The Atomic Division: The Australian Army Pentropic Experiment, 1959–1965
Introduction
The use of nuclear weapons during the Second World War heralded a new era in warfare. The battlefield of the future was envisaged by military planners to be one that included tactical nuclear weapons and thus required a new type of infantry structure. To accommodate these tactical changes, and the desire of the federal administration to reduce troop numbers, the US Army developed the five-sided pentomic divisional structure. The new structure, introduced in the early 1950s, was to have increased mobility and flexibility while offering the best protection against battlefield nuclear weapons. The Australian Army followed similar ideas at the same time. The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell, argued for reform that would better reflect the new tactical environment and allow greater connectivity with the US. A similar, five-sided divisional structure was adopted in Australia that modified the tropical establishment. This ‘pentropic’ structure, introduced in 1960, represented an increase in troop numbers by about half and much more firepower. However, like the US Army’s, the Australian concept was not without detractors and impacted badly on the Citizen Military Forces (CMF). The pentropic divisional structure was abandoned in 1965 and replaced with the previous triangular structure. The experiment, lasting less than five years, had caused disruption and, in the case of the CMF, angst, for no perceivable advantage. Although the reform was intended to improve the Army, the result was far from convincing.46
The New Atomic Battlefield
Considered by many historians to be a seminal piece of US security policy, national security policy paper NSC-68 greatly influenced the US military, particularly the Army.1 Coinciding with the outbreak of the Korean War, the policy paper paralleled the Army’s attitude toward strategy at the outset of the Cold War. Arguing that the Soviet Union would not provoke war until they could win it, it held that the imminent danger lay in war by proxy.2 Containment of the Soviet threat was paramount and, to achieve this, rearmament was necessary.3
During Eisenhower’s presidency, between 1953 and 1961, nuclear weapons became the centrepiece of US military strategy. The ‘New Look’ policy moved the military’s manpower-intense conventional ground forces approach to nuclear-capable forces, specifically the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command.4 The rationale was that the threat of massive nuclear retaliation would act as an adequate deterrent to all aggression, allowing reductions in defence expenditure.5
Reinforcing this concept, John Foster Dulles’s article ‘Strategy for Security and Peace’ appeared in Foreign Affairs in April 1954. Dulles argued that the Eisenhower administration decided on a new strategy of community-based power that was used as a deterrent to any aggressor by ‘making it costly to an aggressor’.6 The free world was not in a position to match ‘Communist forces, man for man and tank for tank, at every point where they might attack’.7 Thus a new strategy was required that utilised assets ‘especially air and naval power and atomic weapons’. This new strategy needed to be flexible with ‘a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power’.8 For Dulles, the ‘potential of massive attack’ would serve to quell aggression, allowing the New Look policy to provide peace and security.9
The US Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, before the Senate Armed Services Committee in early 1957 announced ‘major changes in organization, tactics and weapons’ in the Army.10 The new Army would be reorganised into ‘pentomic’, or five-sided, divisions that were smaller, with 13,800 men rather than 17,500. Taylor spoke of four principles that the new organisation was to be based upon: ready adaptability to the atomic battlefield; better use equipment; understanding of improved communications; and integration of improved arms and equipment.
