The Use of Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadrons within Combat Brigades

Abstract

This article examines the role and use of one of the largest and most flexible sub-units in a combat brigade, the armoured personnel carrier (APC) squadron. It contends that, without a better understanding of all aspects of the combat brigade across the land force, the Army may not utilise its combat assets to best effect. Based on the author’s personal experience, the article explains the best use of an APC squadron and contrasts the armoured mobility of the APC with the protected lift provided by the Bushmaster vehicle. It also provides recommendations for future battlegroup and brigade commanders on how to utilise the APC capability for optimal effect.

Introduction

This article is designed to convey my observations on and recommendations for the use of an armoured personnel carrier (APC) squadron within the Australian Army’s modern manoeuvre brigade. The target audience includes current and future battlegroup and brigade commanders, and staff officers and planners across the Army. I write from the perspective of the APC squadron commander during both the 2013 Armoured Cavalry Regiment (ACR) trial with the 3rd Brigade and within the 1st Brigade in 2014. A combat brigade under the Plan Beersheba construct provides a brigade commander with the ability to task-organise his forces in different ways depending on the mission and the brigade’s employment within the spectrum of conflict. The employment of the combat brigade’s APC squadron ought to be well considered as it is a sub-unit with the capacity and flexibility to be used in many different ways and for a range of different functions.

This article is designed to stimulate thought and debate among professional military thinkers on how to best utilise APC squadrons within the Plan Beersheba construct. The key themes include the blurring of the lines between APCs (a tracked armoured fighting vehicle) and Bushmasters (a wheeled transport vehicle) over the past decade, the differences between mechanised and mounted infantry in a brigade, the grouping and regrouping considerations for a brigade headquarters, and a discussion of the two roles of the APC as armoured mobility or cavalry. The article concludes with a number of recommendations for the use of an APC squadron within the combat brigades of the future.

Definitions of armoured mobility (APCs) and protected lift (Bushmasters)

Before discussing how best to use APC squadrons within combat brigades, I will start by defining what armoured mobility and protected lift assets are and what they do. Armoured mobility refers to the transportation of forces in and the movement of armoured fighting vehicles close to enemy locations. Armoured mobility units provide a high degree of protection from both ballistic and concussive blast trauma, as well as improved protection for the infantry carried inside the vehicle. The Australian Army currently uses an APC — the M113AS4 — in the armoured mobility role. In the future, the Land 400 project may deliver an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) variant which may provide better protection and firepower to the Australian Army.¹ Protected lift units (protected mobility vehicles such as the Bushmaster) transport forces around an area of operations. They provide some degree of protection, particularly against concussive trauma, but are not designed to be employed in a fight against a defended enemy.²

The Army’s blurring of the lines (APC versus Bushmaster)

APC squadrons existed within the Australian Army from the 1960s until 2006 and their use is not a new concept. However, in recent times, and particularly following the arrival of the Bushmaster, the role of an APC unit has been confused with that of a transport unit. Under the 1970s Armoured Corps regiment model, APCs were found in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Cavalry Regiments and, until 2006, they were also located in B Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment (B Sqn, 3/4 Cav). Since 2006, B Sqn, 3/4 Cav, an Armoured Corps unit, has operated with the Bushmaster primarily in its protected lift role, causing confusion over the role of the Armoured Corps and the use of the Bushmaster. Bushmasters were only ever designed to enhance the protection of infantry while moving as far as an assembly area. While the Bushmaster’s ability to save lives was proven in Iraq and Afghanistan, its use prompted a generation of commanders and soldiers to believe that every vehicle can be employed in the same manner — as a transport vehicle.

The use of the Bushmaster on operations marked the initial blurring of lines between transport and armoured mobility. To further confuse the issue, between 2006 and 2013, only the 1st Brigade was equipped with the M113AS4, which meant that the bulk of the Army was not exposed to armoured mobility and generally had more experience in protected lift. As a result, the majority of the Army saw a transport asset, the Bushmaster, as the means to close with an enemy. The M113AS4 was a little-known capability outside the 1st Brigade but was largely assumed to be a Bushmaster with tracks. The Army now risks misusing or underutilising the APC squadrons that are currently equipped with the M113AS4.³ The use of the Bushmaster within B Sqn, 3/4 Cav and its employment as the primary troop-carrying vehicle on recent operational deployments, coupled with the recent reintroduction of the M113AS4 to the Armoured Corps, have created the impression that APCs are simply a ‘lift’ asset. Unsurprisingly, this has caused confusion on the use of APC squadrons at the tactical level.

