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From Goodenough to Outstanding: Army’s mastery of amphibious operations between 1942-1945

Journal Edition
Volume 14, Number 1, Autumn

Abstract

Nearly three decades after conducting landings at Rabaul and Gallipoli, the Australian Army undertook its next amphibious operation.1 Over the next three years, Army mastered amphibious warfare, progressing from a rudimentary battalion-sized landing in October 1942 to a division-level amphibious assault in July 1945. The experience of the 2/12th Battalion – which participated in both of those landings – demonstrates how a shortfall in providing specialist amphibious training for infantry units was overcome through the creation of specialist supporting, joint, combat, combat-support and service units tailored for amphibious operations.

Army’s Second World War experience provides useful precedents as the modern Army rebuilds its amphibious capability. Army’s first amphibious operation in the Second World War occurred in October 1942 when the 2/12th Battalion landed on Goodenough Island and concluded with the same battalion landing as part of the 7th Division’s assault on Balikpapan in July 1945. Within that 33 month period, Army undertook more amphibious operations than in the rest of its 117-year history. This article examines the 2/12th Battalion’s preparation for, and conduct of, those two operations to demonstrate how Army managed that transition whilst simultaneously fighting a war.

Operation Drake - Goodenough

On 22 October 1942, the 2/12th Battalion was tasked with clearing Goodenough Island, east of the New Guinea mainland, where a 350-strong Japanese Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) had been marooned since mid-August.

The 2/12th Battalion was an experienced unit. It had withstood the German Afrika Korps and the Italian Army at Tobruk, and later defeated the Japanese at Milne Bay. But it had no experience with or specialist training in amphibious operations. The Battalion did not have time to prepare for the night landing, dubbed Operation Drake, Operation Drake was a makeshift affair. The higher headquarters’ operations order was only released on 20 October.2 A joint Navy, Army and Air Force planning conference could not be held until the following afternoon when the destroyers HMAS Arunta and Stuart arrived at Milne Bay.3 The Battalion’s combined operation and embarkation order was issued just before midnight on 21 October. There was no time for embarkation or landing training.

A shortage of naval support meant that the two available destroyers had to double as both escorts and fast troop transports. Three local traders’ ketches were also pressed into military service. The only amphibious craft were three Japanese Daihatsu Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP), recovered and repaired after the Japanese defeat at Milne Bay.4 These limitations shaped the landing force’s configuration. The 2/12th was stripped down to around 580 men, with a detachment from the 2/5th Field Ambulance.5 Neither vehicles nor heavy equipment could be taken: The Australians had no means to ship them, and Goodenough Island had no roads anyway.

The landing procedures were similarly makeshift. A 2/12th officer was assigned as an Embarkation Officer aboard each destroyer.6 The destroyers in turn each appointed “a Beach Lieutenant to supervise [the] landing craft at disembarkation points.”7 The 2/12th’s Headquarters Company was designated as the beach party, responsible for unloading the LCVP.8 That task was complicated because detailed landing tables had not been prepared owing to “the possibility of breakdown of [the] small vessels en route”.9

With no opportunity for a beach reconnaissance, the main beachhead at Mud Bay presented challenges. As little was known of the local bathymetry, the destroyers stood off in order to avoid reefs and shoals, while the troops transferred to the ketches and LCVP. Even the shallow-drafted Daihatsu could only come to within 150m of the beach, leaving the infantry to wade through shin-deep water in the darkness and heavy rain.10 The Australians did their best in the unrehearsed – and fortunately unopposed – night landing:

Silence was to be one of its features as the soldiers trans-shipped to small vessels and went ashore … There was some confusion on the beach as the companies sorted themselves out. Altogether the landing, planned as a standard amphibious operation on a small scale, did not go smoothly.11

Once ashore, the 2/12th was largely on its own. The destroyers departed after discharging the troops and their cargo, rendering the 2/12th’s support and supply line tenuous. Evacuation of any wounded requiring treatment beyond the Field Ambulance detachment’s capacity would be by ketch back to Milne Bay. Resupply was limited to such stores and supplies as had been landed.

Naval gunfire support was not provided. Even had the destroyers remained, the 2/12th had neither artillery observers nor any suitable maps. The battalion’s only fire support came from two 3-inch mortars, and such ammunition as could be carried into the island’s rugged interior.12 Although the US Army’s 8th Fighter Group covered the destroyers during daylight hours, the fighters were not capable of supporting the night landing.13 With no air liaison officers, the 2/12th’s air support requests had to be coordinated through the Milne Bay headquarters. The fragility of that system was soon demonstrated. When fighter support was expected for one attack, only Japanese aircraft appeared overhead, while a subsequent attack had to be delayed when the US fighters arrived 30 minutes late.14

Mission success depended upon close coordination between the Battalion’s Main Body (which landed at Mud Bay on the peninsula’s southeast coast) and C Company (which landed on the southwest coast at Taleba Bay). The Main Body advanced westwards, hoping to drive the Japanese out of their inland defensive position and towards a blocking position established by C Company advancing from the east.15

That scheme of manoeuvre proved flawed. Radio communications were unreliable, the Main Body’s planned rate of advance proved unrealistic for a long column, carrying heavy loads, moving over unfamiliar and unforgiving terrain, in total darkness and torrential rain. With the main assault delayed, the planned pincer action became uncoordinated. C Company initially advanced as planned, but after taking heavy casualties, withdrew to the waiting ketches and retired to Mud Bay. Resorting to frontal attacks, the Battalion’s main body advanced slowly over the next three days, only to find the Japanese had escaped from the island in darkness using two Daihatsu which had been delivered earlier by Japanese warships and concealed from Allied aircraft.

