Aremarkable change in the general thrust of Australian defence policy has occurred in the past eight years. In 1996, Australia’s defence policy revolved around the Navy and Air Force defending the northern sea–air gap as if it were a moat. The Army’s role was peripheral to the latter task and was confined to dealing with those enemy combatants that succeeded in penetrating the continental landmass. For a trade-dependent nation such as Australia, the concept of a continental- style defence policy ignored the fact that the national interest depended on a stable international environment that would require mobile forces to operate offshore in order to maintain international stability. In 2004, national defence policy has changed significantly and is focused on the ability to project military power beyond Australia’s shores. While the term ‘expeditionary warfare’ may not appear in policy documents or departmental statements, the ‘e’ word has become the unspoken basis for operational and strategic thinking in the contemporary Australian Defence Force (ADF). This article examines the concepts that govern the ADF’s approach to manoeuvre warfare and analyses how, in the future, Australia might best develop and employ amphibious forces in the littoral environment that dominates much of our area of strategic interest.
Towards a Maritime Strategy: The Army and Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment
In the late 1990s, the Australian Army, seeking a more positive role for itself in national defence strategy, developed the Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) concept. This concept put the Army in the fortunate position of being an intellectual step ahead of the direction that national defence policy has taken in the wake of Australian intervention in East Timor. MOLE provided a vision of how the Army would contribute to a maritime strategy and preceded the 2000 Defence White Paper by almost three years. Indeed, in subtle ways, the MOLE concept has been extremely influential in the ADF’s joint strategic planning processes. In ADF warfighting circles, littoral warfare is now grouped with ‘land and littoral’ rather than ‘sea control and littoral’—a major philosophical change. The Army’s current experimental process, known as Headline, is far more developed than either the Navy’s Headmark or the Air Force’s Headway programs. The Headline experimental framework has allowed the Army to take the conceptual lead in developing offshore littoral operations. As a result, rather than develop their own ideas on offshore missions, both the Navy and the Air Force have been dominated by the MOLE construct and its related concept of Entry by Air and Sea (EAS). Yet an important question remains unanswered: can MOLE, as conceived by the Army, ever be anything other than an aspiration?
It is important to note that the Army has only six infantry battalions at any significant degree of readiness. Furthermore, it is questionable whether there is a sufficient population base in Australia or the national political will to support the expansion of the land force. In order to understand what six battalions represent in regional military terms, it is useful to recall that the Malaysian and Indonesian armies field thirty-five and ninety-two regular infantry battalions respectively. Although numerical comparisons should never be equated with combat effectiveness, they do illustrate the point that Australia would be unable to support sustained land operations in the northern archipelagos. The Army’s infantry battalions are, arguably, the nation’s highest-value military assets. Indeed, they are scarcer than fighter aircraft and warships, on a par with submarines, and are more versatile than most air and sea platforms.
While most modern land-based manoeuvre warfare doctrines have been heavily influenced by World War II German Blitzkrieg techniques and Soviet deep-operations theory, these approaches often minimise the effects of complex terrain. Complex environments such as archipelagos do not lend themselves to decisive sweeping manoeuvres. It is also useful to remember that, after the stunning early successes of Blitzkrieg in 1940–41, the Germans were soundly defeated in attrition battles at Stalingrad and Kursk in 1942 and 1943 respectively. In the Asia-Pacific, much of the land environment is complex, being either delta or urban jungle. Nonetheless, the region is well suited to manoeuvre warfare, provided strategists understand that the medium for operations is the sea rather than the land. In Asia-Pacific conditions, an enemy is pinned not by Sun Tzu’s ‘ordinary force’ on land, but by forces employing manoeuvre by water. In Australia’s maritime archipelagic environment, the bulk of the region’s strategic infrastructure is within 15 miles of the sea. By ensuring control of the sea, the ADF can take as much, or as little, of war on land as it chooses. Moreover, by adopting a maritime basis for manoeuvre warfare, the ADF would be able to gain far greater military value from its limited number of infantry battalions. A battalion group inserted ashore may amount to little more than a minor tactical force. In contrast, if a battalion group manoeuvres at sea, it represents an operational-level threat. Such a force, by being sea-mobile, can strike anywhere over a wide radius and can tie down opposing land-based forces that possess combat power many times larger than its own. A seaborne force represents an effective presence while avoiding an enemy’s strength by the simple expedient of staying beyond reach.
In short, the way to control an archipelago is to control the sea. Such an approach represents not a narrow naval strategy but a broad maritime strategy in which joint forces are employed. While a maritime strategy includes an indispensable role for land forces, that role is not to take and hold territory as in classical land warfare. Rather, in joint maritime operations, the purpose of a land force is to capture points of tactical relevance and hold these only as long as necessary in order for the joint campaign plan to achieve its objectives. For example, in late World War II, when Allied forces faced the Japanese 17th Army in well-prepared defensive positions on Rabaul, they did not take the island by assault. Instead, the Allies took control of a number of nearby land areas using the sea, often against little or no opposition, and then established air bases. Aircraft were subsequently employed to establish local air superiority, thus permitting further Allied amphibious landings in the Admiralties and completely isolating Rabaul. Cut off from their supplies, the Japanese forces on Rabaul quickly ran out of fuel and ammunition, and became as irrelevant to Tokyo’s war effort as if their island base had been physically overrun.
