Army Capability Issues: As CLEAR as Daylight

Abstract

This piece investigates the relationship between coastal, littoral, estuarine and riverine (CLEAR) environments and the conduct of Australian Army operations. Exploring the operational importance of these environments within the Indo-Pacific, it demonstrates the need for Army to fight and sustain itself in these areas to achieve Australia’s strategic defence objectives. Using historical examples to demonstrate the integral role played by watercraft in facilitating the manoeuvre and resupply of land forces, it prompts an analysis of Army’s existing waterborne capability. This capability is rapidly ageing, presenting gaps in Australia’s ability to operate within our region. As the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly militarised, the limited number and quality of our existing waterborne capabilities may inhibit the ability of Army—and the wider Australian Defence Force—to respond to threats. Serious thought must therefore be devoted to how Army will sustain itself in the CLEAR environment. The acquisition of new watercraft provides one solution.

Introduction

The Australian Army (Army), alongside the wider Australian Defence Force (ADF) is currently undergoing a major revitalisation of its military capabilities and force structure. However, an area that has received little attention until now is Army’s coastal, littoral, estuarine and riverine (CLEAR) capability.

Thus, this paper seeks to explore whether Army needs to update its CLEAR capability and what that capability might look like. To do this, an understanding of CLEAR environments is essential. In considering Army’s CLEAR capability it is important to understand the meaning of the acronym and the importance of this space to our region. A key feature of the Indo- Pacific is that the archipelagic chain of South-East Asia and the islands of the South-West Pacific form a ring around the Australian continent. This geography needs to be carefully considered when determining the future of Army’s, and the ADF’s, force structure. Any form of military engagement in the Indo-Pacific will require traversing at least some elements of the CLEAR space. CLEAR environments are highly complex, providing sustenance to populations, facilitating their trade and communication and serving as their home, resulting in a concentration of wealth in key coastal centres. Thus, these environments hold an immense amount of strategic weight due to the key role they play in Indo-Pacific countries. The region has become a centre of strategic gravity. Rapidly developing local powers compete over resources and political leverage, while Asia itself becomes a locus of global competition. Acknowledging this, the Australian Government has highlighted a shift in its policy towards deeper engagement with the region, as seen in the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.¹ If Australia seeks to engage with the region and to operate within it, then Army and the wider ADF must be able to operate throughout the CLEAR space and efforts should be made to enhance this capability.

Army is responsible for coastal and riverine manoeuvre; however, its existing capability is small and antiquated. The threat of land-based anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) systems means that Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vessels are unlikely to spend extended periods of time near hostile coastlines. As a result, Army cannot rely solely on the Australian Amphibious Force (AAF) to provide its logistics and manoeuvre support. It must have the ability to conduct its own sustainment and movement of assets if required. This ability is currently based on antiquated platforms, primarily the Landing Craft Mechanised Mark 8 (LCM-8), the Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo 5-Ton (LARC-V), and Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs).

Historical examples drawn from Australia’s experience in the Second World War and the efforts of the United States (US) in Vietnam provide useful insights into the roles of and requirements for small watercraft when operating in the Indo-Pacific. These insights, combined with existing acquisition programs, can be used to develop a more effective and capable force for operating in CLEAR environments. This force can be further enhanced by considering the option of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. This paper explores the value of small craft within the ADF’s force structure and Army’s ability to conduct sustainment, manoeuvre, interdiction and fire support operations. Although relevant to the littoral space, it does not seek to provide an in-depth analysis of the AAF or the conduct of amphibious operations, or to focus on the utility of rotor-wing solutions in this environment. While versatile in their own way, helicopters are limited in terms of payload and duration, incurring greater operational costs due to maintenance and fuel usage than a relatively simple diesel-fuelled watercraft. Although perhaps the most prominent, amphibious operations are but one of the many jobs undertaken by militaries in the CLEAR space. While Army watercraft can be used to enhance Australia’s amphibious capability, they also fulfil additional roles in supporting the continued presence and effectiveness of the land force. This capability is essential for a small force that may not always be able to rely on the presence of major support vessels, while also allowing for the deployment of a scalable and self- sufficient force.²

Coastal, Littoral, Estuarine and Riverine

A sound understanding of the CLEAR environments is required to operate in the Indo-Pacific. Coastal, littoral, estuarine and riverine environments are operationally complex areas in which land and naval power meet. The broadest of these terms, the littoral zone, is described by the RAN as:

The areas seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the sea.³

As the range of both sea and land based weapons systems increases, so does the littoral; however, for the purpose of this paper the littoral is most relevant when considering the ability to transfer assets from a ship to the shore or to move forces through an island chain. The littoral is made up of a combination of what might be called blue (open ocean) and green (coastal) waters. The coastal zone is integral to this space and marks the boundary between the sea or ocean and the land. Estuaries and river networks (brown water) mark a natural extension of the littoral and allow for the penetration of waterborne forces inland.⁴ The riverine environment is usually characterised by limited land lines of communication and made up of substantial inland waterways that allow for the transportation and manoeuvre of land forces. 

