Australia’s December 2000 Defence White Paper outlined a strategic posture dictated by two major imperatives. The first imperative was defence of the Australian continent and the second imperative was the need to participate in efforts to uphold global security. Since the al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States and the Bali bombings of October 2002, the two imperatives have become intertwined. Participation in maintaining global security is now closely enmeshed with upholding the defence of the Australian continent.
In the current international security environment, the reality is that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must go farther afield in order to safeguard the nation and its interests. As the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Hill, put it in 2003, ‘Australia’s immediate region continues to face major challenges, making it more vulnerable to transnational security threats’. 1 The Minister went on to note that the changed global security environment meant that Australia’s national interests could be directly affected by events outside its immediate neighbourhood. Under these conditions, ADF involvement in coalition operations farther afield is more likely than at any time in the recent past. Involvement in coalition operations would probably entail the provision of important niche capabilities such as those deployed in the war against terror and those forward-deployed to the Middle East in 2002–03 for Operation Bastille. The Minister concluded by observing that, ‘if adverse trends in our region continue, there may also be increased calls on the ADF for tasks in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood’. He pointed to Operation Bali Assist as a recent example. 2
The best way for the ADF to achieve force projection is for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) to ‘take to the sea’ and for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to ensure that deployed forces possess effective organic air power. This article makes the case for the ADF to acquire two or more aircraft carriers that are equipped with F-35 Joint Strike Fighters flown by a mixture of RAAF and RAN pilots.
The Case for Sea-Mobile Air Power: Lessons from Britain
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a move towards expeditionary operations in Western armed forces. For example, the British have prepared for offshore operations in defence of their political interests. Elements of the Royal Air Force (RAF), equipped with the GR7 Harrier, are now configured as Joint Force Harrier—an element that ‘remains ready to deploy anywhere in the world with the Royal Navy’s (RN) Sea Harriers as part of a naval task force’. 3 Recently the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence announced the building of two 60 000-tonne carriers by BAE Systems—the biggest in the RN’s history. Under the British plan, elements of the RAF, joined by the Fleet Air Arm equipped with the new Joint Strike Fighter, will have the capabilities of a carrier battle group, including land target attack, and will be deployable to wherever the British Government decides they are required.
Why is the capacity to deploy away from one’s own country important in military strategy? First, such a capacity follows one of the key Principles of War, namely offensive action. Put simply, it is preferable to take war to the enemy rather than to wait until the enemy brings war to you. Passivity in military strategy gives an adversary the initiative to prepare and to choose the battlefield. The principles of good strategic planning dictate that one should choose the time and place of an engagement, preferably upsetting the enemy’s preparations at the same time.
Second, in contemporary security conditions, the asymmetric threat posed by global terrorism means that a country such as Australia might have to attack an enemy’s centre of gravity at a distance, as did the United States by striking against al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In turbulent times, rogue nations and organisations of militant Islam espousing totalitarian political creeds may seek to attack those countries that embrace democratic political alternatives. Australian defence analyst, Professor Paul Dibb, summed up Australia’s strategic situation shortly after the 11 September 2001 attacks by stating:
We face an arc of instability to our north, a weakened South-East Asia and an uncertain balance of power with the rise of China. Indonesia—the fourth largest country—has an unpredictable future. Prudent Australian defence planners must consider that Indonesia has the attributes of a friend and a potential adversary. 4
Australia is part of a region that seems to be steadily becoming more politically unstable, thus jeopardising a national economic prosperity that is largely dependent on seaborne trade. As Lieutenant Commander Bob Moyse of the RAN has pointed out,
Some of Australia’s most vital areas of interest lie ... in the Sea–Air–Land gap of the Indonesian Archipelago. About 95% of Australia’s trade is carried by sea and most of this goes far to the north before turning east and west onto the world’s shipping lanes. Any significant interference with this trade would have a devastating effect on the Australian economy. 5
How far can imagination take us in envisaging a possible crisis in the future? Several scenarios present themselves: a nuclear device exploding in a Western capital city; germ warfare sweeping through subways infecting thousands; a rogue state launching an attack with nuclear weapons on a neighbour; ongoing terrorist incidents; and problems emanating from failed states. Faced with such situations, the ADF may find itself increasingly deployed overseas in order to assist in ensuring global security.
