A Larger Australian Defence Force—More than Just Mass

Abstract

There are many advantages of increasing the commitment of Australia’s citizens to national institutions such as the ADF. Larger reserve organisations (for all services) provide a large base level of capability that serves as the nation’s ultimate insurance policy—to provide the basis for mobilisation in the event of major interstate conflict. This traditional view, while still important, neglects the many other advantages, such as the effect of having a larger proportion of society serve, thereby contributing to the integration of all elements of the nation. Australia is made up of many diverse cultures, and service to the nation is one of the best approaches to integrate all of those cultures to national advantage. Regardless of background, shared common experience among young individuals will influence their actions, potentially for the rest of their lives. Part-time service in the ADF can provide that experience. This essay considers the Swiss experience of over 150 years of reservist conscription and its positive effects on society, and suggests its application in Australia. The limiting factors are funding, the political commitment and acceptance by the population. Service to the nation, no matter how long or short, is remembered by individuals and influences their actions long past their service.

Introduction

In 1906, Colonel William Bridges,¹ in his role as the Australian Chief of Intelligence, visited Switzerland to gain an understanding of their model of force design and how it could benefit Australia. The first paragraph of Bridges’s report contains the bottom-line statement:

In most, if not all, Anglo-Saxon countries, the army only affects the majority of people indirectly; but in Switzerland every man either serves in the army or pays a direct tax towards its maintenance.²

Switzerland introduced national service in 1848 and identifies itself, in both past and present, as an armed neutral. This means it was, and still is, fully prepared to use force to defend its sovereignty but considers itself neutral in affairs outside its borders.³ This neatly captures Bridges’s findings:

Switzerland’s great defence advantage is that its military, people, industry and politics are virtually indistinguishable. Every aspect of the nation understands and is involved in its defence.

There is strength in this relationship, and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should seek advantage in this area. However, the difference between our two nations is the size of the military compared to the size of the population.⁴ Switzerland’s key advantage is that a larger proportion of its population is involved in its defence. For the ADF, increasing its size, or mass, has distinct advantages beyond the purely military ones.

For the ADF to increase in size, the Australian Government must see advantage in the first, second and third-order effects that this increase in mass will generate, balanced against the cost incurred. These advantages can largely be achieved through increasing the size of the part-time elements of the force. An increase in the number of part-time service men and women provides a base to expand the full-time force in times of need, strengthens the relationship between the ADF and Australian society, develops the social and occupational potential of young Australians and acts as an integration function for society. Part-time members do not incur the same cost as full-time members, based on the temporary nature of their service; however, there is still a cost. Therefore a careful balance will need to occur between cost and benefit. This balance will shift based on the threat that the Government is prepared to accept; otherwise the additional funding required will not be forthcoming.

Expansion in Times of Need

When a government increases the size of its military, it is generally to meet a threat it perceives, either internationally or domestically. The current international order is a result of recent changes. To quote Allan Gyngell, ‘the order we have known for the past seventy years has ended. It’s not being challenged. It’s not changing. It’s over’.⁵ Terrorism is still a global scourge. Russia is seeking a return to its former glory, and the balance in East Asia has changed. Indeed, military power across East Asia continues to grow, with a number of nations possessing significant military capabilities. As the recent US Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress assessed:

The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] also continues to implement the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning ‘informatized local wars’—regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control (C2), and precision strike.⁶

The ADF has recently experienced this disconnection between the number of full time personnel available and the type of operations it planned to conduct, during operations in East Timor. (Image courtesy Defence)

The same report highlighted that the PLA Marine Corps has six brigades forming a core expeditionary force.⁷