Warfare in the littoral, and by extension rivers and estuaries, has more similarities to combat on land than to combat in blue water. These environments present complex ‘surface and subsurface physical environmental conditions’ in which geography plays a major role.⁵ Coastal features, reefs, sandbars, man-made obstacles (for example, bridges or dams) and tides all work to constrain or dictate the movement of waterborne craft, while the close proximity of land and potential targets reduces the time available to respond to threats. As a result, substantial challenges await those seeking to operate in the CLEAR space. This space is extremely important and cannot be ignored.

Army watercraft expand the options available to defence planners and military commanders when considering the movement and manoeuvre of forces and supplies in support of land operations. (Image courtesy Defence)

CLEAR environments are strategically valuable and are present throughout the Indo-Pacific. This makes them strategically valuable. The Indo-Pacific is primarily maritime in nature, with the archipelago to the north playing a predominant role in Australia’s strategic geography. Regional tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea further highlight the importance of the CLEAR space. Thus it is essential that Army understand, and be able to operate in, these environments. Littoral and coastal zones are confined and congested spaces occupied by all manner of people, craft and technologies—allied, opposed and neutral. To access land from the sea, forces must transition these zones. This is not a simple feat. Island chains can work to ‘canalise’ the movements of vessels, can be used to extend the depth of defensive networks and, in combination with bays and rugged coastlines, can provide havens for, or obscure the movement of, vessels while also working to limit the access of larger craft.⁶ Thus, during hostilities, coastlines, estuaries and the littoral zone are of extreme strategic importance. They must be defended to prevent enemy use or interdiction or, alternatively, traversed in order to project power onto the land. As noted by former Army officer and strategic consultant Dayton McCarthy, ‘the sea serves as both the barrier and the pathway between the coastlines’.⁷ Yet CLEAR environments are not only important due to their tactical value. They are also the source of much of the region’s wealth and the home of most of its population.

Throughout South-East Asia and the South Pacific, population and, in turn, economic wealth are concentrated in the CLEAR space. The region is characterised by large, densely populated coastal port cities, interspersed with natural beaches, jungle and sparsely populated island chains. Just as military craft must transition the littoral and coastal zones to project power onto the land, so too must commercial vessels pass through this space to conduct trade. Therefore it is not surprising to find that, as in Australia, throughout the region people, infrastructure and wealth are concentrated along the coast. Seventy-five per cent of the world’s population and 80 per cent of capital cities reside in the littoral space.⁸ As highlighted by strategists Ken Gleiman and Peter J Dean, across the Indo-Pacific, 80 per cent of cities, and therefore most essential infrastructure, trade and industry hubs, and military power, are found within 200 kilometres of the coast.⁹ Narrowing the scope even further, across South-East Asia, 65 per cent of people live within 50 kilometres of the coast, while 75 per cent of cities are situated in low-lying coastal areas.¹⁰ These figures would be higher if populations situated on major inland waterways were also included. Rivers play essential roles in the lives of populations throughout South-East Asia and the Pacific, providing fresh water, food and transportation. The Mekong Delta is perhaps the best example of this, flowing through six countries and with more than sixty million people living and sustaining themselves on its lower basin.¹¹ Given the importance of these areas to people’s lives, it makes sense for Australia to develop capabilities that enable it to act more effectively within them. This will enable Australia to better pursue its strategic objectives.

Strategic Guidance

The Indo-Pacific’s growing prosperity has transformed it into a centre of strategic gravity, increasing the importance of the region to Australia. Due to its rapid economic development, global strategic weight is shifting to the Indo-Pacific. As highlighted by Army, Australia’s region is becoming ‘increasingly defined by a changing geopolitical order’ while ‘the pace of urbanisation and regional competition in littoral environments [brings additional] complexity.’¹² This rapid change is driven by unprecedented economic growth throughout the region. PricewaterhouseCoopers identifies that, if current trends continue, between now and 2050, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam will all fall within the world’s top 10 countries for average real gross domestic product (GDP) growth.¹³ Increased economic prosperity has been coupled with rising military spending throughout the region.¹⁴ While this spending is not necessarily directed at Australia, it will result in the region playing host to a series of much more capable militaries. The combination of this rapid change with the presence of numerous territorial disputes, historic rivalries and great power competition has the potential to drive conflict, or even war, in the region.¹⁵ If that were not already enough, threats posed by natural disasters and climate-induced instability, such as food insecurity and flooding, further amplify the importance of the region to Australia. The conduct of humanitarian aid and disaster relief, stabilisation and non-combatant evacuation operations is an important component of the ADF’s function. A large portion of Australia’s official responses to major natural disasters have taken the form of financial grants, technical assistance or the provision of relief supplies via commercial means.¹⁶ However, as the prevalence of these events increases and regional competition grows, it will be in Australia’s interest to ensure it has a clear, decisive and visible presence when conducting these operations.

