The appointment of Land Commander, Australia, carries with it responsibility for the command of over 25 000 troops and a requirement to deliver ground forces in sufficient time and in proper order for both national and international operations as directed by the Australian Government. Furthermore, the Australian Land Commander may be directed to take responsibility for managing military forces on behalf of the country’s senior operational-level commander, Commander, Australian Theatre. On many occasions over the past three decades, the Australian Army has been required to provide land forces for overseas deployment or deployment within Australian territory at very short notice.
For example, in 1987, following the military coup in Fiji, a company of troops, along with their equipment, was required to be on board a Royal Australian Navy ship and ready for deployment to the South Pacific in less than forty-eight hours. Again, in 1993, the Australian Army received barely four weeks’ notice to prepare and deploy a 1000-strong infantry force for a mission to Somalia. More recently, in January 2004, the Army received less than forty-eight hours to deploy a small medical team to the South Pacific island of Nuie following a damaging tropical storm. In these seventeen years between providing a warfighting force for potential use in Fiji in 1987 and the provision of medical support to Nuie in 2004, the Army has undertaken multiple missions. These missions include peace support operations in Namibia, Somalia, Cambodia, Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This article deals with four challenges of being Land Commander. First, it examines the character of current military operations. Second, the importance of the joint environment in command and control is analysed. Third, the need to provide land force capabilities for rapid effect and overmatch is emphasised. Finally, the article highlights the vital need for well-trained junior leaders who can operate in the complex conditions of today’s military operations.
The Character of Current Military Operations
In February 2004, the Australian Army had approximately 1500 soldiers deployed on military operations both at home and overseas. While this number is less than that in the years between the deployments to East Timor in 1999 and Iraq in 2003, it remains a sizeable force to maintain and sustain in the field. Currently, the Army has a ‘three for one’ sustainment model—that is, one contingent preparing to deploy, one contingent deployed and another contingent reconstituting from deployment. Viewed from the perspective of the sustainment model, the number of soldiers involved in the three stages of deployment is not 1500 but closer to 5000.
The Geographical Spread of Army Deployments
Current land force deployments involve diverse locations and types of operations, ranging from the Middle East through Africa to East Timor and Afghanistan. In Iraq the bulk of the Australian land force commitment is associated with the provision of security for Australian Government’s diplomatic, trade and aid representatives who are involved in the Coalition effort to rehabilitate the country in the wake of the Hussein dictatorship’s demise. The Army also provides significant staff officer support to our own National Headquarters, the coalition Military Headquarters and the Coalition Provisional Authority. In addition, there are officers deployed in the Middle East with Headquarters Central Command and in Kuwait. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Army has observers deployed on several highly sensitive UN missions in Israel and Lebanon, and a group of multinational forces deployed in the Sinai supervising the truce between Israel and surrounding countries.
In Africa and Afghanistan, the Army has very small military contingents providing expert advice to United Nations (UN) and US coalition forces on the search for, and the destruction of, millions of land mines. In the Balkans, the Army contributes a small group of officers to the British peacekeeping force deployed in that region. Closer to home, in the Solomon Islands, there are several hundred soldiers deployed to provide security to the mission led by the Australian Federal Police. That mission aims to re-establish the rule of law and order in the Solomons. In East Timor, Australian forces continue to provide security in the Western region of the country as part of the UN mandate. Indeed Australia provides some 25 per cent of the peacekeeping force’s strength and will continue to do so until the end of the UN mandate later in 2004. In addition, under bilateral arrangements, the Army provides teams to assist in the training of the fledgling East Timorese Defence Force.
In the United States, the Australian Army has a small team of soldiers deployed at the request of the US Marines to assist them in training Marine battalions about to deploy for service in Iraq. The land force also maintains a rifle company at Butterworth in Malaysia as part of our ongoing commitment to the longstanding Five-Power Defence Agreement. The Army continues to make a contribution to the security of major events such as Commonwealth Games, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, the Olympics and the Rugby World Cup. Finally, the land force is involved in border protection and maintains counter-terrorism forces on both the east and west coasts of Australia.