Army Organisation for an Atomic Age
The tactical use of nuclear weaponry had been proposed as early as 1949. US Army General Jacob L Devers, on his retirement, recommended that to increase the efficiency of the Army’s ground forces ‘the atomic bomb be used as “a tactical weapon”’, contrary to the prevailing military opinion that its only use was strategic.11 His sentiments were reinforced by fellow senior officers of the Weapons System Evaluation Group. Major General James M Gavin, a member of the group, wrote ‘The Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb’ for publication in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1951;12 this was followed by articles, by various authors, such as ‘Notes on the Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons’,13 ‘Atomic Weapons for the Battalion Commander’,14 ‘The Tactical Side of Atomic Warfare’15 and ‘The Atomic Revolution in Warfare’.16 One of the first books published on the subject, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, by George Reinhardt and fellow officer William Kintner, argued that atomic weapons ‘tactically employed, should be incorporated into our first line of defense against any creeping aggression’.17 Reporting in the New York Times, Hanson Baldwin wrote on the tactical uses of the ‘family’ of atomic weapons available. The article highlighted some of the limitations of the strictly strategic use of nuclear weapons and, using a pugilistic analogy, how ‘our atomic left-hand-lead could be used—as a boxer uses his left—to keep his opponent off balance, and to prevent the opponent from cocking his round-house right’.18
While future battlefields might include tactical nuclear weapons, one concern for senior officers remained force numbers. General Matthew Ridgway, following his appointment as Chief of Staff in 1953, was concerned that the US Army would be outnumbered in a future war and thus required a force multiplier, and that atomic weapons should be included.19 One reason for the concern was the pressure from the Department of Defense for fewer troops.20 Ridgway was aware that though division capabilities and firepower had increased, their mobility had not. He believed, therefore, that in order to increase mobility and flexibility while reducing damage from atomic attack, improvements were required. He ordered that a study by senior officers, including General Maxwell Taylor, be conducted into the possibility of reorganising division structure and tactics. Simultaneously, exercises in Germany under Major General Gavin, commanding US VII Corps, revealed the limitations of the existing organisational structure, recommending independent dispersed battle groups.21 When Taylor became Chief of Staff in 1954 he continued the study of a new organisation of Army divisions, concluding from his experience during the Korean War that the old triangular division was outmoded.22
The outcome of this research was a new division structure called Atomic Field Army (ATFA), better known as ‘pentomic’.23 The new divisional organisation comprised five (pentagonal) self-contained formations, labeled battle groups. Each of these groups consisted of four rifle companies, a mortar battery and headquarters and support elements, and two battalions of artillery.24 The battle groups allowed greater depth and width than the traditional system, reducing targets during any atomic attack, and were designed to be ‘more pliable and sustainable than traditional battalions’.25 To aid this more dispersed arrangement, Taylor believed that better communications equipment would allow commanders to control their troops and that the introduction of armoured personnel carriers would increase mobility. The changes resulted in a reduction in personnel by nearly 4,000 from each infantry division and 2,700 from an armoured division, thus complying with the Eisenhower administration’s demands.26 Field tests commenced in 1954 at Fort Hood, Texas and Fort Benning, Georgia, with the first unit, the 101st Airborne Division, becoming ‘pentomic’ in 1956. At the completion of further tests and exercises27 Taylor announced the conversion of all divisions to pentomic by mid-1958.
Reception of the new organisation was mixed. Some senior US Army officers queried the abilities of the new equipment touted by Taylor and highlighted conceptual flaws before conversion. Much of the new technology was yet to be issued and shortages of equipment caused concern. Small unit commanders, at platoon and company level, questioned the dispersal of units, particularly when only defending conventionally.28 The division commander faced control problems due to the division’s size and the lack of adequate communications equipment.29 In a speech given in Philadelphia in April 1958, General Willard Wyman stated that the new division structure ‘should not be viewed as the final answer in this business as there is no final answer’.30
While tactical atomic weapons were a revolution in warfare, the pentomic division was not to last. One critique of the system argued that ‘pentomic divisions were relatively inflexible, without specific tailoring to adapt them to widely varying environments’.31 Another stated in an interview that every time he thought of the pentomic design he shuddered.32 Further field exercises proved the pentomic system to be better suited for defensive operations, especially due to its heavy artillery and reduced troop numbers. Ultimately Wyman’s words were prescient, and though it represented a radical break from the past33 the pentomic experiment resulted in a move away from the ‘emotional, traditional, and institutional aspects of military organizations, and creating new functional units that would meet the requirements of modern conventional or nuclear warfare’.34
With the pentomic design’s limitations becoming obvious, an alternative concept was required. Vice Chief of Staff General Clyde Eddleman directed General Herbert Powell, commander of the Continental Army Command, to formulate a new divisional organisation in late 1960. Within three months Powell’s team presented the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) 1961–1965. This study proposed that infantry, armoured and mechanised infantry would have a common base for commanders to assign combat battalions. The divisional organisation would also be dependent on the type of manoeuvre battalions attached. This ‘tailored’ approach was designed to provide the greatest flexibility and was based on the previous triangular division.35 But, like the pentomic design, ROAD was criticised by senior officers. General Adams commented on the allocation of radios, arguing that, at almost one for every five personnel, the number appeared excessive.36 Regardless, the new President, John F Kennedy, after Chief of Staff approval in May 1961, announced to Congress the new divisional organisation. The new structure allied with Kennedy’s ‘Flexible Response’ strategy, which maintained a powerful nuclear force with increased conventional forces, mainly in Europe, while dealing with counterinsurgency.37 The change to the new organisation was to begin in early 1962 and be completed by the end of 1963. However, possibly learning from the pentomic experience, only two divisions were altered until field-testing was completed and equipment became available. Although the changes to ROAD were finalised in May 1964, only European-based divisions could complete the conversion as additional personnel were not made available.