Fighting overseas is, of course, not a new task for the RAN. Indeed, the Australian Navy’s fleet air arm, born after World War II, was designed to ensure that the country could defend its interests far from its shores. As the Chief of the Navy from 1962 to 1964, Admiral Burrell, stated: ‘We will need a Navy as long as Australia remains an island—and the best place to fight, if unhappily that should be required, is as far from Australia as possible’. 6 Admiral John Collins, a veteran of World War II, was a strong advocate of naval air power. He was of the opinion that ‘a fleet that goes to sea without its aircraft today is just as obsolete as a fleet under sail ... Carriers give a fleet tremendously increased striking power and widely increased mobility’. 7
The reason that air power is necessary in accompanying any army or joint maritime force deployed overseas is neatly summed up by the British carrier concept:
Aircraft have mobility, flexibility and versatility, which are the keywords of a modern defence strategy ... [A] Carrier Air Group (CAG) can move to almost anywhere in the world in international waters ... giving both politicians and military commanders options, including early reconnaissance, the landing of special forces and land attack from the air ... Events throughout the 1980s and 90s have demonstrated the high value of the CV [aircraft carrier]. 8
Of course, it might be argued that Australia’s needs are not the same as those of Britain. Yet, a carrier-based force would give the ADF a flexibility that cannot be matched by any number of land-based aircraft operating from Australia. While it is true that in 2002 and 2003, on operations Slipper and Bastille, the RAAF deployed successfully to runways in the Middle East, it cannot always be assumed that friendly nations will provide basing and other necessary facilities to ensure the success of overseas military missions. Moreover, even if facilities are forthcoming, there is no guarantee that the bases themselves will enjoy the same level of protection and security as those used by the RAAF in the Second Gulf War. In contrast, aircraft carriers provide deployed forces with great flexibility as well as platforms that cannot be easily attacked by guerrillas or by enemy Special Forces.
In the past, Australia has always been able to rely on American air support. However, although the United States and Australia are close allies, it is prudent, in an era of multiple operations and military overstretch by US forces, to consider the possession of adequate national air cover in a crisis. Britain appears to understand this need. As the British historian and defence writer, John Keegan, has pointed out, ‘Britain’s forces cannot ... count on operating under the umbrella of American air cover in all future circumstances. A crisis may supervene when national air power is needed’.9
Like Australia, the United Kingdom plans to acquire the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in order to meet its future air-power requirements. All four arms of the American military—army, air force, navy and marines—are purchasing the Joint Strike Fighter. Lockheed Martin, which has designed the F-35 Fighter, will manufacture it in three variants. There will be Conventional Take-off and Landing (CTOL), Short Take-off Vertical Landing (STOVL) and Carrier Variant (CV) versions of the aircraft. 10 The British F-35 project—the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA)—has been aiming to produce ‘a joint RN–RAF offensive aircraft able to deploy from bases at sea and ashore’. 11 BAE Systems will take the leading position as preferred prime contractor for the CV development, with Thales UK, a defence company, providing a design and performing a major role as key supplier. 12 In British defence planning, the aircraft carrier will become the principal platform for the RN–RAF FJCA, with the latter eventually replacing the RN’s and RAF’s Harrier jets. 13
The ADF, The Joint Strike Fighter and the Carrier Option
Australia has also committed itself to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter development project. On present trends, the RAAF should go ahead with the acquisition of the new aircraft, but it should ensure that it buys the carrier, or maritime, version of the plane. It is likely that the F-35 will be not only a highly capable fighter, but an excellent bomber since the aircraft possesses capable self-defence systems and a range of over 1300 km—more than double that of the present F/A-18 Hornet. 14 In the future, the Joint Strike Fighter will be able to perform surface strike against maritime targets as well as attack land objectives.
On present and projected trends, therefore, it seems that the F-35 will be a comprehensive air-technology package. Nonetheless, advanced armaments, precision munitions and a range of 1300 km do not automatically translate into usable military power in a world of asymmetric terrorism and rogue states. If the Australian version of the F-35 is a land-based aircraft, it will only be capable of striking at targets within the Indonesian archipelago. Even with the added purchase of new refuelling tankers to replace the B-707, the RAAF’s projected F-35s will still have limited range as land-based aircraft. 15 The question that must be posed is this: how will land-based aircraft provide permanent air cover to Australian forces in a hostile situation in the Asia-Pacific? In any crisis situation that requires the projection of air power overseas, Australia is limited in its strategic options because it must rely on friendly or host-nation support to provide airfields from which the RAAF can operate.
By contrast, carrier-based aircraft can deploy anywhere in international waters and remain within range while needed, thus providing strategic ‘presence’. Indeed, by merely being in an area, carrier-based aircraft can exert pressure. A good example was the military build-up outside Iraq in 2002 that resulted in the Hussein regime admitting UN weapons inspectors. Carriers and their aircraft present a unique force package that can be used in a variety of ways to project and maximise the effects of military power.
In the past Australian forces have deployed to the Middle East, Africa (Rwanda and Somalia) or even Europe in order to support Australia’s interest in preserving international peace and stability. Accordingly, the future F-35 should be sea-mobile and the RAAF should be equipped with the CV version of the aircraft. In addition, acquiring an Australian sea-mobile version of the F-35 would leave open the possibility for RAAF aircraft to operate not only from RAN vessels or from land bases, but also from British and American carriers.
There is, moreover, a case for the RAN to contemplate acquiring sufficient F-35s to protect its ships, both in an air-to-air role and for executing anti-shipping strikes against enemy warships. A submarine threat could be countered by the same methods that are used currently: a combination of anti-submarine warfare vessels and helicopters that have interoperability with assets such as the RAAF’s AP-C3 Orions. The role of any future Navy F-35 fighters would essentially be one of force protection and anti-shipping strike, while the RAAF F-35s would be employed to attack land-based targets. The Navy’s aircraft would be flown by personnel trained essentially in sea strategy and tactics, and would complement the RAN’s array of surface-to-surface and anti-air missiles. Both RAAF and RAN aircraft could, of course, be used in air defence roles.