China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative looks to support its domestic development as much as to expand its international influence. It leverages economic, diplomatic and military capabilities to pursue this aim.⁸ The OBOR initiative is likely to continue to drive overseas basing of military capabilities such as the PLA Navy support base in Djibouti (on the horn of Africa) and construction of islands in the South China Sea. Its use of all elements of its national power to pursue a national strategy is to be expected, although the end point may challenge the current international order. Therefore, as Stephan Frühling says, ‘Australia’s security, its perceptions of security, and its ability to defend itself will increasingly depend directly on the contemporary state of political relationships in Asia’ and the military forces they control.⁹

Numerous Australian Defence White Papers assert that Australia has time to identify a threat and appropriately prepare for it. Some have even stated that there will be up to 10 years’ warning; however, this view has been challenged by many commentators, including Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin- Smith.¹⁰ Furthermore, old rivalries continue, such as those between Pakistan and India or Iran and the US, and competition between states will always have the potential to escalate to war. It would be easy to suggest that we have enough evidence now—so why should we not prepare? This alone could justify an increase in the size of the ADF. To expand the size of the ADF takes time. It is not a simple undertaking and, depending on the size of the increase, it could be measured in years. To be able to increase the size of a defence force quickly and with the appropriate capabilities matched to the character of the conflict or challenge faced is a very difficult activity for any nation.

Australia has made mistakes in the recognition of the threat and the timeliness of the response. The 1920s and 1930s provided enough indicators and warnings that war was coming. However, when war did come in 1939 with Germany and in 1941 with Japan, the Australian military was unprepared.¹¹ A report on the military defence of Australia noted in 1920, ‘The Empire of Japan remains, therefore, in the immediate future, as the only potential and probable enemy.’¹² As Jeffery Grey notes:

… in March 1939 Cabinet approved in principle the raising of a permanent field force, but when [Prime Minister] Lyons died in office a month later he was succeeded as prime minister by R.G. Menzies, who reversed the decision—allegedly for financial reasons.¹³

To expand the Army took time and was never as simple as training private soldiers; it also required the training and development of every rank level above them. This was a significant challenge with an estimated 726,000 Australians serving in the Army between 1939 and 1945.¹⁴ However, if the Government had acknowledged the threat in the mid-1930s, more appropriate resources could have been allocated, the scale of the subsequent expansion could have been better managed, and the time needed could have been reduced. This additional investment would be of most value in the development of leaders, who take time to learn and develop their skills that can then be leveraged during expansion and when conducting operations— particularly when rapid promotion occurs. Any additional investment in this area now will be of value to any operation in the future.

Australia will always have a small defence force in comparison to other nations, but the idea of Australia needing to fight any future conflict alone is false. Australia has always gone to war in cooperation with other nations and is likely to continue to do so in the future. Therefore, the ADF may provide the tipping point by contributing mass and capability for any future multilateral force to win. Any future conflict will see the permanent force elements from the ADF deploy first, simply because of their readiness for conflict. This has been the experience of the last 20 years. However, in any future large-scale interstate conflict there will be a requirement for the ADF to deploy as much as it can, to try to end the war quickly. History, unfortunately, tells us that wars do not end quickly; therefore new forces will be required, and that means mobilisation depending on the scale of the conflict. The intricacies of mobilisation are beyond the scope of this discussion; however, more trained people and leaders will be required when the time to train and prepare them is at a premium.

The ADF has experienced this disconnection between the number of full- time personnel available and the types of operations it planned to conduct during operations in East Timor. Due to the limited number of regular, full- strength infantry battalions, a large number of reservists accepted full-time service. This was the case for the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, in 2003 when it incorporated 200 reservists to bring it up to full strength prior to its deployment.¹⁵

A part-time member, due to the nature of their service, costs less than a full-time member and requires less time to make battle-ready than an untrained citizen. Consequently, a larger ADF in the form of a larger reserve will require additional funding, although not as much as a similar increase of trained full-time members. A reservist, (depending on their background) will in general not be as fully trained or prepared as a full-time member; however, they will be better trained than someone with no military experience. The clear exception is in areas that directly require a professional qualification or experience (such as medical professions) matched to a military need. The general assumption is that the lead time to prepare a reservist is less than that required to train an inexperienced volunteer from the start. The capabilities used by reserve forces (for example, additional vehicles) would also need to be considered against the cost of those additional items and the overall capability and training standards they should achieve. The standard a reservist is trained to will in general (there are always exceptions) be lower than that required for operations. This gap in training standards should be considered as a risk that can be reduced with increases in preparation time prior to a deployment. A careful balance will need to be managed between the cost of increase and the benefits of an increased force size. This scale extends from a small number of reservists called up for a specific operation (described above) to national service.