The strategic interests and objectives of the Australian Government highlight the need for an effective CLEAR capability. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper sets out the country’s defence priorities and reinforces a swing in Australia’s focus away from the Middle East and back to our near region and the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s stated strategic interests—a secure Australia with secure northern approaches, a secure South-East Asia and South Pacific, and a stable Indo-Pacific—are all maritime in nature.¹⁷ These are supported by three objectives, taking the form of ‘activities the Government expects Defence to be able to conduct if it decides to use military power’ in order to pursue its stated strategic interests.¹⁸ These objectives consist of deterring, denying or defeating attacks on or threats to Australia, its national interests and its northern approaches; making effective military contributions to the security of South-East Asia and supporting the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Islands countries; and contributing military capabilities to support coalition operations.¹⁹ To achieve these objectives successfully, Army must be able to operate effectively in CLEAR environments. As highlighted earlier, the littoral and riverine environments constitute a major portion of the operating environment identified by the 2016 Defence White Paper. Thus, if Australia seeks to actively pursue its strategic aims in the Indo-Pacific, it must consider the value of CLEAR capabilities.

The ability to conduct and sustain independent military operations will enhance Australia’s ability to pursue its strategic defence objectives. The Department of Defence (Defence) has stated that it seeks a force that is ‘more capable of conducting independent combat operations’.²⁰ However, Australia is severely limited in its ability to sustain independent combat operations in the maritime domain. Its limited access to amphibious shipping and watercraft restricts its ability to sustain concurrent operations. However, CLEAR capabilities can enhance the flexibility of land forces and facilitate their movement and sustainment. This would bring substantial advantages in a region defined by its maritime nature, and would help Army contribute to ‘a more capable, agile and potent force’.²¹ Army is right in stating that its ability to ‘[apply] lethality on the land, from the land and onto the land for potency and influence across all domains’ must remain a central focus.²² Throughout history, the ability of militaries to actively achieve this has been essential in enabling them to fight and win.

Operations from the Past and Lessons for the Future

A wealth of insights into the role of and need for capabilities that operate in the CLEAR environment can be drawn from historic operations conducted in the Indo-Pacific. These examples highlight the limitations placed upon military forces trying to operate in this region and the types of operations that may need to be conducted in the future. As highlighted by geographers Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd in their study of the influence of geography on naval warfare, throughout history ‘navies and warships have changed, but their missions and operational environments have not’.²³

The basic tasks and ‘utility’ of naval and waterborne forces, of which the strategic and tactical movement of ground forces, the provision of support to troops that are ashore and the general projection of military power are most relevant to this paper, have not changed over the last century.²⁴ With this in mind, it is worth considering a number of examples to see what we can learn from past operations in the Indo-Pacific. The conduct of Australian forces during the Second World War provides a perfect starting point.

Bougainville provides a perfect example of the value of Army watercraft and the limitations that geography imposes on those attempting to operate in the littoral space. Positioned within the Royal Australian Engineers, the 41st Australian Landing Craft Company (41st ALC Company) was used to run men and supplies between Jacquinot Bay and Wide Bay and from Torokina to the front, and to contribute to fresh landings undertaken by the Army.²⁵ This ferry service was essential to Australian operations. Mountainous terrain combined with large amounts of rainfall resulted in numerous creeks and rivers snaking through the jungles to the beaches, making it extremely difficult to move trucks or jeeps down the coast. Thus, landing craft played a major role in moving forces around the island. Corporal Wallis William Rice noted that landing craft were used to move artillery up the coast every few days as the infantry advanced.²⁶ Craft were also used to deploy fighting and reconnaissance patrols consisting of 10 to 30 men, as well as stretcher parties to extract the wounded.²⁷ 

One of the most famous of these landings was the battle for Porton Plantation. On 8 June 1945, the 42nd ALC Company was ordered to land a company group from the 31/51st Battalion on the beaches of the Porton Plantation at first light.²⁸ The mission was designed to put pressure on Japanese positions that had been holding up the 26th Battalion in its northward advance along the island. The landing would be ‘the only [action] of World War Two in which Australian forces landed on and attacked an enemy-held beach, using landing craft manned by Australians, and suffered casualties in the process’.²⁹ Although the landing ended in failure, with some craft running aground on reefs and additional craft having to be sent to extract infantry the following day, the battle shows the utility of small boats in this domain and what could be achieved by a dedicated and properly equipped force.³⁰ Similar lessons can be drawn from the experiences of Australian forces during Operation Oboe.

The actions of Australian forces during Operation Oboe highlight the difficulties imposed by limited infrastructure and the utility of landing craft to manoeuvre forces. Operation Oboe was the name given to the Allied invasion of Borneo, conducted by the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions, Second Australian Imperial Force, with a range of supporting elements.

From 1 May 1945, Australian forces struggled through the swampy coastal plains, mangroves, dense rainforest and jungle that inhibited the movement of vehicles to existing roads and tracks.³¹ Throughout each phase of Operation Oboe, armour and support elements were held back by poor infrastructure and the pervasive threat of Japanese mines and improvised explosive devices.³² During Oboe Six, the capture of Brunei Bay, the 20th Australian Infantry Brigade captured Brunei without the majority of its supporting armour.³³ The armour had been left behind, the limited existing bridges unable to bear their weight, and swampland slowing their progress. An important lesson was to be drawn from this. Despite limited existing road and communication networks, the rivers of the Klias Peninsula and Brunei were negotiable for manoeuvre.³⁴ LCMs (Landing Craft Mechanised) were brought in to move tanks up the Brunei River and secure the Clifford Bridge, while also being used to carry 4 Troop, A Squadron, 2/9th Australian Armoured Regiment to support the 2/15th infantry battalion at Brooketon.³⁵ Operations in Brunei Bay demonstrated the severe limitations that the geographical environment can place on units operating in the Indo-Pacific. However, in attempts to resolve these issues, waterborne craft provided a solution, enabling Australian forces to advance. Landing craft would also be used in attempts to solve similar issues during Oboe Two.