Operation Drake was a qualified success. It forced a Japanese withdrawal, albeit that the marooned force had been attempting that for two months but had not achieved its destruction. However, the Japanese escaped destruction because the 2/12th’s planned pincer attack failed due to poor communications, ambitious planning, insufficient fire and air support, and tenuous logistics.

Building an Amphibious Army

The Army needed to address these problems if it was to use maneuver from the sea to circumvent Japanese defences in the South West Pacific. But the Army faced competing challenges in making amphibious ships and landing craft available for both operations and training. Compounding this, the Australian Army could not afford the luxury of either raising a separate, specialist marine force, or dedicating hard-pressed infantry battalions to amphibious warfare operations.

But, with the support of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), Army was able to develop a range of specialist units to support littoral operations. By the time the 2/12th undertook its next amphibious landing three years later, Army had embraced amphibious warfare, absorbed its doctrine and raised the specialist units needed for amphibious operations. But Army was unable to translate that effort into regular amphibious training for the 2/12th Battalion, or its sister battalions in the 7th Division.

The 2/12th Battalion returned to Australia from Papua in March 1943 in a much-depleted state. Following Operation Drake, heavy fighting at Buna and Sanananda and disease had thinned the battalion’s ranks. When it arrived in Northern Queensland, the Battalion numbered only 476 men – well below its establishment strength of 745.16 Over the next ten weeks, malaria extracted a further toll forcing the medical evacuation of a further 131 officers and men.17

Not only did the Battalion have to be rebuilt, it also had to be (belatedly) reorganized and properly trained for jungle warfare – there had been little opportunity for this when the 7th Division was rushed from the Middle East back to Australia in response to the Japanese threat in the Pacific. Mostly this involved training in infantry minor tactics as the Battalion took in reinforcements. In July, the 2/12th participated in an air landing exercise in anticipation of the next phase of operations in Papua New Guinea.18 There was no opportunity to undertake specialized amphibious training.

Deploying to New Guinea in August 1943, the 2/12th undertook a series of operations in the Finisterre Mountains, including being airlifted into the Ramu Valley. After arriving back in Australia in May 1944, the Battalion returned to taking in and training replacements. Although the Battalion’s numerical strength had been maintained over the course of its involvement in the New Guinea campaign, there was still a requirement to post out experienced officers and soldiers for rest, for training and promotion, and to provide instructors at Army schools.

That meant the 2/12th Battalion’s training remained focused on jungle fighting, infantry skills and minor unit tactics. Over the coming months, the 2/12th undertook only limited specialist training in amphibious operations before being committed to the final Allied amphibious operation of the war: The 1 July 1945 amphibious assault landing at Balikpapan, known by its operational name as OBOE II.

That did not mean the broader Army had ignored its amphibious capability development. Even before the 2/12th’s commitment to Operation Drake, the Army had already commenced making the doctrinal, organizational and equipment changes needed for sustained, large-scale amphibious operations.

As described above, Operation Drake was the model of improvisation. Planning – to the extent that it was conducted – drew upon British Combined Operations doctrine, with Arunta’s surgeon “who had had training in amphibious operations … placed in charge of the leading craft”19 And in the absence of specialist amphibious vessels, the landing relied upon RAN destroyers, impressed civilian luggers and captured Daihatsu.

In addressing that deficiency, the Army and RAN reached a doctrinal turning point. By 1943, Army formed its first Landing Craft Companies, equipped with British- and Australian-designed landing craft, as part of the Army’s three Engineer Water Transport Groups.20 Those companies supported both training in Australia and operations in New Guinea. At the same time, the RAN converted three obsolete Armed Merchant Cruisers HMA Ships Westralia, Manoora and Kanimbla into Landing Ships Infantry (LSI). But even these investments could not match the challenges the Army and RAN faced if they were to conduct sophisticated amphibious operations across the South West Pacific’s vast reaches.

The resultant reliance upon USN transport and amphibious shipping, and US Army assault craft compelled the Australian Army to adopt and adapt to US amphibious joint warfare doctrine over the more familiar British approach to Combined Warfare (the contemporary British term for Army-Navy-Air Force operations).21 Among the subtleties was a different approach to command and control. Under the British system, the army force commander commanded all army components after they had landed, whereas under the US system, the naval component commander retained command of the operation, including the landing forces, until such time as the army commander had established his headquarters ashore, and a handshake transfer had been conducted.22

By early 1942, the Army, the RAN and their US counterparts, recognised the need to develop a combined, joint amphibious capability. In late 1942 the Joint Overseas Operational Training School (JOOTS) was established at Port Stephens to provide training and to develop doctrine for US-Australian amphibious operations. JOOTS’ first training course concluded on 25 September – a month before Operation Drake.23

The need to prioritise operations in New Guinea, meant there was a significant limitation to the provision of specialist amphibious training to Army units. JOOTS supported the US Navy’s (USN) 7th Fleet Amphibious Task Force, which would embark elements of 15 different Allied divisions – including the Australian 7th and 9th Divisions – in 42 major combat landings in the 26 months from June 1943 to the Japanese surrender in August 1945. As it was not until April 1945 that the 7th Division was earmarked for a specific amphibious operation in Borneo, the 2/12th and its sister battalions did not have the opportunity to be trained at JOOTS.

