From The Vault: The Basis Of Expansion For War*

*This article was originally published inVolume 12 of the AAJ in May, 1950113

In time of peace no nation, with the possible exception of Russia, can afford to maintain at full strength the armed services required for the conduct of a war of the first magnitude. The most that can be done is to maintain an organization which does not impose an unsupportable strain on the national economy and which, at the same time can be expanded rapidly when war becomes imminent. So far as the Army is concerned the smoothness and rapidity of this expansion will depend on the provision and maintenance in peace of:

i. An experienced staff.

ii. A framework of units and formations on which to base the initial stages of the expansion.

iii. The framework of an expandable training organization.

iv. Trained reserves.

v. Sufficient stores and munitions to equip the units and formations brought up to war strength or called into being in the initial stages of expansion.

vi. The organization to convert industry from a peace to a war footing.

The scale at which the foregoing elements are maintained in peace depends upon a number of factors, the more important of which are:

The time likely to be available between the outbreak of hostilities and the necessity for sending ground forces into action. Obviously a nation sharing a land frontier with a probable enemy will have to maintain its army at a much higher degree of readiness than a nation which, by reason of its geographical situation in relation to potential enemies, is not subject to immediate attack.

The necessity for striking a reasonable balance between security and the other interests of the community. Preparations for defence are neither more nor less than a national insurance policy. Like any other form of insurance the time, effort and money devoted to it should be nicely balanced against the estimated risks. Too little is too risky, too much is uneconomic.

Responsibility for the successive steps to determine the composition of a peace-time army are clearly defined. The Army, paying due regard to the implications of national policy and the trend of international affairs, makes an appreciation to determine probable military tasks in the event of an outbreak of war. From this appreciation there follows a further appreciation to determine the size and composition of the forces required to execute those tasks. In other words the Army has, firstly, to forecast what it is likely to have to do, and, secondly, what will be required to do it. The size and composition of the projected war-time army will, of course, be influenced by the manpower requirements of the other services and of industry, and by the type and quantity of equipment likely to be available. It is no use planning to use men and materials which cannot possibly be obtained.

The soldier then has to design a peace organization which will enable him to place the proposed wartime army in the field within the permissable time limit. In doing this he must curb his natural tendency to over insure by recommending an organization which the Government, in view of the many other pressing demands on national resources, obviously cannot approve. Subject to the limitations imposed by this consideration he seeks approval for the strongest organization obtainable. Responsibility for its acceptance, rejection or modification then rests squarely with the Government. The Government’s decision becomes a policy directive which the Army, in conjunction with other Government Departments concerned, is responsible for putting into effect.

The preparation of the Army plan for presentation to the Government finally resolves itself into a compromise between several important considerations. For instance, a balance must be struck between personnel and equipment. It is not much use being able to put large numbers of trained men into the field if you cannot give them up-to-date equipment to fight with. Nor is it any use having on hand a mass of equipment and no trained men to use it. Again it is no use devoting all available resources to the preparation of fighting units and neglecting the administrative organization, which alone enables them to function. Nor can the Army wait until the outbreak of hostilities to conjure out of thin air the training organization-personnel, installations and equipment-to train the stream of re-inforcements which must begin to flow even in the early stages of a major conflict.

The Position at the Outbreak of World War 2

A comparison of the situation which existed in Australia on the outbreak of war in 1939 and that which obtains today is interesting and instructive, provided that the comparison is not made in a spirit of pharisaical virtue. It is at once the strength and weakness of our democratic system that no Government can run counter to public opinion, nor even get very far ahead of it. Australian Governments of the 1930’s reflected Australian public opinion, which, in common with public opinion throughout the English speaking world, flatly refused to believe that another great war was imminent. Anyone who reflects on the temper of those years may well marvel that the Australian public, which caught only an occasional faint echo of the storm gathering on the other side of the world, consented to spend any money at all on the Army.

In 1939 the Regular Army comprised only a few staff officers and warrant and NCO instructors. There were no regular field units, whilst installations and fixed defences were manned by maintenance parties ortly. The administrative units and echelons required for base and of Coperation did not exist even in skeleton form. There were practically no officers available for war planning.

On paper the Militia Forces comprised a respectable array of formations and units. On the ground, however, these formations and units were too weak to provide useful experience for the leaders and not much more than elementary training for the troops.

The Army had no mechanical transport worth mentioning, and no fighting vehicles at all. Its most up-to-date field gun had been made in 1914, but it did have two or three Brens on exhibition at the Small Arms School. Engineering and signal equipment was about on the same level.

The Reserve of Officers consisted of a list of names in a book. Its members received no training or instruction of any kind. Many of them had been completely out of touch with military affairs since they were demobilized in 1919-20.

The Army Schools in existence at the beginning of 1938 were:

• Royal Military College.
   
• School of Artillery.
   
• Small Arms School.
   
• School of Signals.
   
• School of Anti-Aircraft and Fortress Engineering.
   
• ASC School.

During 1938 the .Command and Staff School was established to run short courses for senior staff and regimental officers, and Command Training Depots were set up to conduct courses for junior officers and NCO’s. These establishments, however, had run only a few courses before the outbreak of hostilities.

