.00
2
Unsatisfactory conduct
11.14
5.00
14.00
605
Total
10.14
3.73
13.00
1,440
It is unclear whether the wide range of sanction durations for alcohol-related violations and unsatisfactory conduct is justified. Without additional information about the specific circumstances of each case, it is difficult to determine whether supervisors are giving longer sanctions for more severe violations, or if there is a lack of consistency in the decision-making process. For example, a supervisor may give longer sanctions for cases of long-term alcohol abuse, but he or she may give shorter sanctions for a one-off violation. Similarly, there may be a wide range of circumstances that could lead to a sanction for unsatisfactory conduct, which could justify varying durations. However, if alcohol-related misbehaviour tends to be similar across cases, this variance could indicate inconsistency or noise in the system.
Is Service Length Reduced by Sanctions?
Receiving a sanction in the first two years of service can have a materially negative effect on a military member’s career. This conclusion is based on survival analysis[20] and regression analysis.[21] The survival curves were plotted against years of service for those who had (and had not) received a sanction in their first two years of service. Relevantly, when calculating the curve there was no distinction made between separation types. Ultimately, the data did not provide sufficient detail to indicate how voluntary separations relate to sanctions (and we could not interview members to ask why they chose to discharge). Various reasons for a voluntary separation may be directly or indirectly influenced by a sanction. Additionally, if a member has a sanction and his or her service is separately terminated, it may indicate that the sanction did not change the member’s behaviour as intended. Figure 3 shows the survival for the entire population.
This figure suggests that those who did not receive a sanction had a consistently higher survival rate than those who did. After three years, only 84 per cent of those who received a sanction remained in the service, compared to 93 per cent of those who did not, representing a 9.7 per cent lower survival rate. One factor affecting these findings is Army’s imposition of an initial minimum period of service (IMPS) obligation for other ranks. IMPS is the contractual obligation for other ranks to remain in Army before they can voluntarily separate. This obligation would incentivise individuals not to separate earlier even if they had received a sanction.
Figure 3 - Kaplan-Meir Survival Curve — Sanction Received in First Two Years of Service
The gap between early sanction and no sanction becomes more pronounced as years of service increase. At five years, there is a 25.5 per cent gap between the survival rates of non-sanctioned and sanctioned members, and this gap grows to 53 per cent for 10 years of service. For years of service, this difference applies to both voluntary and involuntary separations and indicates that a sanction is a significant disadvantage for a long-term career. It is also worth noting that the survival estimates stop at 10 years for those who received a sanction in their first two years of service, indicating that all members who met this criterion did not have a career lasting longer than 10 years. This suggests that receiving a sanction early in one’s service could be a barrier to long-term service.
While the data may show a correlation between sanctions and shorter army careers, it may simply be the case that those receiving sanctions are fundamentally unsuited to long-term military service. An early sanction could be a marker of those who have slipped through the screening mechanisms of recruit training and initial employment training. If someone has such poor performance early in their career that they require a sanction, they may not have achieved a longer career, regardless. Further investigation of the career performance of those who are subjected to early sanctions could shed some light on this.
To further test the correlation between sanctions and career longevity, this study used linear regression analysis. Linear probability models (LPMs) are a statistical tool used to investigate the relationship between two variables, such as the effect of receiving a sanction on the likelihood of leaving the ADF. LPMs are a straightforward way to estimate the probability of an event occurring based on changes in the values of other variables. Three models were constructed to examine the relationship between separation and sanction reasons, with increasingly strict controls. This analysis aimed to highlight factors that could be the actual reason why a member separated and to ascertain the true probability that a sanction is the reason for separation.
Applying LPM analysis methods, this study found a positive relationship between members receiving a sanction within the first two years of being enlisted or appointed, and the likelihood of their leaving the Army. The significance level of this finding was 95 per cent or higher, which means that there is a high level of confidence that the result is not due to chance. Once all available factors were taken into consideration, the models showed that those with a sanction at two years have a 10.4 per cent increased likelihood of separation.
In addition to the already negative long-term career prospects indicated by the survival-curve analysis, the findings of the linear regression analysis serve to compound the issue. Specifically, the results suggest a significant positive association between the occurrence of a sanction during the first two years of service and the likelihood of separation from the Army. This finding strongly suggests that an early sanction can act as a hindrance to long-term service regardless of whether the member’s behaviour is changed.
[19] P Bystranowski, B Janik, M Próchnicki and P Skórska, ‘Anchoring Effect in Legal Decision-Making: A Meta-Analysis’, Law and Human Behavior 45, no. 1 (2021): 1–23, at: https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000438; Lieder et al., ‘The Anchoring Bias Reflects Rational Use of Cognitive Resources’.