The use of landing craft to conduct shore-to-shore manoeuvre during Oboe Two depicts an essential capability for the Australian Army. During Oboe Two, the Battle of Balikpapan beginning on 1 July 1945, Australian forces met stiff resistance from dug-in Japanese positions. Japanese forces had mined the major roadways, making it difficult for Australian infantry units to receive vehicular support. To alleviate this issue, Australian forces decided to advance their armoured units directly on their objective. On 5 July, 3 Troop of A Squadron, 1st Australian Armoured Regiment was embarked onto landing craft and landed at Manggar airfield at 1 pm, under the cover of smoke, to engage Japanese positions which had halted the infantry.³⁶ Unfortunately, as the troop stopped to remove its waterproofing, it was engaged by a Japanese 120 mm gun and mortar fire from a position that had been reported as destroyed after an earlier bombardment.³⁷ After further bombardment, a second landing was undertaken by 4 Troop on 9 July, which advanced up the beach and successfully supported a push to capture Manggar airfield. Landing craft would also be used on 5 July to ferry forces to Penadjam on the other side of Balikpapan Bay.³⁸ Without water transport, Australian forces would have been forced to fight well inland in order to secure a position up river where they could cross to the other side of the bay. Despite the sinking of two tanks upon landing, water transport facilitated the capture of Penadjam, allowing allied force to secure the bay.

Although both operations ended in disaster for the armoured units involved, these efforts show the utility of small craft in the littoral space. Moving assets along the coast allows forces to bypass obstacles imposed by both terrain and the enemy. It reduces the amount of attrition suffered by allied forces, minimises wear and tear on equipment and provides the opportunity to advance quickly and act with surprise. This is an important lesson for our contemporary forces. If the ADF seeks to follow its concept of ‘manoeuvre warfare’ then Army will need to ensure that it maintains its ability to move assets around the battlefield rapidly.

The experiences of US forces during Vietnam are extremely useful for understanding combat in the CLEAR space. The River Patrol Force (RPF) and Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) saw substantial combat during the Vietnam War and provide perfect examples of how Army could go about conducting operations in the CLEAR space. The value of these forces was drawn from their flexibility, rapid manoeuvrability, offensive power, and ability to move allied forces and disrupt enemy activity. The Mekong Delta consists of some 2,400 kilometres of natural navigable waterways and an additional 4,000 kilometres of man-made canals and other waterways that sprout from the 4,184 kilometre Song Mekong river.³⁹ With poor infrastructure and few roads, waterways served as the primary mode of transportation within the Delta. The RPF was responsible for patrolling this vast network. Through Operation Game Warden (Task Force 116) the RPF quickly developed into a mobile strike force used to attack Viet Cong (VC) positions, disrupt river crossings and VC troop movement, and secure major rivers for commerce.⁴⁰ During the 1968 Tet Offensive, the RPF was used as ‘roving cavalry’, providing besieged American and South Vietnamese positions with fire support and supplies.⁴¹ This fire support usually came from 81 mm Mark II mortar and .50-calibre machine guns mounted on Patrol Craft Fast (the famous Swift Boats) or Coast Guard Patrol Boats.⁴² 

The MRF was used as an ‘amphibious riverine strike force’, working in combination with the US Army’s 9th Infantry Division to hunt down large bands of VC forces operating in the Mekong Delta.⁴³ Armoured landing craft, in combination with minesweepers and patrol craft, were used to fulfil this task. While the MRF was successful in locating and eliminating large elements of the VC force, the armoured landing craft did prove vulnerable to anti-tank weaponry and ambush, resulting in substantial casualties.⁴⁴ The conduct of the RPF and MRF highlight the value of a dedicated CLEAR capability in enhancing the effectiveness of land forces by providing tactical manoeuvre and naval gunfire support, in addition to an ability to engage the enemy directly. These lessons should be considered carefully when considering Australia’s own development of a CLEAR capability.

Small boats, landing craft and amphibious vehicles are an essential enabling capability in the CLEAR environment. They allow for the completion of a range of support tasks in both stable and contested environments that are essential to the continued operation of forces in the CLEAR space. The previous historical examples highlighted a number of roles undertaken by CLEAR watercraft, including the ability to conduct quicker manoeuvre, logistics over the shore, resupply and rapid reinforcement, naval gunfire support, and interdiction, all of which boost the effectiveness of the land force. Thus, an effective CLEAR capability will enhance Army’s ability to contribute to Defence’s goal of establishing ‘a more capable, agile and potent future force’.⁴⁵

The Indo-Pacific’s growing prosperity has transformed it into a centre of strategic gravity, increasing the importance of the region to Australia. (Image courtesy Defence)

It will also work towards increasing the ADF’s preparedness level by ensuring it is capable of operating in the CLEAR environment and enhancing its sustainability.⁴⁶ As admitted by the 2016 Defence White Paper, ‘Defence’s capability plans have become disconnected from defence strategy and resources, delaying important investments in Australia’s security’.⁴⁷ Australia’s focus on warfighting in the Middle East has seen substantial investment in armoured vehicles and increasing the survivability of our forces against improvised explosive devices. However, this focus has come at the detriment of the development of watercraft and led to the establishment of a heavier force, putting additional strain on our existing water transport systems.⁴⁸ Similarly, despite the proliferation of A2/AD technologies and increased defence spending throughout the region, there has been little development of more resilient and adept watercraft. Army must carefully consider the role played by its existing watercraft to determine whether they meet the requirements of our contemporary operating environment.