The Army Today

After World War 1 there seemed, every reason for believing that an e-ra of universal peace had at last dawned. This feeling, with its consequent effect on public opinion, was particularly·marked in Australia and other countries are removed from a centre of possible conflict. World War 2 has not been followed by similar hopes. On the contrary it is quite apparent to everyone that a major war could start at any time in half a dozen places, some of them uncomfortably close to this country. Consequently Australian public opinion is favourably disposed towards the maintenance of reasonable defence services. Nevertheless there are many other pressing demands on the public purse, and the defence services have to work strictly within the limits of the money which can be allotted to them.

Working within these limits the Army has designed, and very largely brought into being, an organization which can rapidly be expanded to a formidable field army.

For the first time since Feder ation we have a balanced regular field force of all arms. Admittedly this force is only a Brigade Group, but it forms an extremely valuable training ground for regular officers and NCO’s. In addition we have established on a regular basis many of the administrative units on which the speed and smoothness of expansion depends.

Army Headquarters and formation staffs are much bigger than they were at any time during the last peace, and contain elements of practically all the sections required in war. There is a world of difference between expanding an existing staff section, even if it contains only a few trained and experienced persons, and starting it from scratch amidst the stress and urgency of mobilization. From Army HQ downwards provision has been made for the inclusion of CMF staff officers where they can usefully be employed or given worthwhile experience.

In the post-war plan the peace strength of the Citizen Forces was fixed at 50,000. It was considered that better training value would accrue to all ranks if the CMF were organized in a relatively small number of strong formations and units rather than spread very thinly over a vast array of “paper” units. The method of recruiting CMF personnel, and recruiting them in a way that will produce an adequate trained reserve, is of course a matter of Government policy. (At the time of writing the recently-elected Commonwealth Government has not given the Army a direction in this matter.)

In any case the new CMF units are much more lavishly equipped than they were before the war. Units now possess an adequate allotment of mechanical transport, weapons and equipment. In addition the Regular Army staffs of CMF formations and units are much bigger than they were in pre-war days. There is no comparison between the equipment situation of today and that of 1939. Then we had nothing much more than rifles and bayonets; now we have reasonably good stocks of first-class equipment. Of course we cannot rest on that. The equipment will have to be kept up to date and this will absorb a fair proportion of Army funds.

Army Schools

At present the following Army Schools are in operation:

• Royal Military College.
   
• Staff College.
   
• School of Tac tics and Administration.
   
• Armoured School.
   
• School of Artillery.
   
• School of Military Engineering.
   
• School of Survey.
   
• School of Signals.
   
• School of Infantry.
   
• RAASC School.
   
• RAAOC School.
   
• RAEME School.
   
• RAAF School of Land/Air Warfare (Army Component).
   
• Transportation Training Centre.
   
• Technical School.
   
• Apprentices’ School.

The Army Schools are so organized that they can be converted rapidly from a peace to a war basis.

Before the war Australia had to depend for the higher staff and command training of her regular officers on the few vacancies she could obtain at the Staff Colleges in the United Kingdom and India. Not more than three or four vacancies a year could be obtained. Now we have our own Staff College designed to take an average of 30 officers for a ten months’ course each year. The teaching at this college is closely coordinated with that at staff colleges in the United Kingdom and other countries of the British Commonwealth so that a common doctrine is taught throughout the British system. In addition students arc exchanged on a reciprocal basis with the other colleges. Thus this year’s course at the Australian Staff College comprises 27 Australian students, two from the United Kingdom, and one each from Canada, India and Pakistan, while an Australian student is attending the staff colleges in each of those countries. Besides the course itself the pre-entry studies are on a common basis throughout the Commonwealth.

Overseas Training

To enable the AMF to keep abreast of overseas developments, a number of officers and other ranks is sent abroad every year for training and experience. The Overseas Training Schedule for the year 1949-50 provided for 50 officers and nine other ranks. Actually a number of additions were made to the list to meet unforeseen requirements.

In Australia every avenue is being explored to obtain appropriate experience in civil establishments for selected personnel. The system of “civil schooling” being developed aims at broadening the knowledge and experience of regular officers and other ranks of the technical arms and services.

Conclusion

If we compare this brief outline of Australian Army organization as it exists today with the basic requirements for rapid expansion listed in the opening paragraph of this paper it will be seen that we have:

i. An experienced staff, together with the schools and facilities to increase its knowledge and broaden its experience.

ii. The framework of units and formations on which to base the initial stages of expansion.

iii. The stores, munitions and equipment required in the early stages of expansion.

Thus four of the six requirements exist as efficient going concerns. Within the limits imposed by existing Government policy a trained reserve is being created, but, in any case, time is required to build it up to the required strength. Meanwhile, selected members of the Reserve of Officers are being trained and kept up to date in the duties they will be expected to undertake in war.

The sixth requirement the means to convert industry to a war footing is thoroughly organized and was described fully in the article “Higher Defence Organization in Australia” in Australian Army Journal No.8.

Thus, having due regard to the time required for the build-up of reserves, it can be said that the Australian Army is well on the way to fulfilling its peace-time function of maintaining a firm and broad foundation for expansion in war. Its ability to meet an emergency is today infinitely greater than it was in 1939.