[20] Survival analysis is a statistical method for analysing the expected duration of time until an event occurs. In this analysis, this is how long someone remains in service until their discharge.
[21] Regression analysis examines the relationship between two or more variables. In this analysis, this is the relationship between separation and sanctions.
The study’s finding that a sanction can have long-lasting effects on an individual’s career trajectory indicates that the administrative sanctions system does not encourage long-term retention. However, this does not mean that the system is failing to achieve its objectives. It is possible that administrative sanctions serve to indicate those who do not belong in the organisation. After all, administrative sanctions are typically imposed for a significant violation of the standards required by Army. By regularly monitoring the sanctions system, the Army can gain insights into its fairness and effectiveness, such as the number and types of sanctions issued, the reasons behind them, and their impact on the personnel who receive them. This monitoring can also help identify potential biases or inconsistencies, allowing corrective action to be taken.
Training and Education
Army officers and non-commissioned officers are trained in performance management during their all-corps training continuum. Using sanitised vignettes of previous cases, students could be provided such case studies and given a short period within which to assess whether a circumstance warrants an administrative sanction and, if so, for what duration. This data could be collected and presented back to the class to show how their decisions varied (with a comparison to previous years). This information could be used to teach the principles of organisational justice and noise. To support such learning, the ADF (and particularly the Army, through The Cove[22]) has a large body of professional development material around bias in decision-making. It is fair to say, however, that the concept of ‘noise’ is less well understood. Exposure to data on student’s own decisions would help expose how severe (or lenient) they tend to be in their application of sanctions, and the variability that can inadvertently occur in determinations around sanction timeframes. This information would be particularly useful in the pre-command course for commanding officers who often perform the function of imposing authority for administrative sanctions.
Another way to improve consistency in decision-making would be to publish something similar to the US military’s annual ‘Status of Justice’ report.[23] This report provides statistics on both discipline and non-judicial punishment issued across all services. Because the ADF system of administrative sanctions operates separately to the DFDA, the Australian version would need to separate the two categories of reporting. Such a reference could be published by the career management agencies and folded into performance appraisal information provided to the whole workforce.[24]
Decision Support Tools
Although the military discloses the results of DFDA action by courts martial and Defence Force Magistrates, there is no readily accessible database of administrative sanction outcomes. A decision support tool could be developed to provide decision-makers with basic information about similar cases and outcomes to facilitate more consistent decision-making. This would reduce the unnecessary variability in sanction durations while still enabling commanders to apply nuance in their decision-making. There is a risk that this measure could unduly influence decisions—a time-poor decision-maker could just copy the existing determinations to reduce their deliberation time. Such an outcome would have the detrimental effect of reinforcing someone else’s decision instead of providing a bank of clustered decisions with some variation. For example, if the average duration of sanction was particularly harsh in regard to a particular category of violation, then this circumstance would be reinforced over time. This could be mitigated with spot-check reviews by an independent organisation to ensure the system is being used correctly.
Calibration of the Individual
The Army should provide targeted support for personnel who have been subject to administrative sanction. The ultimate objective of the system of sanctions is to protect the organisation and risk-manage the individuals who have been retained despite their misconduct. This creates a situation that imposes an obligation on the organisation to provide the optimal conditions for a member to rehabilitate. Support measures could include specific calibration and training opportunities to enhance a member’s performance and to reduce the likelihood of future sanctions. The achievement of rehabilitation milestones could be recorded as a part of the performance appraisal system or built into the PMKeyS system under the sanction reporting.
The provision of targeted support would demonstrate the Army’s commitment to its personnel and thereby encourage retention. Leaving someone to his or her own devices, or even making the journey harder, will inevitably disincentivise better behaviour. By contrast, incorporating defined goals and incentives into the sanctions process would promote transparency and accountability. While increased management and reporting creates a personnel management overhead, it is warranted when the issue at stake is whether an individual is worth the effort of rehabilitation.
[24] The Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force does provide an annual report on the military justice system but this has not been updated since 2022–23.
The ADF’s administrative sanctions system plays a critical role in the Army’s management of its personnel’s careers. However, to encourage retention, the system must be fair and effective. If the Army is to maximise retention of its workforce, a more comprehensive rehabilitation approach is required. The measures outlined above could assist the Army in achieving its workforce goals by improving its understanding of the system of administrative sanctions and integrating it more effectively into the military’s performance management frameworks. With widespread concerns around a decline in ADF workforce numbers and shorter careers, the ultimate goal should be to minimise the likelihood of personnel separating from the service who have the potential for long and rewarding careers.
