On 11 September 2001, the world’s perception of warfare changed. The al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks on the United States were not launched against an individual country as much as a particular system of values and beliefs. Recognising this reality, countries around the world, including Australia, joined a coalition in order to fight a ‘War against Terror’. The attacks of 11 September were an example of an asymmetric warfare strategy that integrated three types of political violence: terror, suicide and mass destruction.1 Typically, asymmetric tactics are unconventional tactics employed by non-state groups (based on ideological, religious, ethic or illegal activities) to counter states with conventional military strengths. An asymmetric threat may manifest itself as international civil disobedience, criminality, terrorism, cyber warfare, low-level military action and in the future may include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon, but its use by al-Qa’ida on 11 September clearly demonstrated the increasing global reach of non-state groups.2
This article reviews the tension that has developed between regionalist and globalist schools of thought in Australian defence strategy since 2000. Regionalists, such as Paul Dibb, believe that the fundamentals of Australian defence policy are sound and require only marginal changes. 3 Globalists, such as Alan Dupont, tend to believe that Australia’s defence strategy, as articulated in Defence 2000, has major failings due to a significant mismatch between strategy, force structure and the ability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to meet emerging asymmetrical threats. 4 The globalist critique is that Australia’s forces are currently too focused on an unlikely conventional threat to mainland Australia from the region and are not properly structured to deal with a new era of multiple threats that reflect global uncertainty. The main focus of the article is a comparative analysis between the contending regional and global approaches to the defence of Australia. From such a comparative analysis, it is possible to draw conclusions about the usefulness of Australia’s current defence posture in the new century.
The Evolution of 'Defence of Australia' Strategy
Following the publication of the 1976 Defence White Paper, Australia developed a continental defence strategy based on ‘defence of Australia’. This strategy of defending the Australian mainland reversed a ‘forward defence’ policy from the 1950s and 1960s. ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine originally focused on continental geography, although more recently supporters of the policy have referred to themselves as ‘regionalists’. A common feature of the doctrine, however, is its heavy reliance on conventional military forces. 5
Critics of the regionalist approach, such as Alan Dupont, argue that current defence strategy ignores the increasing diversity and globalisation of threats, the declining relevance of geography in strategy, and the increasing importance of non-military and non-state actors in global security.6 For Dupont, the ADF is not properly structured for the type of deployments to which it has been committed since 1999. Too much of the defence budget is committed to technologically advanced but expensive ships and aircraft that the ADF rarely uses. Dupont believes that the ADF needs more ‘niche capabilities’ alongside additional land forces that are equipped for a wide range of contingencies across the threat spectrum. Such forces must be capable of being deployed rapidly with adequate protection, sustainment, and command and control’. 7 The ADF must also be able to meet transnational threats such as people smuggling, money laundering and drug trafficking. In addition, not only must the ADF be capable of winning wars, but it must have the capacity to secure peace. 8
Defence commentators such as Paul Dibb, who are associated with the status quo, have responded by labelling Dupont’s approach as ‘expeditionary’. 9 The use of this term is unfortunate because it suggests the deployment of large, self-reliant forces more in line with the post–Cold War British approach to defence than that of Australia. 10 The approach that Dupont outlined is one in which Australia requires important niche capabilities to defend its interests when participating in international coalitions. It is an approach that is more ‘global’ than ‘expeditionary’ in character. 11
Dibb believes that the fundamental question for Australia is how to prepare for immediate asymmetric and low-level contingences without risking conventional defence preparation. He argues that the regional security threats that underlie traditional defence of Australia strategic thinking have not changed and that preparing for potentially short-term transitory threats may risk long-term national security. 12 For Dibb, the primacy of a geographical defence of Australia is based on such factors as popular support for the policy, the instability of the Asia-Pacific region, the deterrent effect of the ADF and the clarity that the policy provides for force structure priorities within a limited budget. Supporters of the regionalist approach argue that the most effective way to contribute to global security is to be able to deal with security in Australia’s own region. 13
Since 1999, the ADF has experienced the highest level of operational tempo since the Vietnam War. Since 2001, operations have included the commitment to the international coalition against terrorism, an ongoing deployment to East Timor, border protection duties in Australian waters, and a nation-building mission in the Solomon Islands. 14 Defence personnel are deployed both regionally and globally, with Australia employing both niche capabilities, notably Special Forces, and technologically advanced assets such as ships and aircraft.