That training shortfall was mitigated through the establishment of specialist teams of amphibious staff officers which ensured formations and units received training in and assistance with the unique staff work required for amphibious operations. On 31 March 1944, Army formed the 20-strong 1st Australian Combined Operations Section, to be responsible “for training staffs of formations and supervising and coordinating the amphibious training of a corps”.24 The Section was soon attached to Headquarters Australian I Corps to supervise and coordinate amphibious training.25 In the second half of July 1944, the 2/12th’s Commanding Officer (CO) travelled to Cairns to undertake amphibious warfare training coordinated by the 1st Combined Operations Section.26

At the divisional level, the Military Landing Group (MLG) “was designed to supplement the normal staff of an infantry division when undergoing training and to provide trained personnel for specialised duties during an amphibious operation.”27 Commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (the Principal Military Landing Officer), the MLG could assign a Military Landing Officer (Major) to each brigade. Their task was to prepare “the documents necessary to ensure that ships were loaded in accordance with the operation plan.”28 On 7 November 1944 the 1st MLG was assigned to the 7th Division.29

The 2/12th Battalion’s amphibious training

It was not until October 1944 that the 2/12th Battalion’s amphibious warfare training increased. Together with the other 18th Brigade battalions (the 2/9th and 2/10th), the 2/12th sent officers to a “course of instruction for Embarkation Control Officers and Ship Adjutants.”30 Separately, the 2/12th’s CO presented a lecture and sand table demonstration on ‘Amphibious Landing’ to all 18th Brigade officers down to company level.31 Later that month, the Brigade’s battalion commanders together with either their adjutant or intelligence officer were attached to the 25th Brigade (also part of the 7th Division) for amphibious training at Trinity Beach, near Cairns.32 That training was conducted with assistance from US Navy and Army officers from the No.3 Amphibious Training Unit, as well as Army’s 1st Combined Operations Section.33

In November, the 1st MLG provided embarkation training to the 18th Brigade, culminating in Exercise Octopus at Trinity Beach.34 Companies watched a training film about amphibious operations, and then practiced loading mainly British-designed landing craft.35 Between 9 and 12 November, the 2/12th’s companies embarked on one Landing Ship Infantry (LSI) and several Land Craft Infantry (LCI), before commencing landing practice on 13 November. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers were assigned as Boat Team Leaders to liaise with the ship’s crew, and to coordinate landing craft embarkation and disembarkation.36 Exercise Octopus’ landing plan called for the 2/10th and the 2/12th Battalions to be the left and right assault battalions respectively, with the 2/9th following as the Brigade Reserve.37 Eight Landing Craft Assault (LCA) carried the 2/12th’s first wave of two companies ashore, with successive waves landing at ten-minute intervals.38 Exercise Octopus was followed by a divisional- level table-top amphibious operations exercise (Seagull) in March 1945.39

For the 2/12th, that training was exceptional. From November, the Battalion resumed its focus on basic combat skills, and did not undertake any further specialist amphibious training. The closest they came was in February and March 1945 when the unit practiced using folding assault boats for an assault river crossing, albeit that the drill was carried out on dry land.40

That experience contrasted with the Australian 9th Division’s preparation. As the first Australian Division to specialise in amphibious operations, the 9th put two of its brigades through amphibious landing training at Trinity Beach in June and July 1943.41 It then participated in the landings at Lae and Finschhafen in 1943, before being earmarked for three of the OBOE landings in Borneo in 1945 (Tarakan, Brunei Bay and Balikpapan).

In mid-April 1945, the OBOE operations were modified, and the 7th Division was substituted for the Balikpapan landing. The 2/12th did not resume specialist amphibious training until seven months after Exercise Octopus concluded, and such opportunities as were available were mostly ‘on-the- job’ training.

In late May the 2/12th soldiers embarked on USN Landing Ship Tank (LST), which differed from the British- and Australian-designed landing ships and craft used in Exercise Octopus:

The long voyages, mostly in crowded vessels, that preceded the assault somewhat reduced the fitness of the troops. The 18th Brigade, for example, was taken from Australia to Morotai in LSTs, a voyage of 19 days. The LSTs carried their normal complement of 500, which was too many for a voyage of a day or two, but far too many for a longish voyage. After less than a week ashore the troops embarked for Balikpapan and spent another five days on overcrowded and uncomfortable craft.42

Despite this discomfort, the long transit at least allowed the Australian infantry to acquaint themselves with these unfamiliar vessels. The landing craft they would use for the Balikpapan landing were also different from the LCA used on Exercise Octopus. For the Balikpapan landing, the 7th Division’s assault waves instead relied upon US Army Engineers’ Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT). Fifty-one LVT would support the 18th Brigade.43 Better known as Amtraks (short for Amphibious Tractor), the LVT offered protection, firepower and mobility that other landing craft could not. Unlike LCVP, the tracked LVT could move inland, and proved superior to wheeled vehicles at transporting ammunition, stores and wounded across beaches.44 Moreover, as the LVT moved inland, they left the beach clear for subsequent waves of landing craft. As this reduced beach congestion, it also reduced the interval before the next wave could be landed.

Arriving at Morotai on 8 June, the 7th Division’s battalions were introduced to the US Army Engineers’ LVT for “training in embarking, debarking and loading of stores.”45 On 21 and 22 June, the Australians embarked on their transports, and conducted boat drills on 23 June, followed by a Brigade- level landing rehearsal the following day.46 The 2/12th’s assault waves landed from their Amtraks, and the following landing waves in LCVPs closed to within one mile of the beach.47 On the 25th, the assault companies were again put ashore, this time accompanied by their battalion headquarters, but again the training stopped short of a full rehearsal.48

Balikpapan – ‘Outstanding Achievement’49

In contrast to Operation Drake, planning for the divisional-sized Operation OBOE II, was deliberate and well-supported. The 7th Division Commander, Major General Milford, commenced planning on 26 April, and by the end of May had concluded that his Division would conduct an assault landing at Klandasan – Balikpapan’s most heavily defended beach.50

Pre-Landing Support

That planning was informed by a substantial intelligence effort. Aerial photoreconnaissance provided 48,400 prints for planning and familiarisation down to the unit level.51 These included backlit stereoscopic slides, stereo pairs, three-dimensional vertical photos, and both low- and high-obliques.52 From these, scale models at 1:1250 and 1:5000, were constructed and proved “invaluable for briefing all troops.”53 Army had attached Air Liaison Officers (ALO) to supporting Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) headquarters since the beginning of the war for the purpose of coordinating imagery intelligence requirements. But, as will be discussed later, by the time of the OBOE landings, the ALO’s role had expanded beyond just intelligence collection management.

