The recovery of isolated American and coalition personnel has been one of the highest priorities of successive US military and political leaders throughout the 20th century. Since the advent of the helicopter, combat search and rescue techniques, and personnel recovery doctrine have been based on conventional military principles. American dominance in conventional warfare, however, encourages potential adversaries to pursue asymmetric approaches to combat. Until recently, there was a perception that the United States had an aversion to sustaining casualties in combat, and this perception encouraged its enemies to exploit effectively urban environments against this weakness. As one writer has noted, ‘cities offer physical cover—three-dimensional urban terrain—and political cover ... [and] more stringent rules of engagement associated with the presence of noncombatants’. 1
In taking advantage of the urban environment, an enemy is able to conceal his forces behind a shield of noncombatants and use urban structures for camouflage, thereby nullifying US advantages in both heavy and precision weapons. Through employing such methods, an adversary stands to gain significant combat advantages. Moreover, the increase in low-intensity conflicts and urban operations has resulted in a higher risk for US and coalition personnel in becoming isolated in areas that may be too perilous for the United States to undertake conventional recovery missions. In the future, therefore, establishing a comprehensive nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) strategy will be critical if the United States is to carry out a full range of military operations successfully. Understanding the formation, organisation and operations of informal networks represents one of the most important factors that contribute to the success of NAR operations. Such informal networks, both within the adversary populations and within US agencies, can be exploited in order to maximise the chances of successful personnel-recovery operations.
This article argues that the types of informal networks that are found in the urban environments of the Middle East are capable of facilitating successful NAR operations. The article evaluates conditions in urban areas of the Middle East and examines informal networks in terms of use in mounting successful NAR operations. The article also briefly analyses the techniques of personnel recovery in World War II France and in Iraq in 2003. The overall aim is to try to define those principles and requirements that are necessary for military exploitation of informal networks in NAR operations. Future NAR doctrine development should involve a meticulous examination of the informal networks that are found in both Middle Eastern cities and in the urban areas of the world.
Current US Doctrine for Personnel Recovery
The draft version of military doctrine for personnel recovery entitled ‘Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery’ (JP 3-50) is projected for publication at the end of 2004.2 This document is overwhelmingly conventional in tone and addresses the issue of NAR in only one paragraph. Moreover, this particular program for personnel recovery is compartmentalised with regard to specific tactics, techniques and procedures. Yet, the doctrinal principles for successful NAR should be available to, and understood by, all members of the military community since any service may be called on to play a role in such operations.
Apart from JP 3-50, other documents that contain doctrinal guidance for military commanders with regard to NAR operations include Special Forces Personnel Recovery (FM 3-05.231), ‘Nonconventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense’ (Department of Defense Instruction 2310.6), and ‘Personnel Recovery’ (United States Special Operations Command Directive 525-21). 3 The second and third of these documents relate primarily to national and strategic objectives involved in NAR operations. Since FM 3-05.231, Special Forces Personnel Recovery, is current and approved doctrine, and focuses exclusively on the actual implementation of NAR by Special Forces, it will be the primary document to which the authors will refer in this article. In FM 3-05.231, NAR is defined as:
Evader recovery conducted by SOF [special operations forces] UW [unconventional warfare] ground and maritime forces and OGAs [other government agencies] who are specially trained to develop NAR infrastructure, and interface with, or employ, indigenous or surrogate personnel. These forces operate in uncertain or hostile areas where CSAR [conventional search and rescue] capability is either infeasible, inaccessible, or does not exist to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel back to friendly control. NAR forces generally deploy into their assigned areas before strike operations and provide the JFC [joint force commander] with a coordinated PR [personnel recovery] capability for as long as the force remains viable. 4
US doctrinal sources tend to define unconventional assisted recovery separately. In this sense, unconventional assisted recovery may be regarded as simply NAR conducted exclusively by Special Operations Forces. For the purposes of this article, the authors will discuss the general concept of NAR and will address any exceptions that may apply to Special Operations.