The crux of the regionalist versus globalist debate is whether a force structure narrowly designed to meet conventional threats can continue to give an Australian government the options that it requires in order to meet the rise of transnational threats in the post–11 September environment. Australian military personnel have performed admirably in all the situations required of them to date, but the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Hill, has posed the question: ‘Are we offering the full support that they [ADF personnel] really need and deserve?’ 15
Defence 2000 and the 2003 Defence Update: Implications for Change
Defence 2000 provides a blueprint for the ADF’s future force structure and options, with the main priority being ‘to maintain the capacity to defend Australian territory from any credible attack without relying on help from the combat forces of any other country’. 16 Other responsibilities of the ADF include fostering the security of the immediate neighbourhood, promoting stability and cooperation in South-East Asia, supporting the maintenance of strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region and providing support to global security. Defence 2000 was clearly based on the proposition that a balanced conventional force was the most appropriate approach to meet this range of contingencies and diverse threats. 17
Defence 2000 was, however, overtaken by events. Following 11 September 2001, the ‘War on Terror’, the terrorist attack on Australians in Bali in 2002 and increased concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Government released Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003. 18 In this document, issued in February 2003, the Government acknowledged that, while the strategic circumstances facing Australia have rapidly changed, the principles set out in Defence 2000 remain sound. As a result, Australia’s National Security does not suggest any fundamental change to the priorities of defence policy nor does it propose significant changes to the size and role of the ADF. Instead, it recommends some reassessment of areas of the defence capability program and of expenditure. The document states that the Government will fast-track the timetable for various capabilities already identified in Defence 2000, such as intelligence and troop lift helicopters alongside improvements in special forces and interoperability for coalition operations.
In many respects, the 2003 Defence Update adopted a middle road. The document acknowledges the importance of the defence of continental Australia to long-term national security, but also attempts to deal with the reality of a changing threat environment. It is significant that the document appears to suggest that global security issues will play a more important role in shaping ADF force structure. Nonetheless, Australia’s National Security does not deal with the most difficult issue facing Australian defence planners: what long-term capabilities may need to be stalled or even abandoned if there is to be a greater emphasis on global rather than national or regional threats. In an interview at the launch of the Defence Update, Senator Robert Hill indicated the need for considerable additional debate on the future direction of defence policy. 19
In his book on the management of Australian defence preparedness, Alan Hinge argues that a consistent feature of Australian defence policy since the 1970s has been the tendency to favour technological modernisation of force structure over operational readiness.20 It is possible that Australia’s National Security signals a change in this practice. Over the past two years, in a series of interviews and talks, Senator Hill has suggested an increasing commitment to improving operational readiness for more ADF deployments that may be global in character.21 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ADF’s mission to stabilise the Solomon Islands demonstrate the importance for the Government to have recourse to a range of realistic military options.
At present there are probably two major strategic dilemmas that the Australian Government is facing. The first dilemma is finding the correct level of versatility required within the ADF’s force structure in order to ensure operational preparedness and still be able to plan to meet long-term defence requirements. 22 Hinge describes this dilemma as being a ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ problem. Strategists have to decide between a ‘hot’ optimisation of forces for short-warning conflict and nonconventional conflict, or a ‘cold’ concentration on equipping Australian forces in order to meet medium- or high-level conventional threats that may arise in the future. It is a dilemma that lies at the core of the regionalism versus globalism debate in defence policy. A major criticism that Woodman has made of Defence 2000 is that it contented itself with identifying a range of emergent transnational threats but failed to provide sufficient options on how to counter these threats other than through the development of a balanced conventional force.23
While the 2003 Defence Update has provided some of the detail that was missing in Defence 2000, a mismatch still exists between assessed risks and stated priorities. For example, both documents state that a geographical defence of the continent remains the primary force-structure determinant for the ADF despite the low risk of a conventional military attack being launched against Australia. Moreover, the types of tasks required to deal with asymmetric threats are described as occasional tasks that might intrude on the core need to prepare a conventional defence of Australian territory. 24
At the same time, however, Australia’s National Security recognises that the threat from terrorism is not transitory but is probably permanent.25 As a result, the ADF is developing significant capabilities to deal with a range of nonconventional threats even though in theory these are not described as the core task facing the ADF. In the light of these inherent contradictions in Australian strategic doctrine, and the fact that global security issues appear to be influencing force structure decisions, there is a need for a significant review of strategic direction in the near future.