The two roles of APC units — armoured mobility and cavalry

APC units have two roles — armoured mobility and cavalry — and they can be used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance or manoeuvre. Thus far I have discussed the APC strictly in terms of its armoured mobility role — the role that I expect APC squadrons are most likely to fill in an infantry-heavy combat brigade. The armoured mobility role is the most common and the most easily identifiable within the Australian Army so I will discuss this first. The lesser known and possibly more controversial use of APCs in a cavalry role will be the subject of a later section.

Armoured mobility role

APC units, regardless of vehicle type, have historically had the capacity to carry and fight with dismounted troops. The APC squadrons of the armoured cavalry regiments are optimised and fitted to fight with the fighting elements of an infantry battalion including the heavy weapons platoon or the mortar platoon, plus some engineers and artillery observers. Under Plan Beersheba, with the adoption of one APC squadron per combat brigade, a squadron can provide armoured mobility to around a battalion’s worth of infantry, three artillery observers and two combat engineer troops. The squadron can be task-organised in whatever configuration of combat teams and battlegroups the brigade commander and battlegroup commanders see fit. In the armoured mobility role, the APCs provide an infantry commander the ability to manoeuvre his force mounted within the APCs, to utilise the APCs as a separate combat arm physically separate from his dismounted infantry,⁴ or even in a combat service support (CSS) role.⁵ In terms of supporting indirect fires, the APC squadron has the capacity to provide armoured mobility to one mortar platoon and enables artillery observers to move around the battlefield with the protection of armour. The mortars can fire from within the M113AS4, allowing a battlegroup commander to deploy his mortars quickly and with protection. The use of APCs at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict is optimised when they are task-organised with infantry, tanks, artillery observers and engineers. In essence, when employed in a combat role, APCs support the movement of troops in order to apply firepower and effects to gain positional advantage.

Cavalry role

APC units are sensors and a potential source of information like every other person or unit on the battlefield and they can be employed as cavalry.⁶ The individual vehicle craft used in manoeuvring armoured fighting vehicles is common to all vehicles in all roles, and is typical of the drills common to all armoured crews as specified in LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-1 - Mounted Minor Tactics. It is not a dark art to manoeuvre different types of armoured vehicles. The performance of cavalry soldiers in the reconnaissance role is enhanced by such skills as the use of ground to remain undetected and stealth in approaching an enemy location. The officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers who are members of APC squadrons are highly capable cavalry soldiers trained in mounted reconnaissance. They will have served in an Australian light armoured vehicle (ASLAV) squadron or will have been exposed to mounted reconnaissance through training at the School of Armour.

While the crews of an APC squadron are proficient in the cavalry role, the M113AS4 has its limitations and is not as capable as the ASLAV or many other purpose-designed reconnaissance armoured vehicles. The sighting systems are not thermal-capable and cannot extend vision as far as those of other reconnaissance armoured vehicles. In addition, the two-man crew limits the amount of time an APC section can remain in an observation post. The APC’s armament is not designed to defeat other armoured vehicles and thus M113 units are more likely to withdraw if detection by the enemy is possible. Despite this, a combat brigade has little depth in its armoured vehicle reconnaissance and APC organisations can supplement the ASLAV squadron, can be attached as the battlegroup reconnaissance asset for an ACR-based battlegroup, or act as an independent reconnaissance organisation in less risky areas of the battlefield. An APC cavalry organisation would be particularly potent in the reconnaissance role if grouped with dismounted reconnaissance soldiers, reconnaissance equipment such as thermal sights and laser range finders, and other assets such as electronic warfare, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles or helicopters. Indeed, when this concept was adopted during the 3rd Brigade’s Combined Arms Training Activity in 2014 when B Sqn, 3/4 Cav was employed in a cavalry role, the APCs were grouped with some of the dismounted reconnaissance soldiers from the brigade and performed well in support of the brigade plan. While the M113AS4 has its limitations in the cavalry role, the Land 400 project will deliver a new vehicle that may be more capable in both the cavalry and armoured mobility roles. This is the subject of a later section.