Mole and Maritime Strategy: The Problem of Weight Versus Agility
In its present form, MOLE is focused on gaining entry to the land environment as a prelude to allowing the Army to fight a decisive action. Even if the ADF possessed the necessary resources to achieve such an action, it is questionable whether throwing the entire deployable strength of the Army into a single land operation is the best way to conduct manoeuvre warfare within an archipelagic environment. The ADF’s limited land forces are better employed by exploiting the natural isolation of archipelagic landmasses in order to avoid contact with strong enemy forces, and to take control of key transport and communication nodes in the medium of manoeuvre from the sea.
In order to achieve this operational effect, it is necessary to think differently about the use of combat power in littoral operations. The present focus of MOLE is concentrated on creating the conditions for the defeat of the enemy ashore. In terms of force development, this approach inevitably attempts to maximise the combat weight of the landing force. On present trends, the ADF can afford amphibious shipping that provides either mass or agility, but not both. In terms of mass, a fleet of converted commercial roll-on-rolloff ships could be acquired in order to permit the landing of an entire brigade with sufficient logistics for weeks of sustained fighting ashore. However, given the limited port infrastructure in the region, the cross-environmental agility of these ships would be extremely poor and their landing options would soon become highly predictable to any adversary. As a result, a land force might risk becoming caught in a slugging match on the beachhead.
In contrast, in terms of agility, the ADF could seek to create a land force in which combat weight would be traded in return for the flexibility to strike freely at enemy territory. In practical terms, an agile land force would be built around an ability to achieve surprise and then to maintain sufficient operational tempo to stay inside the enemy’s decision cycle. Such a rate of operational tempo is probably unachievable within the confines of the current ADF force structure. For instance, in its naval platforms, the present ADF lacks the necessary cross-environmental agility for archipelagic operations. This weakness is partly due to institutional inexperience, but is also caused by the reality that any offshore mission in the region confronts the problem of using legacy equipment that was intended for continental defence rather than amphibious operations.
By opting for a future force of two landing platform helicopter dock (LHD) ships—vessels that are due for delivery in 2010 and 2013 respectively—the ADF has demonstrated a preference for agility over weight. 1 LHD is the US Navy’s designation for a versatile assault ship with the capability to launch helicopters from a flight deck and landing craft from a rear dock. Despite the fact that the decision to acquire two LHDs does not accord with recommendations from any ADF wargaming experiments or from the work of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, the decision is potentially the best solution to Australia’s problem of executing archipelagic manoeuvre. In the future, two LHDs are likely to give the ADF the agility and tempo necessary to conduct genuine archipelagic manoeuvre warfare provided, of course, that the ships form part of a properly integrated joint capability and are not viewed simply as a collection of expensive and ill-matched platforms.
Organisational Problems in the Development of ADF Amphibious Capability
Unfortunately, the ADF’s current mechanisms for integrating the various elements that make up amphibious capability remain fragile. The LHD ship is characterised by a full-length flight deck and a floodable stern dock that contains landing craft or hovercraft. Two LHDs would allow an embarked force of about 1800 troops—similar in size to a US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). With suitable aircraft and good flight-deck management, the LHD would allow an aviation combat team with heavy weapons to strike deep inland from over the horizon. Such missions would be facilitated and supported by both the Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters and by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
Compared to the more usual LHD–LPD (Landing Platform Dock) mix of ships, the all-LHD solution has strength in the realm of aviation, but remains weak in terms of surface delivery for the simple reason that the LHD lacks organic landing craft. As a consequence, operations in inaccessible areas of the Asia-Pacific region will, in the future, require the use of helicopter types selected under the AIR 9000 acquisition project. Such rotary-wing aviation will need to be optimised during operations in order to generate a sufficient rate of effort on a congested flight deck. If aircraft take too long a time to deploy and only ‘fit on the lifts’ when folded, it would be the equivalent of buying a V8 engine and running it without four spark plugs—an expensive solution that could not possibly generate the output that it was designed to produce.
Unless there are overriding single-service reasons why Phase 2 of the AIR 9000 project should select a helicopter that is poorly suited to amphibious aviation, then spending scarce funds on two ships with large flat decks makes little operational sense. The money would probably be better used in maximising the surface delivery capability of landing craft from perhaps three or four LPDs. In short, the ADF needs to decide whether the type of amphibious ship is determining the type of helicopter acquisition or vice versa. The problem posed by AIR 9000 raises the broader question of where responsibility should lie in synchronising the various elements that make up the ADF’s joint amphibious capability.
In the ADF, while the Chief of Navy has the lead authority for amphibious development, the term ‘lead authority’ is not present in current ADF command-and-control doctrine. The Chief of Navy’s authority to direct the Army in amphibious warfare matters remains problematical. Recognising that the naval staff may lack the breadth to provide him with adequate advice, the Chief of Navy ordered the formation of the one-star level Joint Amphibious Steering Group (JASG). Although the latter was a sensible initiative, the JASG lacks executive authority over any of the elements that make up Australia’s amphibious capability and can be overridden by single-service interests.