Divisional Reform in Australia
Kalev Sepp, speaking at the 1996 Conference of Army Historians in Arlington, Virginia, was incorrect in his pronouncement that ‘no other nation or service chose to emulate [the US Army’s] unique adaptation to the imagined nuclear battlefield of the future’.38 The Australian Army conducted its own reforms at the advent of atomic warfare. A newspaper article published soon after the end of the war heralded ‘the fourth age of war’, as the ‘atomic bomb is not simply a new weapon. It is a new kind of warfare, a completely new type of war’.39 This sentiment was reinforced in the Australian Parliament as early as 1946 when Thomas White, Member for Balaclava, declared that the ‘atomic bomb has completely revolutionized warfare’ and that the ‘defence factor stressed a decade ago by military and political leaders is very much out-dated today’.40 Parliamentary concerns, though, concentrated more on the peaceful use of atomic energy until the Cold War became of greater importance.
By the mid-1950s the Australian Army began preparations for a future battlefield that included tactical nuclear weapons. Returning from a conference called by Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Australian Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell, declared ‘Army planning must be based on what will and might happen in atomic warfare’. In an interview with newspapers, Rowell spoke of four main problems: the need to disperse troops against nuclear damage; battlefield mobility to offset communications loss; resourcefulness in commanders of all grades; and simplification of administrative processes. He considered ‘that in attack we will have to shape our tactics so that we will provide the enemy with a concentration that will give him an ideal target for nuclear bombs’.41 Rowell’s replacement as CGS on his retirement in December 1954, ‘Bomba’ Wells, continued Rowell’s thinking. Just before his appointment, having returned from commanding Commonwealth forces in Korea, Wells spoke of the need to develop new doctrine and said that it ‘might take some years to find the answer to the problems’.42 The following year, the Army began training in atomic warfare, beginning with exercises for senior officers,43 reflecting NATO tactical doctrine in Europe.44 At the same time Lieutenant General Bruce Clarke, US Army Commander in the Pacific, while visiting Australia for Coral Sea Week in May 1955,45 addressed the Military Board. Clarke discussed the pentomic doctrine of atomic warfare.46 The Minister for the Army, Josiah Francis, wrote to the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, informing him of the newly devised concept and the changes tactical nuclear weapons would pose on the battlefield of the future.47
The initial work on a new divisional structure began soon after. A study group was formed comprising senior officers with experience in jungle warfare. In the first such study to be undertaken by the Australian Army, the group was to design an organisation that would operate only in South-East Asia against a numerically superior force; the Regular Army would act as a ready-reaction force until the Citizen Military Forces could be mobilised. The new organisation must have a high firepower ratio and be able to operate in all terrain in South-East Asia in conventional or nuclear war.48
A new organisational structure was announced publicly in November 1959. In the House of Representatives, Minister for Defence Athol Townley told fellow parliamentarians of the proposal to reorganise the Australian Army ‘on lines similar to the United States Army, which is based on the pentomic division’. These changes would ‘produce regular and CMF forces well organized, trained and equipped, which will be able to play a prompt and effective part with our allies in any hostilities in which we may become involved’.49 The new division, though not dependent for effectiveness, was to be ‘capable, if necessary, of operating with nuclear weapons’.50 Simultaneously, part of a new three-year Defence plan was the abolition of national service.51 The CGS, Lieutenant General Sir Ragnar Garrett, wanted to keep the funds spent on national service to be used for the modernisation of the Army.