An APC squadron is an inherently flexible unit crewed by officers, NCOs and soldiers trained to operate in both the combat and reconnaissance aspects of mounted manoeuvre. They can be employed to provide mobility for infantry and used as a cavalry organisation, particularly if they are task-organised with other reconnaissance elements.

APC squadron headquarters

The APC squadron headquarters is an inherently flexible command and control node that can add significant value to the brigade or battlegroup plan in either the armoured mobility or cavalry role. The headquarters is M113-based, has VHF communications, and is commanded by a combat corps (Armoured Corps) major. In the armoured mobility role, the headquarters can provide mobility to an infantry battlegroup commander, allowing him to traverse the same ground as his vehicle-mounted infantry and tanks while also commanding the battle. The APC squadron commander can assist in controlling the mounted manoeuvre on behalf of the battlegroup commander, adhering to his plan. The squadron commander can also command the APC squadron in its cavalry role (with its significant amount of armoured fighting vehicles) as described earlier. If the brigade plan requires a high degree of flexibility and good communications, the headquarters is ideally placed to command and control a mounted combat team including tanks, APCs, infantry, artillery observers and engineers. During Exercise Hamel in 2013, the APC squadron’s headquarters commanded a combat team in a battlegroup and, later, the 3rd Brigade’s reserve combat team. The APC squadron headquarters is a flexible command and control node that can operate in the armoured mobility, cavalry or combat team role.

Issues and recommended solutions

The different types of fighting units within a combat brigade have increased the burden on the brigade headquarters in terms of training, detailed tactical planning and logistical support. The common brigade structures that will result from Plan Beersheba will have a positive effect across the Army, but will increase the pressure on brigade commanders and unit commanders to ensure that combined arms training achieves the appropriate standard and complexity. This section discusses my observations and recommended solutions to issues that are inherent within a combat brigade and related to the use of APCs.

Combined arms training

There is a stark difference between the level of combined arms training provided to infantry and armour when the infantry are mechanised rather than mounted. The mechanised infantry of the past — infantry soldiers who used vehicles that were integral to their unit — were very powerful, particularly when grouped with tanks. In the current structure, mounted infantry — infantry carried in armoured vehicles from another unit (in this case the APC squadron) — are potentially just as potent as long as they are grouped with tanks, are familiar with the doctrine and are well practised in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of mounted units. Combined arms teams that include APCs, tanks and infantry require time and practice to ensure that they can fight to and through an objective and, for a number of reasons, there is a risk that this will be done poorly. The first reason, as described earlier, is that the roles of APCs and Bushmasters are currently confused and APCs are regarded by some as transport assets. Bushmasters and utility helicopters are a means of movement only, while the APC squadron’s mobility allows Australian commanders to fight in a different way. Second, standard infantry battalions will be pulled in an ever-increasing number of directions demanding a growing number of different skill sets, including those required for the infantry’s dismounted, airmobile and mounted roles.⁷ A high level of skill in combined arms manoeuvre will only be achieved if all infantry and armoured commanders within a brigade invest time and effort into learning how to use combined arms theory with the Army’s new order of battle. If unit commanders do not voluntarily conduct combined arms training in the barracks and in the field, the brigade’s headquarters may need to ensure that this occurs. Planning and direction from key staff in the brigade headquarters may need to be more tailored towards combined arms training to prevent the different armoured cavalry regiments and infantry battalions from becoming too dissimilar to achieve the intent of Plan Beersheba, to be flexible and reasonably similar in utility.

Command versus control

The most common point of friction in infantry-APC cooperation is the issue of who is in control of the battle and when. While MLW 2-1-3 – APC Regiment,⁸ the most recent document to enshrine APC doctrine, is 30 years old, much of it remains relevant. For example, I would recommend that infantry commanders remain in command of the APC unit attached to them to maintain unity of command at all levels. However, it is prudent for the infantry commander to delegate control of the mounted fight to the senior mounted commander (tank or APC). An element of trust between commanders is essential and is linked to my previous point on the need for regular training. The future ACR doctrine, the draft LWP (CA) MTD CBT 3-3-7 – Armoured Cavalry Regiment,⁹ will be valuable reading for any staff officer or commander within a combat brigade.