In Special Forces Personnel Recovery, doctrine lists five specific tasks for NAR embracing contact, authentication, support, movement and exfiltration of personnel to friendly control. 5 In order to fulfill these tasks, military forces establish recovery teams and recovery mechanisms. A recovery team involves individuals or groups, while a recovery mechanism normally refers to the type of infrastructure required to support the five tasks of NAR. This mechanism may include indigenous forces or civilians from inside a given operational area and, ‘depending on its size and range, an RM [recovery mechanism] can vary the nature of its actions from overt to covert to clandestine’. 6
NAR doctrine also recognises the difference between conventional and nonconventional personnel recovery operations. These differences include the degree of political risk, the nature of the operational techniques employed, the relative independence of recovery forces from friendly support, a requirement for detailed operational intelligence and the possible use of indigenous or surrogate forces. A novel feature of NAR is the possibility of using informal networks to meet objectives.
Nonconventional Assisted Recovery and the Use of Informal Networks
Middle Eastern specialist, Guilain Denoeux, has noted that, in the absence of popular political institutions, informal networks thrive in underdeveloped regions of the world. He states that, in the Third World in general:
... the lack of political organizations enjoying wide popular support has led informal groups and associations to assume functions—including mediating disputes, allocating resources, conveying information and providing for order and social integration—that, in more institutionalized political settings, have become the responsibility of formal organizations.7
Such networks offer meeting places, contacts and channels for the circulation and communication of information, and ‘because of their informal nature, they are hard for governments to control and locate’. 8 Urban areas in the Middle East are no exception to the rule of informal networks. Most states in the region do not have the resources or capacity to meet the formal socioeconomic needs of their populations. As several writers have observed, many urban areas in the Middle East often represent an institutionalised agglomeration of associations whose activities are very different from those of the incorporated cities of the Western world. 9 As a result, people in many Middle Eastern urban areas use informal networks to fulfil a variety of social needs.
In terms of NAR activities, these informal networks can either threaten or facilitate recovery operations. The key to success would appear to lie in identifying a typology of networks that can be exploited. Denoeux lists four specific types of network that are most important in the Middle East: the clientelist, the occupational, the religious and the residential. In order to facilitate NAR operations, US forces must develop a degree of trustworthiness within these networks. Trust is based on three factors: reputation, performance and appearance. 10 Developing a genuine reputation for goodwill in the minds of potential collaborators is therefore vitally important. Promise and performance must be matched, and US forces must be sincere in their concern for the safety and livelihood of those surrogates that assist the United States in the conduct of NAR operations. Balancing the three factors of reputation, performance and appearance will help develop a solid foundation of relational trust that will help in ensuring the committed support of NAR surrogates. In assessing the impact of different types of informal networks in the Middle East in the conduct of successful NAR operations, it is important to discuss their special characteristics and to evaluate ways of exploiting networks by establishing effective incentive programs in order to ensure indigenous support for NAR operations.
The Clientelist Network
The patron–client relationship, or the clientelist, is a network typified by the symbiotic interaction of individuals of differing social status. A typical example in the contemporary Middle East is the relationship between local notables and the ruling elite. The local notable usually represents a respected member of the community and acts as a mediator in airing popular concerns to the ruling government. In return, the notable can provide community cooperation for the elites in the central government. As Denoeux puts it, ‘they [the notables] and their respective families [have] often entered into alliances and coalitions among themselves, creating in the process an informal urban leadership structure. 11
While a clientelist network can be exploited to facilitate NAR operations, it requires careful analysis of local conditions. For example, in Middle Eastern states with relatively centralised regimes, government officials, patrons and brokers may often belong to the same structure. In fact, patrons and government officials may often be the same individuals. 12 This type of strong client–patron relationship suggests that attempting to recruit and utilise local notables for NAR operations might be a counterproductive exercise. Regimes with weaker central authority are probably more promising in the conduct of NAR in that the relationship between ruling elites and local notables may be tenuous. Under these circumstances, careful recruiting and vetting of local notables may facilitate the creation of recovery mechanisms in designated areas for recovery. A careful social–political and intelligence study of local relationships will be vital if US forces intend to utilise a clientelist network to facilitate NAR operations.
In clientelist networks, building trust will be vital and should be based on an American reputation for delivering consistent rewards to those local notables who collaborate in the establishment of recovery networks. America’s performance will most likely be judged against the US forces’ ability to protect not only the physical safety, but also the community power-base, of local notables who collaborate as surrogates. Moreover, US forces must appear to have assertive control over events, and this control should be clearly observable to the surrogates. If US forces falter in presenting an image of control, then it is likely that there will be a diminution of trust. As a result, the ability of US forces to influence the required network will decline.