Labeled pentropic for its five-sided structure and replacement of the tropical establishment, the new organisation was specifically designed for use in tropical regions and consisted of five air-transportable infantry units.52 Infantry battalions, of five companies each of five platoons, were 50 per cent larger than before, with twice the firepower. Support was provided by a reconnaissance squadron, an armoured regiment, five field regiments, a field engineer regiment, and a signals regiment, called a Combat Support Group. According to the initial article on the changes in the Australian Army Journal of February 1960, the pentropic division conferred ‘much greater flexibility’ for the divisional commander than previously. A battalion would be commanded by a full colonel, with a lieutenant colonel as second-in-command. At the opposite end of command, in the rifle companies, the platoon commander’s task was ‘made as simple as possible by removing all supporting weapons from his command and by adding an additional assault section to increase his flexibility’.53 With the introduction of a new general-purpose machine gun, the machine gun platoon was removed, being replaced by anti-tank weapons.
Subsequent articles in the Australian Army Journal expanded on the concepts put forward. The role of armour in the Combat Support Group was to be similar to the old armoured car regiment, but with increased personnel and equipment in each squadron’s headquarters and the inclusion of a surveillance troop. The new element was the addition of armoured personnel carriers ‘to provide the infantry with the additional protection and mobility required in nuclear or conventional warfare’.54 A Special Air Service (SAS) company, whose primary role was medium-range and long-range reconnaissance, as well as battlefield surveillance, would be attached to each Combat Support Group. The SAS company would be ‘a versatile and highly mobile force’ to rapidly collect accurate information.55
The changes to the division were not limited to structure but also extended to equipment. New vehicles, weapons and other equipment were selected to maximise mobility, especially by air, maximise firepower and ‘possess a nuclear potential’. Vehicles and weapons were to be ‘a simplified family’ that were compatible and standardised with US types. Rifle companies were to be armed with the L1A1 SLR (self-loading rifle) and M60 general-purpose machine gun, both firing standard NATO 7.62 mm rounds. Armoured vehicles were to include Saladin and Saracen armoured cars, the Ferret Scout car and the Centurion tank.56
Command changes at divisional level were designed for greater flexibility and control. The divisional commander was to retain ‘all the responsibilities for command in training and battle’, but the ‘complexity of divisional operations may well prevent the commander from giving personal attention to all the detailed matters of command’.57 To fulfill command tasks in a more complex environment the commander would ‘rely on his staff to a greater extent than before’, with delegation important. The divisional commander was to be assisted by a deputy commander, who would contribute to policy and planning while also being task force commander. To the normal division headquarters was added a radiological centre to assist and advise on nuclear, biological and chemical matters, particularly radiological hazards.
The new structure consisted of three types of groupings: battle, task force and combined teams. A battle group was a battalion with other services or arms attached. Each battle group would include a field artillery regiment and a field engineer squadron, with aviation and additional artillery added when required. Like a battle group, a task force was to have no fixed composition but be organised to achieve particular tasks. Typically based on two or more battalions, but potentially an infantry battalion and armoured regiment, the task force was either commanded by direct divisional control or run as an independent mission. Although there were nominal changes, the ‘principles of handling a headquarters and for grouping within the division have not changed’—rather the changes increased flexibility.58
Reform was not limited to direct warfighting. In January 1964 the article ‘Public Relations in the Pentropic Division’ appeared in the Australian Army Journal. Written by Captain A Dunne, Public Relations Officer, Northern Command, the article proposed a pentropic public relations war establishment to assist in the commander’s public relations plan, collect material and liaise with media outlets.59
The reorganisation was not limited to the regular Army but also affected the CMF. The disbandment of units to comply with the new pentropic structure caused angst amongst the citizen soldiers, with many becoming surplus to establishment.60 In Parliament the Member for Parkes, Leslie Haylen, queried the Minister for Army, John Cramer, over the future of the CMF. Haylen referred to correspondence he had received from a unit commander whose unit was to disappear and be absorbed into other units.61 Haylen may have been overstating his case, though, when in March 1960 he said that the ‘CMF are just a rabble of reinforcements for the pentropic forces’.62 Although the pentropic organisation had a negative impact on the CMF, change, as Dayton McCarthy wrote in his history of the CMF, was inevitable. Despite the problems of the implementation, the CMF did benefit from improved equipment and more integrated training with the regular Army.