Given this reality, it is at least arguable that the best method of synchronising the effective development of the ADF’s joint amphibious capability might be to place it under the authority of the Chief of the Capability Development Group (CCDG). Such a step might solve the problem of tri-service direction, but it also raises the question of the proper location of expert advice on amphibious matters. The difficulty here is that, while each of the single services can give useful advice on their particular piece of the amphibious jigsaw, they often only possess limited comprehension of how the pieces fit together into a holistic picture. Since meaningful amphibious operations are all about detail, the melding of tri-service thinking is crucial to overall success. Vesting authority for amphibious development in the CCDG would be easier if the ADF possessed a joint tactical-level concept for amphibious operations. Yet, just as there is no joint authority to provide the ADF with detailed advice on amphibious matters, so there is no triservice organisation charged with developing a joint amphibious tactical concept.
One solution might be for the Capability Development Group to align itself with the Australian Amphibious Task Group. Yet, if the CCDG were to approach the Commander Australian Amphibious Task Group (COMAUSATG) for professional advice, it would almost certainly place an added burden on an operational commander who is supported by a small staff and is preoccupied by a busy exercise schedule. Even if COMAUSATG possessed responsibility for contributing to ADF capability development, the reality is that the staff lack expertise in critical Army and Navy warfare disciplines. Another possible solution would be to entrust Commander Australian Navy Amphibious and Afloat Support Group (CANAASG) with amphibious warfare development. Yet there are again institutional difficulties with such an approach. The CANAASG’s charter makes it clear that the group is concerned with equipment rather than with joint capability management. Moreover, the CANAASG staff is the smallest of the Navy’s seven force element groups and looks after the widest range of ships, but it clearly lacks breadth of knowledge in important Army and Navy specialisations. In short, within the ADF, no single organisation or force element is directly responsible for Australia’s joint amphibious capability development. No single entity ‘owns’ amphibious capability in the way that the Navy owns joint anti- submarine warfare or the Army owns joint offensive support.
The Future Organisation of Amphibious Capability in the ADF: Towards the British Model?
Any nation with a serious commitment to amphibious capability must have a clear point of responsibility. In this respect, the British organisational system of amphibious command and control might serve as a model for Australia. At present, the Royal Navy has two operational taskforce commanders working for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. These component commanders, both two-star admirals, are designated as the Commander United Kingdom Marine Force and the Commander United Kingdom Amphibious Force respectively. The former commands blue-water operations while the latter commands brown-water, or littoral, operations. The Commander of the United Kingdom Amphibious Force is, effectively, the owner of Britain’s entire amphibious capability, including the ships, the landing force and two subordinate commands: the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander Landing Force (CLF).
The Commander of the British Amphibious Force is also the official Amphibious Warfare Authority and is recognised as such by the single-service chiefs and by the Ministry of Defence. In an Australian equivalent of the British system, the amphibious commander might be a one-star officer with a direct operational line to the Maritime Commander, Australia, and a line of responsibility to the CCDG. The present Commander of UK Amphibious Forces is a Royal Marine, the nearest equivalent to a purple uniform in the UK armed forces. In the absence of an ADF marine force, it is feasible that the Commander Australian Amphibious Force could become an alternating Army and Navy appointment.
Conclusion
If the ADF is seriously committed to 21st-century archipelagic manoeuvre warfare in the Asia-Pacific region, then it needs to recognise three factors. First, the Australian Army does not possess adequate numbers of troops to sustain an embroilment in hostile territory and must, as a result, thoroughly imbue itself with a manoeuvrist approach to all operational activities. Second, given the littoral nature of the Asia-Pacific region, all within the ADF must recognise that land force manoeuvre is predominantly a maritime activity. Finally, any operational concept developed must be tri-service both in tone and character. An intellectual and philosophical recognition of interdependence is vital because neither the Navy nor the Air Force can control the maritime environment without the Army. Australia must develop an acceptable joint operational concept for archipelagic manoeuvre warfare but, while doing so, it must recognise that the devil is always in the detail of bringing the various service components together.
The distinguished British inter-war military strategist, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, once said that the effectiveness of a nation’s forces always starts with organisational structure. The ADF’s structures are not designed to generate joint manoeuvre in the archipelagic environment to Australia’s north. In terms of the region, the northern archipelagos from Java to Fiji are the most likely areas of operations for the ADF in the future. The first and most important step that the ADF needs to take in order to develop an effective amphibious capability is to rectify its organisational shortcomings. An advocate—an owner of the ADF’s amphibious assets—needs to be created. Without this vital first step, single-service philosophies will always reign. The Navy will continue to think in terms of delivering a ‘cargo’ and the Army will continue to think that ships merely provide the land force with ‘sea lift’. If amphibious warfare is left in the grip of single-service operational concepts, any attempt that the ADF might make to conduct effective archipelagic manoeuvre risks the pedestrian and attritional stalemate of another Anzio, Salerno or Gallipoli.
Endnotes
1 The ‘sea-lift capability’ in 2016 may provide bulk transport for follow-on forces.