The Occupational Network
In Middle Eastern conditions, the occupational network brings craftsmen and tradesmen together in a beneficial and cooperative relationship. Although formal organisations such as craft guilds exist in the Middle East, the informal networks that sustain them are often more significant in influence. A unique aspect of Middle Eastern occupational networks is the bazaari. The term bazaari has been described as ‘a generic term that encompasses craftsmen, merchants, shopkeepers, and many moneylenders’. 13 Despite developments in manufacturing and business, leading to trade unions, occupational networks remain important throughout the Arab world.
The possibility of exploiting occupational networks for NAR operations is probably greater than within clientelist networks. However, like the latter’s, the characteristics of occupational networks would require careful and judicious study by US intelligence. The character of Middle Eastern small business centred on the bazaari creates an environment that is potentially favourable to US forces and opens up avenues to provide incentives for cooperation. Conversely, it must be noted that, in some authoritarian regimes such as Syria, the central government maintains tight control over the business sector through selected agents in both the bazaari and the trade unions. Another potential problem with exploiting an occupational network is that the bazaari may be closely linked to Islam and associated with the mosque, as in contemporary Iran. Weak or adversarial relations between a Middle Eastern regime, its national religious leaders and the bazaari provide perhaps the best opportunities for exploiting occupational networks in NAR operations.
Building trust between US interests and Middle Eastern occupational networks will most likely rest on the former’s reputation for honouring payments. Such payments should follow the local capitalist norms that attracted the network to collaborate initially. The United States should avoid large-scale lump-sum payments to occupational surrogates, but instead follow a bargaining strategy based on a system of consistent payments to those that cooperate within the network. Such payments have the effect of signalling a long-term commitment by the US Government.
The Religious Network
Middle Eastern religious networks are not well understood in Western culture. Since militant Islamist groups cannot be regarded as networks that facilitate American objectives, the United States must concentrate on collaboration with what Asef Bayat has called ‘social Islamist’ networks. 14 Such networks are primarily instruments of the middle and lower middle class and help to provide many basic social services to communities, sometimes through local independent mosques. Religious networks are often cellular in organisation and have proven to be effective at disseminating political information throughout the Islamic world.
The exploitation of Islamic religious networks for the purpose of NAR operations would obviously be extremely difficult. Within Western government and educational institutions, there is insufficient information available about the organisation and motivations of such networks. Another reason that NAR operations would be difficult to organise in conjunction with Islamic religious networks is the inability of the United States to provide tangible incentives for those that collaborate. Beyond finance, US agencies lack the capability to compete with the cultural and moral incentives that indigenous Islamic communities provide.
Because Western culture is often encumbered by widespread ignorance of Middle Eastern religious values, the United States might attempt to build a reliable reputation based on respect for, and support of, the various social services that religious networks provide to Arab communities. Such an approach should be reinforced by actively fostering social services both domestically and internationally. Finally, and arguably most importantly, the United States should try to ensure social commitment while maintaining a religious neutrality. Any attempt to manipulate the theological aspects of religious networks is likely to result in undermining the usefulness of such networks, which become less trustworthy.
The Residential Network
Residential networks are perhaps the most cohesive of the Middle East’s informal networks. These networks usually reflect neighbourhoods with similar ethnic and religious, and often occupational, backgrounds. Residential communities face common daily problems such as poor living conditions, limited access to schools, a paucity of medical facilities and a lack of participation in various cultural organisations. Government control of residential areas may also often be conducted through informally recognised community leaders who communicate residential concerns to ruling elites and mediate between the latter and the residents in return for a form of socio-political control over some elements in the neighbourhood.
