In conventional terms, the task of Australia’s defence and national security apparatus is to protect national territory against any form of direct military attack. This task is usually taken to mean repelling an armed invasion of the continent although, in recent years, the possibility of a terrorist attack on Australia has become a factor in the public mind. In reality, Australia has never had to fear seriously the prospect of invasion. Even in 1942, the Japanese hesitated to invade Australia; today, only the United States has the military ability to invade and occupy this country. In the case of terrorism, defence remains primarily a task for the intelligence, police and emergency services.
Australia has fought in defence of interests, not territory. Many have suggested that Australia’s involvement in military operations over a century have been interventions in ‘other people’s wars’. Yet, Australia has always intervened in defence of what it perceives to be its national interests—a perfectly legitimate national enterprise. Because there is often almost no discussion of what Australia’s external interests might be, confusion reigns until such interests come under pressure from events.
Apart from the security of national territory—rarely, if ever, under threat even from localised raids—Australia’s history suggests the existence of two dominant and interrelated permanent interests: one political and the other economic. The permanent political interest is to support the maintenance of global or regional peace, almost always in conjunction with our allies. Indeed, a compelling case can be made to support the view that Australia has always gone to war in order to restore peace once it has broken down. Certainly this was the case for Australia in 1914 (World War I), 1939 (World War II), 1950 (Korea), 1962 (Vietnam) and 1990 (the Persian Gulf), as well as in the many commitments made since 1945 to United Nations peacekeeping operations.
The permanent economic interest is that Australia is a country heavily dependent on overseas trade, and any disturbance of that trade may risk damaging Australian prosperity. The economic interest is, of course, virtually inseparable from the political interest of contributing to international stability, without which trade will be disturbed. Yet, despite these realities, the popular and intellectual mood of Australia has often been one of persistent isolationism—until, of course, a crisis develops. To a large extent, Australian isolationism stems from a belief that the country is small and insignificant, and is located a long way from the important centres of the world. While that perception may have once been real, it is no longer credible today.
With a population of approximately 20 million people, Australia ranks demographically 52nd of 236 countries and dependent territories. More importantly, the country ranks 16th in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). If one excludes seven countries or territories that make revenue as international tax havens, Australia ranks 11th in per capita GDP in the world. 1 Moreover, Australia is a significant trading nation, ranking 26th in the world for exports and 21st for imports. 2 These rankings are based on monetary values, but if reckoned by tonnage, Australia, as a trading nation, ranks 17th in the world. If rated on tonnes and kilometres, Australia’s status rises to seventh internationally. In Australia’s case, a large proportion of exports are of minerals and agricultural products with low added value, while the distance from principal export markets accounts for the much higher ranking on the basis of tonnes per kilometre.
Australia’s total exports in 2002 amounted to just over $120 billion free on board (f.o.b.) while imports cost some $129 billion f.o.b.,3 accounting for some 31 per cent of GDP. Trade in services added a further $64 billion, meaning that Australia’s total trade amounted to just on 40 per cent of GDP. It should be noted that the above figures do not account for the unquantified contribution to GDP made by trade-dependent industries. Clearly, Australia’s prosperity—as indicated by such measures as employment rates, per capita GDP and government revenues—is heavily dependent on overseas trade, the security of which represents an overwhelming strategic interest.
Australia’s overseas trade is carried overwhelmingly by sea. Exports account for more than 500 million tonnes of cargo annually, with a further 58 million tonnes imported. 4 Another 600 tonnes are carried by air, but air transport accounts for more than nine million tourists inward and outward bound. The average sea journey exceeds 9000 km, with the total seaborne trade task exceeding 5000 billion tonnes per kilometre. In 2001–02, there were 8816 ship voyages into and out of Australia. This figure represents a reduction on previous years, due in part to the introduction of larger ships. More than 3000 ships are engaged in trade with Australia in any given year. Coastal shipping carries a further 52 000 tonnes, mostly bulk cargoes of significant value to industrial processes, such as oil refining and distribution as well as steel making.
In strategic terms, Australian trade represents a national interest subject to a degree of vulnerability, at least in politico-economic terms. Even limited attacks on merchant ships trading with Australia could generate economic uncertainty, upward pressure on insurance rates and demands for maritime protection. During the Cold War, serious concerns were expressed by some of our trading partners, most notably Japan, at the vulnerability of their import trade in energy and minerals. Some 20 per cent of Japan’s imports originated in Australia. 5 Forgetting that Japan was defeated in 1945 mainly by the interdiction of its overseas supplies, some Australian strategic thinkers suggested that this issue was unimportant but, as with the tango dance, it takes two to trade. In short, Japan’s vulnerability was Australia’s too.