The spread of these operations demonstrates that ground forces continue to be an essential component both of the military art and of policy. The rise of a spectrum of threats over the past decade—particularly the emergence of an increasing number of ‘non-state actors’, including terrorist networks and transnational criminal organisations—has reinforced the importance of armies internationally. In international security, soldiers are not a diminishing but an increasing asset. In the 1990s, it was fashionable in some strategic circles to suggest that ground forces could be replaced by technology, and that low demography and fear of casualties would constrain the use of armies by advanced nations. If anything, the reverse has occurred. There is now a realisation that platforms such as ships, submarines and military aircraft cannot create a deterrent presence on the ground. Air and naval platforms cannot find and fight hostile forces in complex terrain, nor can they confront emergent land-based asymmetric threats.
Land Forces and the Joint Environment
It is important to note that the Land Commander may also operate as the Land Component Commander, Joint Operations, and may act as the lead joint commander if required. This situation reflects the reality of the joint operational environment and the need to harness the capabilities of land, naval and air force elements. For example, in operations in East Timor in September 1999, maritime and air force elements were crucial to creating what might be called ‘best effect’ arrival in order to deter hostile action against Australian land forces. Maritime and air force elements were the mainstays of force sustainment after land forces arrived and helped to create a secure environment in East Timor.
The defence of the inner arc around Australia, and the deployment and sustainment of Australian troops away from this country cannot be achieved by land forces alone. Operational success can only emerge from a refined and joint maritime strategy that carefully balances land, sea and air capabilities. Australia must always remember its military history and recall the high price it paid for sending unprotected and largely immobile forces into the northern archipelago during World War II. In Rabaul, Ambon and Timor in 1942, Australian garrisons were lost because they lacked proper equipment and did not have adequate sea and air support. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) must have the ability to operate in coalition with its allies on land, at sea and in the air across the northern approaches to Australia. The ability to project joint military force into those approaches, and beyond them if necessary, should be the key determinant of ADF force structure and of what may be described as generic force preparation.
Apart from joint command, the Land Commander may also have to act as a combined commander (commanding multinational troops) in a coalition involving other nations, possibly alongside non-government organisations. In this respect, it is useful to remember that General Peter Cosgrove was a joint and a combined commander in East Timor in 1999–2000. He commanded contingents from other nations as well as Australian force elements from all three services. In the past, Land Commanders have commanded combined forces, notably military contingents from New Zealand and South Pacific nations for peace operations in Bougainville in 1994, and again between 1998 until 2003. The current Solomon Islands operation is a combined operation supported, but not commanded, by the ADF.
Preparing Capabilities for 'Best Effect' and 'Overmatch'
A major demand for any Land Commander is that of developing effective military capabilities in terms of force preparation for deployment, command, protection, sustainment, redeployment and reconstitution. In preparing military capabilities, the Land Commander faces a trio of challenges. The first challenge is to ensure that generic force preparation is sufficient. The second challenge is to use what specific force preparation time is made available efficiently and effectively because warning time rarely equals preparation time. The third challenge is to ensure that there are sufficient force elements to meet the demands of rotation for longer-term force projections. Unlike the World Wars and the limited conflicts of the Cold War in Korea and Vietnam, there is no time in contemporary missions for Australian forces to train and to familiarise themselves with operational conditions while in theatre. Success in contemporary operations may not always involve traditional tests of military strength, but rather the use of force in ambiguous and complex conditions. Land forces have to achieve ‘best effect’ on arrival and then continue to be successful by possessing ‘overmatch’ capabilities until the mission is accomplished, in case they are challenged.
Generic and Specific Force Preparation and Force Rotation
The Australian land force must have a capacity for generic and specific force preparation as well as furnish a capability for force rotation. Generic force preparation helps to maintain a range of land force elements that can be deployed in the timeframes required by the Government. Unless land forces possess resources maintained at appropriate levels of generic preparedness, the ADF runs the risk of deploying under-trained and under-equipped force elements. Nonetheless, specific force preparation before deployment is also of vital importance. Since the Somali mission in 1993, the trend in force preparation has been for governments to give the defence force about four weeks before a military deployment. Accordingly, the Army has an array of land forces prepared and ready to move according to that span of notice. However, there are often specialised force elements that need more time for readiness, while some missions require specific force preparation due to perceived political or cultural sensitivities.
Troops may have to adapt to a wide range of roles and Rules of Engagement at short notice. They must also rehearse skills such as weapons handling, and application of firepower and manoeuvre, as well as the full range of tactical techniques and scenarios, particularly if hostilities are expected. In addition, it is wise to ‘wargame’ the headquarters staff in likely tactical, political and emergency scenarios before deployment occurs.