Exploiting the Middle Eastern residential network offers both advantages and disadvantages for NAR operations. If a sympathetic residential network can be identified for exploitation, it is likely to prove very reliable. Since residential networks cut across the full spectrum of informal networks, the United States can offer incentives that might meet majority needs within a given community. The main disadvantage with residential networks is that they are often too limited in area control to provide support beyond immediate community boundaries. As Denoeux observes, the group emotions that unite the members of a given quarter often translate themselves into ‘feelings of animosity toward the inhabitants of other quarters, especially neighboring ones, who [can be] easily identified as collective enemies’. 15
Within residential networks, cultivating respect for the community’s autonomy can facilitate the development of trust. Building a tradition, both domestically and internationally, of supporting community initiatives is one way of attempting to cultivate this type of reputation. US forces can win community support by fostering the civic health of those informal residential networks that offer their support to NAR. Finally, to reinforce their trustworthiness, US representatives should communicate with the network as a collection of citizens, not as a form of politico-military officialdom. In other words, recruiting efforts should be undertaken by local figures that are recognised advocates of the community.
Exploiting and Influencing Informal Networks in the Middle East
Having identified the four types of informal networks that dominate the social landscape of the Middle East, it is now possible to discuss techniques of psychological persuasion in developing support from American NAR operations. As Robert Cialdini has pointed out, techniques of psychological persuasion include reciprocity, authority, social proof, consistency, commitment and liking. 16 These techniques are most effective when used in concert with one another and are applicable across cultures. However, the use of specific techniques, or combinations thereof, may vary from society to society.
The technique of reciprocity is useful in that offering a particular incentive yields a return and builds influence. The technique of using local authority figures may increase influence because people in informal networks often associate the credibility of a situation with support from figures of authority. Similarly, authority is linked to the phenomenon of social proof in that local acceptance reinforces the power of influence. Taskings and incentives that are consistent with the selfimage and desires of the target community may bolster the trust and commitment of network members. Finally, the simple reality of liking between individuals or between groups may facilitate persuasion and agreement.
It is important to note, however, that attempting to exploit informal networks with strong loyalties to a centralised regime is likely to be counterproductive. The informal network that exhibits dissatisfaction with its ruling political regime is the proper target. Such networks contain the marginalised within their ranks. Marginalised figures may often avoid outward defiance, but they may also possess a useful potential to oppose ruling elites, particularly when the correct circumstances present themselves—possibly in NAR operations.
Influencing the Clientelist Network
Within the clientelist informal network, NAR planners must seek to identify vulnerable areas such as the presence of political instability. For instance, urban areas are often inherently unstable with regard to the structure of patron–client relationships because of the pluralism and competitiveness of the human environment. Local notables who are dissatisfied with the central regime may have the patronage to persuade their clients to move into collaboration with US forces. By applying Cialdini’s techniques of persuasion, NAR planners may be able to avoid offering inappropriate incentives. For example, a typical Western approach might involve offering money as a standard incentive. While monetary means may be effective under certain circumstances, they may prove highly counterproductive in others. US forces may be able to employ the techniques of authority and social proof if network members respected by the targeted local notable are already supporting American operations.
Reciprocity and consistency offer perhaps the best opportunity to exploit a clientelist informal network. Using a combination of money, post-conflict political support, offers of asylum and other incentives may garner patron support within the network. The method of liking, in and of itself, is probably the least effective unless one encounters clients that exhibit strong liberal democratic or capitalist tendencies. Identifying the system of patronage based on wealth and prestige within a clientelist network is the key factor in winning local support for NAR objectives.
Influencing the Occupational Network
In informal occupational networks, such factors as high taxation, restrictive trade, constraints on domestic manufacturing, and limitations on the autonomy of unions or bazaari may yield collaborators for NAR operations. Individuals or modern business concerns with international economic links with Western nations or market expansion motives may be open to persuasion since they tend to exhibit ‘a relatively cosmopolitan... and liberal outlook’. 17
Most Middle Eastern businesses and bazaars tend to be established in urban areas with manufacturing, transportation and human resources. The occupational networks that result from the interaction of these factors may provide a key node for NAR operations. As with clientelist networks, persons of authority and symbols of social proof may be enlisted to win over supporters within occupational networks. Moreover, garnering the support of large international companies for US recovery operations may provide some influence in this area.
Reciprocity and consistency still appear to be the strongest methods of persuasion in winning the support of occupational networks. The latter are designed for profit and the use of money. Occupational networks provide post-conflict trade support, access to emerging technologies, offers of asylum and the opportunity to conduct business in the United States, and represent a melange of methods for co- opting support. The factor of liking may also reinforce the support of those members of occupational networks who possess ideals of free-market capitalism.