The Pentropic Division in Action
Major exercises were held following the divisional alterations to test the new organisation. The first was the CGS exercise, held at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, attended by nearly 150 senior officers from all services. Delegates came from the US, Britain and New Zealand to observe new equipment that had been, or was soon to be, introduced into the Australian Army.63 Three more CGS exercises followed, as well as three major field exercises: Icebreaker, Nutcracker and Sky High. The second of these exercises, Operation Nutcracker, involved 8,000 soldiers and included a task force of two battle groups, supported by armour, and CMF troops.64
The final exercise, Sky High, involved Iroquois helicopters landing infantry and simulating casualty evacuation, and included 600 British troops.65 According to Army comments, the pentropic structure, though ‘new and different from any other national Field Force Organization’ was classified as ‘basically sound’.66 This sentiment was supported by some officers. Major General Alan Morriso e executive officer of 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment between 1962 and 1964, commented that, though initially difficult, once understood the pentropic system was simple. The five-company structure provided a reserve that could be used as an exploitation force and provide better echelon protection.67
In October 1962 the Minister for Army, Athol Townley, announced a new Three-Year Defence Programme. Before Parliament Townley spoke of the requirement to increase defence expenditure in order to maintain ‘highly trained forces of all three services, equipped with modern, conventional weapons and as self-contained as possible’. The forces were to ‘be readily available to work either together or with allied forces in situations that might pose a threat to our security, wherever they might develop’. Citing the crises developing in Cuba and North-East India, Townley mentioned that South-East Asia was of ‘primary strategic importance to Australia’ and the region faced ‘increasing Communist pressures’.68 To accomplish the perceived tasks, the government decided to increase Army personnel by 17 per cent and continue equipment purchases.69
The Demise
The pentropic division was not without its critics. An initial extreme reaction was from the Sydney Tribune, which claimed that the government’s decision to form two pentropic divisions was ‘the best possible means for making sure that from now on Australia is continually on the verge of intervening in an Asian country’.70 Leslie Haylen, the Member for Parkes, expressed a similar sentiment. During parliamentary debate in March 1960 he queried the government’s defence expenditure, claiming that the country had a ‘curiously named pentropic force’, ‘a badly mauled and shattered CMF’, ‘a Navy with eight ships, with 300 cooks’ and an Air Force ‘comprising sixteen squadrons, most of which are obsolete or obsolescent’.71 In March 1964 Sir Wilfrid Hughes, Member for Chisholm, argued that the Army could be improved. He proposed three battle groups and urged:
[For] goodness sake let us get rid of this pentropic organization which does not fit in with the American army, the British army or anybody else we may have to fight with in South-East Asia.72
By this time several arguments against the pentropic structure had become prevalent. These included that the US Army had abandoned the pentomic division; that the structure was not standardised with allied divisions; that the old system had worked; that the pentropic division was too unwieldy and therefore hard to command; and that Australia should not differ from larger allied powers.73 All the arguments held a degree of validity but could also, equally, be rebutted. For the Army, though, the new structure resulted in a reduction of personnel in command administration, and training that caused anxiety. Commenting on the changes the CGS, Lieutenant General Reginald Pollard, stated that cuts were made on an arbitrary basis, rather than after ‘detailed examination of minimum tasks required’. Certain cuts were ‘excessive’ and resulted in overloading that was ‘serious’, with certain essential administrative procedures ‘falling behind’.74