Grouping and regrouping of APCs

If a brigade is to field the majority of its units simultaneously, brigade headquarters faces an increased burden in planning the detailed regrouping within a combat brigade for both tactical and logistical reasons. Tactically, the Brigade Major and his operations staff will plan two down and task one down; however, in a combat brigade that contains an APC squadron, a brigade headquarters must plan three down. This is because an APC troop is designed to fight alongside an infantry company, and an APC troop is three levels of command down from a brigade headquarters.¹⁰ The Brigade Major must be aware of the location of each APC troop so that he can plan the groupings of infantry companies with APC troops. This ability to plan down three levels is particularly important in a combat brigade given the paucity of mobility assets integral to the brigade, and because of the military axiom that there must be three of an asset in barracks to have two of them in the field (given medical issues, leave, courses, vehicle serviceability, etc). There may not be sufficient APCs, Bushmasters and helicopters to manoeuvre all the infantry, particularly as the mobility capacity of the brigade is dependent on the manning and serviceability of vehicles. There may be a need to provide armoured mobility to dismounted troops in sequence as opposed to simultaneously as is optimal. The Brigade Major will thus have a more difficult job managing regrouping than in the past.

Along the same lines, the brigade’s S4 (the key logistics planner) must be aware of the tactical plan so he can appreciate how thinly the logistics assets of the ACR and the CSSB are stretched when regrouping occurs. The logistics assets of the ACR will be task-organised to support the armoured assets of the brigade by the Commanding Officer of the ACR, but the brigade S4 must be aware of the brigade plan so as to enable the manoeuvre plan. The brigade S4 staff, much like the Brigade Major’s operations staff, will have a more difficult time managing the logistical support to the brigade if regrouping is to occur frequently. I recommend that, when regrouping between units in the future, the brigade headquarters issues a detailed ‘regrouping order’ much like the one that appears in the current multi- role combat brigade SOPs.¹¹ The direction to regroup is completed primarily at brigade headquarters level and a regrouping SOP inclusive of location, unit, radio frequency, timings, command status and likely mission is essential. Without such an SOP, a significant amount of friction will be induced and the risk of fratricide will increase. ‘Rapid regrouping’ — regrouping in the middle of a mission — was attempted on several occasions during the ACR trial of 2013 within the 3rd Brigade. Given the communications suite, speed and mobility of the M113AS4 and the ability of Armoured Corps crewmen to conduct regular rendezvous procedure, APC units can be regrouped relatively quickly as long as the requisite planning is completed at brigade level. When a combat brigade is manoeuvring two or even three of its battlegroups simultaneously, the ability to group and regroup assets across the brigade will be an important skill for brigade staff.

Brigade-wide exposure to APCs — cavalry and armoured mobility roles

While Plan Beersheba is still being implemented, the temptation to use APCs exclusively in the armoured mobility role threatens to become a potential weakness in a brigade’s reconnaissance plan. While war planners would need to consider the use of unmodified M113AS4s in a highly contested battlefield in the future, there have been operational examples in the past 15 years in which Armoured Corps and infantry soldiers have used the M113 in both the armoured mobility and cavalry roles. In the coming decades, the M113AS4 fleet is likely to be replaced by the IFV variant of the Land 400 project. The principle that the organisations that currently use APCs have an armoured mobility role and a separate cavalry role will remain the same when the Land 400 vehicles enter service. Therefore, the more exposure that all elements of the combat brigades have to the APCs in their armoured mobility and cavalry roles, the easier the transition to Land 400 in the future.

The use of the APC squadron in either the armoured mobility or the cavalry role needs to remain a consideration for brigade and battlegroup commanders in the future, particularly with the relative reduction in mounted reconnaissance assets within the Army.

Conclusion

APC squadrons are not new to the Australian Army, but their employment within a combat brigade will be new to many. When correctly grouped, trained and commanded, the combination of APCs, tanks, infantry, engineers and artillery observers amplifies the combat effectiveness of the combined arms team. This article has argued that the level of mounted combat skills previously attained by the mechanised infantry of old will be difficult to achieve unless there is sufficient drive from commanders to conduct combined arms training in barracks, in simulation and in the field. Pockets of enthusiasm within infantry battalions and armoured cavalry regiments will not be enough. APC units have an armoured mobility role (picking up and fighting with infantry close to an objective, not to be confused with taking infantry to the assembly area like a Bushmaster) and a cavalry or reconnaissance role. For some this will be a simple and logical argument, while for others it will be anathema and something to be avoided.