The 2/12th’s CO, his Intelligence Officer and a small staff commenced unit-level planning on 22 May: “a few oblique air photos were studied, making the formation of a rather vague plan possible.”54 After arriving at Morotai in mid-June, the rifle companies were briefed on their role using the “two models and selected vertical and oblique aerial photos … with a view to demonstration of the type of terrain, foreshore obstacles etc.”55 As late as 1 July, aerial photos were air-dropped to the invasion convoy at sea to ensure the landing force received the most up-to-date information available.56

Milford’s plan called for a two brigade-frontage, with a total of three battalions in the assault wave: From left to right these were the 18th Brigade’s 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions, and the 21st Brigade’s 2/27th Battalion. The 25th Brigade would remain afloat as the divisional reserve. Importantly, the 18th Brigade’s force laydown mirrored that used in Exercise Octopus eight months earlier.

Milford’s landing plan went against the USN’s advice and highlighted the different approach to command responsibilities between the Rear Admiral Noble as the (USN) commander afloat and Milford, as the army commander ashore. On 25 May, the leader of the USN planning team, “told Milford the more he looked at the divisional plan the less he liked it.”57 The choice of Klandasan beach exposed the fleet to the Japanese shore batteries, and necessitated “a ‘double dog-leg’ boat” in order to conform to the Balikpapan coastline’s ‘irregular bottom.’58 Although marked with buoys before F-Day (the designated landing day), the choice of this approach would complicate the landing.59 Rear Admiral Noble, echoed those concerns to both Milford and the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Morshead. “Morshead, however, ruled in Milford’s favour.”60

Planning hit a further snag when differences emerged between the MLG’s preparations, and USN practice:

The production of a landing diagram at an early stage in the planning in compliance with the US Navy’s request, was not in accordance with the sequence of planning on which brigade planning had been based; this, therefore produced unexpected problems for brigades.61

These problems too were eventually overcome, allowing the final divisional, brigade and battalion landing plans to be issued. In addition to a detailed listing of the load for each landing craft, a table summarised the overall distribution of troops, stores and equipment into individual landing craft, and a landing diagram outlined each wave’s composition and timing.62 The 2/12th Battalion’s two assault companies would go ashore in twelve LVT launched directly from the LST that carried them from Morotai.63

The assault wave would be followed three minutes later by a second wave of 15 LVT carrying support weapons, an anti-tank gun, mortars and reserve ammunition.64 USN LCVP would transfer the third wave (battalion headquarters and the remaining two rifle companies) from their transport ships to the beach.65 Subsequent waves of Landing Craft Medium (LCM) and Landing Craft Tank (LCT) carrying vehicles and heavy equipment, followed by LST and Landing Ship Medium (LSM), would unload directly onto the beach.

The complicated landing approach was just one of many challenges to be overcome. In addition to the support provided by the MLG and the Combined Operations Section, a range of engineer, artillery and other Army, RAN and RAAF units, specially established and trained for amphibious operations, supported the 7th Division with this complex and unfamiliar operation.

Beachhead management was the responsibility of the 2nd Beach Group, a specialist formation comprised of both RAN and Army units. First established in December 1943, a Beach Group was designed to “organise the landing of troops, vehicles and stores, and to establish dumps in support of a division-sized amphibious landing.”66

At first it was thought the beach would not be much of a problem and could be controlled by a small naval party. But experience soon showed that a bottle-neck on the beach, broached landing craft or bogged vehicles could prejudice the success of an entire assault. The Beach Groups, each consisting of about 2,000 men, were formed on an inter-Service basis and their area of responsibility included the whole beach, its approaches and the dump area just inland where stores unloaded from boats were stacked.67

The 2nd Beach Group included a Headquarters, an Engineer Field Company, a Pioneer Battalion, two signals sections, Ordnance, workshops, medical units, and two RAN Beach Commandos.68 The 117-strong Beach Commandos each comprised a small headquarters with two officers (the Principal Beach Master and Deputy Beach Master), three beach parties, and a boat repair and recovery section.69 Landing with the first and second waves, the Beach Commandos conducted a quick reconnaissance of the area as they guided subsequent assault waves into shore, and provided communications between the Army units and the naval landing force.

The Beach Commandos faced a difficult task coordinating the Balikpapan landing. “Owing to a signalman’s error the first [landing] wave … landed at 0855, five minutes early.”70 The 18th Brigade’s first wave “landed in a heap.”71 The 2/12th Battalion’s leading wave disembarked on the right half of ‘Able Red’ beach instead of ‘Able Yellow’ – almost one kilometre west of their intended target.72 The second wave now followed eight minutes behind rather than the planned three-minutes. “Great congestion resulted, stores were lost and difficulty experienced in moving LVTs off the beach to the [rendezvous] … succeeding waves quickly overran the beaches and the recovery of stores was difficult.”73 Despite those challenges, the Beach Commandos guided 9 485 personnel, 582 vehicles and 993 tons of stores ashore by the end of F-Day.74

The 7th Division’s after action report concluded that “the landing took place on a much smaller front than intended and, had the beach been strongly defended, this mistake might have proved costly.”75 The 2/27th Battalion was also landed on the wrong section, leading one platoon to mistakenly occupy a high point (dubbed “Ration”) inside the 2/12th’s area of responsibility.76 Although the 2/27th platoon moved when the mistake was realised, the 2/12th’s attack had slowed in the confusion. Nevertheless, by 1120hrs the 2/12th had:

…secured all objectives of phase 2 with the exception of north end of RATION. This feature was finally captured at 1204 hours.77

By 1945, Army’s doctrine called for daylight landings to overcome the difficulties of avoiding offshore hazards, identifying the landing beach and advancing into the jungle in darkness.78 Importantly, that change also allowed for closer air and naval gunfire support (NGS) than was possible with night landings.