Occupational networks appear not to be as hierarchical as clientelist networks, making patronage perhaps less of a factor. Nonetheless, it may still be possible to use managers in the occupational network as a node of the network for information, resources and support.
Influencing the Religious Network
Islamic religious networks arguably present the greatest challenge to exploitation by US forces in support of NAR operations. Nevertheless, there are some possibilities for cooperation that those concerned with NAR operations should not overlook. For instance, religious establishments that are strongly repressed by centralised regimes might provide useful allies. Some secular authoritarian regimes such as Algeria and Egypt often demonstrate a disregard for Islamic values, thus breeding a resentment that is sometimes translated into surrogacy. Friendly forces might be able to persuade various individuals or groups within social Islamist groups to assist in recovery operations.
Since many urban areas in the Middle East are overpopulated, with high levels of unemployment, support from social Islamic networks is a significant feature. The possibility of approaching some religious networks in areas that central governments have neglected and that are short on resources may result in avenues of support for NAR operations.
Similarly, factors of authority may be influential. For instance, the support of a Muslim Brotherhood or similar social Islamic groups might help persuade the target network to assist NAR operations. Given contemporary Middle Eastern conditions, however, one should not be overly optimistic in enlisting the support of Islamic religious networks. Techniques of reciprocity and consistency may provide a means of influence possibly through financial aid and post- conflict community initiatives. It is doubtful that the technique of liking will assist NAR efforts, largely due to differences in political values and social beliefs between Americans and the Islamist religious networks of the Middle East.
In sum, the exploitation of religious networks appears to be the least likely means of facilitating successful NAR operations. Nonetheless, a socio-political analysis of Islamic religion and its dynamics in the Middle East remains important in a region in which the United States is engaged both politically and militarily for the foreseeable future.
Influencing the Residential Network
Informal residential networks represent a mosaic of the three networks discussed above. As a result, identifying critical vulnerabilities for exploiting support in residential networks encompasses all of the criteria that the authors have already outlined. Individuals and groups targeted for collaboration and support in clientelist, occupational and religious networks will also have influence in their residential communities. Bringing the additional resources of a residential network to bear may provide expanded NAR capabilities.
US forces can also exploit residential areas by using individuals who possess strong community ties. For instance, in many urban areas, civil servants with control of urban information, utilities and infrastructure might be of great value in assisting NAR operations. Authority and social proof can again be employed as effective methods of persuasion. On the other hand, since neighbouring communities are often social rivals, cultivating authority may be of more value.
Such an approach does, however, imply that NAR operatives have already infiltrated and exploited a clientelist network. Reciprocity and consistency are also vital features in winning the support of residential networks. The incentives discussed earlier—money, post-conflict support, asylum, and community-specific enticements—may all be effective in garnering support for recovery operations. The United States must ensure that such incentives are consistent with the character and needs of those in the network. Liking can reinforce these techniques within communities that reflect a desire to live by Western standards, but this technique is, by itself, unlikely to be sufficient in winning collaboration.
The exploitation of informal residential networks can serve as a force multiplier for NAR operations, especially when combined with the resources of one or more of the other networks. The residential informal network is reliable in that it cuts across social, religious and cultural boundaries, and has great potential in providing supporters. However, those concerned with NAR operations need to realise that the residential network is limited in terms of the autonomous support that it can provide. Finally, residential areas have geographical limitations, while their frequent social rivalries with other communities act to restrict the amount of resources they can provide to NAR operations.
Informal Networks in Personnel Recovery Operations
Since World War II, the United States has become reliant primarily on conventional means for personnel recovery. In South Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s and in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s, US forces primarily used conventional search-and-rescue methods to recover personnel. There was no existing infrastructure for nonconventional recovery of service personnel. This situation evolved over a period of three decades and was based on the prevalence of a short-term mentality for the conduct of combat operations. The emphasis on conventional search-and-rescue techniques have been further reinforced by an inherent mistrust on the part of American authorities of surrogate personnel in areas of operation. It appears that the current operational tempo has at last forced military planners to give serious reconsideration to the existing conventional paradigm. Observations of informal network support for NAR operations in World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom are also useful in illustrating the unconventional character of recovery operations.