The debate within the military over the pentropic division was carried out in the Australian Army Journal during 1964. The Directorate of Military Training, unsurprisingly, argued for the structure outlined in the article ‘King of the Jungle or Paper Tiger’, claiming that the ‘changes that were made were essential and inevitable’, and that though there were imperfections they were ‘neither great nor insurmountable’.75 Brigadier RT Eason responded to the directorate’s claims by saying that it lacked ‘battle know-how’ and the pentropic structure was ‘a Paper Tarzan and like all wild creatures of the jungle, he will be hard to command and lacking in stamina’.76 Colonels CMI Pearson and WJ Morrow opposed Eason’s views, especially those put forward about unwieldy commands, countering that until ‘the new organisation is tried in war we can do little but philosophise and exercise’, but implored ‘those who have the good fortune to serve in it to try and understand it, rather than to simply criticize it’.77 What was apparent though was that the complexity of the structure made it more difficult to command. Platoon commanders, who were usually young and inexperienced, were required to command a larger formation. For the CMF the impact was great and resulted in the demise of many old units that had strong links to the local community. Although the new regiments were given the prefix ‘Royal’, the designation did not counter the belief among some CMF officers that the changes were in revenge for pre-Second World War friction with regular officers. Added to this was the need to reorganise along British lines troops that were dispatched to Malaya as part of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve.
The existence of the pentropic structure came under increasing pressure with the appointment of a new CGS, Lieutenant General Sir John Wilton, in 1963. Wilton had never been a supporter of the new organisational structure, stating later that it was ‘unwise to experiment with such a fundamental change at that stage, and we couldn’t really afford the effort in terms of time and manpower to test it thoroughly’.78 Wilton had not been in the country during the pentropic implementation, making it easier for him to deconstruct the organisation on his appointment as CGS.79 With the pentropic system incompatible with either the US or British divisional structures, and following public criticism, Wilton ordered a review in October 1964. The report, by Major General John Andersen, recommended a reversion to the previous triangular structure, but with the addition of aviation.80 The Andersen Report, as it was named, was approved by the Military Board and Cabinet in December 1964 and January 1965, respectively.81 For Wilton this was ‘the quickest decision I managed to get taken by the Government in my time’ as CGS.82
The demise of the pentropic organisation and the implementation of its replacement, the Tropical Warfare establishment, was timely. By the end of the year the Australian Government was informed of the possibility of US troops being deployed in South Vietnam ‘together with such ground forces as Australia and New Zealand might be able to provide’.83 Soon after, US president Lyndon Johnson wrote to the Australian Prime Minister, Menzies, calling for expanded assistance from ‘our closest allies in the area, the Australians’.84 The Chiefs of Staff, meeting two days later, advised the government that to counter increased guerilla activity ‘sizeable US and allied ground forces supported by air attacks’ would be required.85 Before Parliament on 29 April 1965, Menzies announced that he had received ‘a request form the Government of South Vietnam for further military assistance’ and, in consultation with the US, decided that an infantry battalion would be dispatched.86 Australia’s commitment to the conflict in Vietnam was sealed and with it the recently reorganised Army.
Conclusion
The pentropic divisional structure was ‘the most radical attempt at reorganization of the Australian Army in the 20th century’.87 The resultant structure proved to be unwieldy and inflexible, however, with excessive reliance on combat support elements to provide the needs of policy planners. Although the pentropic structure was abandoned as a wasteful experiment, it did force the Army to assess all facets of the organisation and implement improvements,88 while the Andersen Report highlighted the advantages of an aviation arm. The adoption of a structure and equipment similar to the US Army’s was an indication of the shift toward coalition warfare. But these positive outcomes failed to offset the disadvantages and confusion caused by the reforms, particularly within the CMF. The failure of the pentropic experiment was apparent in its inability to work with either the British or the US structures of the early 1960s, and in the speed of its replacement following the Andersen Report. The reversion to the previous triangular structure was made in time for Australia’s largest involvement in South-East Asia, Vietnam.