In contrast, the Swiss have consistently maintained a large military organisation with conventional capabilities (infantry, tank, armoured personnel carrier, artillery, air defence, etc.) based on a part-time conscription model. They have enabled this capability by training their force through a period of initial full-time service and then a continuing part-time commitment. They have committed only small numbers of troops to various peacekeeping operations, with the main force focused on the defence of Switzerland. The Swiss armed forces have fluctuated in size over time, depending on the circumstances they face. With a current population of 8 million (one-third of Australia’s), Switzerland has a military of 240,000 members (compared to Australia’s ADF of approximately 80,000 active full- time and part-time members).¹⁶ Switzerland’s military commitment therefore represents approximately 3 per cent of its population, compared to an Australian figure of approximately 0.32 per cent. If Australia were to match the Swiss 3 per cent, we would expect an ADF of approximately 750,000 people. During the Second World War, ‘at the peak of its mobilisation Switzerland had 850,000 men under arms or standing in reserve, which represented a fifth of the total population’.¹⁷ One of the reasons why Switzerland has never been invaded is the deterrence effect produced by such a large and capable military, combined with the mountainous geography it defends. During the Cold War, the Swiss maintained large conventional forces. This has continued since 1989. For example, the Swiss military has acquired 380 Leopard 2A4 Main Battle Tanks, 581 M109 155 mm self-propelled guns and 310 Piranha I 6x6 vehicles armed with TOW-2.¹⁸ These systems are suited for a military force designed to deter a conventional state-based threat, which would be assumed to have large numbers of armoured vehicles and artillery. They are employed by a force that (for soldiers) conducts 18 weeks of initial training followed by a single three – to four-week training block every year until the required number of days have been served.¹⁹

Conventional deterrence is one advantage of a large military, but another is its integration effect on the society from which it comes.

Although part-time elements require additional training and equipment and are therefore less ready, they do have advantages especially the close ties they have to their communities. (Image courtesy Defence)

Relationship Between the ADF and Society

Switzerland’s continuing commitment to national service seems odd given that the last time it faced a credible conventional state-based threat was in 1989 from the then Warsaw Pact. Many other European nations used national service as a foundation for their defence during the Cold War but ceased it when the threat disappeared. Switzerland clearly sees value in continuing national service, not just because of the deterrence effect a large military has against any state-based adversary but also for the cohesive effect service has on Swiss society. Perhaps the military’s effect on Swiss society is seen as more valuable than a traditional role of deterrence against other states. Former Chief of the Defence Force Admiral (Rtd) Chris Barrie experienced this first hand during the Sydney Olympics, at a breakfast held with the then president of the Swiss federation.

In conversation, he told me he would return to Switzerland within two weeks to undertake his annual national service obligation. I wondered why the head of state would feel compelled to undertake his national service obligation, but he explained as a proud member of the Swiss community he accepted the obligation, and went on to say ‘our national service makes us Swiss’.²⁰