World War II and Informal Network Exploitation
The case of the evasion networks used in Occupied France during World War II provides a good example of the unconventional exploitation of informal networks. While the French case is not transferable to conditions in the Middle East, it does provide insights into the use of informal networks. Establishing and financing escape lines in Occupied France was a daunting task for Allied sympathisers and members of the French Resistance. Nonetheless, informal occupational networks did assist in the escape of large numbers of Allied military personnel.
One member of a French occupational network was the entrepreneur, Louis Nouveau, who was recruited by Ian Garrow, a member of the British 51st Highland Division, who developed one of the earliest escape lines in France after 1940. Significantly, Noveau was a commodity trader with a large number of social contacts, and he took advantage of them to help Garrow in his escape work. 18 Nouveau did not support Allied escape operations for monetary reasons, but because of his sentiments as a French patriot. Patriotism may not represent a tangible incentive; nonetheless, from the Allied perspective, it was an exploitable incentive.
French informal residential networks proved critical for successful recovery of Allied personnel. In most cases, Allied personnel seeking to evade German capture were protected by local families in their homes or farms. The local people took enormous risks in providing shelter for Allied pilots and agents since German soldiers routinely searched residences and provided rewards for the capture of Allied military personnel. Security concerns forced the French resistance to move airmen from house to house in villages and towns. Moreover, in their search for Allied military personnel, the Germans sometimes resorted to taking French hostages. As one downed pilot, Paul O’Connell, recalled, ‘I feared that the spouses and the relatives of the hostages might turn us in, if they knew anything, to obtain the release of their loved ones’. 19 Yet, in this case and in many others, local French communities refused to betray the whereabouts of Allied personnel to the German authorities.
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Informal Network Exploitation: The Case of Private Jessica Lynch
While NAR operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom remain extremely sensitive and have not yet been published, the rescue of US Army Private, Jessica Lynch, illustrates the potential benefits of employing an informal occupational network to support personnel recovery operations. Although open-source information on the Lynch case remains controversial and divergent, what is available suggests that support from an informal Iraqi occupational network was instrumental in Lynch’s successful recovery.
Private Lynch was attached to the 507th Maintenance Company, under the operational control of V Corps. Tactical control was invested in the 3rd Fire Support Battalion operating with the 5th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery (Patriot). On 23 March 2003, during the rapid advance on Baghdad, Lynch’s group became isolated from its convoy. After coming under heavy attack in the city of An-Nasiriyah, seven members of the company were captured, including the seriously injured Lynch. The other six prisoners were moved from the hospital where they were treated, but Lynch remained in place because of the seriousness of her wounds.20
While only one Iraqi individual was regarded as actively collaborating with US forces, other Iraqi professionals were also involved. The main US source concerning Lynch’s whereabouts was an Iraqi lawyer named Mohammed al-Rehaief. The latter informed elements of the US Marine Corps of Lynch’s location and status; he then returned to the hospital where she was being held in order to obtain more actionable intelligence. Al-Rehaief knew the hospital staff well since his wife worked there as a nurse. Indeed, members of the hospital staff are reported to have attempted to drive Lynch to the safety of friendly forces themselves before being forced to return due to the hostility that they encountered at Iraqi and US checkpoints.21 Later, in a Congressional resolution, al-Rehaief was lauded for his ‘compassion, bravery and humanity’ in assisting in Lynch’s rescue. Despite the obvious bravery of this individual, it is significant that he specifically requested asylum for himself and his family. 22
While the Lynch case may not be a true representation of NAR, it does serve to highlight the presence of informal occupational networks among Middle Eastern professionals. Moreover, the Lynch case suggests the value of attempting to establish long-term ties with individuals in such networks throughout the Middle East.
Because of their amenability to tangible incentives, the informal occupational networks appear to offer opportunities for the United States to develop useful links in NAR operations.
Conclusion
The increase in low-intensity conflicts and military operations other than war in urban areas throughout the Middle East and American military involvement in the region has created a need to re-evaluate the principles and techniques of NAR operations. The authors of this article have argued that the utilisation of informal networks is an important factor in the successful conduct of personnel recovery operations. Understanding the structures, motivations and communications of various informal networks is crucial to proper utilisation of such networks. For NAR planners and operators, such an understanding must encompass the informal networks of both potential adversaries and their own organisations.