OBOE II received an unprecedented level of both. Pre-H-Hour air strikes from 28 May to 30 June alone totalled 2130 sorties, and saw 2900 tons of high explosive, incendiary, phosphorus and napalm bombs, and a further 1000 gallons of liquid napalm dropped.79 By F+8, a further 392 sorties by land-based aircraft added 490 tons of bombs and 14 190 gallons of napalm.80 Medium bombers also laid smoke over the beaches to cover the daylight landing.81

To coordinate this support, the RAAF applied lessons learned from the May 1945 Tarakan landing (OBOE I), and deployed new, three-person Air Liaison Parties (ALP) to support each infantry battalion at Balikpapan: The 2/12th’s ALP landed with Battalion Headquarters in the third wave at H+8 minutes.82 Equipped with portable radios, the ALP were smaller and more agile than the larger twelve-strong Air Support Parties (ASP) used in that role at Tarakan.83 At Balikpapan, the ASP were attached to the Brigade Headquarters.

Divisional Headquarters was supported by an Air Support Section (one officer and 24 other ranks).84 They provided air-ground communications with Air Commodore Scherger’s Headquarters 1st Tactical Air Force, which was initially co-located with Headquarters 7th Division aboard the USN Attack Group Commander’s command ship USS Wasatch.85

Although Scherger came ashore with Milford on F-Day, the transition of control from the USN Controller Support Aircraft (Afloat) to the Controller Support Aircraft (Ashore) did not take effect until 3 July.86 This was because of “an unavoidable delay in unloading air force communications equipment” and because the USN aircraft carriers provided a more flexible response than Allied operating from land bases located nearly 600km away.87 Despite those measures, coordination was not perfect: On F-Day, “the navy planes were briefed, but disregarded their instructions and bombed into the 2/10th Battalion area,” killing three Australians and wounding fourteen others.88

In addition to these RAAF units ALO “specially trained as airborne observers flew in RAAF Liberators” over the landing area from F-Day.’89 They “reported activities of friendly and enemy ground forces, conducted ranging for NGS, and dropped messages,”90 as well reporting back to the headquarters’ ship the locations of marker panels used to pinpoint friendly troops ashore.91

Artillery units

NGS was similarly comprehensive. The “pre-landing bombardment and target preparation lasting 16 days, was the longest in this or probably any other modern war.”92 Between H-120 minutes and H-3 minutes, Allied light cruisers and destroyers fired 1320 6-inch and 4400 5-inch rounds, followed by specially modified LCI unleashing 4400 4.5-inch rockets in the seven-minute window from H-10 to H-3.93 Over the next six days, USN and RAN warships fired a further 11,158 rounds from 4.7-inch, 5-inch and 6-inch guns, and 114,000 rounds from 20mm and 40mm guns in support of the landing force.94

That support was coordinated and directed by a specialist Army artillery unit – the Australian Naval Bombardment Group (ANBG). The 1st ANBG had been created in January 1943, and by late-1944 comprised two bombardment troops, each capable of supporting a division, with five Shore Fire Control Parties (SFCP).95

As the 2/12th hit the beach, successive waves of landing craft delivered a steady accretion of firepower. The assault companies employed their LVTs’ .50- and .30-calibre machine guns until sufficient troops were landed to provide covering fire.96 The assault companies were also bolstered by flamethrower teams, while the second LVT wave (at H+3 minutes) brought additional firepower: Four 4.2-inch mortars provided support until the artillery’s 25-pounder field guns could be brought into action.97 A 6-pounder anti-tank gun was also available for use in a ‘sniping role’ against defensive positions.98 The first field troop was to be available by H+60 minutes, growing to a battery by H+90, two batteries by H+120 and an entire regiment by H+200.99 Over the next 22 days, the Australian artillery fired 61,501 rounds in support of the 7th Division.100

Armour

Three Matilda tanks were landed at H+13 minutes, followed by two flamethrower Matildas (“Frogs”) and a tank-dozer ten minutes later.101 An armoured reconnaissance party and an engineer detachment landed with the first wave to identify and clear a route forward for the tanks off the beach. That didn’t prevent the 2/12th’s supporting tanks from becoming bogged and therefore unavailable during the Battalion’s initial advance.102 Even after the tanks worked free from the mud, the infantry’s lack of familiarity with tank-infantry cooperation became apparent. ‘Frogs were used to good effect, [but the] lack of previous training with the co-operating infantry mitigated [sic] against their being used with maximum benefit.’103 The 7th Division Headquarters later concluded that:

…when tanks are to be employed with infantry, the tank units concerned should be allocated to the infantry formation at least one month prior to the action. Effective co-operation can be ensured only by personal contact and combined [arms] training.104

This was one of the most strident criticisms identified in the 7th Division’s After Action Report. Tellingly, there were no such criticisms of the Division’s preparation and training for amphibious operations.