Endnotes
1 David T Fatua, 1997, ‘The “Long Pull” Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army’, Journal of Military History 61: 94.
2 John Lewis Gaddis, 2005, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 81.
3 Melvyn P Leffler, 2010, ‘The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952’, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 83.
4 Richard W Kedzior, 2000, Evolution and Endurance: The US Army Division in the Twentieth Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), 23.
5 Robert A Divine, 1981, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press), 37.
6 John Foster Dulles, 1954, ‘Policy for Security and Peace’, Foreign Affairs 32: 354.
7 Ibid., 357.
8 Ibid., 358.
9 Ibid., 363.
10 ‘The Atomic-Age Army’, The New York Times, 24 March 1957, 27.
11 ‘Devers Valedictory: Atom is a Ground Aid’, The New York Times, 29 September 1949, 7.
12 James M Gavin, 1951, ‘The Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 7: 46–50.
13 George Reinhardt, 1952, ‘Notes on the Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons’, Military Review 32: 28-37.
14 Frank J Sackton, 1954, ‘Atomic Weapons for the Battalion Commander’, Army Combat Forces Journal 5: 18–22.
15 George Reinhardt and William Kintner, 1955, ‘The Tactical Side of Atomic Warfare’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 11: 53–56.
16 Thomas R Phillips, 1954, ‘The Atomic Revolution in Warfare’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10: 315–317.
17 George Reinhardt and William Kintner, 1953, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company), 224.
18 Hanson Baldwin, ‘An Atom Bomb “Family”’, The New York Times, 15 June 1951, 8.
19 Robert A Doughty, 1979, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute), 16.
20 Matthew B Ridgway, 1956, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers), 286.
21 James Gavin, 1958, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper), 137–139.
22 John M Taylor, 1989, General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen (New York: Doubleday), 193.
23 Pentomic was, according to Taylor’s memoirs, so termed by ‘Madison Avenue’ to offset the appearance of unglamorous conventional forces—‘pent’ referring to the five battle groups, and ‘tomic’ for atomic fire support. However, its official name was Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division (ROCID). It may be open to interpretation that the ‘pent’ also came from the physical structure of the Pentagon, the US military headquarters.
24 Donald A Carter, 2015, The US Army before Vietnam, 1953–1965 (Washington: Center of Military History), 27.
25 AJ Bacevich, 1986, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: National Defense University Press), 105.
26 Mark J Bacon, 2003, ‘A Question of Limited War: Generals James Gavin and Maxwell Taylor, and Their Influence on US Military Policy, from the New Look to Flexible Response’, MA thesis, Central Missouri State University, 53.
27 ‘1,200 Paratroopers Jump in Test of ‘Pentomic’ Division’, The New York Times, 12 January 1957, 3.
28 Carter, 2015, 29.
29 John J McGrath, 2004, The Brigade: A History, its Organization and Employment in the US Army (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press), 61.
30 Willard G Wyman, 1958, ‘The Pentomic Division’, Vital Speeches of the Day 24, 432.
31 Virgil Ney, 1969, ‘Evolution of the US Army Division 1939–1968’ (Fort Belvoir: US Army Combat Operations Developments Command), 74.
32 Bacevich, 1986, 135.
33 ‘Reorganising the Armies’, The Manchester Guardian, 23 February 1957, 1.
34 Ney, 1969, 74.
35 Carter, 2015, 37¬–38.
36 Ibid., 38.
37 EN Saunders, 2011, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 108.
38 Kalev I Sepp, 2001, ‘The Pentomic Puzzle: The Influence of Personality and Nuclear Weapons on US Army Organization 1952–1958’, Army History 51, 2.
39 ‘The Atomic Bomb Introduces the Fourth Age of War’, The Argus (Melbourne), 17 November 1945, 2.
40 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 8 August 1946, 4067.
41 ‘Army Training Tactics Must be Revised for Atomic War’, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 September 1954, 2.
42 ‘Army Prepares New Tactics for Atom War’, The Argus (Melbourne), 2 November 1954, 6.