The shared experience gained from serving the nation in your youth (the initial period of full-time training) and the ongoing commitment to its security (the annual, ongoing, part-time commitments) provides value to the nation and enhances the national identity of individuals with their nation. It trains and develops the nation’s youth at a time when they are commencing their working lives, thus providing them with a foundation of individual discipline they can leverage into the future. Australia is not a stranger to this experience, with periods of our military and societal history characterised by national service with both full-time and part-time forces.²¹ Australia has had several periods of national service in its history. Arguably the most important iteration occurred soon after the outbreak of the Second World War. This saw compulsory service with the militia in Australia only, which was in accordance with the Defence Act 1903 (Cth).²² In February 1943 the Government further defined Australia to include New Guinea and adjacent islands, thus enabling militia units to serve in the region.²³ When the war ended, conscription also ended, until 1951 when the Menzies Government introduced the National Service Scheme (NSS). The NSS was seen as a drain on regular Army manpower during a period of operational commitments to Korea and then Malaya. It lasted eight years, until 1959. Australia’s last experience of national service was from 1964 to 1972. This was different from other schemes in that it was selective, not universal, and that in 1965 the Government introduced new powers allowing national servicemen to deploy overseas, principally to Vietnam.²⁴ Controversies surround Australia’s use of conscription—mainly over the question of whether the Government should have the power to force someone into service to fight. For most, this is logical in the context of the defence of mainland Australia against an existential threat, but less so for wars of choice such as Vietnam. Since 1972 the ADF has relied upon volunteer full- time and part-time forces.

Until 1995, the Army’s part-time force, the Army Reserve, was generally larger or the same size as the regular Army.²⁵ Currently the regular Army is twice the size of the Army Reserve.²⁶ This suits the Army, as there has been a need to provide trained land forces at short notice to a number of different operations since 1999. Although part-time elements require additional training and equipment to meet the standard Army deems suitable for current operations, and are therefore less ready, they do have advantages, especially the close ties they have with society. These ties have been enabled through long associations between units and communities. Many Army Reserve units can trace their lineage back to the First World War, when upon return they became part-time militia units that have remained in the community since.

The ADF currently has seven different service categories in which a person can render service.²⁷ Only one of these categories is for those rendering full-time service; the rest have various levels of commitment and could be considered part time. Part-time members may be considered more integrated with society than full-time members, particularly those who have other jobs and fulfil their military service as a second career. With this in mind, a larger ADF—particularly a part-time one—would greatly enhance and strengthen the ADF’s relationship with society. This relationship could include providing shared common experiences to Australians in their youth and aid in the integration of society. A number of programs are available for this, including the ADF Gap Year program, but the real challenge is increasing the number of people participating in these programs. If Australia is to reconsider the size of the ADF and the basis of its force structure, it should look to the advantages the Swiss have found in their national service: namely that a large part-time force is a valuable integration tool for a nation’s society.

Integration Function for Society

The Swiss military identifies four roles for itself: to defend Switzerland, to contribute leadership experience to society, to integrate new members into society and to maintain national cohesion.²⁸ The first role has an outward focus, as expected of a national military force, but the other roles are all inwardly focused on Swiss society and are perhaps of the most relevance to the nation. Switzerland has four official languages: German, French, Italian and Romanic. These languages reflect the mix of cultures resident in Swiss society. National service is used to integrate all elements of Swiss society: the rich, the poor, new citizens and members of long- established Swiss families are all required to provide service alongside each other. National service is not purely military; civil service is also an option, with approximately 50,000 people providing service in healthcare, welfare, departments such as forestry, and non-profit organisations.²⁹ John Blaxland from the Australian National University has highlighted some of the advantages such a scheme would have for Australian society.³⁰ The inward focus of national service has value for the nation. Senior management in Swiss companies find value and status in their simultaneous part-time service within the military. The military provides them with leadership skills they then transfer into civil sector advantage.