Hinge’s study of preparedness goes on to describe a second dilemma facing Australian strategic practice: that of the ‘consume’ or ‘invest’ resource allocation problem. Consumption of resources in meeting present operations reduces the amount of finance and skills that can be invested in long-term capability development. 26 One of Defence 2000’s strengths was the document’s clear commitment to significant long-term funding and to systematic review of capability development. 27 The unexpected tempo of operations and their increased expenditure requirements mean that the Department of Defence is facing serious budgetary challenges. Indeed, Senator Hill has indicated that some long-term capabilities might need to be either delayed or even abandoned in the future. 28
Conclusion
Australia faces a changing global threat environment. This reality is reflected in the tension that has arisen between a traditional geographical and regionalist approach to defence policy and that of a wider transformational and global approach to strategy. At the core of the debate is the issue of whether a force structure designed to meet traditional conventional threats in our regional environment can continue to give the Australian Government the flexible options that the latter requires in order to meet the growing transnational threats of the post–11 September environment.
Defence 2000 was intended to provide a blueprint for force structure into the 21st century in a way that attempted to address both conventional and asymmetric threats. However, the aim of the document is to develop capabilities over a decade. Unfortunately, operational requirements have necessitated a re-evaluation of Australia’s defence capabilities, and this reality is reflected in the 2003 Defence Update. The latter publication suggests that, in the future, the Government may fast-track the timetable for a variety of military capabilities in order to try to strike a balanced position between contending regional and global defence demands. It is likely, however, that in the long term the strategic dilemmas that have emerged to face Australian planners since 2000 will only be comprehensively resolved by the development of a new Defence White Paper.
Endnotes
1 J. Kurth, ‘The War and the West’, Foreign Policy Research Institute Newsletter, 2002, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 1.
2 See D. Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’, National Strategy Forum Review, Winter 2000, p. 2; and A. Stone, ‘Future Imperfect’, RUSI Journal, 1999, vol. 144, no. 3, p. 1.
3 See Paul Dibb, ‘Tinker with defence policy and risk attack’, Australian, 30 October 2001; ‘Does Asia Matter to Australia’s Defence Policy?’, Public Lecture, National Institute for Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, 23 October 2002, at <http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~niap/Dibbspeech.pdf>; and ‘Does Australia need a New Defence Policy?’, The Blake Dawson Waldron Lecture, National Museum of Australia, 22 July 2003, at <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/viewpoint/paper_030811.pdf>.
4 Alan Dupont, ‘Transformation or Stagnation?: Rethinking Australia’s Defence’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, April 2003, vol. 57, no. 1, p. 3.
5 See Dibb, ‘Does Asia Matter to Australia’s Defence Policy?’ and ‘Does Australia Need a New Defence Policy?’, passim.
6 Dupont, ‘Transformation or Stagnation?: Rethinking Australia’s Defence’, pp. 3–5.
7 Ibid., p. 10.
8 Alan Dupont, ‘Modern wars can’t be based on obsolete battle plans’, Australian, 14 November 2002.
9 Dibb, ‘Does Asia Matter to Australia’s Defence Policy?’, p. 6.
10 See United Kingdom Department of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1998.
11 Dupont, ‘Modern wars can’t be based on obsolete battle plans’, Australian, 14 November 2002.
12 Dibb, ‘Does Australia Need a New Defence Policy?’, pp. 16–18.
13 Dibb, ‘Does Asia Matter to Australia’s Defence Policy?, p. 5.
14 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, Commonwealth Government of Australia, Canberra, 2003, pp. 26–7.
15 T. Thomas, ‘Defence Policy “on the run”‘, Australian Defence Business Review, 2002, vol. 21, no. 15–16, p. 17.
16 Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth Government of Australia, Canberra, 2000, pp. 46–53.
17 Stewart Woodman, ‘Not quite the full Monty?: Analysing Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, April 2001, vol. 55, no. 1, p. 30.
18 Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, pp. 5–6.
19 The Hon. Senator Robert Hill, Speech at the Launch of the Defence Update, Canberra, 2003. Interview transcript, 26 February, 2003, pp. 1–2.
20 Alan Hinge, Australian Defence Preparedness, University of New South Wales, Sydney 2000, p. 128.
21 Senator Robert Hill, ‘Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions for Defence’, address to the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australian Defence College, Canberra, 18 June 2002, pp. 1–3; 4–6; Australia’s National Security, pp. 8–17; and Thomas, ‘Defence Policy “on the run”, pp. 16–17.
22 Hinge, Australian Defence Preparedness, p. 10.
23 Woodman, ‘Not Quite the Full Monty?: Analysing Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper’, p. 30.
24 Defence 2000, pp. 52–3.
25 Australia’s National Security, pp. 11–12.
26 Hinge, Australian Defence Preparedness, p. 130.
27 Woodman, ‘Not Quite the Full Monty?: Analysing Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper’, p. 29.
28 The Hon. Senator Robert Hill, Speech at the Launch of the Defence Update, Canberra, 2003. Interview transcript, 26 February 2003, pp. 1–2.