With the end of the Cold War, the strategic threat to maritime trade has diminished. The United States is the only military superpower in the world, and lesser powers are unable to inflict serious damage to the flow of world trade. Most threats exist on the political and financial rather than strategic levels simply because they impact on business and economic confidence. The most obvious contemporary threats to trade are sub-national rather than national, and emanate from piracy and terrorism. Unlike states, non-state pirates and terrorists have no fixed interests to protect, and their tactics can be more flexible and ruthless.
Given the current volume of global seaborne trade, the impact of piracy remains limited. Most international piracy is the work of entrepreneurs seeking little more than cash and valuables. In recent years, however, there has been the emergence of organised crime syndicates that not only seek to hijack cargoes, even bulk cargoes, but the ship itself, which is then given a new identity to seek further cargoes. Various incidents of piracy, especially in Chinese waters, have been identified as being the activities of renegade security force units.6
For Australia, piracy has, so far, been of limited impact. The country has one of the smallest merchant fleets in the world and Australian-flag ships are rarely at risk. Nevertheless, their cargoes represent Australian wealth, and their loss would have an adverse impact on insurance rates, coupled with a perceived need to provide additional security, either by naval units or private security forces for escort duties through high-risk sea lanes.
Unlike piracy, terrorism—especially extremist Islamist terrorism—is a far more significant problem. Over the past decade, terrorists have demonstrated a significant ability to attack ships and aircraft with no regard for the lives of either the terrorists or passengers. Indeed, the aim of many 21st-century terrorist operations is to kill as many people as possible in the most dramatic way. Aircraft have been common targets, but ships—commercial and naval—have also been attacked. Australian security authorities are understandably concerned at the potential for the use of ships to be attacked at sea or in harbour, or to be used to import weapons of mass destruction into a major port. This threat has assumed more salience since Australia was singled out as a primary target by the al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah networks. Given that Jemaah Islamiyah is an indigenous Indonesian network and that much of Australia’s seaborne trade—especially the highly vulnerable natural gas tankers—passes through poorly policed Indonesian waters, the possibility of a dramatic incident certainly exists.
Tourism and education represent the fastest-growing elements of Australia’s trade in services. In 2002, Australia received almost 4.5 million tourists from overseas and welcomed 162 000 overseas students.7 Spending by international visitors accounted for 11.2 per cent of total exports, while student expenditure was responsible for an estimated $4 billion of export income. 8 The impact of terrorist attacks and outbreaks of disease such as sudden acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) demonstrates that tourism and foreign students represent a highly elastic element of Australia’s overseas trade. Although the economic impact of disruption might be small, the political effect is much greater, albeit temporary and probably exaggerated in a truly strategic sense. In the political sense, however, perceptions are often more important than reality. While terrorism can be seen as a relatively trivial weapon to use against a sophisticated nation, its political impact is considerable. Both the United States after 11 September 2001 and Australia after the 2002 Bali bombing demonstrated a high degree of community resilience and resistance to terrorism. While there was a dreadful cost in lives in both incidents, and in the impact and cost of additional security measures, the long-term economic and social effects were negligible. The most serious risk today lies in the potential of Islamic terrorist groups gaining access to, and then using, weapons of mass destruction. No-one can be sanguine about the possibility of such a scenario but the use of such weapons is likely to be totally counterproductive to the terrorist cause, especially among moderate Muslims.
In the wider strategic sense, the activities of failed or rogue states remain the main challenge to Australian prosperity and security, and that of what might be termed the community of respectable nations. In the Asia-Pacific region, failed or potential failed states such as the Solomons and Papua New Guinea demand an engagement by Australia that may be expensive both in time and cost. Failed or rogue states threaten the peace on which economic prosperity through trade depends. This is a subject of importance that demands a sophisticated analysis and debate within Australian public-policy circles—a process that has, so far, been lacking.
Endnotes
1 This and related data is derived from the CIA World Factbook 2003, viewed 25 May 2004, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.
2 Ibid.
3 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade and Economic Statistics, viewed 25 May 2004, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/economics_trade_card.htm…;.
4 Transport data is derived from the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, Australian Transport Statistics—2002, viewed 25 May 2004, <http://www.btre.gov.au/docs/trnstats02/trnstats.htm#Top>.
5 See Manabu Yoshida, Resources, Maritime Transport and SLOC Security—A Japanese Perspective, in Malcolm J. Kennedy and Michael J. O’Connor (eds), Safely by Sea, University Press of America, Lanham, VA, 1990.
6 For a somewhat chilling personal description, see Captain Ken Blyth with Peter Corris, Petro Pirates—The hijacking of the Petro Ranger, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.
7 See Bureau of Tourism Research, Tourism Snapshot—International, viewed 25 May 2004, <http://www.btr.gov.au/service/datacard/international.pdf>; and Department of Immigration, Overseas Students in Australia, viewed 25 May 2004, <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/50students.htm>.
8 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade and Economic Statistics, viewed 25 May 2004, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/economics_trade_card.htm…;.
