Book Review - How to Fight a War

by Mike Martin

Hurst Publishers, 2023, 272 pp

Hardback ISBN: 9781787389304

Paperback ISBN: 9781911723875

Reviewed by: Anthony Duus

Mike Martin is a former British Army officer with extensive experience in Afghanistan, and he is currently a Senior Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. In How to Fight a War, his fourth book, Martin has written a ‘reference guide for the Commander in Chief of a nation’s military’, as he believes that ‘our leaders must have the strategic, operational, and tactical skills to prosecute wars successfully’.^[1] In actuality, Martin has developed a book that should be on every initial reading list for Defence personnel—uniformed personnel, public servants, elected officials and advisers should all have this book as they enter and begin to navigate the complex world of Defence. 

The book is broken into three easily digestible parts. It offers an elegant introduction to what Defence personnel need to do and know in the event of a conflict. It begins with the fundamentals—having a strategy and the intelligence to support it, building a logistics system, generating and sustaining morale in your force and, lastly, training that force to be ready. The book then turns to the development of the tangible capabilities required to dominate the five domains, focusing principally on the land domain and how the air, maritime, space, information and cyber domains influence and support it. Martin then illustrates how a war can be fought with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. 

Throughout the book Martin, as a former army officer, stresses the importance of the land domain, arguing consistently that it is the primary domain and that the other domains exist to support land forces. Martin’s view may be controversial to many, so it is worth quoting his perspective in full:

No matter what anyone tells you—and there will be plenty of sailors, airmen and (especially) evangelists for new technology that will try to convince you otherwise—the land domain is pre-eminent, because wars are won or lost only on land. The primacy of the land domain is straightforward to convey. People live on land, and war is a human phenomenon driven by the most powerful of emotions. The reality of trying to influence them is that throughout history wars have always been decided by your troops taking control of someone else’s village, town or city and, bearing a sword, musket or rifle, imposing your order. The other domains … exist to support the land domain and your land forces. You cannot win a war without them. Nor could you win a war by relying only on the other domains.^[2]

Despite this rightful prominence of the land domain in Martin’s text, he is quick to note that success requires joint and mutually supportive effect across all domains—no domain should be neglected at the expense of any other. Indeed, as Martin argues, time after time promises of new technology (and the accompanying evangelists) proclaim the end to primacy of the land domain, but they are quickly proven wrong. His example is very pertinent. In November 2021 the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Boris Johnson, introduced an Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy by stating that the UK had to ‘recognise that the old concepts of fighting big tank battles on European land mass are over and there are other, better things we should be investing in’.^[3] UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace explained that the review would deliver armed forces that were ‘fit for tomorrow’s battles’ by switching from ‘traditional warfighting’ to ‘technological warfighting’.^[4] Three months later, Russia invaded Ukraine with a largely armoured and mechanised force, reminding the highly technologised Western militaries that such conventional forces were definitively not obsolete.^[5]

The third part of the book pulls it all together, emphasising how all the domains work together to generate a military’s freedom to manoeuvre. Again, Martin focuses upon the land domain and how the different land capabilities work together, based upon the building blocks of the combined arms team—infantry, armour and artillery. This includes in close-combat scenarios. In this regard, Martin notes that an absolute necessity for the combined arms team to be successful is the ability and willingness to engage in close combat. Given what has been seen thus far in both Ukraine and Gaza, the ability to conduct combined arms manoeuvre and utilise the five domains remains paramount. Ukrainian infantry, supported by artillery, armour and engineers, are clearing Russian trenches with rifles and grenades.^[6] Israeli infantry and combat engineers are clearing buildings and tunnels in Gaza the same way—face to face with small arms, grenades and rockets.^[7] Despite all the support that can be rendered by the air, sea, information and cyber domains, at the heart of combined arms manoeuvre is the requirement for all land domain assets to operate as a combined arms team. After artillery, loitering munitions, attack aviation and armour have done all they can, it will still be up to the infantry and combat engineers to enter an enemy’s entrenched positions and, in a very small space, either kill them or force their surrender or retreat. 

The book’s final part is very short, but nevertheless thought-provoking. It considers how wars end and where the future of war may lie. To end a war is difficult, and the question is how a victor can end a war without imposing conditions that will inevitably provoke a further conflict in 50 or 100 years hence.

As already noted, Martin’s How to Fight a War should be an essential addition to the initial reading list for all persons associated with the Defence enterprise—whether they are military personnel, public servants, politicians or their advisors. My recommendation here, however, is carefully worded. The reality is that, for those who have prior experience in the topics covered, or who have benefited from the ADF’s professional military education system, little new is revealed. Martin has nevertheless provided a well-crafted exploration of how wars are fought and, in so doing, baselines the knowledge required for Defence personnel to contribute to the defence of their nation. As such, the book’s value should not be underestimated.

About the Reviewer

Colonel Anthony Duus is an Armoured Corps officer and has served in a variety of regimental and staff appointments. He is currently the Director of the Australian Army Research Centre and leads an eclectic group of skilled public servants, committed reservists and talented contractors.

Endnotes