A Future Carrier Force: The Problem of Financial Cost
What would be the cost of the suggested strategic rearrangements? The carrier-based F-35 is more expensive than the land-based version, and acquiring two carriers would also be costly. Moreover, the RAN’s projected Air Warfare destroyers would still be needed because defensive systems required against aircraft at a distance are not the same as those required to defend against missiles at closer range. The optimum defence capability for Australia at sea is the combination of the aircraft carrier and the F-35.
Britain’s two new aircraft carriers will cost the taxpayer £2.9 billion or AU$9.2 billion. 16 In terms of current Australian defence spending, such a cost would be prohibitive. It should be noted that the United Kingdom’s defence spending is 2.8 per cent of its GDP on defence compared with Australia’s 1.9 per cent of GDP. In April 2003, the Australian’s international and defence correspondent, Greg Sheridan, argued that ‘... we [Australia] have a defence force that is just too small. We have an expeditionary rhetoric, a defence of Australia force structure doctrine and a pacifist budget’. 17 New carriers would also involve other costs, particularly in staff, since the RAN would need to expand its current personnel in order to cope with two large vessels. A possible alternative to a CV force would be for Australia to seek to acquire the Tomahawk missile system, which is capable of being launched from submarines and/or surface vessels. The ADF could consider a cruise missile option for a future force, although such an option might not provide the same level of precision strike as modern carrier-based air power.
Conclusion
This article has tried to ‘fly the kite’ of carrier-based air power for the ADF. Although this solution has proven unpopular since the 1980s, and is both expensive and challenging in force structure terms, carrier-borne air power may, in the decades ahead, become a necessity for the ADF. Australia is an island-continent with a vital stake in helping to maintain a stable international environment, not least because the majority of its trade depends on secure sea-lines of communication. Additionally, in an era when threats to national security can develop at short notice and frequently require off-shore deployments in defence of the national interest, sea-based air power can provide the ADF with a potent method of force protection.
In contemporary security conditions, air power at sea is a matter for both the RAN and the RAAF to contemplate, if only because of the range of threats against which Australia must defend itself. The best way for Australia to cope with an uncertain security environment is to grasp the nettle and to spend a significant sum of money in order to equip the ADF with a flexible, offshore joint force with organic aviation. Such a force, based around two aircraft carriers equipped to deliver modern air power, wherever and whenever necessary, is the type of long-term insurance policy that the nation requires to protect its future in the first quarter of the 21st century.
Endnotes
1 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update, Minister for Defence Media Mail List, 26 February 2003.
2 Ibid.
3 Royal Air Force Cottesmore, viewed 8 March 2003, <http://www.raf-cott.demon.co.uk/harrier.html>.
4 Paul Dibb, ‘Tinker with defence policy and risk attack’ (originally published in the Australian), viewed 30 October 2001, <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/2001/Nov01/Dibb.htm>.
5 Bob Moyse, ‘STOVL JSF Needed for Expeditionary Warfare’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, March–April 2003, p. 12.
6 Text of speech by Admiral Burrell to a Country Women’s Association conference. Original copy in the possession of his daughter Fayne Mench was supplied to the author.
7 Colin Jones, Wings and the Navy, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, NSW, 1997, p. 33.
8 Royal Navy website, viewed 13 March 2003, <http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/148.html>.
9 John Keegan, ‘Labour must keep its promise to build two new aircraft carriers’, Daily Telegraph, viewed 7 May 2003, <http://www.opinion.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2003…;.
10 Lockheed Martin website, viewed 13 March 2003, <http://www.lmaeronautics.com/products/combat_air/x-35/>.
11 Richard Scott, ‘Renamed aircraft project reflects joint RN/RAF role’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, <http://www.janes.com/defence/air_forces/news/jdw/jdw010607_1_n.shtml>.
12 Ministry of Defence, ‘Industrial alliance will build super-carriers’, viewed 30 January 2003, <http://www.mod.uk/dpa/future_carrier.htm>.
13 Naval Projects, viewed 13 March 2003, <http://homepage.tinet.ie/~steven/navalprojects.htm>.
14 Alan Stephens, ‘An “Enlightened” Decision? Australia and the Joint Strike Fighter’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, February 2003, pp. 6–9.
15 Department of Defence Media Release 168/03, ‘New Defence Air-To-Air Refuelling Capability’, advised that ‘a fleet of up to five new-generation air-to-air refuelling aircraft’ would be acquired by the RAAF from 2007, <http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DeptTpl.cfm?CurrentId=2904>.
16 David C. Isby, ‘Thales carrier build strategy’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, <http://www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/jni/jni030107_1_n.shtml&…;.
17 Greg Sheridan, ‘Lack of grunts our major military flaw’, Australian, viewed 5 April 2003, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,6237469%2…;.