Universal national service does not discriminate against the affluence, culture or religion of those participating; however, it may discriminate against age, criminal convictions, physical and intellectual capacity and gender. In Switzerland, only male citizens are required to serve; female citizens may volunteer (although there is a call for female conscription). Many factors affect the very low incidence of terrorism and radicalisation in Switzerland. A study conducted in 2013 identified one of these factors as Switzerland’s ability to provide a significant degree of social, economic and cultural integration to those living in the nation.³¹ France has experienced a number of terrorist incidents throughout its history and has recently reintroduced national service for all 16 year olds. Although not explicitly stated, this could be interpreted as a strategy to reduce the number of radicalised French citizens. This service includes a month-long placement focusing on civil culture (work in charities, the police, fire service or the military) and is designed to promote social cohesion and foster and sustain a more active sense of citizenship.³²

There are many advantages of increasing the commitment of Australia’s citizens to national institutions such as the ADF. (Image courtesy Defence)

Over the last 40 years, Australia has experienced acts of terrorism and has seen an increase in the number of radicalised people. National service does not need to be purely focused on military service to be effective, as both Switzerland and France have identified. For France, service at a young age is seen as an advantage as well. Australia has a long history of training its youth, and currently Cadets from the three services number approximately 26,000, supported by 3,200 officers and instructors.³³ Under the Australian Universal Training Scheme from 1911 to 1929, three levels of training were instituted: all boys aged 12 to 14 years were to enrol in the junior cadets; 14 – to 18-year-olds were to enrol in senior cadets; and 18 to 26-year-olds had to register with the home defence militia—the Commonwealth Military Forces.³⁴ Dr Craig Stockings has identified this as a ‘significant social and military activity. Hundreds of thousands of cadets were placed in uniforms and graced the drill halls newly built in almost every city, town and village of the nation’.³⁵ This had a significant effect on the nation at the time, and ‘from January to July 1911 alone, a total of 102,194 cadets were medically examined and of these only 3,725 were rejected as unfit for service with another 2,697 deemed temporarily unsuitable’.³⁶ This widespread cadet service or military exposure is important to remember, as the vast majority would go on to serve with the first Australian Imperial Force (AIF). The influence this had on that generation of Australians is important to consider in terms of its integration effect on society for many years after and, for those who would then serve in the AIF, some military and leadership training and experience from which to draw.

For the ADF, increasing the numbers in the part-time Cadets and Reserves is likely to see the greatest benefit for society balanced against the funding required. The scale of the increase is the challenge. Compulsory military service for all would be very difficult to introduce. It would require a proclamation by the Governor-General and approval by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.³⁷ Such a proclamation by the Governor- General can only be issued in time of war, which the Defence Act defines as ‘any invasion or apprehended invasion of, or attack or apprehended attack on, Australia by an enemy or armed force’.³⁸ Therefore, for Australia to introduce conscription in a time of peace, when it would have the greatest effect on Australian society, would require a change in the law. This would be politically unacceptable in current circumstances. Australia has had a chequered history of conscription—from the failed referendums during the First World War to selective conscription during Vietnam. Therefore, more traditional volunteer recruiting initiatives would be required. One option, which was trialled during the Ready Reserve scheme of the 1990s, could be focused on university students and apprentices with fees greatly subsidised if students complete military training during study breaks. Options for how much training is suitable should be balanced against university and apprenticeship study requirements. This would require a subtle change to how Reserves are viewed by the ADF. Reserves are currently viewed as part of a total force alongside the full-time components, because they generate capability required for the conduct of operations that are almost always dangerous and often at short notice. Instead, the Reserves would need to be viewed as an instructor and leadership base for future mobilisation in

the event of large-scale conflict (because the full-time ADF elements will have deployed and will not be of sufficient size to train and prepare a new force) and, perhaps more importantly, as an integration tool for Australian society. The size of the full-time ADF should remain the same or increase in proportion to the part-time component to enable their training. Cadets could be a requirement for attendance at school. Some schools already have this, but if expansion of such a program were to occur, just as with other forms of increase, it would require funding as well as the right people to instruct and manage the increase. Although overseen by the ADF, Cadets are currently trained by members of the Australian community who act as officers or instructors of Cadets.