The challenge for a Land Commander is to find sufficient time for specific force preparation. Such preparation can become complicated because often the warning time issued by the Government may not necessarily allow sufficient preparation time required for training tactical-level commanders. Understandably, a Government may not wish its intentions to use military force to be disclosed before all options have been explored and the processes of political and diplomatic negotiation have run their course. For instance, it might have been embarrassing if specific force preparation for deployment to Somalia in 1993 and East Timor in 1999 had been disclosed before interventions were legally sanctioned by UN mandate. Land Commanders have to balance political realities against operational requirements for specific force preparation.
The point that must be grasped is that there are significant risks if land forces are not allowed time to prepare for individual missions. High-readiness units may not take much time to refresh themselves in military tactics, but it is critical that they understand specific Rules of Engagement, and the political and cultural sensitivities of the particular mission that they are about to undertake. Because of the diversity of both locations and missions, no modern Army can be prepared for every military contingency. Therefore, a realistic amount of time is required to gain an understanding of the political and cultural complexities of the intended operational environment. Some of the risks in not taking specific force preparation seriously enough can be demonstrated by the case of Somalia in 1992–93.
In Somalia, UN forces failed to appreciate both the political determination and the military power of Somali warlords to oppose international intervention. In particular, the Americans were humiliated and forced into withdrawal after sustaining eighteen fatalities in an urban ambush in Mogadishu. This incident has since been popularised in the book and film, Black Hawk Down. In addition, the Canadian, Italian and Belgian armed forces faced breakdowns in discipline and were later racked by investigations into the conduct of their troops. Yet none of these armed forces lost a significant test of military strength in Somalia. What these forces appeared to lack was an understanding of the imperatives of the Somali cultural, ethical and social milieu. These imperatives should have been examined thoroughly during specific force preparation before deployment.
Another problem in preparing capabilities is that of force rotation. Although land forces may achieve quick results after initial deployment and employment, there is a growing trend in many missions to leave some forces in place. The latter helps to consolidate and maintain an operational environment and provides the stability necessary if reconstruction and restoration of governance are required by a society. This sequence of deployment, employment and consolidation occurred in Bougainville in 1997, in East Timor in 1999 and in the Solomons in 2003. In 2004, the Australian Army still has a protection force in place in Baghdad. Force rotation can, however, stretch specialist requirements in logistics and communications.
Here, the reserves have an important role to play in reinforcing regular force elements—as was the case for the 6th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, before it rotated with INTERFET forces in East Timor in 2000. Australian Army reservists have been in full-time service in almost all military operations since 1999 and the land force is currently developing a substantial role for the reserves in national security operations.
The Need for Comprehensive Conventional Capabilities
Despite the war on terror and what General Cosgrove has called ‘good neighbour’ operations by Australia in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomons, it is important that the Army maintain a focus on its conventional military capabilities. Counter-terrorism and peace support operations are not the raison d’être of a nation’s defence forces. From a professional point of view, with experience drawn from multinational operations, there is little evidence that would suggest that our defence force should have anything less than a comprehensive range of conventional capabilities. Only conventional capabilities create the range of military options and deterrent ability to secure the national interest from a spectrum of threats, ranging from conventional attack to terrorism. The military adage that it is ‘easier to adapt down to peace support operations, rather than struggle with little warning to adapt up to conventional operations’ is an irrefutable reality.
Conventional land-force muscle still remains a useful tool in diplomacy. It is far better to deter hostile intent with a decisive application of force, or defeat a threat with an ‘overmatch’ of force. The ability to lash an adversary with firepower from artillery, armoured vehicles and helicopter gun ships is useful for any commander. Through the proposed Hardening and Networking the Army initiative, Australian ground forces will be able to create decisive deterrence through ‘overmatch’ and, as a result, save the lives of young Australians. The multinational force deployed to the Solomons in July 2003 is a good example of the power of ‘overmatch’. This force was made up of Australians and various regional allies. The mission to the Solomons acted as a deterrent to violence. The presence of Australian troops persuaded potentially hostile groups not to attempt to oppose the Regional Assistance Mission by armed force.