That everyone on the battlefield is a sensor is not a contested argument, so the use of M113AS4s to supplement a reconnaissance plan should not be discounted, particularly if they are grouped with dismounted reconnaissance soldiers, electronic warfare assets or helicopters. That said, the M113AS4 does have its limitations. It was never designed to fight against another armoured vehicle and has relatively light armour and armament which makes it vulnerable to enemy attack. It was designed to suppress enemy infantry in a combined arms team containing tanks and dismounted infantry as a minimum. In the armoured mobility role, the M113AS4 is less vulnerable when coupled with tanks and infantry. In the cavalry role, the M113AS4 is better protected when sited in concealed locations, something that Armoured Corps officers and NCOs are trained to do.

Despite their limitations, APCs such as the M113AS4 can add value in both the armoured mobility and cavalry roles. The few occasions in the past when Australian soldiers have walked into battle provide sufficient evidence that armoured mobility will remain part of modern warfare in western armies. Within Australia’s primary operating environment, there is every chance that the Army will be required to conduct combat operations in areas that are not permissible to wheeled vehicles such as Bushmasters, G-wagons or Unimogs. In East Timor, for example, M113AS1s were used in both the armoured mobility and cavalry roles. I would urge unit and brigade commanders to practise warfighting skills with the APC squadron of the brigade as the Bushmaster element held within the CSSBs will not always be the most appropriate vehicle on future battlefields. The M113AS4 represents an interim measure until the implementation of Land 400, which will introduce an armoured mobility variant designed to allow the Army’s two combat corps, the infantry and armoured corps, to work together to approach and fight through an objective.

Endnotes

1    LCVS Project Team, Program LAND 400 – Land Combat Vehicle System draft preliminary operational concept document, July 2014 at: http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/ Preliminary_Operational_Concept_Document-9-5887.pdf
2    A PMV is any vehicle which has protective characteristics to enhance its survivability but is not designed to deliberately engage in combat within the direct fire zone. These vehicles tend to prioritise protection over firepower and tactical mobility, but may have greater operational mobility as a result.
An APC is an armoured fighting vehicle generally equipping armoured personnel carrier units or motorised infantry. An APC provides transport for its occupants to a secure area to dismount and then commence their assault on foot. Depending on its degree of protection, mobility and firepower, the APC may provide direct fire support and/or accompany the troops in the assault. APCs generally lack the protection of heavier protected IFV.
An IFV is an armoured fighting vehicle generally equipping mechanised and/or armoured infantry. These vehicles are specifically designed to fight with armoured units by transporting infantry into the assault at speed, under the protection of armour and suppressing fire. The infantry may remain mounted or dismount to assault with armoured vehicles and provide intimate protection.
3    D Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment is the 1st Brigade’s APC squadron and is based at RAAF Edinburgh, Adelaide. B Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment, is receiving its M113AS4s in 2014–2015 and will become the 3rd Brigade’s APC squadron. It will be renamed ‘B Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment’ when the 2nd Cavalry Regiment formally comes under command of the 3rd Brigade in 2015. The name of the APC squadron that will reside within the 7th Brigade was yet to be confirmed at the time of writing.
4    APCs can be used in any phase of war within the Manoeuvre BOS. For example, in offensive operations the APCs can be used in an attack by fire against a dismounted enemy, a support by fire against an entrenched enemy or in an urban zone, or as cut-off in support of an infantry assault. In defensive operations, APCs can support a counter-attack, a deception plan or provide intimate support to defend a battle position. These examples are not exhaustive.
5    For example, an APC section / troop can hold extra ammunition, food and water within the vehicle to resupply dismounted infantry in the reorganisation phase of an attack, or can assist in casualty evacuation in the event the ambulance capacity is overwhelmed in a mass casualty scenario.
6    The role of cavalry as defined in LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-6 – Cavalry Regiment is to ‘locate, dislocate and disrupt the enemy through the conduct of offensive, defensive, reconnaissance and security activities both mounted and dismounted.’ See p. 1-4.
7    Plan Beersheba concept of employment, Version 1.1 dated 19 May 14, p. 23.
8    MLW 2-1-3 APC Regiment, p. 9-9.
9    LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-7 – Armoured Cavalry Regiment (draft).
10    Brigade (brigade commander), unit (ACR commander), sub-unit (APC squadron commander) and sub sub-unit (APC troop leader).
11    Multi-role combat brigade SOPs, Annex B to SOP 3.7 – Regrouping Order, p. 304 (B-1).