Engineers

Engineer support was comprehensive, with tasks delineated and allocated to different specialist units. The 7th Division’s engineers had trained against “copies of Japanese underwater obstacles … erected on dry land and then off Trinity Beach.”105 But at Balikpapan, the USN took responsibility for the demolition of obstacles to the high water mark.106

Although Australian Landing Craft Companies were not employed at Balikpapan, specialist engineers were embarked aboard the RAN Landing Ships Infantry (LSI) that supported the 7th Division landing: HMA Ships Westralia, Manoora and Kanimbla. Each LSI had a permanently embarked ‘Docks Operating Personnel, Royal Australian Engineers’ unit, better known as an Army Landing Ship Detachment (LSD).107 A LSD comprised two officers and 65 other ranks, and was responsible for the embarkation, assault loading, and disembarkation of equipment, ammunition and stores and also for launching the ship’s landing craft.108 They also “maintained and repaired running gear, and they were trained as auxiliary ships’ gun crews, as fire and repair parties, and as stretcher bearers”109 Operation of the LSI’s landing craft remained a naval responsibility.110

Ashore, a total of nineteen specialist engineer and pioneer units supported the 7th Division’s nine infantry battalions. On the beach, four Royal Australian Engineer (RAE) Field Companies, two RAE Docks Operating and two Port Construction companies, as well as a Pioneer Battalion were tasked with developing the beach head, clearing beach exits for the assault waves’ advance, and establishing the base area. These units were additional to the 7th Division’s three RAE Field Companies, one Field Park Company and one Pioneer Battalion, which directly supported the infantry brigades.111 Their tasks included the clearance of mines, bombs, and obstacles – by the end of the operation the Australian engineers had defused 5000 mines, booby- traps and unexploded bombs, including daisy-chained 250kg aerial bombs employed by the Japanese as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).112

Finally, the USN 111th Naval Construction Battalion (the ‘Seabees’) was tasked with building a jetty capable of unloading up to four LST simultaneously, while four RAAF Airfield Construction Squadrons restored the two Japanese airfields to support Allied air operations. This lavish allocation of troops to tasks meant that the engineers were not divided between competing priorities.

By the end of the first day, the 7th Division had secured its first phase objectives, and command passed from Rear Admiral Noble to Milford’s headquarters ashore.113 Although the operations around Balikpapan continued until the 15 August Japanese surrender, the OBOE II landing had been successful. In his 25 July message to all ranks, Milford described it as an ‘outstanding achievement.’114 More than 60 years would pass before the Australian Army undertook its next operational amphibious landing – of similar strategic importance, but less tactically complex – when elements of the International Stabilisation Force secured East Timor’s Comorro airfield on 28 May 2006 as part of Operation Astute.115

Conclusion

There was an order of magnitude difference in both the complexity and scale of Operation Drake and OBOE II. The former was a hasty, unopposed battalion-sized amphibious landing at night, the latter a deliberate, daylight divisional amphibious assault against well-prepared defences. While the modern Army’s future amphibious operations are more likely to resemble Operation Drake’s scale and intensity than OBOE II’s, the approach to investing in the development of specialist supporting joint units remains relevant.

In the period between these two very different operations, Army had settled on US Joint amphibious doctrine in place of the British Combined Operations approach and had established specialist units to overcome the challenges posed by amphibious operations. Even with those advantages, 2/12th Battalion faced many challenges in preparing for the Balikpapan landing. Apart from Operation Drake, the 2/12th Battalion did not have experience with amphibious operations and was not earmarked for any specific landing until April 1945. Second, a combination of factors meant the Battalion received only limited training in amphibious operations. Aside from the table-top exercise Operation Seagull in March, and the late-June 1945 OBOE II rehearsal, the 2/12th only participated in only one amphibious exercise (Octopus), more than half a year earlier. A third challenge were the frictions resulting from differing US and Australian commanders’ sense of where the threshold for their respective planning responsibilities lay, as well as the last-minute changes to the landing plan to accommodate differences between the USN and Australian Army processes. Fourth, the 2/12th was landed at the wrong location and five minutes earlier than planned. Despite these challenges, once ashore the 2/12th and its sister battalions quickly re-orientated themselves and secured their assigned objectives more or less on schedule.

The availability of specialist supporting units helped overcome the infantry’s inexperience with amphibious operations. First was the attachment from November 1944 of the specialist MLG staff to both the Divisional and Brigade headquarters to provide specialist advice and training. Second was the allocation of a Beach Group, including the RAN Beach Commandos to manage the tricky sea-land threshold. Third was the assignment of sufficient specialist engineer assets to the range of tasks required: clearing the underwater obstacles, loading and operating assault craft, developing, clearing and maintaining the beachhead, supporting the advance inland, restoring and improving Balikpapan’s port facilities, and repairing and operating the airfields. Fourth was the allocation of specialist artillery and air liaison units to coordinate naval gunfire and air support. A further factor was the smooth transition of command and control from the naval amphibious commander to the Army landing force commander, and with it the progressive transition of control of air support. It was these investments that allowed the Australian Army to master amphibious operations by 1945, even when it did not have the opportunity to provide specialist amphibious training for infantry battalions.