43 ‘Atomic War Exercises for Army Units’, The Canberra Times, 25 July 1955, 2.
44 ‘This Is the Shape of Things to Come’, The World’s News (Sydney), 15 January 1955, 3.
45 ‘Service Honours for General Clarke’, The Canberra Times, 3 May 1955, 2.
46 Address by Lieutenant General Bruce C Clarke to Military Board, 5 May 1955, National Archives of Australia, NAA A5954, 1451/4.
47 Letter from Minister for the Army, Josiah Francis to Prime Minster, Robert Menzies, 27 May 1955, NAA A1209, 23/1957/4076.
48 ‘King of the Jungle or Paper Tiger’, Australian Army Journal 179 (1964), 5.
49 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 26 November 1959, 3188.
50 ‘Major Army Changes to Start Immediately’, The Canberra Times, 28 November 1959, 3.
51 ‘No National Service in Reorganised Defence Plan’, The Canberra Times, 27 November 1959, 1.
52 ‘Pentropic Division’, Australian Army Journal 129 (1960), 7.
53 Ibid., 10.
54 ‘Armour in the Combat Support Group’, Australian Army Journal 133 (1960), 9.
55 ‘The Special Air Service Company’, Australian Army Journal 133 (1960), 16.
56 ‘Equipment for the Pentropic Division’, Australian Army Journal 134 (1960), 9–29.
57 ‘Command Grouping for Battle in the Pentropic Division’, Australian Army Journal 135 (1960), 5.
58 Ibid., 11.
59 ‘Public Relations in the Pentropic Division’, Australian Army Journal 176 (1964), 42–44.
60 Dayton McCarthy, 2003, Once and Future Army: A History of the Citizen Military Forces 1947–1974 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press), 103.
61 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 17 March 1960, 404.
62 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 31 March 1960, 808.
63 ‘Exercise, Weapons Display’, The Canberra Times, 9 August 1961, 5.
64 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 25 October 1962, 70.
65 ‘Gap Was Man-Made’, The Canberra Times, 8 November 1963, 5.
66 ‘Army Comments on Defence Notes on the Army Programme 1962–65’, 29 June 1962, NAA A6059, 23/441/60.
67 David Horner, 2008, Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment (2nd edition) (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), 114–115.
68 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 24 October 1962, 1877.
69 Ibid., 1881.
70 ‘“Pentropic” Brinkmen are Planning a War in Asia’, Tribune (Sydney), 6 April 1960, 9.
71 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 31 March 1960, 805.
72 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 4 March 1964, 264.
73 ‘King of the Jungle or Paper Tiger’, Australian Army Journal 179 (1964), 6–9.
74 ‘Army Comments on Defence Notes on the Army Programme 1962–65’, 29 June 1962, NAA A6059, 23/441/60.
75 ‘King of the Jungle or Paper Tiger’, Australian Army Journal 179 (1964), 9.
76 RT Eason, ‘The Paper Tarzan’, Australian Army Journal 183 (1964), 11.
77 CMI Pearson and WJ Morrow, ‘The Pentropic Division: Another Point of View’, Australian Army Journal 187 (1964), 10.
78 Army Historical Programme, interview with Wilton, Australian War Memorial, AWM 107, 5.
79 David Horner, 2005, Strategic Command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian Wars (Melbourne: Oxford University Press), 177.
80 Andersen Report, 23 November 1964, NAA A2653, 604/R6/7.
81 Ian McNeill, 1993, To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), 22.
82 Army Historical Programme, interview with Wilton, AWM107, 5.
83 Peter Edwards, 1992, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 337.
84 Letter from Jack Lydman, Chargé d’Affaires US Embassy, Canberra, to Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, 14 December 1964, NAA A1945, 248/2/100.
85 ‘Aid to South Vietnam: Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee’, 16 December 1964, NAA A1954, 248/4/100.
86 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 29 April 1965, 1060.
87 Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior and Jean Bou, 2008, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (2nd edition) (Melbourne: Oxford University Press), 419.
88 McNeill, 1993, 22.