Australia’s Existing CLEAR Capabilities

Army’s ability to operate in CLEAR environments is limited by its reliance on a small number of antiquated platforms. Army watercraft expand the options available to defence planners and military commanders when considering the movement and manoeuvre of forces and supplies in support of land operations. They allow for the independent deployment, sustainment and extraction of land forces, in addition to a range of auxiliary roles like reconnaissance and fire support, facilitating the projection of land power. The LCM-8 is the backbone of the Australian Army’s waterborne capability. As highlighted by the United States Army, landing craft provide:

inter – and intra-theatre transportation of personnel and material, delivering cargo from advanced bases and deep-draft strategic sealift ships to harbours, inland waterways, remote and unimproved beaches and coastlines, and denied or degraded ports.⁴⁹

This capability will be essential when operating in the Indo-Pacific. Introduced in 1965, the LCM-8 can carry up to 54 tonnes of cargo and has a maximum speed of 9.5 knots when fully loaded.⁵⁰ With a draft of 1.5 metres it can access most waterways, while mounted machine guns provide a limited defensive capability. However, the LCM-8 is an extremely dated platform and is limited in its ability to support the Army’s future needs. It is unable to transport Army’s M1 Abrams main battle tank and, though it is capable of transporting Army’s new LAND 121 Phase 3B trucks and the oncoming Rheinmetall Boxer, the increased weight of contemporary combat systems will put additional strain on this legacy platform.⁵¹ The relatively small number of these craft is also of concern, restricting Army’s ability to sustain concurrent efforts and move force elements.⁵² The craft’s relatively slow speed and open-topped design also leave it ill-suited to conducting riverine operations, with its steel hull providing only limited protection to the boat’s occupants. Thus, Army’s existing LCM-8 capability is not sufficient to meet the challenges of operating in the Indo-Pacific. This is also true of Army’s other watercraft.

Army’s additional waterborne craft fail to fully fill the gaps left by the LCM-8 in Australia’s CLEAR capability. The LARC-V provides an additional logistical service, functioning as a ship-to-shore connector and transport craft. Like the LCM-8, the LARC-V is a legacy platform that was acquired during the 1960s. Capable of carrying roughly 4 tonnes of cargo at a speed of around 48 kilometres/hour on land or 8.5 knots on water, the LARC-V is a useful amphibious vehicle.⁵³ It provides a unique logistics over the shore capability, able to move supplies inland from waiting ships rather than solely depositing them onto a beach or river bank. However, just like the LCM-8, its downfall comes from a slow speed when waterborne, a lack of protection for troops using the craft for transportation, and the limited number of craft available for use. Counter to the LARC-V, RHIBs do provide Army with a rapid response, interdiction and tactical insertion capability. The Zodiac FC-470 can take 10 combatants, holding a maximum weight of 1,250 kilograms, and provides

a nimble alternative for negotiating waterways.⁵⁴ Its low profile, speed and relatively small size make it ideal for manoeuvring up rivers, conducting reconnaissance and inserting special forces or raiding parties. However, the craft’s simple design offers little additional protection or offensive capability to the crew. As a result, Army lacks any form of offensive watercraft for operations in the CLEAR environment and, while it does maintain some capacity to conduct logistics over the shore and move and sustain land forces, its small number of antiquated platforms are unlikely to meet the operating challenges of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite enhancing the ADF’s ability to operate through the littoral space, the AAF plays only a minor role in boosting Army’s tactical manoeuvre and resupply capability over a prolonged period. With the commissioning of two Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs), HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide, on 28 November 2014 and 4 December 2015 respectively, Australia has developed a respectable amphibious capability.⁵⁵ Each LHD has the ability to land a force of over 1,000 personnel with their equipment and supporting vehicles by a combination of helicopter and watercraft.⁵⁶ These watercraft comprise four LHD Landing Craft LCM-1E, with additional space for four RHIBs.⁵⁷ In combination with the Landing Ship Dock HMAS Choules, the ADF has the potential to deploy a number of force packages ranging from an Amphibious Ready Element consisting of one amphibious ship, a combat team and supporting helicopters, to an Amphibious Ready Group capable of conducting a full spectrum of amphibious operations with extensive helicopter support and a number of combat teams.⁵⁸ 

However, the AAF does not provide Army with a permanent and flexible capability. The eight LCM-1E landing craft are tied to the LHDs, extremely valuable platforms whose exposure to risk should be kept to a minimum. The option of an additional LCM-8 or two LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) courtesy of HMAS Choules does little to alleviate this issue.⁵⁹ In light of the threat posed by hostile A2/AD capabilities, it is unlikely that either of these vessels would be kept close at hand after the completion of an amphibious operation. Once the major vessels of the RAN have withdrawn to blue water, taking the LCM-1E with them, Army has little capacity to manoeuvre any serious force up and through major waterways or around coastal features. Despite this, efforts to restore Army’s CLEAR capability have been limited.