Endnotes

  1. The Army had conducted a smaller landing operation one month earlier, when a company from the 2/10th Battalion landed on nearby Normanby Island to kill or capture survivors from the Japanese destroyer Yayoi that had been sunk nearby. But this was not an action conducted against an enemy land combat force. McCarthy, Dudley, 1959, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One, Army, Volume V, South-West Pacific – First Year, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p 346
  2. AWM52 Item No. 1/5/25/4 War Diary of the 11th Australian Division General Staff Branch – Milne Force, October – December 1942, Milne Force Operation Instruction, No 12, 20 Oct 1942
  3. Gill, Hermon, 1968, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 2, Navy, Volume II, Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p 182
  4. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/9 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, October – December 1942, Appendix C, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order No1, 21 Oct 42 and AWM54 963/22/2 [Transport - Sea (Allied) - Small Ship Coys and Small Ship Log Books:] AMF Formation of the Marine Section Milne Bay - Raising of Japanese barges and operations on Goodenough Island – 1944
  5. AWM52 Item No. 8/3/12/9, op cit, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order No1, 21 Oct 1942
  6. AWM52, Item No 8/3/12/9, 1942
  7. AWM52 Item No 1/5/25/4 War Diary of the 11th Australian Division General Staff Branch – Milne Force, October – December 1942, Milne Force Operation Order No 1, dated 20 Oct 1942
  8. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/9, op cit, Appendix C, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order No 1, 21 Oct 1942
  9. AWM52 Item No 1/5/25/4, op cit, Milne Force Operation Order No 1, dated 20 Oct 1942
  10. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/9, op cit, entry for 22 Oct, p 4
  11. McCarthy, D, op cit, p 347
  12. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/9, op cit, Appendix G ‘Report on Operations at Goodenough Island, 22-25 Oct 1942’, p 24
  13. AWM52 Item No 1/5/25/4, op cit, Milne Force Operation Order No 1 dated 20 Oct 1942
  14. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/9, op cit, entry for 25 October, p 7, and Appendix G “’Report on Operations at Goodenough Island, 22-25 Oct 1942’, p 24
  15. McCarthy, D, op cit, p 346
  16. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/10 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, January – July 1943, Entry for 8 Mar 1943, Folio 25
  17. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/10 op cit, Remarks for 31 May 1943, Folio 28
  18. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/10, Folio 63.
  19. Graeme-Evans, AL, Of Storms and Rainbows: The Story of the Men of the 2/12th Battalion , Volume 2, 12th Battalion Association, Hobart, 1991, p 188
  20. McNicoll, R, The Royal Australian Engineers, Volume III, 1919-1945 Teeth & Tail, Corps Committee of the Royal Australian Engineers, Canberra, 1982, p 307
  21. Dean, PJ, 2012, ‘Amphibious Warfare: Lessons from the Past for the ADF’s Future’ in Security Challenges, Vol 8, No 1, Autumn, pp 57-76, at pp 68-69. ‘US Navy Fleet Training Publication served as the guide.’ Barbey, Daniel E, 1968, MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations 1943-1945, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, p 37
  22. Australian Military Forces, 1946, Command and Staff Training: Amphibious Warfare Precis 1 – General, Army Headquarters Cartographic Company, May, pp 4-5
  23. Dean, op. cit, p 65
  24. AWM52 1/11/2/1 War Diary of the 1st Australian Combined Operations Section, May – June 1944, entry for 1 May 1944
  25. Australian Military Forces, 1946, Command and Staff Training: Amphibious Warfare Precis 2 – Army Aspect, Army Headquarters Cartographic Company, May, p 7
  26. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/17 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, May – August 1944, entries for 16 Jul and 1 Aug 1944
  27. Australian Military Forces, Command and Staff Training: Amphibious Warfare Precis 2 – Army Aspect, op cit, p 7
  28. Australian Military Forces, p 7
  29. AWM52 1/11/5/2 War Diary of the 1st Military Landing Group, September 1944 – September 1945, entries for 7 Nov 1944
  30. AWM52 Item No 8/2/18/57, War Diary of the 18th Infantry Brigade, October 1944, entry for 19 Oct 1944
  31. AWM52 Item No 8/2/18/57, entry for 15 Oct 1944
  32. AWM52 Item No 8/2/18/57, Appendix J (Folio 65), 18th Australian Infantry Brigade Amphibious Training Instruction No 1, dated 23 October 1944, and Appendix F (Folio 52), Movement of 18 Australian Infantry Brigade Group Training Cadres to Trinity Beach
  33. AWM52 Item No 8/2/18/57, Folio 58
  34. AWM52 1/11/5/2, op cit, entries for 9-13 Nov 1944
  35. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/19 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, November 1944, entries for 7-8 Nov 1944
  36. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/19, Appendix 9, Duties of Boat Team Leader
  37. AWM52 Item No 8/2/18/57, op cit, Appendix L, Exercise Octopus, dated 30 Oct 1944
  38. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/19 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, November 1944, 2/12th Australian Infantry Battalion Operation order No 1 dated 8 November 1944, p. II, and Wave Diagram, Folio 40
  39. AWM52 1/5/14/64 War Diary of the 7th Australian Division General Staff Branch, March 1945, Part 1, passim
  40. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/22 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, February – March 1945, Appendices 9, 20, Folios 46, 47, 91
  41. Dexter, David, 1961, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One, Army, Volume VI, The New Guinea Offensives, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p 266
  42. Long, G, 1963, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One, Army, Volume VII, The Final Campaigns, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p 510
  43. Long, 1963, p 513
  44. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84 War Diary of the 7th Australian Division General Staff Branch, September 1945, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 Sep 1945, p 31
  45. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’
  46. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/24 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, June 1945, Entries for 21-23 June 1945, and Morison, Samuel E, 1959, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XIII, The Liberation of the Philippines, Oxford University Press, London, p 273
  47. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/24, op cit, entry for 24 Jun 1942
  48. For example, the battalions did not practice calling in naval gunfire support. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 op cit, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’ and AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/24 op cit, entry for 25 Jun 1942
  49. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/75 War Diary of the 7th Australian Division General Staff Branch, June - July 1945, Part 1, Message to All Ranks, Folio 97
  50. Long, G op. cit, pp 504-505
  51. Baker, N, More Than Little Heroes: Australian Army Air Liaison Officers in the Second World War, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p 140