Military service is not the only option; service in other organisations could also assist in integrating society. Options could follow the Swiss and French model, with welfare, health, local government and emergency service organisations seeing increased participation. This idea has been advocated by others. The challenge will remain getting the required numbers for it to be significant and have an effect. This ultimately requires money. The investment would need to be scalable; the benefits will take time to be seen and may not be of a tangible or measurable nature. The Swiss have had uninterrupted military conscription for over 150 years but only recently enabled a civil service option, in 1996, so this case study is primarily founded on the example of military conscription.³⁹

Military service has other advantages in terms of the actual training that all members undertake. Two simple examples are physical training and medical training. Physical training can be simple, effective and set the conditions for Australians to be more active even after their service ends. Medical training is always advantageous for a wide variety of domestic emergencies. Military service is also a challenging experience and therefore builds confidence and motivates individuals not only during service but for the rest of their lives.

Military service also develops leaders. This skill is readily transferable to a professional workplace and can provide a strong foundation to be built upon.

There are many advantages of increasing the commitment of Australia’s citizens to national institutions such as the ADF. The limiting factors are funding, the political commitment to do so and acceptance by the population. For the ADF specifically, larger reserve organisations (for all services) provide a high base level of capability that serves as the nation’s ultimate insurance policy—to provide the basis for mobilisation in the event of major interstate conflict. This event or strategic shock could occur at short notice, and flexibility is required now because the specifics of the event and the required response are unknowable. However, it is almost certain that people—soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen—will be required. A large part-time force balances the cost of more people now and the requirement to be prepared for the future. Perhaps the more significant advantage is the effect of having a larger proportion of society serve, thereby contributing to the integration of all elements of Australia. Our country is made up of many diverse cultures, and service to the nation is one of the best approaches to integrate all of those cultures for the benefit of the nation. Regardless of an Australian’s background, shared common experience among young individuals will influence their actions, potentially for the rest of their lives. The effectiveness of this will be difficult to measure and is a long-term commitment. Service to your nation, no matter how long or short, is remembered by individuals and influences their actions long past their service.

Endnotes

1. Colonel Bridges would go on to be the first commandant of the Royal Military College Duntroon and command the 1st Australian Division at Gallipoli, where he was fatally wounded in 1915.
    
2. William Bridges, 1907, Report on the Swiss Military System, Compiled in the Department of the Chief of Intelligence (Melbourne: J Kemp, Acting Government Printer), 7.
    
3. Sabine Mannitz, 2007, The Normative Construction of the Soldier in Switzerland: Constitutional Conditions and Public Political Discourse (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute), 6, at: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/Switzerland_9.pdf 
    
4. Switzerland’s population is 8,292,800 and its overall military strength is 241,000 (approx.). Australia’s population is 23,470,100 and its overall military strength is 80,000. Sources (accessed June 2019): CIA Factbook, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/; and Global Firepower, at: https://www.globalfirepower.com/ 
    
5. Allan Gyngell, 2018, ‘Fear of Abandonment: Australia’s Response to Changing Global Orders’, Gallipoli Memorial Lecture, at https://rusi.org/event/gallipoli-memorial-lecture-fear- abandonment-australia%E2%80%99s-response-changing-global-orders 
    
6. Department of Defense, 2019, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: United States Government), ii–iii.
    
7. Department of Defense, 2019, 60–61.
    
8. Department of Defense, 2019, i.
    
9. Stephan Frühling, 2019 ‘The Defence of Australia: From Lucky Country to Uncomfortable Normality’, in Peter Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor (eds), After American Primacy: Imagining the Future of Australia’s Defence (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press), 25.
    
10. Peter Jennings, 2017, ‘Preparing for the War of 2020’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, at: https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/preparing-war-2020
     
11. Jeffrey Grey, 2001, The Australian Centenary History of Defence—Volume 1: The Australian Army (Melbourne: Oxford University Press), 107.
     