Because Third World adversaries are most likely to apply asymmetric approaches to warfare, the exploitation of informal networks is likely to offer US forces the best opportunities for NAR. The Middle East is now an area in which the United States has a high level of military involvement. Consequently, understanding the clientelist, occupational, religious and residential relationships in urban Arab populations and knowledge about the character of the regimes in the region may prove to be critical in future military operations. In current Middle Eastern conditions, clientelist and occupational networks offer the greatest opportunity for establishing extensive recovery mechanisms. However, residential networks are capable of offering more reliability and security, albeit in a limited geographic area. Due to their lack of theological understanding and the inadequacy of incentive provisions currently available, US forces should, in general, avoid the exploitation of religious networks.
Fostering efficient and positive informal networks within organisations and between agencies responsible for NAR is also important in achieving success. The sharing of interpersonal skills and knowledge is essential in order to cut across organisational boundaries in hierarchical bureaucracies. Without this ability, time-sensitive actionable intelligence may be lost. By maintaining strong and positive connectivity among domestic networks, military planners will be able to consolidate multiple resources effectively towards one overarching mission—recovering isolated personnel.
It is important for senior leaders to recognise and support the existence of informal networks both outside and inside their organisations. If the United States wishes to improve the chances of recovering isolated personnel lost during operations, developing trust in surrogate forces will be essential. Increasingly, an unconventional paradigm for personnel recovery operations is required—one that is transformational, rather than transitional, in character. Planning, coordinating and employing operations around informal networks will require judicious study and intellectual effort on the part of NAR implementers. Without such a concerted effort, US forces risk failing in one of their most important military priorities.
Endnotes
1 S. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, p. xi.
2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery’ (Revision, 1st draft), Joint Publication 3-50, Washington, DC, 30 May 2003.
3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Forces Personnel Recovery, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.231, Washington, DC, 30 April 2003; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ‘Subject: Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense’, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) Number 2310.6, Washington, DC, 13 October 2000; and Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, ‘Subject: Military Operations: Personnel Recovery’, USSOCOM Directive Number 525-21, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 21 April 2003.
4 FM 3-05.231, Special Forces Personnel Recovery, p. G 21.
5 Ibid.
6 M. McCrann, ‘Unconventional Assisted Recovery: Providing the Doctrinal Framework’, Special Warfare, Spring 1999, vol. 12, p. 10.
7 G. Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1993, p. 16.
8 Ibid., p. 24
9 C. van Nieuwenhuijze, The Sociology of the Middle East, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1971, p. 454; and A. Saqqaf (ed.), The Middle East City: Ancient Traditions Confront a Modern World, Paragon House, New York, 1987, p. xx.
10 This argument is outlined in P. Stompzka, Trust: A Sociological Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
11 Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East, p. 36.
12 Ibid., p. 109.
13 Ibid., p. 136.
14 A. Bayat, ‘Activism and Social Development in the Middle East’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2002, vol. 34, pp. 1–28.
15 Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East, p. 46.
16 See R. Cialdini, Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion, William Morrow and Company Inc., New York, 1993.
17 Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East, p. 140.
18 S. Ottis, Silent Heroes, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2001, p. 80.
19 A. Rougeyron, Agents for Escape, trans. M. A. McConnell, Louisana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA, 1996, p. 25.
20 Department of the Army, ‘Subject: Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company’, Executive Summary Report, 19 October 2003, Washington, DC, viewed 22 February 2004, <http://www.slite.afis.osd.mil/stripes/Oct2003/20031019.pdf>.
21 J. Raby, ‘Iraqi Faked Heart Attack to Help’, Stars and Stripes, 19 October 2003, viewed 22 February 2004, <http://www.slite.afis.osd.mil/stripes/Oct2003/20031019.pdf>; and H. Dellios and E. Torriero, ‘A Tamer Tale of Lynch’s Rescue’, Philadelphia Enquirer, 29 May 2003.
22 A. Harmony, ‘Cunningham co-sponsors resolution honoring Iraqi who helped rescue PFC Lynch’, 11 April 2003, Press Release, viewed 20 November 2003, <http://www.house.gov/Cunningham/Press_Releases>; and Raby, ‘Iraqi Faked Heart Attack to Help’, Stars and Stripes, 19 October 2003.