  52. AWM52 Item No. 8/3/12/25, op. cit., Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’
  53. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25
  54. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25
  55. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25
  56. Waters, Gary, 1995, OBOE: Air Operations Over Borneo 1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, p 137
  57. Long, op cit, p 506
  58. Morison, op cit, p 273
  59. Morison, op cit p 273
  60. Long, op cit, p 506
  61. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operations, OBOE Two, p 27
  62. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation order ‘OBOE Two’, Appendices C, D, E and F
  63. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’
  64. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’ and 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order ‘OBOE Two’, Appendix C
  65. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’ and 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order ‘OBOE Two’, Appendix C
  66. James, K, ‘Those Army-Navy Freaks’ in Wartime, Issue No 51, Australian Arm Memorial, Canberra, 2010, pp 32-36, at p 33
  67. Swan, W N, Spearheads of Invasion, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1953, p. 23.
  68. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 September 1945, Appendix C, Order of Battle, p 6
  69. James, K, 2010, ‘Those Army-Navy Freaks’ in Wartime, Issue No 51, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2010, pp 32-36, at p 33
  70. Morison, Samuel E, 1959, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XIII, The Liberation of the Philippines, Oxford University Press, London, pp 273-274
  71. According to the commander of the supporting 2/4th Field Company. McNicoll, op cit, p 275
  72. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 September 1945, Appendix I, 18th Brigade Operations From 1 July to 14 August 1945, p 1
  73. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’
  74. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 September 1945, Appendix P, Unloading Details
  75. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/75, op cit, entry for 1 Jul 1945
  76. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’
  77. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/75, op cit, entry for 1 Jul 1945
  78. Australian Military Forces, 1946, Command and Staff Training: Amphibious Warfare Precis 1 – General, Army Headquarters Cartographic Company, May, p 9
  79. AWM52 Item No 1/5/25/4 War Diary of the 11th Australian Division General Staff Branch – Milne Force, October – December 1942, 7 Aust Div Weekly Intelligence Review No.1, Part One, Summary of Operations
  80. AWM52 Item No 1/5/25/4 War Diary of the 11th Australian Division General Staff Branch – Milne Force, October – December 1942, 7 Aust Div Weekly Intelligence Review No 1, Part One, Summary of Operations
  81. Waters, G, 1995, OBOE: Air Operations Over Borneo 1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, p 130
  82. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/19 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, November 1944, 2/12th Aust Infantry Battalion Operation order No 1 dated 8 November 1944, p. II, and Wave Diagram, Folio 48
  83. Waters, op cit, pp 47, 94
  84. Waters, op cit, p 39
  85. Morison, Samuel E, 1959, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XIII, The Liberation of the Philippines, Oxford University Press, London, p 268
  86. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operations, OBOE Two, p 22
  87. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, pp 22, 24
  88. Odgers, GJ, 1968, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 3, Air, Volume II, Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p 485 and AWM52 Item No 8/3/10/41 War Diary of the 2/10th Battalion, June – July 1945, entry for 1 July 1945, 1655hrs. The attack went ahead ‘despite protests’ from Air Vice-Marshal Bostock. Waters, Gary, 1995, OBOE: Air Operations Over Borneo 1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, p 132
  89. Waters, Gary, OBOE: Air Operations Over Borneo 1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1995, p 141
  90. Waters, Gary, OBOE: Air Operations Over Borneo 1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1995, p 141
  91. Baker, N, 1994, More Than Little Heroes: Australian Army Air Liaison Officers in the Second World War, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, p 142
  92. Morison, Samuel E, 1959, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XIII, The Liberation of the Philippines, Oxford University Press, London, p 267
  93. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order ‘OBOE Two’
  94. Hermon, G, 1968, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 2, Navy, Volume II, Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p 648
  95. Horner, D, 1995, The Gunners: A History of Australian Artillery, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p 363, 411. No 6 SFCP (A Troop 1st ANBG) landed with the 2/12th Battalion Headquarters
  96. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’ and 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order ‘OBOE Two’, p 5
  97. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25 War Diary of the 2/12th Battalion, July 1945, Operational Report ‘OBOE Two’ and 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order ‘OBOE Two’, p 12, and AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 Sep 1945, p 34
  98. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 Sep1945, p 34 and AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25, op cit, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order ‘OBOE Two’, p 9 and Appendix C
  99. AWM52 Item 8/3/12/25, p 9
  100. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operations, OBOE Two, p 22
  101. AWM52 Item No 8/3/12/25, op cit, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn Operation Order ‘OBOE Two’, Appendix C
  102. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 Sep 1945, Appendix I, 18th Brigade Operations From 1 July to 14 August 1945, p 2
  103. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 September 1945, p. 33
  104. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 September 1945, p. 34
  105. McNicoll, op. cit., p 272
  106. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operations, OBOE Two, pp 10, 23
  107. Swan, WN, 1953, Spearheads of Invasion, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p 9. These were the forerunners of the more recent Ship’s Army Detachment
  108. ‘Landing Ships: Work of Specialists’ in the West Australian newspaper, 1 Nov 1944 edition, at accessed on 24 Oct 2015
  109. McNicoll, op cit, p 315
  110. Swan, op cit, p 12
  111. Long, op cit, Appendix 6
  112. Also AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, op cit, Report on Operation OBOE Two, dated 28 Sep 1945, Appendix E, 7th Division Operation Order, p 23
  113. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/84, Appendix E, 7th Division Operation Order, p 8
  114. AWM52 Item No 1/5/14/75, op cit, Message to All Ranks, Folio 97
  115. Australian Defence Force, Operations Series, Operations Series, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.2: Amphibious Operations, Australian Defence Force, Canberra, (2nd Edn) 2009, p 5-21

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