12. Australian War Memorial, Report on the Military Defence of Australia, Conference of Senior Officers of the Australian Military Forces, 1920, vol. 1, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, AWM1 20/7, 6.
     
13. Jeffrey Grey, 2001, The Australian Centenary History of Defence—Volume 1: The Australian Army (Melbourne: Oxford University Press), 104.
     
14. Gavin Long, 1963, The Final Campaigns: Australia in the War of 1939–1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial), 635.
     
15. John Blaxland, 2014, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press), 172.
     
16. CIA Factbook and Global Firepower.
     
17. Allen Dulles, 1966, The Secret Surrender: The Classic Insider’s Account of the Secret Plot to Surrender Northern Italy During WWII (New York: Harper & Row), 27–28.
     
18. ‘Swiss Army Equipment’, GlobalSecurity.org, at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/europe/ch-army-equipment.htm
     
19. 245 days for soldiers, 550 days for NCOs and 680 days for junior officers.
     
20. Chris Barrie, ‘We need to Debate Conscription’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 October 2009, at: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/we-need-to-debate-conscription- 20091002-ggf1.html
     
21. Many other nations have had similar experiences, particularly European nations during the Cold War (Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark etc.).
     
22. The Act allowed for a government to introduce conscription for the defence of Australia only and not for service overseas.
     
23. ‘Conscription’, Australian War Memorial, at: https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/encyclopedia/ conscription
     
24. ‘National Service Scheme, 1951–1972’, Australian War Memorial, at: https://www.awm. gov.au/articles/encyclopedia/conscription/vietnam 
     
25. David Anderson, 1997, The Challenge of Military Service: Defence Personnel Conditions in a Changing Social Context (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library), at: https:// www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary… Publications_Archive/Background_Papers/bp9798/98bp06
     
26. Department of Defence, 2017, Annual Report 2016–17 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), at: http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/16-17/
     
27. ‘ADF Total Workforce Model’, Department of Defence, at: http://www.defence.gov.au/adf- totalworkforcemodel/ServiceSpectrum.asp
     
28. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Foster with Colonel Romeo Fritz, Swiss Army, 1 June 2018.
     
29. Jessica Dacey, ‘Booming Civilian Service Raises Questions’, Swiss Info, 27 January 2010, at: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/booming-civilian-service-raises-questions/8175796
     
30. ‘Time to Introduce a New National Service?’, Overnights, ABC Radio, 22 June 2019, at: https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/overnights/time-to-introduce-a-ne…- service/11237410 
     
31. Lorenzo Vidino, 2013, Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland (Zurich: Center for Security Studies), 4.
     
32. Aamna Mohdin, ‘European Countries Are Quietly Bringing Back the Draft, Quartz, 3 July 2018, at: https://qz.com/1318379/france-joins-sweden-and-lithuania-in-bringing-ba…- mandatory-national-service/
     
33. ‘About Cadets’, Department of Defence, at: https://www.armycadets.gov.au/about/about- cadets/
     
34. ‘Universal Service Scheme, 1911–1929’, Australian War Memorial, at: https://www.awm. gov.au/articles/encyclopedia/conscription/universal_service
     
35. Craig Stockings, Australia’s Boy Soldiers: Conscripted Cadets, 1911–1929, in The Great Debate: Conscription and National Service 1912-1972. The proceedings of the conference held at the Pompey Elliot Memorial Hall, 30 May 2005, by Military History and Heritage, Victoria, 11 September 2019, at: https://www.mhhv.org.au/wp-content/uploads/Australia---s-Boy-Soldiers-Conscripted-Cadets-1911-1929-Dr-Craig-Stockings.pdf
     
36. Stockings, 2005.
     
37. Gary Brown, 1999, ‘Military Conscription: Issues for Australia’, Current Issues Brief 7, Parliament of Australia, at: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib9900/2000CIB07
     
38. Brown, 1999.
     
39. Mannitz, 2007