Raids, Recoveries, Reconnaissance, and Rebels
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2023, 233 pp
Hardback ISBN: 9781009292054
Authors: Deane-Peter Baker, Roger Herbert and David Whetham
Reviewed by: Ian North
The ethical application of state-sponsored violence is a vexed and highly topical point of discussion for the countries (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) represented by the three authors of this recently released book. Even a casual observer of military and/or current affairs in Australia would be familiar with the contemporary court cases involving members of the Army’s Special Operations Command, as well as the release of the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report (commonly referred to as the Brereton Report).[1] Prior to reading a book with such an unambiguous title, it is prudent to highlight the credentials of the authors and reinforce the gravity of their important contribution at a time of profound global unrest. Both Baker and Whetham are ethicists, each with substantial involvement with the Australian and British militaries. Herbert is a retired US Navy SEAL who now lectures on military ethics. The authors’ combined expertise and practical experience make this book a highly relevant resource for those seeking to further their knowledge in the fields of military ethics and the employment of special operations forces (SOF).
The authors’ intent for the book is clear: they seek to answer the question ‘Is there something ethically special about special operations?’[2] Following the introduction, which briefly describes both the theory of special operations and the moral framework of conventional warfare, the proceeding four chapters cover the major mission sets (raids, recoveries, reconnaissance, and support to rebels) conducted by most SOF units around the world. Here, the authors examine each topic against the two main criteria that exist within ‘just war’ theory. These being jus ad bellum, which can be translated as the ‘right to war’, or ‘the conditions under which states may resort to war or to the use of armed force in general’; and jus in bello, which is ‘the law that governs the way in which warfare is conducted’.[3] The final two chapters examine the ‘crowded space between peace and war’ (i.e. special operations conducted outside a declared conflict), and ‘ethical armouring for special operations forces’ (enhancing the moral and psychological resilience of SOF).[4] Collectively, the seven chapters cover the majority of the spectrum of unconventional warfare that SOF engage in. Within each, there is a steady stream of observations and practical suggestions for a range of audiences.
The book is at its most accessible when using case studies from real life. The authors’ referral to examples such as Operation Neptune Spear (the US Navy SEAL’s raid to kill Osama Bin Laden in 2011), Operation Nimrod (the UK SAS’s recovery of hostages in the Iranian embassy in London in 1980), and the Coast Watchers (the Royal Australian Navy’s western Pacific observation program during the Second World War) makes the subsequent analysis and discussion easier to link to pragmatic outcomes. However, the book becomes more academic when dealing with concepts rather than case studies, and this is most obvious in the chapter dealing with rebels. This happens largely because surrogacy, or proxy warfare (operations conducted by, with or through rebel forces), is an element of unconventional warfare that remains shrouded in secrecy. Consequently, this limits the authors’ ability to use examples to illustrate the theory being examined. This is not a criticism; however, casual readers should be aware of it. In any case, the structure of the book easily allows for targeted reading without detracting from the overall narrative.
Notably, the authors do not set out to provide a definitive analysis of ethics as it relates to special operations. They state that ‘our account is not intended to be exhaustive, we hope what we have considered here highlights the relevance of the core ethical principles underpinning the just war tradition’.[5] In the same vein, they routinely point to resources that offer additional detail on specific topics, and raise areas they consider require further development. The only criticism here is that both the discussion and the additional sources offer limited engagement linking ethical considerations for the employment of SOF in the context of broader military operations, or grand strategy (the application of all aspects of national power to purposefully change the relationship between two or more states).[6] While the focus on ethics is the raison d’être for the book, this omission is problematic because the authors have noted that governments see SOF capabilities as valuable in part because they provide the option to reduce risk, and the potential cost of both blood and treasure.[7] This could be read as an implied argument in favour of limited war, something Clausewitz warned against when he wrote: ‘war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force’.[8]
Relatively short at just over 200 pages, The Ethics of Special Ops nevertheless covers a lot of detail. Those who constitute its primary audience—the officers and non-commissioned officers who conduct planning for and command SOF at the tactical and operational levels—should be comfortable with the balance of philosophical discussion and practical examples.[9] A case in point here is one of the last sections (‘How and why things go wrong’), which draws on open-source reporting from three Western nations (Australia, the UK and the US) to provide practical examples of contributing factors to poor ethical decision-making. Tactical commanders and planners could easily adopt the material presented here as a list of ‘what not to do’. Equally, the book’s analysis will also engage a secondary audience: men and women who are, or seek to be, commanders of soldiers (or sailors or aviators) in the future. The detailed examination of jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria across multiple scenarios reinforces the universal applicability of just war theory and, accordingly, the importance of educating future military leaders on it. Perhaps the most important target audience for this book is the senior military leaders and politicians making strategic decisions to send SOF into harm’s way. As the book reaches its finale, it turns repeatedly to the steps this last audience needs to take to protect the uniqueness of SOF. As the authors stress, SOF should not be the default option or ‘easy button’ for the achievement of strategic objectives, taken for the sake of expediency, military or political.[10]
In conclusion, this book is well researched, well written and hugely timely for Western militaries dealing with multiple instances of degraded ethical decision-making by SOF. For an Australian audience, the security and resource (in terms of both people and finances) challenges laid out in the National Defence Strategy[11] and the Defence Strategic Review[12] further contribute to its relevance. More important though is the unequivocal message that the ‘lie, cheat or steal—we must win at any cost’ mentality fostered by a small number of SOF (and accepted by some members of the public) must be discarded—not forgotten but consciously and deliberately set aside. As the authors stress, doing this will not only ‘prevent unnecessary and illegitimate death and destruction … [but] also preserve the moral lives of the people we send out into conflict on our behalf’.[13]
Endnotes
[1] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2020).
[2] Deane-Peter Baker, Roger Herbert and David Whetham, The Ethics of Special Ops: Raids, Recoveries, Reconnaissance, and Rebels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), p. 26.
[3] ‘What Are Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?’, International Committee of the Red Cross website, 22 January 2015, at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0.
[4] Baker et al., pp. 151, 178.
[5] Ibid., pp. 116–117.
[6] P Layton, ‘Defining Grand Strategy’, The Strategy Bridge, 17 August 2020, at: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/8/17/defining-grand-strategy.
[7] Baker et al., pp. 5, 145–151, 216–217.
[8] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chapter I.
[9] Baker et al., p. 26.
[10] Ibid., pp. 213–214, 216.
[11] Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program.
[12] Australian Government, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023), at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.
[13] Baker et al., p. 215.