A Future CLEAR Capability

CLEAR capability projects have had a poor history over the last decade, demonstrating a lack of priority. Defence has failed to deliver some of the capabilities highlighted in its Defence Capability Plan 2006–2016.⁶⁰ JP 2048 Phase 1a was established for the provisioning of six Amphibious Watercraft Systems in the form of the LCM-2000.⁶¹ However, this project was abandoned due to structural issues with the craft. JP 2048 Phase 3, Amphibious Watercraft Replacement, was intended to replace the entirety of the ADF’s landing craft; however, this project was also cut back and, in the end, only resulted in the development of the LHD Landing Craft. JP 2048 Phase 5, the project to replace Navy’s Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) to provide landing craft with enhanced ocean-going capabilities and the capability to transport large armoured vehicles, trucks, personnel and stores for intra-theatre sealift or the conduct of independent small-scale amphibious operations, lost its priority.⁶² The decommissioning of the last Balikpapan Class LCH in November 2014 has seen the removal of this capability from the ADF.⁶³ However, if it seeks to remain an influential actor in the Indo- Pacific, Australia cannot afford to continue scrapping projects linked to its CLEAR capability.

Existing Army projects designed to enhance its CLEAR capability must be given priority. Despite constant failures over the last decade to replace Army’s existing watercraft, two projects remain. Highlighting an increased awareness of the importance of the CLEAR space, LAND 8710 and LAND 8702 are projects for ‘Army Water Transports’ and ‘Army Riverine Craft’ respectively.⁶⁴ Recognising the importance of landing craft and amphibious vehicles to the ADF’s battlefield logistic support, tactical resupply and force manoeuvre, LAND 8710 seeks to replace Army’s antiquated water transport fleet (LCM-8 and LARC-V).⁶⁵ With an indicative cost of $400 million to $500 million, the project has been approved to move towards Gate 1 (the risk mitigation and requirement-setting phase) of the acquisition process; however, there is still a long way to go.⁶⁶ LAND 8702 seeks to ‘re-establish’ a fleet of lightly armed small patrol boats capable of carrying small force elements to increase manoeuvrability.⁶⁷ Defence’s stated intention for this capability to be delivered from around 2022, with a program time frame of 2018 to 2028, is extremely ambitious, as the project remains in Phase 1.⁶⁸ 

However, both of these projects hold a substantial advantage. With LAND 8710 projected to cost $400 million to $500 million and LAND 8702 estimated at $200 million to $300 million, existing CLEAR projects are far cheaper than many of Defence’s other acquisition projects in the Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare stream, whose costs range from $100 million to $200 million for barracks redevelopment all the way to $10 billion to $15 billion for Army’s new infantry fighting vehicles.⁶⁹ In this context, an updated CLEAR capability is an extremely affordable endeavour. Considering the advantages an updated CLEAR capability will bring in enhancing the effectiveness of Australia’s armed forces throughout the Indo-Pacific, it makes sense to prioritise these projects. These capabilities could be further enhanced through the exploration of autonomous systems. 

Autonomous Vehicles

Autonomous and semi-autonomous systems provide a way to circumvent the dangers of operating in the CLEAR environment. Over the last decade there has been substantial experimentation with investment in autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, ranging from specialised land systems to unmanned aerial vehicles, watercraft and unmanned underwater vehicles.

The use of autonomous or semi-autonomous systems in specialised roles allows for the removal of risk to human operators. The use of these platforms to conduct mine and barricade clearance, forward reconnaissance and hydrographical mapping has the potential to both reduce the threats faced by and increase the situational awareness of friendly forces. As stated by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Director for Defence & Strategy, Michael Shoebridge, autonomous systems ‘will, at the very least, be essential “complementary capabilities” to the big, complex manned platforms’ of the future ADF.⁷⁰ Army is already aware of the advantages autonomous systems can bring, highlighting the use of artificial intelligence, autonomy and robotics as a way of obtaining ‘asymmetric advantages’ in its 2018 Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy.⁷¹ 

The ability for autonomous systems to come in almost any shape or size allows them to fill a multitude of roles. The potential use of small underwater craft to map and explore beaches, harbours and inland waterways provides a solution to the challenges A2/AD capabilities pose to forces conducting pre-landing operations.⁷² Alternatively, a larger surface vessel, taking the form of a landing craft or small barge, could be used to transport equipment, supplies, vehicles and munitions from waiting ships to the shore, or from established logistics hubs to advance bases or forward deployed troops. Thus, the development of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems has the potential to bring a range of advantages to Army’s CLEAR capability.

Conclusion

The Australian Army needs a more advanced CLEAR capability. Situated in a maritime region with extensive CLEAR environments, Army must be able to project power across the water. The CLEAR space is home to the majority of the region’s wealth, and population centres are concentrated within it, making it essential for Army to be able to wield influence in this domain.