The Importance of Junior Leadership
At the beginning of the 21st century, soldiers are required to operate in an ambiguous and complex security environment in which operational, ethical, legal and cultural issues may merge and interact. Australian Army operations in Somalia in 1993 demonstrated that Australian land forces had to be doves of peace as well as hawks of war. On the one hand, Australian soldiers had to establish a strong ground presence, using force if necessary, in order to deter hostile forces. On the other hand, Australian land forces had to deliver humanitarian aid to the dispossessed and reassure a traumatised populace with a firm and friendly presence.
In Somalia, it was not unusual for several soldiers in a patrol to be alert to possible threats while others played soccer with members of the local populace. In Somalia, and more recently in East Timor and the Solomons, striking a balance between coercion and compassion has been a hallmark of Australian military practice. Indeed, even in the more demanding warfighting environments in Afghanistan and Iraq, there were a number of occasions when Australian soldiers of junior rank were able to ease tensions and deflect potentially lethal encounters by balancing their military professionalism with a degree of cultural awareness and humanitarian compassion.
One of the key elements in Australian soldierly skills is that recourse to lethal action is rarely chosen as a first course of action. Even in hostile environments, Australian soldiers and their commanders know that they are ambassadors for the values of the nation. In this respect, many of the Army’s personnel serve in what might be termed the ‘shop front of Australia’s international engagement’. While the responsibility to produce well-equipped, well-trained professional soldiers has not diminished, traditional tactical skills must now increasingly be supplemented by cultural and legal knowledge in order to equip personnel to participate in contemporary military missions.
During modern military operations, the decisions of junior leaders can have immediate effects because of electronic technology and the global media. The video camera is a powerful instrument. Because of its pervasiveness, the decisions of junior leaders in an operational area can now make or break an operation by influencing political opinion. The author recalls that, during his service in East Timor in late 2000, his efforts as a commander to develop a sound security strategy and to communicate a winning campaign plan ultimately depended on the calibre of junior leaders. All the planning that the author did would have amounted to little had his headquarters not been able to rely on junior leaders to perform well in isolated villages and mountains far away from direct supervision.
The Australian Army possesses excellent junior leaders because it has invested in one of the best individual and collective training regimes in the world. The land force prizes initiative, flexibility of mind and forthrightness in its young service personnel. Indeed, as General Cosgrove said in a 2003 speech to the Sydney Institute, ‘the need for well-trained infantry and Special Forces has not diminished as the modern battlespace becomes more crowded with sophisticated technology and the means to deliver accurate and massive firepower. Precision-guided munitions alone will not annihilate well-concealed and determined opponents dispersed in complex terrain’. Despite advanced technology, it is still men and women, junior leaders and small teams that remain the critical factors in most Australian military operations.
Conclusion
Australian soldiers must be prepared to serve from the suburbs of Sydney through protection of the Olympics to the backstreets of Baidoa in Somalia and the deserts of Iraq. However, it is impossible to tailor military forces to every contingency. Rather, Land Commanders must be prepared to devote as much time as possible to the problem of specific force preparation before deployment. In contemporary international conditions, the need for ‘best effect’ arrival and ‘overmatch’ for quick results has become more important in ensuring operational success. The more time that is available for force preparation, the better the Army’s junior leaders can be equipped with training in order to achieve that critical balance required in operational technique between military coercion and humanitarian compassion.
While much of Australia’s attention in the near future will, in all likelihood, focus on the global war against terror and on ‘good neighbour’ operations—often involving nation-building and peace support—we must not neglect conventional warfare.
Australia’s conventional military capabilities remain a priority. Such capabilities provide force protection and can be used to create deterrent ‘overmatch’ for peace support operations. In the future, capabilities from the Hardening and Networking the Army initiative can be expected to improve Australia’s land force combat effectiveness and to increase the protective effect on military personnel serving in the field.
Finally, it is important to reinforce the point that the trend in early 21st-century military missions is one in which land forces receive short notice to deploy. Yet the Army must strive to achieve ‘best effect’ arrival and quick operational success through ‘overmatch’ capability. This sequence of events may occur in conditions in which Australian forces are not always required to defeat hostile forces in symmetrical tests of military strength. Instead, forces may be expected to operate in an atmosphere of violence in complex political situations against ambiguous adversaries and among noncombatants. As a result, the Army must improve its cultural, legal and ethical understanding of the complexity of modern military operations and be constantly prepared for the diverse contingencies that are likely to be required of ground forces by the Australian Government.
