* This article is based on an essay that won third prize in the Chief of Army’s Essay Competition for 2003.
Defence self-reliance has been defined as indicating ‘a national will to depend as little as possible on external decisions and resources’. 1 In an Australian context, the idea of self-reliance was first formally introduced into defence policy in the 1976 White Paper and was reaffirmed by the 1987, 1994 and 2000 Defence White Papers as a main feature of official strategic thinking. Yet, while Australia has adopted self-reliance, the latter is a posture that can only operate effectively within an alliance framework. The Defence Department outlined this rationale in the 1987 White Paper, which stated that Australia’s concept of self-reliance must be ‘set firmly within the framework of our alliances and regional associations’.2
The basic premise of Australia’s approach to defence self-reliance since 1976 is that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must be capable of defending Australian territory from direct attack without relying on assistance from other countries.
However, Australia’s commitment to self-reliance in all aspects of defence strategy has never been absolute. For example, Defence 2000 states that Australia would not hesitate to seek help from her allies and would plan for a significant degree of support in non-combat areas including intelligence, surveillance, resupply and logistics. 3
Moreover, should Australia be attacked by a conventional enemy, substantial American military support would be essential. In this respect, self-reliance is underwritten by American power, with the latter acting as both a deterrent and as a force multiplier for the ADF. In other words, there is a strong reciprocal relationship between the doctrine of self-reliance and the sheet anchor of the Australian-American alliance. Australia must be able to mount a credible self-defence since, as A. D. McLennan has noted, ‘the [ANZUS] treaty is an adjunct to the national defence effort, not a substitute’.4 Because of the alliance, Australia requires a degree of self-reliance to prepare not simply its own defence, but also to support its US ally if necessary. The paradox between self-reliance and alliance dependence is that, without the US alliance, defence of Australia is likely to prove difficult. Yet, without a policy of self-reliance, the US commitment to the alliance might wane. Allies must be able to be effective partners.
Self-reliance and the alliance also perform in a reciprocal fashion within the Asia-Pacific region. The US alliance assists Australia in its quest for regional security in the Asia-Pacific and Australia’s ties with the United States promote Canberra’s regional role. In many respects, the Australian-American alliance reinforces US strategic engagement in the region. The alliance is a platform that allows Australia to play a meaningful, intercessionary role between East Asian states and the United States. As William Tow has noted, ‘the alliance ... provides Australia with a much greater strategic standing by affiliation than it would otherwise have’.5 Similarly, in the South Pacific, it has been pointed out that ‘the continued firm commitment of the US to come to the assistance of Australian forces when required, gives (Pacific) Islanders, in a sense, the best of two worlds: the security of an alliance and the independence of nonalignment’.6
In technological terms, the reciprocal relationship between self-reliance and the US alliance has allowed Australia to develop RMA-style technologies that reinforce a degree of self-reliance in areas such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Because of the US alliance, Australia has access to the latest military technology, which it could not possibly develop on its own, and receives preferred status in the procurement of military equipment. Further agreements enable the supply of munitions and equipment in a crisis, thus decreasing the need for large-scale stockpiling. The important logistic support that the United States provides has allowed Australia to invest in key areas such as platforms, technology, personnel and training. The Australian-American alliance underwrites self-reliance by permitting access to cutting-edge technology and contributes to interoperability.
A defence policy that is based on a mixture of self-reliance and alliance dependency provides Australia with a range of unique opportunities. The price of this approach, however, is a political one and resides in a constant need to balance an independent national policy against vital alliance interests. Skilful policy-making should always be aimed at maintaining a balance and should never become a simplistic choice between incomplete self-reliance on the one hand or complete dependence on an alliance on the other.
Endnotes
1 G. J. Pauker, S. Canby, A. R. Johnson and W. B. Quandt, In Search of Self-Reliance: US Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon Doctrine, Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1973, p. 3.
2 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia—Defence White Paper 1987, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987, p. vii.
3 Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, p. 47.
4 A. D. McLennan, ‘Australia’s Security Dilemma’, Policy, vol. 18, no. 3, Spring 2002, p. 22.
5 W. T. Tow, ‘The Future of Alliances: AUSMIN as a Case Study’, paper presented at ‘Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015 Conference’, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 21–23 September 1998.
6 Cited in F. A. Mediansky (ed.), Strategic Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Islands, Centre for South Pacific Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 1995, p. 310.