Army is right in stating that its ability to ‘[apply] lethality on the land, from the land and onto the land for potency and influence across all domains’ must remain a central focus. (Image courtesy Defence)

Given rising regional tensions and the potential for conflict, Australia must be capable of operating effectively in the Indo-Pacific. Australia cannot be reliant on allies to provide its logistics support and manoeuvre its forces. An advanced CLEAR capability will greatly enhance Australia’s ability to project force throughout the region, further enabling it to meet Australia’s strategic defence objectives. Existing capabilities do not satisfy this requirement. The LCM-8 and LARC-V are both antiquated platforms that, while valuable, do not exist in sufficient quantity or have the capabilities required for sustaining Australian forces in littoral, coastal or riverine combat. Light inflatable craft provide a more useful platform for conducting riverine operations; however, they too are limited in their ability to manoeuvre forces and provide active support to the land force. Historical conflicts in the region have highlighted the importance of CLEAR capabilities. In 1945, Australian forces made substantial use of landing craft and small boats to sustain their operations and circumvent the challenges posed by hostile terrain. On Bougainville, watercraft were used to advance Australian forces, launch patrols and distribute supplies, while on Borneo landing craft played a major role in facilitating the movement of armoured units. The experience of US forces in Vietnam also demonstrated the value of small craft in providing tactical manoeuvre and fire support. Given these experiences, and the strategic objectives outlined by Defence, it is clear that Australia needs to invest further in its CLEAR capabilities. Although this capability could take many forms, Army’s existing programs and past experience suggest that the development of a robust fleet of manned craft capable of moving troops, supplies and equipment is essential. This will strengthen Army’s ability to sustain its efforts on land, while also enabling it to contribute to the AAF. Combined with autonomous or remotely operated systems capable of enhancing the precision and situational awareness of the force, and a fleet of small, fast and offensively capable craft, Army could have a significantly enhanced CLEAR capability that would bolster its capacity to project force in the Indo-Pacific.

Endnotes

1. Department of Defence, 2016, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia); Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).
    
2. Scalable force refers to the ability to provide force packages of varying sizes relative to the magnitude of the assigned objective. This prevents wasting resources that could be used elsewhere.
    
3. Royal Australian Navy, 2010, Australian Maritime Doctrine (Canberra: Sea Power Centre).
    
4. An estuary is the tidal mouth of a large river, marking the transition zone between the river and maritime environments.
    
5. Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd, 2002, Brown -, Green, and Blue Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group), 145.
    
6. Dayton McCarthy, 2018, The Worst of Both Worlds: An Analysis of Urban Littoral Combat (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre), 40.
    
7. McCarthy, 2018, 12.
    
8. Cole Peterson, 2014, ‘Over the Beach: The Enduring Utility of Amphibious Operations’, The Journal of Military Operations 2, no. 4.
    
9. Ken Gleiman and Peter J Dean, 2015, Beyond 2017: The Australian Defence Force and Amphibious Warfare (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute), 15.
    
10. Peter J Dean, 2018, The ADF and the Indo-Pacific Operating Environment (Perth: Perth USAsia Centre), 6–7.
     
11. International Rivers, 2019, ‘Southeast Asia’, at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/ programs/southeast-asia
     
12. Australian Army, 2019, ‘Accelerated Warfare: Futures Statement for an Army in Motion’, at: https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/ futures_statement_accelerated_warfare_a4_u.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3h_ Hk9eQRgsQ9aTtkic0SJvrsrUAnuF0aX6yrwm1NQBHm9sISPidfzbgY
     
13. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015, The World in 2050 (PwC), 18.
     
14. See the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Military Expenditure Database, at: www.sipri.org/databases/milex
     
15. For an exception analysis of the key strategic flashpoints in Asia, see Brendan Taylor, 2018, The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War (Carlton, VIC: La Trobe University Press).
     
16. Steven Bullard, 2017, In Their Time of Need: Australia’s Overseas Emergency Relief Operations, 1918–2006 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Cambridge University Press), xiv.
     
17. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 16.
     
18. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 17.
     
19. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 12.
     
20. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 18.
     
21. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 13.
     
22. Australian Army, 2019, ‘Accelerated Warfare’.
     
23. Lindberg and Todd, 2002, 224.
     
24. Lindberg and Todd, 2002, 224.
     
25. Defence Public Affairs Organisation, 1999, Sailors in Slouch Hats (Canberra: Department of Defence), 18, 35.
     
26. Defence Public Affairs Organisation, 1999, 35.
     
27. Defence Public Affairs Organisation, 1999, 70.
     
28. Defence Public Affairs Organisation, 1999, 4.
     
29. Defence Public Affairs Organisation, 1999, 4.
     
30. The ALC companies lacked any form of specialised equipment. The ALCs were mass- produced and simple, their flat bottoms susceptible to catching on reefs and shores. Additionally, most crews lacked any form of charts or hydrographical data, few were equipped with radios for communication, and most had limited seafaring/maritime experience.
     
31. Australian War Memorial, Operational Reports—Tank—Army Fighting Vehicles and Activity Reports—Oboe One—Tarakan—July 1945, in Tarakan (Oboe One) Reports: ‘C’ Squadron 2/9 Australian Armoured Regiment, AWM54, 617/7/3, 1.
     
32. The Glenelg, Collins and ANZAC highways in Tarakan were all heavily mined. Mining halted the advances of two troops on Labuan, and forces in Balikpapan were constantly held up by buried depth charges and explosives as they attempted to advance inland. For an exceptional account of Australian armour on Borneo, see Peter Donovan, 1988, Waltzing Matildas (Blackwood, SA: Donovan and Associates), 119–122, 156.
     
33. Australian War Memorial, 2/9 Australian Armoured Regiment AIF, July 1945, in Unit War Diaries, 1939–45 War, AWM52, 3/1/15.
     
34. Australian War Memorial, Oboe Six—2/9 AUST ARMD REGT GP OP ORDERS NO. 1, in Unit War Diaries, 1939–45 War, 2/9 Australian Armoured Regiment AIF, May 1945, AWM52, 3/1/15.
     
35. Donovan, 1988, 164.
     
36. AWM52, 3/1/15.
     
37. Australian War Memorial, 1 AUST ARMD REGT (AIF) NARATIVE FOR JULY 45, 2, Jan–May 1945, in Unit War Diaries, 1939–45 War, 1 Australian Armoured Regiment AIF, AWM52, 3/1/17.
     
38. AWM52, 3/1/17.
     
39. Gordon L Rottman, 2006, illustrated by Hugh Johnson, Vietnam Riverine Craft 1962–75 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing), 4–5.
     
40. John Darrel Sherwood, 2015, War in the Shallows (Washington, DC: Naval History and Heritage Command, Department of the Navy), xi.
     
41. Sherwood, 2015, xii.
     
42. Sherwood, 2015, 233–234.
     
43. Sherwood, 2015, xi–xii.
     
44. Sherwood, 2015, xi–xii.
     
45. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 13.
     
46. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 22.
     
47. Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 13.
     
48. See the LAND 400 projects, as well as enhanced soldier systems.
     
49. Department of the Army, 2018, Weapons Systems Handbook 2018 (Washington, DC: United States Government), 216, at: https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/537695.pdf
     
50. Hydrographic Systems Program Office, Electrical & Mechanical Engineering Instruction, Marine L 136-8, Landing Craft, Mechanised, 8 (LCM8), Series 1 and 2 (Canberra: Department of Defence), 3.
     
51. The new Boxer weighs in at 38.5 tonnes. A list of Project LAND 121 acquisitions can be found at: https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/modernisation-projects/project-land-121
     
52. The quantities of craft remain classified.
     
53. Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1963, Technical Manual No. 55-1930-205-10: Operators Manual, Lighter, Amphibious (LARC-V) Self-Propelled, Aluminium 5-Ton, Design 8005, FSN 1930-710-5728 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army), 1.
     
54. Zodiac MILPRO, 2019, ‘FC-470’, at: https://zodiacmilpro.com/wp-content/ uploads/2013/02/TDS-EN-FC-470-roll-up-floor-Z802222.pdf
     
55. Royal Australian Navy, 2019, ‘Current Ships’, at: http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats- craft/current-ships
     
56. Royal Australian Navy, 2019, ‘Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD)’, at: http://www.navy.gov.au/ fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd
     
57. Royal Australian Navy, ‘LHD Landing Craft (LLC)’, at: http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships- boats-craft/ac/lcm
     
58. Department of Defence, 2019, Amphibious Operations, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.2 (Canberra: Department of Defence), section 2, 6.
     
59. Royal Australian Navy, 2019, ‘Landing Ship Dock’, at: http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships- boats-craft/lsd
     
60. Department of Defence, 2006, Defence Capability Plan 2006–2016 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).
     
61. Department of Defence, Defence Capability Plan 2006–2016, 67.
     
62. Department of Defence, 2012, 2012 Defence Capability Plan (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 109.
     
63. Royal Australian Navy, 2019, ‘HMAS Brunei’, at: http://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-brunei
     
64. Program Management Office, Australian Army, 2019, Introduction to Land Capability (Canberra: Australian Army).
     
65. Department of Defence, 2016, 2016 Integrated Investment Program (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 117–118.
     
66. Australian Army, 2019, ‘Army Watercraft: Littoral & Riverine Modernisation’, slide presentation to industry stakeholders (Canberra).
     
67. Department of Defence, 2016 Integrated Investment Program, 119.
     
68. For information on capability acquisition and its relevant phases, see Department of Defence, 2014, Defence Capability Development Handbook 2014 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).
     
69. Department of Defence, 2016 Integrated Investment Program, 119–120.
     
70. Michael Shoebridge, ‘AI and Autonomous Systems Are Urgent Priorities for Today’s Defence Force’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 29 April 2019, at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ai-and-autonomous-systems-are-urgent-…-for- todays-defence-force/
     
71. Australian Army, 2018, Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre), 1.
     
72. For a discussion of the contemporary difficulties in conducting pre-landing operations, see Albert Palazzo, 2019, Pre-Landing Operations: Getting Old Tasks Done in an Age of Transparency (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre).